Edson: Conversion plans essential before war comes to end
By Peter Edson
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Millett: Deflating husband’s ego in public seems bit unfair
Wife who seems to enjoy making smart remarks isn’t as clever as she thinks it is
By Ruth Millett
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Poll: Majority want no compromise with Germany
Terms are ‘unconditional surrender for Hitler or his generals
By George Gallup, Director, American Institute of Public Opinion
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Yanks know what they like; their favorite is Jane Russell
She stirs controversy and imaginations as queen of pinups
By Marguerite Young
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Roving Reporter
By Ernie Pyle
Somewhere in Sicily, Italy – (by wireless)
One of the outfits with which I lived for a while on the Sicilian front was the 120th Engineers Battalion, attached to the 45th Division.
The bulk of the 120th hail from my adopted state of New Mexico. They are part of the old New Mexico outfit, most of which was lost on Bataan. It was good to get back to these slow-talking, wise and easy people of the desert, and good to speak of places like Las Cruces, Socorro, and Santa Rosa. It was good to find somebody who lives within sight of my own picket fence on the mesa.
The 120th is made up of Spanish-Americans, Indians, straight New Mexicans, and a smattering of men from the East. It is commanded by Lt. Col. Lewis Frantz, who was superintendent of the Las Vegas (New Mexico) Light & Power Company before entering service.
Col. Frantz has now been in the Army for three years and has not been home during all that time. The 45th Division spent nearly two and a half years in training, and everybody almost went nuts thinking they’d never get overseas.
The strangest case of self-consciousness along that line that I’ve run onto is Capt. Waldo Lowe of Las Cruces. He had a chance to go home on furlough last Christmas, but didn’t because he was ashamed to be seen at home after spending two years in the Army and still not getting out of the United States.
And now he can’t go home
Now that he has leaped the overseas hurdle and feels qualified to go home, he can’t get there, of course. The executive officer of the unit is Maj. Jerry Hines, athletic director of the New Mexico Aggies for many years. Maj. Hines is expecting a football player in his family about mid-September. He says he hopes to get home in time to see him graduated from college.
Two of my Albuquerque home-towners are Capt. James Bezemek, 2003 N 4th St., whose father is county treasurer there, and Capt. Richard Strong, 113 Harvard St.
Capt. Strong was company commander when I saw him, but has since been promoted to the battalion staff. He and his two sergeants had one of the narrowest escapes in the battalion when their jeep (which they’d abandoned for a magnificent ditch about two seconds before) got a direct hit from an “88” and blew all to pieces. The sergeants were Martin Quintana, who used to be a machinist for the Santa Fe at Albuquerque, and John W. Trujillo, of Socorro.
A similar narrow escape happened to Capt. Ben Billups, of Alamogordo, New Mexico, a few days later when his brand-new amphibious jeep which he’d had just one day was hit and burned up. I would have been with him if I hadn’t got sick and gone to the hospital that morning. It’s a smart guy who knows just when to get sick.
The unit’s losses from mines and shellfire have been moderately heavy. Col. Frantz estimated that half of their work has been done under at least spasmodic shellfire, and at one time his engineers were 8.5 miles out ahead of the infantry.
Parachutes make silk sheets
The colonel himself is a big, drawling, typical Southwesterner whose stamina amazes everybody, for he is no spring chicken. During the critical periods he would be on the go till 4 a.m., snatch a few hours’ sleep on the ground, and be off again at 7 a.m.
In action, the officers just flop down on the hard rocky ground like everybody else, but when they go into reserve, they fixe up bedrolls on smooth places under trees, with blankets and mosquito nets. In fact, a few of the battalion officers right now are sporting the luxury of white silk sheets. They found a torn parachute and gave a Sicilian woman some canned food to cut it up and sew it into sheets for them.
A good percentage of the battalion speaks Spanish, and occasionally you’ll heard some of the officers talking Spanish among themselves, just to keep in practice, I suppose. This New Mexico bunch misses more than anything, I believe, the Spanish dishes they are accustomed to in that part of the country.
Their folks occasionally send them cans of chili and peppers, and then they have a minor feast. Capt. Pete Erwin, of Las Vegas and Santa Fe, has a quart of chicos – New Mexico dried corn – which he is saving for Christmas dinner.
Simms: Rumors begin to fill air as Allies land in Europe
As in last war, political activities may supersede in importance events upon battlefield
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard staff writer
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Japs shorten supply lines
Heavy shipping losses force withdrawals
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Clumsy PBYs credited with saving Alaska
Valor of first airmen to meet Jap invasion highlight of Pacific War
By Frank H. Bartholomew, United Press staff writer
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Americans held as war prisoners receive relief supplies steadily
Red Cross answers questions asked by relatives
By Marguerite Young, NEA staff writer
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Hull expands control over foreign work
Assumes power over economic activities of civilian agencies
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Churchill buys $100 war bond
Rules waived to make purchase legal
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Invasion is belittled by U.S. communists
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Post-war job plan urged by Church Council
Providing work is called first duty of industry and government
…
U.S. State Department (September 4, 1943)
Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Washington, 4 September 1943.
Secret
CCS 196/4
Intelligence and Quasi-Intelligence Activities in India
REFERENCE: CCS 117TH MEETING, ITEM 7
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the formation of a Combined Liaison Committee in India with British and American representation. In addition to intelligence representatives, both air and ground, the U.S. representatives will include a “Rear Echelon” officer conversant with the American quasi-military and civilian activities (Office of Economic Warfare, Office of Strategic Services, Office of War Information, Federal Communications Commission, etc.).
The meetings of the committee will be at times and places which the committee finds requisite in order to enable information and views to be exchanged and problems referred to the committee to be discussed.
The committee will have the following purposes:
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To facilitate combat intelligence, both air and ground, being exchanged between GHQ and Rear Echelon in New Delhi.
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To enable cooperation to be facilitated between the American Joint Intelligence Collection Agency now being organized in the theater, and the British Joint Intelligence Committee.
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To facilitate the free exchange of information and coordination between the U.S. and British quasi-military agencies in India and the South East Asia Command.
There will be full and open discussion in the Combined Liaison Committee before any quasi-military activities involving operations in India or the South East Asia Theater are undertaken. However, before plans for such operations in these areas are put into effect by U.S. agencies, the concurrence of the Government of India, the Commander-in-Chief, India, or the Supreme Commander, South East Asia Theater, must be obtained as applicable. The U.S. authorities are to be kept fully informed of British plans and activities, and will be entitled to discuss them.
- To constitute a central point through which the exchange of information from all these groups can be channelized, coordination arranged, and points of divergence ironed out.
It is also agreed that there will be a free interchange of intelligence on a cooperative basis. However, the intermixture of British and American intelligence staff officers is not agreed to, except those operating on a combined staff under a supreme commander. Arrangements regarding U.S.-British Intelligence activities will have to be coordinated with the needs of the new South East Asia Command.
H. REDMAN
J. R. DEANE
Combined Secretariat
740.0011 European War 1939/31526¼
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
Washington, September 4, 1943.
Memorandum of Conversation
SUBJECT: DANISH REQUEST FOR STATEMENT FROM THE PRESIDENT
PARTICIPANTS: Secretary of State Hull and the Minister of Denmark, Mr. Henrik de Kauffmann
The Minister of Denmark called at his request. He said it meant a great deal to his people to receive encouragement just now and especially such encouragement as would be given by a brief statement that the President and Mr. Churchill might together or individually put out. He handed me a copy of a draft which he said he gave to the President yesterday (copy attached). I showed every interest in the situation and said that he had fully presented the idea to the President, that the matter is perfectly simple and calls for no conference between the President and myself, and that the President himself will decide whether or not to put it out and that if he does not do so, the matter will have to remain in abeyance until later when it could be revived on some suitable occasion.
The Minister was greatly appreciative of what I had said on this same subject during the past three days.
CORDELL HULL
[Attachment]
Draft Statement
The Danish people, long subjected to the Nazi yoke, have revolted against their oppressors in a way that has stirred the admiration of the Free World. The sympathy of all free men go forward to the Danish Nation and their gallant King, who, though made virtually a prisoner in his own country, continue[s] to fill the hearts of his people with his defiant spirit, which the tyrants have been unable to break.
Since the occupation of Denmark on April 9, 1940, the Danes in the Free World, through their contributions to the Allied war effort, have voiced the suppressed feelings of their countrymen at home. Greenland has taken her place as a bastion in the Atlantic battle.
In December 1941, Mr. Churchill and I invited the Danish Minister in Washington, Mr. Henrik Kauffmann, to join the United Nations declaration (of January 1, 1942). In accepting, Mr. Kauffmann referred to the fact that the Danish Government in occupied Denmark were under German duress, and thus not free to sign the Declaration by the United Nations. Mr. Kauffmann proclaimed that the Danish Nation:
…though subjugated, now more than ever, believes in the principles and purposes of the Atlantic Charter. Danes in the free world feel pledged to contribute the best of their efforts in the common struggle for victory over Hitlerism, adhering to the principles of the Declaration of January 1, 1942 as if the Declaration had been signed by a free Danish Government.
All remnants of a Danish Government in Copenhagen have now ceased to exist. As trustees for Danish interests outside Denmark, the Danish Ministers in Washington and London and Danish official representatives elsewhere, working for the liberation of Denmark together with Free Danish organizations all over the world, may count upon our fullest support.
Our thoughts and our good wishes go to the people of Denmark in their struggle; they have clearly demonstrated to the world that they fully endorse the declaration of the Danish Minister in Washington on January 2, 1942. Every Dane, whether in his home country or abroad, who contributes to our common cause is an ally in name as well as in fact. We welcome Denmark’s time-honoured flag, “Dannebrog,” by the side of the banners of the United Nations.
740.00119 European War 1939/1630
The Secretary of State to the Presidents Chief of Staff
Washington, September 4, 1943.
Secret
My Dear Admiral Leahy: I transmit for your consideration a copy of a note1 submitted to the Department by the Greek Embassy, under date of August 13, 1943, containing the request of the Greek Government that:
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Greece be represented on the Armistice Delegation to be set up in connection with the anticipated surrender of Italy; and
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The Armistice terms provide “for the immediate evacuation of Italian military and civil authorities of all territories claimed by Greece and for the delivery of these territories to Greek authorities”, or, in the absence of Greek authorities, that these territories be “provisionally left in care of Allied authorities.” Specific mention was made, in this connection, of the Dodecanese Islands and of Northern Epirus (Southern Albania).
Some of the points raised in the Embassy’s note have subsequently been disposed of by the joint communication made to the Greek Prime Minister by the British and American Ambassadors on August 29, 1943, regarding the instrument to be signed in connection with the possible unconditional surrender of Italy. The Greek reply to this communication, a copy of which is also attached, empowers the Allied Commander-in-Chief to sign the proposed instrument on behalf of Greece and indicates that the Greek Government desires to have a representative present at the time of signature…
Sincerely yours,
CORDELL HULL
The British First Lord of the Admiralty to Prime Minister Churchill and the British First Sea Lord
London, September 4, 1943.
Most secret
Immediate
Your Welfare 584. (U-Boat Statement).
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On the basis of the number of U-Boats sunk in relation to our shipping losses, August has been the best month of the war. Our shipping losses from U-Boat attack were 13 ships of 86,000 tons and we have sunk 20 German and Italian, and two Japanese U-Boats.
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Owing to the number of supply boats sunk, the enemy have had to withdraw a large number of U-Boats which would normally have operated for considerably longer.
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For this reason, and for others, including the rearmament of U-Boats, the enemy have not developed their full power to attack shipping routes.
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We estimate enemy has about 140 U-Boats based on Biscay ports and a further 200 in commission in the Baltic, including school boats, a large number of which should be ready to sail for the Atlantic now. There are signs that the flow of U-Boats from the Baltic to the Atlantic is already starting.
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Although the results for August are very good, it is recommended that your statement with the President should not give too much emphasis to this because the public do not appreciate the possibilities of the U-Boat force at the enemy’s disposal. A very favourable statement this month, taken into account with your statement last month, would be inclined to encourage a feeling that the U-Boat war is over. It is proposed that your statement with the President should take the following line.
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Heading of proposed statement. As a result of the Prime Minister’s recent agreement with Mr. Mackenzie King that the Canadians were to be consulted before the issue of each monthly statement, the precise procedure to be followed is not clear to Admiralty as it is not known whether Mr. Mackenzie King himself wishes to be shown the communiqué before it is issued or whether he would be content merely that it should be passed by the Canadian Navy Board. Admiralty have therefore not taken any steps to bring the draft to the notice of either the Canadian Navy or the Canadian Prime Minister. Begins.
Issued by the President and Prime Minister after consultation with the British Admiralty, United States Navy Department, and Canadian Department of National Defence for Naval Services.
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August has been another successful month in U-Boat warfare. Owing perhaps to re-armament and other causes, there appear to have been fewer U-Boats at sea than in recent months, and shipping losses have continued to decrease.
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It is significant that the enemy made virtually no attempt to attack North Atlantic shipping, and opportunities for attacking the U-Boats have been relatively few. Nevertheless, U-Boats have been hunted relentlessly on all stations wherever they have appeared and a heavy toll has been taken of the enemy. In fact, more U-Boats have been sunk than merchant ships.
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Surface and Air forces have both contributed to this satisfactory month’s work by the efficiency of their escorts, patrols and offensive operations. Shore-based aircraft have often had to face powerful enemy air opposition, and carrier-borne aircraft have played a most important part.
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We are ready to attack the enemy with utmost vigour should he provide the opportunity by resuming a general attack on our shipping with the very large number of U-Boats at his disposal. Ends.
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt
Washington, September 4, 1943.
Mr. President. It seemed to me that your draft message to Stalin did not draw clear enough distinction between the Mediterranean Commission and the Three-Power Conference. I have ventured therefore to suggest some alterations which you will be able to identify on the re-typed copy annexed.
I also annex a re-draft of my message, in which I have made some changes. In particular, you will see that I show Stalin I am aware that you propose a different procedure, and I suggest an argument in favour of adopting it.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL
4.9.43
[Enclosure 1]
September 4, 1943.
Draft of Message from President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin
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The Prime Minister and I are both happy at the idea of the military, political meeting.
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I think it should be held as soon as possible. What would you think of a date about September twenty-fifth?
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In regard to location, the Prime Minister has suggested London or Edinburgh, and I would be willing to have my representatives go to either of these if you also think it best. However, I am inclined to the thought of a more remote spot where also the membership of the meeting would be less surrounded by reporters. I would be inclined to suggest Casablanca or Algiers or Tunis. I do not object to Sicily but the communications from and to there are more difficult.
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The political representatives would, of course, report to their respective Governments because I do not think we could give plenary powers to them. They could be advised on military developments by attaching one or two military advisers to them, though I do not want to have the meeting develop into a full-scale Combined Staffs’ Conference.
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I have no objection to adding a French member to the meeting because we are in the midst of equipping ten or eleven of their divisions in North Africa. However, I think it would be very unwise to have the French take part in discussions relating to the military occupation of Italy. If the Italians go through with surrender terms, I hope they will be able wholeheartedly to assist the occupation troops. On the whole, the Italians greatly dislike the French and if we bring the French into occupation discussions at this time the civil and military elements in Italy will greatly resent it.
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We can discuss the problem of consulting the Greeks and Yugoslavs later on.
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If Mr. Molotov comes, I would wish to send Mr. Hull, but I do not believe that the latter should make such a long journey and I would, therefore, send the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles. Mr. Harriman would go with Mr. Welles because he has such good knowledge of all shipping, lend-lease and commercial matters. For an American military adviser, I will try to send somebody from my Joint Staff who is in complete touch with the work of the Combined Staffs.
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The tenacity and drive of your Armies is magnificent and I congratulate you again.
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While this coming Conference is a very good thing, I still hope that you and Mr. Churchill and I can meet as soon as possible. I personally could arrange to meet in a place as far as North Africa between November fifteenth and December fifteenth. I know you will understand that I cannot be away from Washington more than about twenty days because, under our Constitution, no one can sign for me when I am away.
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In regard to a Commission to sit in Sicily in connection with carrying out of further settlements with Italy, why not send an officer to Eisenhower’s headquarters where he would join the British and Americans who are now working on this very subject?
ROOSEVELT
[Enclosure 3]
Draft of Message from Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin
THE MILITARY COMMISSION
I have discussed with the President your suggestion for a military-political commission representative of our three countries. The President is sending you his views.
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If a formal commission is to be set up, I make the following suggestions as to its constitution and scope, from which I think the President would not dissent, but he is telegraphing separately.
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As to its location I will agree to Sicily if you are set upon it, but I believe that either Tunis or Algiers, which are an established Allied headquarters, would be more convenient. There will be no harm in trying both.
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I suggest that the members of the commission should be political representatives appointed by the three governments, each reporting to his Government direct. The commission could not, of course, supersede or override the authority of the Governments concerned. The representatives may require to be assisted by military advisers. The political representatives should be kept informed by their governments of military and political developments affecting their work, and would in their turn inform their Governments of local developments. They could make joint representations to their Governments, but would not have the power to take final decisions. They would, of course, not interfere with the military functions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.
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I was glad to find that you agreed that a French member might be added. The President to whom I have submitted the idea also seemed inclined to accept it with certain reservations. We must remember that before long the French will presumably have ten or more fully equipped divisions which will certainly be needed in action.
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There are others, notably the Greeks and the Yugoslavs, who are directly interested, and I suggest that we should devise a procedure for calling them in for consultation when questions of direct concern to them are under examination.
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As I understand it the commission would, in the first instance, handle the Italian question only. When other cases arise experience should have shown whether this or some other organ would be the best medium for cooperating [coordinating?] our views and plans.
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The President is making to you the different suggestion that you might think it sufficient to send an officer to General Eisenhower’s headquarters. Seeing that the commission, if set up, would meet almost concurrently with the conference of Foreign Ministers, it may be that you will agree that the President’s plan meets the case.
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In the event of its being decided to establish the commission, I should be grateful to learn whether you agree with the proposals I have made above. The commission, if it is desired, should be set going this month, but see my immediately following telegram.