By Peter Edson
Inaccuracies are charged before full evidence is submitted
By Thomas L. Stokes, Scripps-Howard staff writer
Study requested by unidentified military agency; pro-Russian charges hurled
By Ernie Pyle
Somewhere in Sicily, Italy – (by wireless)
Lt. Gen. Omar Nelson Bradley is 50. He is married, and has a daughter who is the apple of his eye.
Mrs. Bradley is living at West Point for the duration, as are the wives of several other generals in this area. Their daughter, Elizabeth, who is 19, will be a senior at Vassar this fall. It’s only 30 miles from Vassar to West Point, so she can be with her mother for weekends.
Each of them writes to the general about three times a week, so on the average, he gets about one letter a day from home. They usually write him V-letters.
He writes back about twice a week, although during hard campaigns, two or three weeks sometimes get by without his having time to write. When he does write, he pecks out the letters on a portable typewriter, using a very proficient two-finger system.
Elizabeth is majoring in French at Vassar, and this summer she had the ecstatic experience of talking to Gen. Henri Giraud in his own language and asking him about her father, whom Giraud had seen just before leaving Africa. Gen. Bradley, incidentally, doesn’t speak any foreign language.
‘Second greatest general’
The whole Bradley family is devout in its esteem for Gen. George C. Marshall, the Army’s Chief of Staff. When Gen. Bradley got his third star, Elizabeth wrote him a letter of congratulations in which she said they knew he was “the greatest general in the world – next to Gen. Marshall.”
Gen. Bradley is a tall man, who seems thin although he weighs 182 pounds. His legs are long and he is a terrific walker. Recently, Hanson Baldwin did a piece about him in The New York Times which Mrs. Bradley wrote her husband was “an excellent piece except he called you medium height, which makes me furious.” Actually, the general is just half an inch under 6 feet, in his socks.
The general is deeply tanned. He is getting bald on top, and the rest of his hair is cut short and speckled with gray. His head flares out above the ears more than the average man’s, giving him a “dome” and an air of erudition. He wears faintly tinted tortoise-rimmed glasses.
It would be toying with the truth to call him handsome, instead of good-looking. His face shows the kindness and calmness that lie behind it.
To me, Gen. Bradley looks like a schoolteacher rather than a soldier. When I told him that, he said I wasn’t so far wrong, because his father was a country schoolteacher and he himself has taught at West Point and other places. His specialty was mathematics.
The general doesn’t smoke at all. He takes his cigarette rations and gives them away. He drinks and swears in great moderation. There is no vulgarity in his speech. Back home, he says, he and Mrs. Bradley probably took one drink a month before supper. Over here, where liquor is hard to get, he drinks hardly ever, but he does pour a dust-cutting libation for visitors who show up at suppertime. He has three bottles of champagne that somebody gave him, and he had been saving them for the capture of Messina.
The general’s voice is high and clear, but he speaks so gently you don’t hear him very far away. His aides say they have never known him to speak harshly to anyone. He can be firm, terribly firm, but he is never gross, nor rude. His quality of “ordinariness” puts people at their ease.
‘Makes you feel like a general’
A quaking candidate for a commission in the officers’ school at Fort Benning, Georgia, was once interviewed by Gen. Bradley, and when the soldier came out, he said:
Why, he made me feel like a general myself.
He is just the opposite of a “smoothie.” His conversation is not brilliant or unusual, but it is packed with sincerity. The general still has the Midwest in his vocabulary – he uses such expressions as “fighting to beat the band” and “a horse of another color.”
Gen. Bradley is a hard man to write about, in a way, just because he is so normal. He has no idiosyncrasies, no superstitions, no hobbies. He doesn’t collect seashells. He doesn’t read Schopenhauer. There is nothing odd or spectacular about him.
He laughs good-naturedly at small things and has an ordinary Midwestern sense of humor. One day at Sidi Nsir, after Gen. Eisenhower had been visiting there, Gen. Bradley walked into the room where his chief of staff was working and said:
Bill, Gen. Eisenhower says you’re out of uniform today.
The chief of staff – a colonel and an old friend of Gen. Bradley’s – was perturbed. He looked at his leggings, his necktie, his shirt – everything seemed all right to him. And then Gen. Bradley said:
No, no, it isn’t your clothes. You’ve got on the wrong insignia.
Whereupon he walked over, unpinned the eagle from the colonel’s shirt collar, and pinned on a star. That was his way of informing his friend he had been promoted to brigadier general.
‘They also serve who stand and wait’
By Jess Stearn, Scripps-Howard staff writer
U.S. State Department (August 20, 1943)
|United States||United Kingdom|
|President Roosevelt||Prime Minister Churchill|
Roosevelt and Churchill, accompanied by Hopkins, Harriman, Brown, Mrs. Churchill, and Thompson, went on a fishing trip, and that Roosevelt and Churchill had an opportunity for discussions during the drive to and from Lac de L’Épaule. According to an informal memorandum by Harriman, which states that Roosevelt and Churchill “had a discussion of the Pacific war after lunch” and contains the following details of the conversation:
The Prime Minister was arguing for “S[umatra]” which I gathered did not particularly appeal to the President. The Prime Minister was enthusiastic over this conception. As a matter of fact, it is impossible because the shipping is not available. The President was more interested in “B[urma].” The President used most of the glasses and saltcellars on the table making a “V”-shaped diagram to describe the Japanese position in the semi-circular quadrant from western China to the South Pacific, indicating the advantages of striking from either side, thereby capturing the sustaining glasses, and the disadvantage of trying to remove the outer ones one by one. It was not too serious but a pleasant relaxation.
|United States||United Kingdom|
|Admiral Leahy||General Brooke|
|General Marshall||Admiral of the Fleet Pound|
|Admiral King||Air Chief Marshal Portal|
|General Arnold||Field Marshal Dill|
|Lieutenant General Somervell||Vice Admiral Mountbatten|
|Vice Admiral Willson||Lieutenant General Ismay|
|Rear Admiral Cooke||General Riddell-Webster|
|Rear Admiral Badger||Admiral Noble|
|Major General Handy||Lieutenant General Macready|
|Major General Fairchild||Air Marshal Welsh|
|Brigadier General Kuter||Captain Lambe|
|Brigadier General Wedemeyer||Brigadier Porter|
|Commander Freseman||Air Commodore Elliot|
|Commander Long||Brigadier Macleod|
|Brigadier General Deane||Brigadier Redman|
|Captain Royal||Commander Coleridge|
August 20, 1943, 2:30 p.m. **Secret**
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 112th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to the following British suggestion for Air and Naval Commanders for OVERLORD:
Naval Commander: Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth (Admiral Sir Charles Little)
Air Commander: Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command (Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory)
Sir Alan Brooke said that he would like to have time to refer this matter to London where the officers most qualified to advise were situated. It might be necessary to handle it at a later date through the Joint Staff Mission.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer action on this paper.
Previous Reference: CCS 112th Mtg. Min, Item 7.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft telegram to General Eisenhower on the subject of the use of OSS and SOE organizations in Sardinia.
Sir Alan Brooke suggested certain amendments to this telegram, including a reference to operations in Corsica.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed, with certain amendments, to the dispatch to General Eisenhower of the signal contained in CCS 318/1 (Subsequently dispatched as FAN 198).
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had not had sufficient time to arrive at a definite conclusion with regard to the plan and would like to hear the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. The early action required by U.S. forces in the Pacific appeared to be generally agreed by the Combined Staff Planners, except for differing views as to the emphasis to be laid on operations in New Guinea. It was with regard to operations of British forces that the various alternatives existed.
Admiral Leahy said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were in agreement with the recommendations put forward by the U.S. Planners with certain amendments which he outlined.
General Marshall said that, in his opinion, it would be necessary to undertake the recapture of the whole of Burma; only thus could the main road to China be reopened. Akyab and Ramree must be taken before the next monsoon. Operations further south, i.e., against Sumatra, would, he considered, be a diversion from the main effort which must be concentrated with a view to clearing Burma.
Sir Alan Brooke then outlined the various operations which could be undertaken from India.
Sir Alan Brooke said that there seemed to be two alternatives. In both cases the first step would be the recapture of North Burma. After that, it would be possible either to press on with the reconquest of the whole of Burma and later attack Singapore or, alternatively, to recapture Singapore and afterwards clear Southern Burma. The extent of the operations this season was dependent on the reply from the Commander in Chief, India, with regard to the lines of communications through Assam. The capture of Akyab was a necessary preliminary to an attack on Rangoon, since it provided the necessary air base. The Prime Minister had suggested an alternative operation, the capture of the northern tip of Sumatra. It was not possible to undertake in 1944 both the capture of Akyab and that of Northern Sumatra. The Akyab operation could take place in March and the Sumatra operation, which was not dependent on the monsoon, could take place in May. The North Sumatra operation was being examined and necessitated a force of some four divisions. This was only a slightly larger force than that required for Akyab.
From an examination of the courses of action put forward by the Planners, it appeared that the opening of a port in China could be accomplished at approximately the same time, whether this was done by an overland advance through China after opening the main Burma Road, or, whether it was done by sea-borne attacks from Singapore after opening the Malacca Straits.
It was, in any event, essential to develop to the maximum the air route into China. It was the only method of supplying that country. On the defeat of Germany a great number of aircraft should be available. In addition to this it was necessary to decide on the main line of advance, either overland or by sea from Singapore. In each case the Ledo Road would first be opened and then either Akyab captured as a preliminary to an attack on Rangoon, or Northern Sumatra captured as a preliminary for an attack on Singapore, Whatever course of action was adopted, great developments would have to be undertaken with regard to base facilities in India.
Admiral Leahy asked if an attack on the Kra Isthmus, as an alternative to the attack on Northern Sumatra, had been examined.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that though this line of advance had certain advantages, the difficulty was the lack of any ports on that coast.
Admiral King said that he had always considered Bangkok as the most valuable prize. If this town could be captured, it would be unnecessary to assault Rangoon, since all Japanese lines of communication to it could be effectively cut, and it would fall into our lap.
Sir Charles Portal said that on the assumption that the war against Germany was completed by the autumn of 1944, he believed that the air route to China could be vastly increased. According to the plan, no substantial amount of supplies could get into China by any road before 1946. The United Nations would have a tremendous production of heavy bombers, transports and air crews which, when the drain of active operations against Germany ceased, would rapidly build up into vast numbers. Similarly, the other requirements for the air route, such as radio aids, would be plentiful.
To achieve results, however, from these vast forces it would be necessary at once to start building up the necessary facilities and to make preparations for deploying and employing the aircraft. Numbers would be so large that, if necessary, unserviceable aircraft could be scrapped rather than large repair depots should be set up. Maximum efforts must be made, if necessary at the expense of operations to open the southern road. By 1945 it could be possible for the air supply route to reach such magnitude that delivery by the Ledo and even the main Burma roads would be insignificant in proportion. He realized that there were great difficulties in the construction of airfields particularly in China. Myitkyina, Bhamo and Lashio could be used which would increase the load. Air forces could develop a direct air offensive on Japan and ground forces could be thrown in to stiffen the Chinese troops required to safeguard the base area. Japanese opposition everywhere would be weakened and their morale lowered. Operations on these lines would be, he felt, more profitable than tedious land operations to open the main land route. As he visualized it, it would, by the methods he had outlined, be possible to continue attacks on the periphery of the wheel to achieve attrition, to attack the heart of Japan (the center of the wheel) by air, with devastating results on her industry and morale, while at the same time the westerly drive in the Pacific would cut the spokes of the wheel. Thus he believed the earliest collapse of Japan could be achieved, but a greater effort must be made to build up the air route. A study of the logistic possibilities should be made at once, after which the route must be built up, if necessary at the expense of ground operations.
General Marshall said that he felt it important that in view of the immense difficulties of ground operations in the area concerned, that the most effective application of our air superiority should be considered and that we should capitalize on the effects of this superiority.
Sir Charles Portal said that he was very strongly in agreement with General Marshall and had himself been thinking on the same lines. He had been impressed by the small number of aircraft (22) required to maintain three of Brigadier Wingate’s groups. The air could be directed by these groups onto vital enemy points. Penetration by these methods with lightly armed forces assisted and supplied by the air, could, he felt, produce quicker results than the laborious advances of land forces, accompanied by the necessary building of road communications. With regard to the seizure by air action of potential air bases, he believed that while this, in certain cases, could be achieved, it must be remembered that troops and anti-aircraft weapons were essential in the initial stages and that the bases could not be held by air action alone until the enemy had been driven back to a certain distance from them.
General Arnold said that he considered that further use could be made of the vast number of fighters and light bombers which would later be available for direct action against the Japanese all over Burma. They could attack railroads, bridges and troops and vehicles on the march.
Sir Charles Portal agreed that this had great possibilities but pointed out the risk of delaying the air operations out of China by building up too heavy a force of lighter aircraft for operations in Burma.
Both General Marshall and Sir Alan Brooke agreed that the tactical conception of operations in Burma employing air reinforcement and air support and supply to long-range penetration groups should be studied as a matter of urgency.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that to attack Japan it would be necessary to base forces far into China. The Chinese forces required to hold the essential bases would require considerable supplies which would effect a reduction in the air effort itself. In addition to the development to the maximum of the air route, the Ledo Road, with pipelines for gasoline, and then a sea route into China, must be developed. Operations to clear Lower Burma by means of long-range penetration groups in conjunction with air support or operations against either the Kra Isthmus or Singapore could be undertaken. He would be interested to know which it was believed would most assist the United States thrust in the Pacific, particularly with regard to the synchronization of these operations with corresponding operations in the Islands.
Admiral King said that in view of the nature of the country he did not believe that an attack on Rangoon would divert many Japanese forces. Operations, however, against the vital center of Bangkok or into China to develop the air offensive would, he thought, both produce strong Japanese reactions. The Japanese, however, had no shortage of troops. Their major deficiencies were in aircraft and shipping. Shipping was their main bottleneck since this was required to support all their operations throughout a wide area, including their air operations. This being the case, he believed that the initial main effort of the air forces based in China should be against shipping and port facilities.
Sir Charles Portal said that he agreed with Admiral King’s conception of the vital importance of striking at Japanese shipping from the air.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had had a most valuable discussion. He would like to have the subject further considered on the following day. It was important to get the background as to possibilities by the various methods which had been discussed and to decide on a long-range plan and to relate immediate operations to this general policy.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer action on this paper.
Reference: CCS Memo for Information No. 132.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum setting out the main points in the various signals which had recently been exchanged between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the latest information seemed to show that the Germans had some 16 divisions in Italy. The majority of these appeared to be in the north and there was a tendency to move the headquarters of units in the south into the Naples area.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of CCS Memo for Information No. 132.
Sir Alan Brooke said that there had been no time to refer the British paper with regard to policy in relation to Spain to the Foreign Office but it set out the military considerations involved.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved this paper.
General Marshall said it seemed that the present scale of equipment to Turkey was too high and might be reduced.
Sir Alan Brooke agreed with this view. The Turks were not absorbing all the equipment now being provided. Their training and repair facilities were inadequate. He believed that supplies should be slowed down to a “trickle” and they should not be given more than they could usefully absorb and employ.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved this paper.
Sir Alan Brooke outlined the present position in Russia. In general, the Russians were in a stronger position than ever before. He believed that they had reserves available for further offenses in the autumn. Hungary was understood to be seeking to negotiate a separate peace and neither Rumania nor Finland were desirous of remaining in the war. The Germans would, he thought, be forced to hold all their existing divisions on the Russian front or even to reinforce them. This would facilitate our operations in Italy and OVERLORD. He did not believe that there was any chance of the Germans achieving a negotiated peace with the Russians who had too much to wipe off the slate.
General Marshall referred to the forming of a “Free Germany” movement within Russia. From reports he had received, it appeared that Russia was turning an increasingly hostile eye on the capitalistic world, of whom they were becoming increasingly contemptuous. Their recent “Second Front” announcement, no longer born of despair, was indicative of this attitude. He would be interested to know the British Chiefs of Staff’s views on the possible results of the situation in Russia with regard to the deployment of Allied forces – for example, in the event of an overwhelming Russian success, would the Germans be likely to facilitate our entry into the country to repel the Russians?
Sir Alan Brooke said that he had in the past often considered the danger of the Russians seizing the opportunity of the war to further their ideals of international communism. They might try to profit by the chaos and misery existing at the end of hostilities. He had, however, recently raised this point with Dr. Beneš, who had forecast the Russian order to international communist organizations to damp down their activities. Dr. Beneš’ view had been that since Russia would be terribly weakened after the war, she would require a period of recovery, and to speed up this recovery would require a peaceful Europe in which she could take advantage of the markets for her exports.
There would, however, Sir Alan Brooke considered, be Russian demands for a part of Poland, at least part of the Baltic States, and possibly concessions in the Balkans. If she obtained these territories, she would be anxious to assist us in maintaining the peace of Europe.
With regard to Russia’s air power, Sir Charles Portal said that in view of her superiority on the Eastern Front, the results achieved were disappointing. This, he believed, was largely due to lack of adequate training and handling.
In discussing the possibility of the Germans releasing forces from the Eastern Front for operations elsewhere by the shortening of their line, Admiral King said that he was doubtful whether the shortening of a line would in fact allow Germany to divert divisions elsewhere. The shortening of the line would enable the Russians to intensify their dispositions on this shorter front.
Lord Louis Mountbatten reported that certain experts with regard to synthetic harbors were now on their way to Québec to discuss the matter with the appropriate United States officers.
|United States||United Kingdom|
|Secretary Hull||Foreign Secretary Eden|
|Mr. Dunn||Sir Alexander Cadogan|
August 20, 1943 Secret
Mr. Eden first spoke of the operation LIFEBELT. He said that arrangements had now been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the President and the Prime Minister for entry into the Azores by British forces, exclusively, on the understanding that within two weeks after the start of the operation efforts would be made by the British to obtain the consent of the Portuguese for American forces to join them in the islands. He further said that such assurances as the Portuguese had asked had been given by the British Government with respect to the withdrawal of British forces from Portuguese territory after the war and also with respect to the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty in all her territories. Mr. Eden suggested that assurances along similar lines would be asked by the Portuguese from the United States. Such assurances might be given if we felt like doing so at the time request was made for American forces to join the operation. Comment was made that this was a reversal of the previous position taken by the United States Chiefs of Staff, who had stated their objection to confining the operations exclusively to the British and had referred to the original decision to use force, if necessary, in order to make the Islands available for Allied operations.
Mr. Eden brought up the question of the discussions which had been going on between the Prime Minister and the President as to the conditions of surrender to be given the Italians in the event of tender of unconditional surrender being received by the Allied forces or governments. He said that it was the Prime Minister’s view that the long, comprehensive document was the form to be preferred.
The Secretary said that he had gone over this document, which, as far as he was concerned, appeared to be satisfactory but that he understood the President’s view to be that General Eisenhower was now empowered to present the military requirements which would be imposed in the event of an Italian surrender, and that any further political, financial and economic terms which had not yet been finally agreed upon as between the two Governments would be handed to the Italians at a later time.
Both the Secretary of State and Mr. Eden agreed that this matter would take further discussion with the Prime Minister and President before being entirely clarified.
The Secretary then, stated there had been some considerable publicity giving the impression that Stalin had not been invited to the Quebec Conference and remarked that it appeared to be rather fruitless to continue the system of inviting Stalin to the conferences, and that some attempt should be made to arrive at a basis of talks with Stalin in order to come to grips, if possible, with Soviet general policy and cooperation, if possible, in the much broader picture of the maintenance of peace and world security. The Secretary pointed out that everything seemed to go back to the Russian demands for territory, which was another way of looking for security. He made the point that security was world-wide, and if we could draw the Russians into a broad discussion, then the emphasis would not remain merely on the smaller countries on Russia’s western border.
Mr. Eden agreed to the necessity of making a new approach to this problem, but stated frankly he had no suggestions to make and would welcome any ideas that were put forward to accomplish this purpose. He furthermore felt that this should be done without any loss of time.
The Secretary said that he had given a great deal of thought to this problem and would come back to the subject again with Mr. Eden.
(He did not touch on the four-power declaration which he had already drafted and placed in the hands of the President as he preferred to await the President’s move on that subject first. The first mention of the four-power arrangement in the form of a draft declaration was made by the President at the dinner that same evening attended by the Prime Minister, the Secretary, and Mr. Eden at the Citadel.)
The Secretary also spoke of the necessity for keeping China not only closely informed but cooperating in the general broad over-all picture as we went forward with the war. He said he realized that the Chinese could not be brought into all of the strategic conferences naturally, but he had had visits from Chinese representatives who indicated that the Chinese were feeling rather badly about not being included in discussions pertaining to the war against Japan in which they were important factors, and they were convinced conversations on this subject would take place in Québec.
Mr. Eden brought up the question of the Italian move to have Rome declared an open city.
The Secretary brought Mr. Eden up to date on the American position which was disclosed in the correspondence between the Papal Delegate in Washington and the Department. Upon receiving word from the Papal Delegate that the Italians had decided to have Rome declared an open city and asking for the conditions under which the Allies would be prepared to accept such a declaration, the Papal Delegate was informed that the matter was under consideration and that there was no reason why the Italian authorities could not proceed in any manner they desired to fulfill the requirements of such a declaration.
The Secretary went on to say, however, that the American Government had made no commitment whatever on the subject, nor was any commitment contemplated as far as we were concerned.
Mr. Eden expressed his agreement and satisfaction with the position thus far taken, which left entire freedom of action to the two governments.
The Secretary brought up the subject of dependent peoples, but Mr. Eden did not appear to be ready to go forward with this subject.
Mr. Eden then spoke of the message which had been sent by the King of Greece to both governments, requesting advice on their part as to the position he should take in the face of demands of certain Greek elements that he renounce any intention of coming to Greece until a plebiscite on the subject of the monarchy had been taken in that country.
Mr. Eden then went on to say they were having great difficulties with the Yugoslav Government as the young king had just accepted the resignation of the Yugoslav cabinet in connection with the refusal of the Croat member of the cabinet to agree to the transfer of the Yugoslav Government from London to Cairo. It was Mr. Eden’s opinion, however, that the transfer would be accomplished within two or three weeks, and that it was much better for the Yugoslav Government to carry on its operations from Cairo where it was nearer the situation.
Mr. Eden inquired as to the recent published stories that an agreement had been arrived at between the Senate and the State Department which would provide for approval by the Senate of international agreements entered into by the United States during the wartime period.
The Secretary explained that the situation was not exactly as reported. He said that for some time now he had been carrying on conversations with members of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate and other important Senators, with a view to keeping them informed of the Government’s plans with regard to certain international arrangements which became necessary in the carrying out of the war effort. He cited as an example the United Nations arrangement with respect to relief and rehabilitation (UNRRA). He told how he had shown copies of the draft arrangement on this subject to the Senators, had explained to them how the legislative function in connection with providing of funds and approval of the arrangement was provided for in the text of the draft, and had offered to meet any reasonable suggestions with respect to changes of wording in order to make the position of the legislative branch of the government clear in all respects. He said that he had met with considerable success in these conversations up to the present, and he proposed to continue along those lines in as great a detail as was necessary in order to keep the Senate informed of the plans of the Executive in all these respects.
Mr. Eden brought up the subject of relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation. There was a somewhat lengthy review of the negotiations extending over a period of two years or more, in which the Secretary made the point that at no time had the policy of the American Government not been fully agreed in, by telegrams from the Prime Minister to the President, which Mr. Eden admitted.
The discussion ran along the lines of the British taking the position that de Gaulle was their only friend in 1940, the Secretary raising as against this attitude the objectives and actions of the United States Government, including the prevention of the French Fleet and the French North African bases from falling into German hands, Admiral Leahy’s work in keeping up the spirit and courage of the French population in France, the U.S. naval support long before we were in the war, and the lease-lend aid. It then became evident that neither Mr. Eden nor Sir Alexander Cadogan had seen the last State Department Formula which had been transmitted to the President within a few days after receiving the last British Formula on the subject. Copies of the State Department draft, which was almost word for word the same as the British last suggested formula, were then produced. After examining them, Mr. Eden said he felt that the Prime Minister could not accept a formula which did not contain the word, “recognition.” There was some discussion on this point in order to bring out the American view that “recognition” was only given to a government or some form of government, whereas in this case it was understood that both the British and the U.S. Governments had no intention whatever of considering the French Committee as a government.
Mr. Eden made the suggestion at the end of this discussion that it might be necessary for the two Governments to adopt their own formulas and make their announcements in their own separate ways.
The Secretary followed this by a remark that such a procedure, even if done at identically the same moment, would mean an obvious divergence of views.
Mr. Eden said that he realized any such policy would be so considered and regretted any such possibility.
The Secretary replied that he very much regretted the consideration of such a divergence of views but that if the British could stand it, we could.
The Secretary then made a convincing and reasoned marshalling of the situation as it affected the long-term view of the United States toward the whole French situation and the future of France itself.
Québec, 20 August 1943. Secret CCS 301/2
|References:||a. CCS 301|
|b. CCS 301/1|
The U.S. Chiefs of Staff believe that the proposed subparagraph for inclusion in paragraph 8 of CCS 301, circulated as CCS 301/1, does not express the importance of the maintenance and buildup of the air route into China, or the intention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard thereto.
The U.S. Chiefs of Staff recommend the inclusion of the following subparagraph in paragraph 8 of CCS 301, in lieu of the subparagraph presented in CCS 301/1:
(i) Air Route into China
Present plans provide for first priority of resources available in the China-Burma-India Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air routes and air supplies to China, and the development of air facilities, with a view to:
Québec, 20 August 1943. Secret CCS 313/1
The U.S. Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of paragraph 20 of CCS 313 as amended below:
- To summarize, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take the following action:
a. Approve the general objectives as a basis for planning and preparation.
b. Direct examination of lines of advance, including a study of the feasibility and desirability of operations through the Moulmein area or Kra Peninsula in the direction of Bangkok with the object of isolating Rangoon and facilitating the capture of Singapore.
[Subparagraphs c, d, e, f, g, h, i, and j are identical with subparagraphs b, e, d, e, f, g, h, and i, respectively, as recommended by the United States Planners in CCS 313.]
k. Approve planning for the start of operations against Southern Burma and/or the Malaya Peninsula with a target data of 1944; these plans to be revised at the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
[Subparagraph l is identical with subparagraph k as recommended by the British Planners in CCS 313.]
Québec, 20 August 1943. Secret Enclosure to CCS 323
The provision of an appreciation producing an outline plan to direct the full aerial resources of the United Nations to bring about, in conjunction with other military and naval effort, the overwhelming defeat of Japan not later than 12 months after the defeat of the Axis powers in Europe.
It is assumed that:
a. The defeat of the Axis powers in Europe has been accomplished in the fall of 1944.
b. Russia and Japan maintain a state of neutrality.
c. China continues as an active and cooperative Ally, furnishing ground forces which, in conjunction with U.S. Tactical Air Forces, serve to secure the unoccupied portions of China.
d. The capacity of the air, road and pipeline facilities for “over the hump” transportation is to be first devoted to requirements of the 14th Air Force and the Chinese Army.
e. During the period in question, October 1944 to August 1945, inclusive, United Nations naval, air, amphibious and ground operations in the North, Central, South and Southwest Pacific, in Burma and the Bay of Bengal areas, are maintaining constant and increasing pressure against enemy forces. United Nations submarines, in increasing numbers, continue to harass and destroy enemy shipping.
f. North and North Central Burma are cleared of the enemy and occupied in 1944; and all of Burma in 1945.
To accomplish, by a combined aerial offensive, the destruction of the Japanese military, industrial and economic systems to such a degree that the nation’s capacity for armed resistance is effectively eliminated, within 12 months after the defeat of Germany.
a. To accelerate the destruction of selected systems of critical Japanese industry, the accomplishment of which will reduce the Japanese war effort to impotency.
b. Among the intermediate, nevertheless the most important objectives, is the neutralization of the Japanese Air Force, by combat, and through the destruction of aircraft factories, and the reduction of Japanese shipping and naval resources, to a degree which permits an occupation of Japan.
To reduce Japanese capabilities of resistance to a point which, within 12 months after the defeat of Germany, will force the capitulation or permit the occupation of Japan, requires the launching of an effective bomber offensive against vital targets on the main islands not later than the fall of 1944. Only such an offensive can, at a sufficiently early date, reach and destroy the vital elements of Japan’s transportation structure, and the nerve centers of her economic, military and political empire.
In view of the political, economic, military and transportation situation in the USSR, and more particularly the degree of industrial and economic development in Far Eastern Russia, the vulnerability of supply lines connecting it with Western Russia, and the consequent logistic difficulties which would probably be encountered in supporting air forces in substantial strength in the Maritime Provinces, it is unwise at this time to plan United Nations bomber offensive operations against Japan from bases in that area.
The islands of the Pacific within effective bombing range of the vital industrial areas of Japan, do not afford adequate bases for our air forces which will be available in 1944-45. Upon information now available, it appears that the only land area affording such bases with adequate capacity and dispersion, within 1,500 miles of the Japanese target area, immediately available for development, is on the Chinese mainland.
The beginning of the air offensive against Japan cannot await the opening of the ports of Hong Kong and Wenchow by the difficult and necessarily slow penetration of the enemy’s far flung and well defended defensive positions to the south and east thereof. Naval advances from the south and east will, however, be greatly facilitated and expedited by preliminary air offensive operations against the industrial and transportation targets on the island of Honshu.
It is evident that if a bomber offensive is to begin in 1944 from bases in China, the movement of all troops, organizational equipment and supplies in the base areas must initially be accomplished by air from India.
The transportation of such personnel, equipment and supplies may be accomplished by the employment of approximately 4,000 B-24 airplanes converted to cargo airplanes and tankers. The project will require a flow of approximately 596,000 tons per month through the port of Calcutta. (See Section 1, Enclosure “A”). Calcutta port facilities are at present adequate to handle 960,000 tons per month. Construction of additional facilities in that port will however not be required immediately.
A most important factor in planning for the air attack on Japan from the west, is the necessity for providing adequate protection of the air bases against the violent Japanese reaction which is certain to follow the large-scale development of those bases, and initiation of the use thereof. The pressure being exerted by our operations against Japanese forces in outlying Pacific areas in Burma and perhaps Sumatra, will substantially contain those forces, and prevent Japan from greatly reinforcing her air forces now deployed in China. Nevertheless, Japan will not readily accept the risk of loss of her already important, and potentially rich, newly acquired empire to the south. It is believed, however, that Chinese forces, reasonably equipped and supplied, aided in leadership, supported by the U.S. 10th and 14th Air Forces, will be able to defend the air base areas. Chinese forces and U.S. Tactical Air Forces, essential to provide such defense, will be available. Logistic support for them is dealt with in a subsequent paragraph. The initiation of the bomber offensive, and even measures in preparation therefor, will tremendously stimulate Chinese morale and unify the Chinese people under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.
A brief outline of the logistical implications of the proposed plan is contained in Enclosure “A.”
B-29 heavy bomber aircraft possess a tactical radius of 1,500 miles with a bomb load of ten tons, and are the best suited aircraft for the bombing of Japan from available bases. B-29 tactical units shown in Section 2 of Enclosure “A” will be available for deployment in China for operations against Japan on the dates indicated.
Studies conducted within the U.S. Army Air Forces indicate that 28 B-29 groups, of 28 airplanes each, conducting five missions per month on a 50 percent operational basis, for a period of six months, or a total of 168 operating group months, can accomplish the degree of destruction required to accomplish the Over-all Objective, described in paragraph 4, above.
Seventy-five percent of the selected strategic targets in Japan lie between Tokyo and Nagasaki. Substantially, all of this objective area is within 1,500 miles of a region in unoccupied China, the center of which is Changsha, within an approximate 800 miles radius of Kunming (See Map, Appendix “A”).
The area 400 miles north and south of Changsha, within this zone, is suitable for the development of VLR bomber airfields, and many old unimproved fields exist in the region. Operations of B-29 aircraft from this area would bring the majority of the selected strategic objectives within effective tactical radius.
From a source of supply in the Calcutta area, 200 heavy bomber aircraft of the B-24 type, stripped of armor, armament, and other equipment not essential to transport service, can support one B-29 group operating against Japan from bases in this area, at the rate set forth in paragraph 14.
Such B-29 type airplanes would transport gasoline, bombs and other required supplies directly from the port of Calcutta to Kunming, using the latter area as a staging center, before proceeding with a capacity load to the B-29 operating base zone.
A minimum striking force of 100 B-29 airplanes is desirable to conduct effective strategic bombing operations against Japanese mainland objectives. The availability of ten B-29 groups in the base area will permit sustained operation by such striking forces. Ten B-29 groups will be available for deployment in China by October, 1944.
2,000 B-24 type aircraft, converted to transports, would be required to support such operations from Calcutta supply bases. This number of aircraft, so converted, could be made available in the Calcutta area by October, 1944.
Aircraft availability schedules shown in Section 2, Enclosure “A,” indicate that a total of 20 B-29 groups will be available for deployment in China by May, 1945, and could be maintained at normal strength thereafter.
The same schedules indicate that the 4,000 B-24 type aircraft required for conversion to transport functions to maintain these 20 B-29 groups, can also be made available in the Calcutta area by May, 1945.
Operations by the 10-20 groups of B-29 aircraft which will be available, at the rate set forth in paragraph 14, would total 182 operating group months by 31 August 1945 at which time it is estimated that the degree of destruction of Japanese resources essential to crush the enemy’s capacity for effective armed resistance will have been fully accomplished.
Such operations, while weakening and demoralizing the enemy, will vastly encourage our long-suffering Chinese allies, and inspire them to increased and united effort to eject the enemy from their homeland, and hasten complete victory.
During the summer months of 1945, B-29 groups based on the Aleutian Islands could effectively attack parallel strategic Japanese objectives located in the northern part of the Empire.
Air Bases. A report on air base requirements and availability is contained in Section 3, Enclosure “A.” Sites, materials and labor required for construction of Chinese and Indian air bases are locally available.
Preparation of the necessary bases and other facilities for these operations must be initiated at least one year prior to October, 1944.
Other Supply Routes into China. The supplies brought into China from the west by the Air Transport Command, by pipeline, or by overland transportation, would be available for equipment and support of Chinese Ground units and supporting Tactical Air Forces (the latter provided by the USAAF, with limited augmentation by Chinese Air Units). The Tactical Air Force required to be furnished by the USAAF, will be available. The indicated volume of such supplies during the period in question is set forth in Section 4, Enclosure “A.” Such balance of supply as is available beyond the requirements of the above forces will serve to reduce the demands of the B-29 strategic Air Force upon the special type of air transport support set forth herein.
Concept of the Operation
a. Phase I. October 1944-April 1945. Sustained B–29 precision bombing attacks throughout the period to accomplish the destruction of selected strategic Japanese industrial systems, including aircraft factories and ship yards.
b. Phase II. May 1945-August 1945. An all-out attack against the other selected strategic objectives within tactical radius, integrated with attacks upon complementary objectives in Northern Japan by two B-29 groups based in the Aleutian Islands, to accomplish the destruction of Japanese resources which are an essential preliminary to an occupation of the Japanese homeland by United Nations forces.
The destruction of Japanese resources to such a point that the enemy’s capacity for effective armed resistance is substantially exhausted can be accomplished by sustained bombing operations of 10-20 B-29 groups based in an area of Unoccupied China within 1,500 miles of the center of the Japanese industrial zone.
Such operations can be supplied by 2,000-4,000 B-24 type aircraft, converted to transports, based at Calcutta, supplying the operational bases after staging at Kunming.
The required air striking and supply forces will be available.
Adequate air and ground defense forces and the maintenance of such units will likewise be available.
The planning and preparation of air bases and other facilities essential for the execution of this plan should be instituted without delay.
The execution of this plan promises to vastly strengthen our Chinese Allies, and to bring about a decisive defeat of Japan within 12 months after the defeat of the Axis powers in Europe.
That the line of advance proposed in the “Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan” be approved; and that this appreciation and outline plan be submitted to the Combined Staff Planners for further study and detailed development.
That in consonance with the United Nations Overall Objective, and Overall Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War, action be initiated without delay and prosecuted with all practicable expedition, to complete the preparatory measures required to be taken, and to provide the facilities and air bases in expanded numbers and increased proportions, essential for the timely execution of this plan.
Québec, 20 August 1943. Secret Enclosure to CCS 222/2
a. The present limit of UGS convoys is 80 ships.
b. UGS 16 sailing on August 26th has 91 firm presenters. A number of these ships have been held back from previous UGS convoys, because of the inability of North African ports to handle them. It is understood that this difficulty no longer exists.
c. UGS 17 sailing September 5th already has 79 presenters with indications of more to come.
d. A similar situation is foreseen for the next few UGS convoys.
The situation regarding UGS 16 is now urgent and there appear to be two alternatives:
a. To raise the limit of UGS convoys.
b. To withdraw the 11 lowest priority ships.
The most satisfactory solution would be for alternative a to be adopted.
If this is not feasible the 11 ships to be withdrawn from UGS 16 will suffer the least possible delay if they are included in the first available HX or SC convoy to U.K. to join up with a KMS convoy to the Mediterranean. This would result in a delay in arrival dates of these 11 ships at their destinations of between 16 days and 26 days, depending upon the speed of the ships selected. North Atlantic and KMS convoys are frequently overloaded but have no fixed limit, and are not so well protected as UGS convoys.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff are, therefore, requested to give a decision on the allocation of ships to UGS 16 as a matter of urgency. If it is decided that the limit for UGS convoys must remain at 80 ships, it is requested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff indicate the priority in which these 80 ships should be selected. A decision is required by August 23rd in order to ensure the least delay to any ships which it may be necessary to withdraw from UGS 16.
The detail of ships and destinations of the 91 presenters for UGS 16 is shown in the Annex.
Québec, 20 August 1943. Secret CCS 314/3
We have noted the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff (CCS 314) concerning the shortage of vehicle lift for OVERLORD and the necessity of additional landing craft therefor; viz., 57 LCT(3 or 4)s and 15 LCT(5)s. Consideration has also been given to the British proposals contained in CCS 286.
We have examined the possibility of providing additional LCT(6)s from U.S. sources and find that our own LCT deliveries to fulfill the TRIDENT U.S. commitment for OVERLORD cannot be accomplished as early as desired and that it is impossible to increase the number of LCTs so committed; viz., 146, of which 41, at least, must come from the Mediterranean.
Studies are under way which it is hoped will effect an increase in the rate of U.S. landing craft production. However, the result of these studies at the present time indicates that such an acceleration cannot be felt before April 1944.
In view of this, the deficiencies in OVERLORD will have to be made good from the Mediterranean and these movements will, of course, in the case of LCTs, have to be adjusted to weather conditions.
It is suggested that every effort be made to put all the LCT(5)s now in the U.K. in an operating condition and employ them in OVERLORD as a means to improve the situation.
Québec, 20 August 1943. Secret Urgent
The promising situation existing throughout the Italian area would appear to offer an excellent opportunity by means of 5th Column activities to establish conditions in Sardinia for an unopposed occupation of that island or an unopposed landing on it with Italian help. For Eisenhower FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 198, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The OSS and SOE organizations might collaborate in accomplishing this. Furthermore this presents an excellent opportunity to test the effectiveness of these organizations and to provide them with experience and training for future operations of a similar character. Corsica also may be worth your attention. Your comments requested and recommendations.
740.0011 European War 1939/30810: Telegram
Vatican City, August 20, 1943. U.S. urgent
Following is from a reliable source. (This is Tittmann’s 159, August 20 with reference to his 156, August 17.)
An interministerial committee met some days ago to discuss measures to be taken in connection with declaration by Italian Government that Rome is an open city and another meeting held yesterday of same committee with Badoglio presiding. In addition to orders already given to anti-aircraft batteries Rome not to react in case of raid pending their suppression Badoglio ordered immediate removal from Rome of all possible military objectives both personnel and material. Question of military traffic through Rome still presents difficulties but every effort is being made to solve problem and it is hoped satisfactory solution will soon be found. Meanwhile, orders have been given military trains all kinds now obliged pass through Rome should do so without stopping.
Québec, 20 August 1943. Most secret CCS 321
We have examined the suggestion put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 303 paragraph 10) that the time is now ripe to take full advantage of our present position and adopt a stern and frankly demanding policy towards Spain.
We can say at once that we agree entirely with the sense of this suggestion. The only point at issue is exactly how far we should go.
We feel that it will be agreed that:
a. The Spaniards, with Germany on their doorstep, will not be persuaded to take any military action which appears to threaten Germany and which might bring on them German retaliation. Any action or threat on our part to coerce them in this direction would merely tend to unite them against us.
b. From our point of view, it is most undesirable that we should press the Spaniards to a point which might impose upon us any military commitment in support of diplomatic or military threats.
We suggest therefore that it would be unwise to go so far as to press the Spaniards to transfer the bulk of their defensive forces to the North, which they would be most unlikely to do.
We suggest that our general policy should be to deny the enemy his present privileged position in Spain, and to (supplant him there to as great an extent as possible, thus transferring to the Germans the anxiety that has hitherto been ours. In pursuance of this policy, we suggest that we should now intensify pressure by economic and political means in order to obtain the following objectives:
a. Discontinuance of supplies of raw materials to Germany. The most important material which Germany obtains from Spain is wolfram, of which commodity Spain and Portugal supply the largest proportion of German requirements. A note on the wolfram position by the Ministry of Economic Warfare is attached.
b. Withdrawal of the Blue Division from the ranks of the enemy.
c. A modification of the present distribution of Spanish forces in Morocco so as to remove any suggestion of distrust of the United Nations.
d. Cessation of the use of Spanish shipping for the benefit of our enemies.
e. Denial to the enemy of secret intelligence facilities.
f. Facilities for civil aircraft of United Nations.
g. A more benevolent attitude towards escaped Allied prisoners of war.
h. The strictest interpretation of international law towards enemy personnel and naval and air units.
i. Elimination of objectionable anti-Allied propaganda and increase in pro-Allied propaganda.
Owing to the resentment which we are likely to cause if we interfere directly in Spanish internal affairs, it would not be in our military interests openly to promote the restoration of the monarchy since such interference would be likely to cause serious disorder in Spain, of which the Germans might take advantage by infiltration.
We should, however, welcome and encourage the formation of a less anti-Allied Government.
Germany’s Present Position
The virtual absence of stock, Allied preemptive purchasing in the Peninsula and the success achieved against blockade runners has made Germany’s wolfram position critical.
Stocks and Supplies
Germany started the war with a stock of 12,000 tons of concentrates. After the outbreak of war, Germany was dependent upon what was then a small output in the Peninsula, of which Portugal provided some 2,000 to 3,000 tons and Spain only 300 tons. Until 1942 Germany used her stocks to maintain an annual consumption of about 9,000 tons. From 1942 onwards, her consumption has been at the rate of about 5,800 per year, of which about 4,300 are basic industrial consumption and the balance for A.P. projectiles. Mines in Germany and France produce about 250 tons a year. Should our preemptive purchases in Spain and Portugal continue to be successful Germany will receive only about 2,000 tons from each country in 1943 and may receive substantially less from Spain. As Germany started the year with only 500 tons of stock, a further cut in consumption will be necessary unless she succeeds in obtaining further supplies by blockade running.
Effects of Shortage
Germany’s main uses for tungsten (the metal derived from wolfram) are to make tungsten carbide, which is used for providing a hard tip for machine tools, and for cores for armor piercing projectiles. Small quantities of tungsten are also used for providing filaments for electric lamps, radio valves, etc., and as a hydrogenation catalyst. A substantial reduction of supplies would therefore face Germany with the following alternatives:
a. A cut in the production of weapons of all types, resulting from the absence of tungsten carbide tips from cutting tools and consequent less efficient production, or
b. The sacrifice of armor piercing ammunition with tungsten carbide cores.
Should supplies from the Peninsula be entirely cut off, Germany would probably suffer both as it is improbable that she would obtain sufficient supplies by blockade running. Blockade running by surface ships should prove impracticable in the future and submarines could only bring the desired quantity at the expense of all other much needed commodities.
Speed of Effect
The loss of supplies from the Iberian Peninsula would probably not affect military operations for six months but after that the effect would be increasingly felt.
Failure to obtain wolfram from the Iberian Peninsula would seriously affect the rate of production throughout German industry and would render impossible the manufacture of armor piercing projectiles with tungsten carbide cores on any substantial scale. These effects would become apparent in actual operations after about six months, depending on the rate of military wastage.
Québec, August 20th, 1943.
Dear Mr. Hull, Enclosed I am sending to you two short aide-mémoires on questions which I believe are of a great importance for the cause of the United Nations in Central Europe.
I most sincerely hope that it will be possible for you to consider these questions at the present conference and to bring to them an adequate solution.
I am [etc.]
OTTO of Austria
The military and political events of the near past have put Austria into the forefront of the interest of the United Nations. As approximatively 84,8% of the German implements of war for Italy are shipped over the Austrian railroads, much will depend on the attitude and action of the Austrian people.
The trend of the United Nations has been to recognize the heroic fight of Austria against the Germans by considering that country as an occupied country, which shall be liberated. But as this point has not yet been made sufficiently clear, certain agencies have used this to spread false impressions.
News from Russia indicate that the Soviet Government is about to launch an Austrian Government or National Council under the presidency of Wilhelm Koplenig (36 Gorkova ulica, Moscow), former leader of the Austrian Communist Party. Such a move would very much strengthen the Austrian Communist Party – which hitherto was negligible – and would disturb the Catholic, agrarian and patriotic opposition. The fear of Communist dictatorship would gravely weaken the Austrian resistance against the Axis.
Under these circumstances and with due regard to the ever-increasing strategic importance of Austria, the following program with regard to Austria is submitted:
A clear declaration at the Quebec Conference, that Austria is an occupied country and will therefore be liberated, like the other occupied countries.
A settlement of the question of Southern Tyrol, along the lines suggested in the annexed memorandum on that question.
The recognition by the United Nations of a provisional Austrian authority. This authority should be non-partisan and represent Austria only as long as its people is silenced. It should not have authority to commit Austria on constitutional questions. In order to achieve this aim, a Committee of all former Austrian diplomats and consuls, who have kept their nationality and resisted the Nazis, could be formed, linking thus the legality of the past with the condition of non-partisan character.
Such a program would avoid the harm which might be clone by a Russian unilateral step, without too much antagonizing Russia. It would strengthen Austria’s resistance against the Axis and thus help the progress of the war. It is finally in line with the lofty principles announced by the leaders of the United Nations.
In the coming discussions of the United Nations, the question of establishing just and reasonable borders for Italy and her neighbours will be of great importance for the foundation of a lasting peace.
In this connection the question of Southern Tyrol, called by the Italians Alto Adige, will be of paramount importance. This land was conceded to Italy in the last peace treaty over the protest of its Austrian population and of several Allied leaders. Under Italian occupation the Southern Tyrolese population was severely persecuted, dispossessed and partly replaced by Italians. Under an agreement between Mussolini and Hitler1 a notable part of the population was forcibly moved to Germany between 1939 and 1942, where they still live under very hard and inhuman conditions. Southern Tyrol has therefore suffered more than many other parts of Europe from Axis cruelty.
Southern Tyrol can be divided roughly into two parts:
a) South of the present Austrian border and North of a line Adamello Mountains-Salurn-Cortina d’Ampezzo, is a country with 85% Austrian population, deeply attached to Austria.
b) South of the above-mentioned line and North of the Italian border of 1914 is a country which, contrary to Italian propaganda, has still 54% Austrian population.
It is therefore a matter of justice, well in line with the principles of the United Nations, that this territory should be returned to Austria. It would be also a matter of political wisdom. Neither the Southern Tyrolese, nor the Austrians have ever accepted the present border. If good relations ought to be established between Austria and Italy, this can only be done by solving the Southern Tyrolese question in an Austrian sense. This would furthermore strengthen Austria materially and morally against Germany.
If the necessity of a plebiscite in the Southern zone of Southern Tyrol would be felt, care should be taken that only real Southern Tyrolese could vote. The right to vote restricted to residents as of 1918 and to their descendants would be the guarantee that the voters really represent the Southern Tyrolese people.