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Says Air Forces ignored recommendation of Army engineers
By Thomas L. Stokes, Scripps-Howard staff writer
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New York –
The hull of the former French liner Normandie, rising approximately 2.5 degrees a day, reached an angle of about 37 degrees today.
By Mrs. Walter Ferguson
The War Department is asking power from Congress to investigate unjust claims against the Army man’s paycheck. These claims come most often from women who have lived apart from their husbands but waste no time in demanding a dependent’s share of his allotment the minute he is drafted.
Decent feminists will blush for their sex as they study the records. The whole thing is tied up with the alimony question, which is also due for an overhauling.
How can we justify demands for alimony along with demands for full economic equality? In a world where the feminine half of the population does everything but tote a gun into battle, it is absurd to go on expecting clinging-vine privileges. Yet court records disclose this amazing inconsistency.
While half of us yell for bigger pay envelopes, the other half cry to the judge for a larger slice of ex-husbands’ pay.
The war offers new chances to prove woman’s ability and independence, but it will also take away cherished soft snaps.
It is possible that the sheltered woman will be regarded as a social outcast in the post-war world, for we are moving into a period when each individual will be judged by the contribution he makes or the service he renders to society. And if equal rights prevail, will it not be illogical for a woman to ask support from an ex-husband unless she actually tends his children with her own hands?
A fair division of property, yes – but the future will probably see both father and mother, after divorce, contributing to the upkeep of the offspring, and the childless wife having no claim on an ex-husband’s earnings.
Commodity Credit demands to be outlined to House leaders
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Navy wife complains she wouldn’t contaminate people of towns to which he is transferred
By Ruth Millett
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U.S. soldiers bitter over anti-personnel mines strewn by mines
By Thomas R. Henry, North American Newspaper Alliance
With U.S. 7th Army, Sicily, Italy – (Aug. 6, delayed)
Like death-dealing ghosts, men lie dead for weeks after contacting mines which the evacuating Germans have strewn on roads, in cemeteries, on beaches and at all possible billeting areas along the Sicilian north coast road.
Anti-personnel mines which go off with a slight jar have caused considerable U.S. casualties and delay in the advance after the enemy leaves his position and retreats eight or 10 miles eastward.
The idea of fighting ghosts is very much in the minds of U.S. soldiers. Men who laid the mines are probably dead or many miles away and it seems as though they were operating machine guns from graves. Probably nothing has aroused U.S. soldiers’ hatred of the Germans more than the sight of comrades wounded and dying from these invisible foes.
Italian wounded
I saw a pathetic sight before the advanced field evacuation station today as a chaplain priest gave the last rites to an Italian prisoner whose leg was blown off. The Italian was alternately praying, kissing a picture of his mother and cursing Mussolini while Capt. Don Wilson of Tribune, Kansas, administered what first aid was possible.
Field ambulances arrived every few minutes with more mutilated prisoners. They had been put into what seemed an ideal billeting area on the Mediterranean beach and were building their own barbed-wire stockade in entire agreement with the international convention when they were caught in mines intended for billeting Americans.
Worse than Tunisia
Minefields are much worse here than in Tunisia and grow thicker as the Americans advance eastward. They may have been laid in expecting the invasion on the north coast or purely as delaying devices. It cannot be verified whether the bodies of enemy dead were used as boobytrap bait here.
The Italians are quite helpful because they point out where they saw Germans lay mines but they cannot be trusted entirely. They often get killed themselves. Our troops are usually too impatient after fighting days for an objective to delay hours while U.S. engineers lead the way with magnetic brooms locating mines.
Scottsdale flier tells how bomber brought crew home safely with 3 motors gone
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By Ernie Pyle
Somewhere in Sicily, Italy – (by wireless)
All my life I have enjoyed being in hospitals (as soon as the original moaning-and-groaning stage was past), and my recent time at a frontline Army clearing station was no exception.
On the third day I was scared to death that I was well enough to leave. But the doctor looked thoughtful and said he wanted me to stay another day. I would have kissed him if he had been a nurse instead of a man with a mustache and a stethoscope.
That was the only trouble with the hospital – it didn’t have any nurses. In fact, we lacked a number of the usual hospital touches. We were hidden, inevitably, in an olive grove, and our floors were merely the earth. The toilet was a ditch with canvas around it. And if you washed, you did so in your own steel helmet. There were no such things as hospital pajamas or bathrobes. I arrived in my Army coveralls and left in my coveralls, and I never once had them off all the time I was there.
During the day they kept the sides of our tent rolled up, and it was pleasant enough lying there with nothing to do. But at night the tent had to be tightly closed for the blackout, and it became deadly stuffy. And all night long the litter-bearers would be coming and going with new wounded. It made an eerie scene in the dim glow of our single lantern, and sleep was almost impossible.
Doctor humors Ernie
So the last couple of nights we moved our cots outdoors and slept again under the wide starry skies of Sicily, and attendants brought our medicine out there in the dark. German bombers came over but we just lay there. Every morning a chaplain would come around with a big boxful of cigarettes, tooth powder and stuff.
The doctor had me on a liquid diet at first, but I gradually talked him into advancing me to a soft diet and finally to a regular one. That progression from liquid to soft to regular diet was one of the great experiences of my life, for believe it or not, all three diets were exactly the same thing – soup and canned tomato juice.
When I accused the doctor of duping me, he grinned and said:
Well, it comes under the heading of keeping the patient happy by pretending to humor his whims.
Happy! I was hungry! But as you see, I survived, and actually I must say I have never been treated more grandly anywhere than by those doctors and men.
During the time I lay at the clearing station with my own slight aches and pains, hundreds of wounded soldiers passed through on their way back to hospitals in the rear. I was in one of five small tents in which they were deposited on litters while waiting for ambulances, so I lay right among them for four days and nights. It couldn’t help but be a moving and depressing experience, and yet there was something good about it too.
Ward-boys always attentive
The two main impressions I got out of it were (1) the thoughtful and attentive attitude of the doctors and ward-boys toward the wounded men, and (2) the grand spirit of the wounded men themselves. I’ll write tomorrow about the second of these two.
As pitiful as wounded men are, it is easy to become hardened and cross with so many passing through your hands. You could eventually get to look upon them all as just so many nuisances who came deliberately to cause you more work. Yet the ward-boys treated their wounded as though they were members of their own family.
I paid particular attention as I lay there, and no wounded man ever made a request that a ward-boy didn’t go jumping to fulfill.
This was especially true of the ward-masters, who are responsible for whole tents. There were three that impressed me greatly.
One was Cpl. Herman Whitt, of Enid, Oklahoma. Before the war he was a salesman for a biscuit company. He married a beautiful Indian girl back home. Cpl. Whitt is tall, nice-looking, and talked very slowly and softly. He says he feels better about the war, doing this job of caring for the wounded than if he were up there killing people himself.
Our night ward-master was Cpl. Woodrow Cox of Milo, Oklahoma. He too is tall than six feet, and he was a ranch hand back home, yet his voice is almost like a musical instrument, and he talks with that snaillike Oklahoma drawl that is so soothing in times of excitement.
The third was Cpl. Rodney Benton, of 8030 West 5th St., Oklahoma City. You could see the difference between city and country in these boys. Rodney was all git-up-and-git. He talked faster and moved faster than the others. But all three had the same deep conscientiousness in their work and their feeling for the wounded.
Rodney is one of twins, and his identical brother Robert is a corporal in this division’s other clearing station. They are 23. Both had two years of premedical work at the University of Oklahoma, and they intend to be doctors. So you see they were in their glory here. In fact, they almost drove the doctors nuts asking questions all the time.
Völkischer Beobachter (August 13, 1943)
dnb. Aus dem Führer-Hauptquartier, 12. August –
Das Oberkommando der Wehrmacht gibt bekannt:
Am Kubanbrückenkopf, am Mius und am mittleren Donez verlief der Tag ohne wesentliche Kampfhandlungen. Im Raum von Bjelgorod dauert die große Abwehrschlacht an. Südwestlich Orel scheiterten Angriffe mehrerer Sowjetdivisionen. Auch im Kampfraum südlich und südwestlich Wjasma griff der Feind weiter an. Während im Südteil dieses Abschnitts die Kampfhandlungen noch nicht abgeschlossen sind, wurden die Sowjets an den übrigen Fronten unter hohen Verlusten abgewiesen. Die Sowjets verloren gestern 120 Panzer.
Die Luftwaffe griff wieder trotz ungünstiger Wetterlage an den Brennpunkten in die Erdkämpfe ein. Sie vernichtete in den letzten zwei Tagen 83 Sowjetflugzeuge.
In der dritten Schlacht südlich des Ladogasees haben die unter Führung des Generalfeldmarschalls von Küchler, des Generalobersten Lindemann und des Generals der Infanterie Wöhler stehenden deutschen Truppen, unterstützt von den durch General der Flieger Korten geführten Luftwaffenverbänden, in der Zeit vom 22. Juli bis 6. August den Ansturm der 8. und 67. sowjetischen Armee in heldenmütigen Kämpfen abgeschlagen und damit die Durchbruchsabsichten des Feindes vereitelt. Außer der im Wehrmachtbericht bereits genannten 1. Infanteriedivision zeichneten sich in dieser Schlacht die 5. Gebirgsjägerdivision und die ostpreußische 11. Infanteriedivision besonders aus.
Im hohen Norden wiederholten die Sowjets gegen die am Louhi-Abschnitt neu gewonnenen Stellungen ihre Gegenangriffe, die bereits vor der Hauptkampflinie zerschlagen wurden.
Leichte deutsche Seestreitkräfte versenkten in der Nacht zum 11. August vor der Kaukasusküste ein sowjetisches Kanonenboot und ein Schnellboot und beschädigten ein weiteres schwer. Andere deutsche Seestreitkräfte nahmen in der gleichen Nacht küstennahe Sowjetstellungen an der Miusfront erfolgreich unter Feuer.
Auf Sizilien verliefen die Absetzbewegungen auf eine verkürzte Brückenkopfstellung planmäßig. Dem im Nordabschnitt entlang der Küstenstraße nachdrängenden Gegner wurden in zähen Abwehrkämpfen erhebliche Verluste zugefügt. Ein stärkerer feindlicher Landungsversuch westlich Kap Orlando wurde im Zusammenwirken mit der Luftwaffe zum größten Teil bereits vor der Küste abgeschlagen, die an Land gekommenen Teile des Gegners vernichtet.
Im Küstenraum der besetzten Westgebiete und bei freier Jagd über dem Atlantik wurden fünf feindliche Flugzeuge und ein Großflugboot abgeschossen.
Ein Verband schwerer deutscher Kampfflugzeuge griff in der Nacht zum 12. August das Gebiet des Kriegshafens Plymouth sowie militärische Ziele in Bournemouth mit einer großen Zahl von Spreng- und Brandbomben an. Alle eingesetzten Flugzeuge kehrten zurück.
Störangriffe einzelner britischer Flugzeuge in der vergangenen Nacht in Westdeutschland verursachten nur geringen Gebäudeschaden.
U.S. State Department (August 13, 1943)
65566/COS.
New Delhi, 13th August 1943.
Most secret
Most immediate
Following from General Auchinleck for Chiefs of Staff:
Program of planning for operations from India:
On receipt of decisions of Washington Conference a first appreciation of the possibility of carrying out the tasks allotted to this Command was produced.
Salient point in this was that while requirements were in the neighborhood of 4,300 tons a day, theoretical maximum we could hope for was a lift into Assam of 3,400 tons a day. It seemed at the time that requirements for the operations could probably be reduced to this figure.
The two months which have followed have revealed in the first place increased requirements. This is mainly due to the continuance into October, November and December of engineer stores for Airfield Program which has first priority and must be met in full. Airfield Program and connected activities have resulted in an increase of personnel in Assam for which no allowance had been made. Further, we had reckoned on using some of the oil production for our own requirements, but the Americans now ask for the total output which means we must import more petrol and lubricants into Assam than we had anticipated.
While requirements have increased lift which we can count on getting has been reduced. In the first place the figure of 3,400 included no margin for contingencies which must be reckoned at absolute minimum of 15 per cent. Secondly, the stepping up of the previous lift which was only about 1700-1800 does not take effect until mid-September and in the meantime arrears are accumulating of essential stores which must be lifted. Shortage of locomotives will not be made good until October. Greatest factor, however, in reducing figure has been breaches near Burdwan owing to floods on the Damodar River subsequent breach at Ghatsila and floods at Parhatipur.
Result of factors in Paras. 3 and 4 above is that we are faced with a total deficiency of lift into Assam of about 128,000 tons by 1st March. If reductions are made to the limit which we consider possible in tonnages allotted for our own purposes and to the Americans this deficiency can be reduced but not by more than 20,000 tons in total which leaves a daily deficiency of about 600 tons for six months.
Problem is thus in first place whether L of C can be stepped up still further and secondly if no increase possible in L of C how reduction in requirements can be effected.
Whole question discussed today with Benthall, Member in Chargé War Transport Department and with American Generals Ferris and Bissell.
Majority of improvements to L of C into Assam are long term projects which cannot help our immediate problem such as doubling railway lines, building increased River Fleet, and increasing capacity of River Ports. Much of this is already in hand but will not be effective before October 1944. Proposals for short term improvement are as follows:
(i) Increasing number of train paths by improving the operation of the railway system through supervision by Military personnel, and by relaxing certain precautions thus taking risks which would not be acceptable in normal times. War Transport Department is immediately starting inquiry into possibility of this. Representative of Wheeler will be associated with inquiry and also Representative of Transportation Directorate.
(ii) Immediate increase in locomotive and rolling stock on Bengal and Assam Railway from other parts of India to be replaced by fresh stock from U.S.A. on arrival. War Transportation Department is inquiring into possibility.
(iii) Quickening of turn round on river by installation of navigational lights and of night running. We are inquiring into this.
(iv) Flying Stores for China from Calcutta into Assam Airfields. This can only be done with help of additional aircraft from U.S.A.
While we may be able to achieve some improvement by these methods or by a combination of them and are doing all we can to do so, I feel it is probable that an over-all deficiency will remain. The L of C into Assam has never fulfilled expectations and this must be borne in mind. Possibility must, therefore, be faced of having to call off either the advance from Ledo or the advance from Imphal or both.
If we call off the former, and the Road Construction project, troops required for defensive would probably be not more than one infantry brigade which was all we had there before the Americans took over this area. This would effect a saving of between four and five hundred tons a day. If we call off the latter we should still need two divisions forward for defensive purposes, with one division in reserve. This would mean a saving of only about two hundred tons a day. Thus if we remain on the defensive on both fronts saving effected would be six or seven hundred tons a day against anticipated deficiency of about six hundred tons a day. We should then be able to meet fully demands of air ferry route and later in the season when construction of airfields is reduced, while capacity of L of C is increased by fresh stock from U.S.A. and completion of pipelines, we should have a growing capacity to spare for increased lift to China.
Question now arises whether the land operation in Arakan, Cudgel and the assault on Akyab should be carried out without operations in North at the same time. We should carry out raids and simulate activity by all means in our power in order to induce Japanese to believe that we were contemplating an offensive in the North. I consider therefore that it is unlikely that they would appreciate that we had abandoned the Imphal advance in time to enable them to alter the dispositions of their land forces substantially before the monsoon. As far as land forces are concerned, therefore, containing effect would be approximately the same as that of the Imphal advance. Unlikely however that a similar containing effect would be exerted in case of Air Forces. On balance I do not think abandonment of the land and air operations in Northern Burma should rule [out] Arakan operations and Akyab.
I do however consider that Akyab should not be attempted without the land operations in Arakan. Examination of the L of C required for the latter reveals that this also is insufficient for full requirements. Bottleneck is Chittagong. Everything possible is being done to increase capacity here by extension of wharfage use of country craft at improvised jetties etc. but it appears unlikely that it will ever be possible to carry out both the raising to heavy bomber standard of the Eastern Bengal Group of airfields before next monsoon and the Arakan operation.
The A.O.C.-in-C. points out that if these airfields are not completed to heavy bomber standard in the winter of 1943-44 they will not be ready for operations either this year or in 1944-45. They are needed at once for deeper penetration in Burma. They would be essential for increased air offensive over Burma and particularly were it decided to carry out at a later date an airborne attack on Mandalay or Rangoon and they may also be required for supplying Allied Air Forces in China. I am not in a position to assess the relative probabilities of these operations.
I am in doubt as to whether priority given at Trident to air operations means that preparations for air operations mentioned above should take absolute precedence over land operations which I have been instructed to carry out this winter. But if Akyab is to take place this winter I consider that Arakan operations must have precedence over raising the standard of these airfields.
It remains to consider whether, if Akyab is unavoidably delayed, the Arakan operations should be given priority over the raising of the standard of Eastern Bengal airfields. I think that the Arakan operations might be successful by themselves and that we should have a fair chance of capturing Akyab overland. Setting aside any nonmilitary reasons for its capture main military reasons are:
(i.) containing effect on Japanese forces in Burma and particularly Air Forces.
(ii.) possession of a more advanced airfield. These must be weighed against completion of airfields in Eastern Bengal.
We should maintain continuous air offensive against Burma and in particular Akyab whether amphibious operations were postponed or not. Japanese would remain in uncertainty until weather had deteriorated to such an extent as to make it difficult for them to move large forces. Consider therefore containing effect is likely to be the same in either case.
Regarding airfields A.O.C.-in-C. would prefer raising Eastern Bengal airfield to heavy bomber standard to acquiring new airfields at Akyab.
In these circumstances therefore there would be little military advantage in taking Akyab beyond raising morale and killing Japanese. Do not consider this would justify failure to raise standard of airfields. If therefore Akyab were abandoned I should recommend that the Arakan operations also should be abandoned and priority given to airfields.
Fully appreciate anxiety which exists to start large-scale offensive operations against Burma this coming winter. The course of planning for even the limited operations intended in Northern Burma has brought me to the conclusion that best military course would be to avoid such operations and to concentrate on supply to China by air, at the same time increasing and conserving strength of India and preparing resources for large scale amphibious operations against Malaya next winter. Preparation for these would enable us to bring training of troops to high standard. If they were definitely decided on for 1944-45 it would be desirable to divert resources earmarked for Akyab to taking Andamans in the late spring of 1944. We are urgently examining the possibility of this and will signal results to you.
Americans are examining effect of changed situation on their plans in more detail and I cannot send final recommendations until results of War Transport Departments inquiry regarding railways is known but it seems desirable to let you know probabilities at once.
This signal has been discussed with and agreed to by C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet who is in Delhi and A.O.C.-in-C.