America at war! (1941--) -- Part 2

Ferguson: Where women have failed

By Mrs. Walter Ferguson

Captives spared the third degree on military data

Use of coercion forbidden by international pact; food packages from the Red Cross eke out camp provisions
By Dick Thornburg, Scripps-Howard staff writer

3 dead, 79 injured –
Super bomber crash probed

800-ft swath cut through Marine buildings

U.S. sergeant gets 5 medals in single day

Previous award makes him one of most decorated

WAACs incensed by sloth of the female parasites

Lag is recruiting drive gives enlisted women the idea that conscription is due
By Blair Moody, North American Newspaper Alliance

Ernie Pyle V Norman

Roving Reporter

By Ernie Pyle

Tunisian front – (by wireless)
The thing that Americans in Africa had fought and worked six months to get came today. When it did come, it was an avalanche almost impossible to describe. The flood of prisoners choked the roads. There were acres of captured material.

I’ll try to tell you what the spirit of the day was like.

It was a holiday, though everybody kept on working. Everybody felt suddenly free inside, as though personal worry had been lifted. It was like we used to feel as children on the farm, when parents surprised us by saying work was finished and we were going to the state fair for a day. And when you have looked all day goggle-eyed at more Germans than you ever expected to see in your life, you really feel like you have been to a fair.

Today you saw Germans walking alone along highways. You saw them riding, stacked up in our jeeps, with one lone American driver. You saw them by hundreds, crammed as in a subway in their own trucks, with their own drivers. And in the forward areas our fairgrounds of mile after mile contained more Germans than Americans. Germans were everywhere.

German officers weep

It made you a little lightheaded to stand in the center of a crowd, the only American among scores of German soldiers, and not have to feel afraid of them. Their 88s stood abandoned. In the fields, dead Germans still lay on the grass. By the roadside, scores of tanks and trucks still burned. Dumps flamed, and German command posts lay littered where they had tried to wreck as much as possible before surrendering.

But all those were sideshows – the big show was the mass of men in strange uniform, lining roads, swamping farmyards, blackening fields, waiting for us to tell them where to go. High German officers were obviously down in the mouth over the tragic end of their campaign. We saw some tears. Officers wept over the ghastly death toll taken of their men during the last few days. Officers were meticulously correct in their military behavior, but otherwise standoffish and silent.

Not so the common soldiers. I mingled with them all day and sensed no sadness among them. Theirs was not the delight of the Italians, but rather an acceptance of defeat in a war well-fought – why be surly about it?

Germans are friendly

They were friendly, very friendly. Being prisoners, it obviously paid them to be friendly; yet their friendliness seemed genuine. Just as when the French and Americans first met, the Germans started learning English words and teaching us German words.

But circumstances didn’t permit much communion between them and our troops. Those Americans who came in direct contact with them gave necessary orders and herded them into trucks. All other Americans just stared curiously as they passed. I saw very little fraternizing with prisoners. I saw no acts of belligerence and heard neither boos nor cheers. But I did hear a hundred times:

This is the way it should be. Now we can go on from here.

Americans and Germans trade cigarettes

German boys were as curious about us as we were about them. Every time I stopped a crowd would form quickly. In almost every group was one who spoke English. In all honesty I can’t say their bearing or personality was a bit different from that of a similar bunch of American prisoners. They gave us their cigarettes and accepted ours, both for curiosity’s sake. They examined the jeep, and asked questions about our uniforms. If you passed one walking alone, usually he would smile and speak.

One high American officer told me he found himself feeling sorry for them – until he remembered how they had killed so many of his men with their sneaking mines, how they had him pinned down a few days ago with bullets flying; then he hated them.

A ‘sucker for guy who loses’

I am always a sucker for the guy who loses, but somehow it never occurred to me to feel sorry for those prisoners. They didn’t give you a feeling they needed any sorrowing over. They were loyal to their country and sorry they lost but, now it was over for them, they personally seemed glad to be out of it.

Tonight, they still lounge by thousands in fields along the roads. Our trucks, and theirs too, are not sufficient to haul them away. They will just have to wait their turn to be taken off to prison camps. No guards are necessary to keep them from running off into the darkness tonight. They have already done their running and now they await our pleasure, rather humbly and with a curious eagerness to see what comes next for them.

U.S. Navy Department (May 12, 1943)

Communiqué No. 374

South Pacific.
On May 11:

  1. During the early morning, a group of Army Flying Fortress (Boeing B 17) heavy bombers bombed Japanese installations at Kahili on Bougainville Island and at Shortland Island. Fires were started at Kahili, but results of the attack on Shortland Island were not observed.

  2. Later in the morning, a force of Dauntless (Douglas SBD) dive bombers and Avenger (Grumman TBF) torpedo bombers, escorted by Wildcat (Grumman F4F) and Corsair (Vought F4U) fighters, attacked Japanese positions at Rekata Bay, on Santa Isabel Island. Two barges and one seaplane were strafed and the seaplane was set on fire.

  3. All U.S. planes returned from these operational attacks.

U.S. State Department (May 12, 1943)

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1 p.m.

United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Lord Beaverbrook

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Washington, May 12, 1943.


Conduct of the War in 1943-44

  1. We have asked for this meeting because we think the time has come to carry a stage further the combined plans agreed upon at Casablanca. We have no intention of suggesting any departure from the principles underlying the decisions taken at that Conference (see C.C.S. 155/1 and 170/2). We feel, however, that their application requires review and development in the light of the progress of the war in the last four months, the detailed studies which have been carried out, and the experience which has been gained.

Operations in the European Theater

  1. The decisions reached at Casablanca (see C.C.S. 155/1, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5) were as follows:

Operations in the European Theater will be conducted with the object of defeating Germany in 1943 with the maximum forces that can be brought to bear upon her by the United Nations.

The main lines of offensive action will be:

a) The occupation of Sicily with the object of:
(i) Making the Mediterranean line of communication more secure.
(ii) Diverting German pressure from the Russian Front.
(iii) Intensifying the pressure on Italy.

b) To create a situation in which Turkey can be enlisted as an active Ally.

(c) The heaviest possible bomber offensive against the German war effort.

(d) Such limited offensive operations as may be practicable with the amphibious forces available.

(e) The assembly of the strongest possible force (subject to (a) and (b) above and paragraph 6 below (Operations in the Pacific and Far East)) in constant readiness to re-enter the Continent as soon as German resistance is weakened to the required extent.

In order to insure that these operations and preparations are not prejudiced by the necessity to divert forces to retrieve an adverse situation elsewhere, adequate forces shall be allocated to the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters.

  1. So far as amphibious operations from the United Kingdom are concerned, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have since approved a directive to General Morgan to prepare plans, among other things, for a “full scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible.” So far as operations in the Mediterranean were concerned, the Casablanca Conference did not look beyond the capture of Sicily. It is therefore now for consideration what action should be taken in the European Theater between the capture of Sicily and the mounting of the full-scale offensive in 1944 – a period of anything up to nine or ten months – for the furtherance of the objects agreed at Casablanca which have just been referred to.

  2. It seems to us unthinkable that we should be inactive during these critical months when Russia is engaging about 185 German divisions. This is just the time when we ought to be exerting all the pressure that we can. It would be fatal to give Germany so long a breathing space in the west, and thus possibly enable her to avert collapse.

  3. In our view, the main task which lies before us this year in the European Theater is the elimination of Italy. If we could achieve this, it is our opinion that we should have gone a very long way towards defeating Germany. The break-up of the Axis would inevitably have a most serious effect on the psychological and material strength of Germany. The effects would be:

a) The withdrawal of some 35 Italian Divisions from Greece, Yugoslavia, and southern France. Germany would either have to let go of one or more of these countries, with all that this implies in loss of raw materials and prestige, and in the extension of the range of the Allied bomber offensive, or alternatively she would have to substitute German for Italian troops at substantial cost to the Russian Front.

b) The elimination of the Italian Navy would enable us to transfer very considerable naval forces from the Mediterranean to the Pacific or to the Indian Ocean, whichever is thought preferable. If we were able to take over the Italian Fleet, the naval position would be still more favorable.

c) We should be able to mount a threat through Sardinia and Corsica against the south of France in the spring of 1944, which would greatly increase the chances of success of cross-Channel operations from the United Kingdom.

d) The collapse of Italy would have a big effect on Turkey, and hasten her readiness to make common cause with the Allies.

  1. It is of course possible that we might eliminate Italy after the fall of Sicily by air action alone. We think, however, that it would be most unwise to bank on this or to transfer any substantial part of our bomber force from the United Kingdom. We therefore consider it essential that we should follow up a successful HUSKY by amphibious operations against either the Italian islands or the mainland, backed up, if possible, by operations in other parts of the Mediterranean. Only in this way can we reap the full benefit of our victories in Africa and in HUSKY, and employ the powerful and experienced Anglo-American forces gathered in the Mediterranean Theater and their assault craft. We have considered various alternatives, and have formed provisional views as to which should be undertaken. We will explain these in detail later on.

  2. The provision of the shipping required to deliver a second amphibious blow in the Mediterranean this year will of course have repercussions elsewhere and will affect BOLERO. But even if Italy collapses as a result of the first blow (HUSKY), we shall still need considerable shipping in the Mediterranean to exploit this success by installing air bases on the Italian Mainland and Islands, by increasing supplies to the Balkan resistance groups, and by speeding up our aid to Turkey. In either case some delay is likely to be caused to the buildup of BOLERO, but we believe that this disadvantage will be greatly outweighed by the fact that successful Mediterranean operations, and still more the elimination of Italy, will ease the task confronting an army landing in Europe from the United Kingdom.

  3. We do not believe that there is any method of giving effectual help to the Russian Front throughout this year other than a continuance of Mediterranean operations, and the intensification of our bomber offensive. It was decided at Casablanca that the heaviest possible bomber offensive against the German war effort should be a feature of the campaign of 1943. Nothing has occurred in the interval to alter the wisdom of this decision, and we think that Sickle should continue to have a high priority.

Pacific and Far East Theater

  1. At Casablanca it was agreed that certain operations should take place in the Pacific Theater (see C.C.S. 170/2 paragraph 5(a)), and that subject to certain reservations, plans and preparations should be made for the recapture of Burma to take place in the winter of 1943-44. The 15th November was approved as the provisional date for the ANAKIM assault. We do not know whether the experience of the last four months, and the studies which have been made by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff have caused them to confirm or modify the program for Pacific operations which was drawn up. We should like to hear their views on this. As to ANAKIM, the position is that after Casablanca, the Commander in Chief, India, was at once invited to frame the best possible plan, and to state his requirements. We are prepared to explain this plan and its implications in detail if the U.S. Chiefs of Staff so desire. We think the plan represents the best that can be made having regard to the resources which will be available. But it is necessary to say straight away that we are of the opinion that the full operation should not be attempted in the winter of 1943-44. Our main reasons are:

a) The magnitude of the assault and the scope of the operations to which it would be the prelude, are such that we do not feel able to undertake them at a critical period in the war with Germany, on whom we cannot afford to relax the pressure.

b) We are very doubtful of the feasibility of the operation at the present time. For any reasonable prospect of success it would demand a sufficiency of forces specially trained and equipped, and backed up by ample reserves of men and material. These conditions cannot be fulfilled in the coming winter.

c) Until long-term plans for the ultimate defeat of Japan have been decided upon, it cannot be assumed that the re-conquest of Burma, however desirable the political effect, especially on China and India, is indispensable from the military point of view.

d) Operation ANAKIM, even if successful in 1943-44, would not be likely to reopen the Burma Road until the middle of 1945.

  1. Although we cannot do ANAKIM this year, we recommend that everything possible should be done, with the resources available to keep up the pressure on Japan from the west and to support China. We have various alternatives to propose, and would welcome discussion of any suggestions which the U.S. Chiefs of Staff may desire to put forward.

  2. The results of our examination of ANAKIM make us feel that we should together examine more closely the method by which the defeat of Japan is ultimately to be brought about. This is essential so that all preliminary operations can be arranged to fit into the ultimate design, and so that Commanders in Chief in the Far East Theater and Indian Ocean may have a firm basis on which to frame their long-term plans and preparations. This will insure that the right sort of equipment of all kinds will be available in the necessary quantities when the time comes.


  1. It is clear that the availability of shipping will be one of the main governing factors as to what can and what cannot be done in 1943 and also in 1944. We suggest, however, that before going into details on shipping, we should clear our minds on the strategical issues, and decide, on merits, on the course of action at which we should aim. Thereafter we should examine the extent to which the shipping available will enable us to fulfill our program. We think it essential that the shipping question should be examined in detail, and settled before the Conference breaks up.

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 2:30 p.m.

United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Field Marshal Dill
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General McNarney Lieutenant General Ismay
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

May 12, 1943, 2:30 p.m.


The President welcomed Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff. He recalled that it was less than a year ago when they had all met in the White House, and had set on foot the moves leading up to TORCH. It was very appropriate that they should meet again just as that operation was coming to a satisfactory conclusion. The meeting at Casablanca had set on foot Operation HUSKY, and he hoped that this would meet with similar good fortune. He thought that the keynote of our plans at the present time should be an intention to employ every resource of men and munitions against the enemy. Nothing that could be brought to bear should be allowed to stand idle.

He then asked the Prime Minister to open the discussion.

The Prime Minister recalled the striking change which had taken place in the situation since he had last sat by the President’s desk, and had heard the news of the fall of Tobruk. He could never forget the manner in which the President had sustained him at that time, and the Shermans which had been handed over so generously had made their reputation in Africa. The British came to the present meeting adhering to the Casablanca decisions. There might have to be adjustments made necessary by our success, which also enabled us to take a longer forward view. TORCH was over, HUSKY was near, what should come next? He would put forward some views which had been formed by careful study. These would not be in the shape of fixed plans, but rather of ideas for the common stock. We had been able by taking thought together to produce a succession of brilliant events which had altered the whole course of the war. We had the authority and prestige of victory. It was our duty to redouble our efforts, and to grasp the fruits of our success. The only questions outstanding between the two Staffs were questions of emphasis and priority. He felt sure that these could be solved by mutual agreement.

He did not propose to deal with the U-boat war, and the aerial bombardment of Germany. There were no differences of opinion on these subjects, though there might be a few points of detail to be cleared up between the two Staffs. He would like to put forward for consideration a number of objectives, and questions which might focus subsequent study. The first objective was in the Mediterranean. The great prize there was to get Italy out of the war by whatever means might be the best. He recalled how in 1918, when Germany might have retreated to the Meuse or the Rhine and continued the fight, the defection of Bulgaria brought the whole of the enemy structure crashing to the ground. The collapse of Italy would cause a chill of loneliness over the German people, and might be the beginning of their doom. But even if not immediately fatal to Germany, the effects of Italy coming out of the war would be very great, first of all on Turkey, who had always measured herself with Italy in the Mediterranean. The moment would come when a Joint American-Russian-British request might be made to Turkey for permission to use bases in her territory from which to bomb Ploești and clear the Aegean. Such a request could hardly fail to be successful if Italy were out of the war, and the moment were chosen when Germany could take no powerful action against Turkey. Another great effect of the elimination of Italy would be felt in the Balkans, where patriots of various nationalities were with difficulty held in check by large Axis forces, which included 25 or more Italian divisions. If these withdrew, the effect would be either that Germany would have to give up the Balkans, or else that she would have to withdraw large forces from the Russian Front to fill the gap. In no other way could relief be given to the Russian Front on so large a scale this year. The third effect would be the elimination of the Italian fleet. This would immediately release a considerable British squadron of battleships and aircraft carriers to proceed either to the Bay of Bengal or the Pacific to fight Japan.

Certain questions presented themselves in relation to the Mediterranean. Need we invade the soil of Italy, or could we crush her by air attack? Would Germany defend Italy? Would Italy be an economic burden to us? He did not think so. Would arguments against a general conquest of Italy apply equally against a toe and heel operation to establish contact with Yugoslavia? Finally, there was a large political question for the British and United States Governments. What sort of life after the war should we be willing to accord to Italy if she placed herself unreservedly in our hands? He might observe that if Italy made a separate peace, we should have the use of Sardinia and the Dodecanese without having to fight for them.

The second objective was the taking of weight off Russia. He was much impressed by Stalin’s attitude, in spite of the stopping of the Arctic convoys. For the first time, in his recent speech, Stalin had acknowledged the efforts and victories of his Allies. But we should never forget that there were 185 German divisions on the Russian Front. We had destroyed the German Army in Africa, but soon we would not be in contact with them anywhere. The Russian effort was prodigious, and placed us in their debt – a position from which he would like to emerge. As he had already mentioned, the best way of taking the weight off the Russian Front in 1943 would be to get, or knock, Italy out of the war, thus forcing the Germans to send a large number of troops to hold down the Balkans.

The third objective had already been mentioned by the President in his opening remarks. It was to apply to the greatest possible extent our vast Armies, Air Forces, and munitions to the enemy. All plans should be judged by this test. We had a large Army and the Metropolitan Fighter Air Force in Great Britain. We had our finest and most experienced troops in the Mediterranean. The British alone had 13 divisions in that theater. Supposing that HUSKY were completed by the end of August, what should these troops do between that time and the date 7 or 8 months later, when the cross-Channel operation might first be mounted? They could not possibly stand idle, and he could not contemplate so long a period of apparent inaction. It would have a serious effect on relations with Russia, who was bearing such a disproportionate weight.

The objectives he had so far mentioned all led up to BOLERO, SLEDGEHAMMER, and ROUNDUP. By BOLERO, he meant the administration arrangements necessary for the movement and reception of large American forces in the United Kingdom. He could not pretend that the problem of landing on the Channel coast had been solved. The difficult beaches, with the great rise and fall of tide, the strength of the enemy’s defenses, the number of his reserves, and the ease of his communications, all made the task one which must not be underrated. Much, however, would be learned from HUSKY. The question arose whether anything could be done this year before the weather broke in August or September. All the British landing craft had gone from the United Kingdom to HUSKY, and owing to priority having been rightly given to SICKLE, only one U.S. division was so far available in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, plans were being made for an operation to provoke an air battle, and we were standing ready to exploit a German collapse, should this by any chance take place. He wished to make it absolutely clear that H. M. Government earnestly desired to undertake a full-scale invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom as soon as possible. They certainly did not disdain the idea if a plan offering reasonable prospects of success could be made.

The fifth objective was aid to China. As a result of Casablanca, Field Marshal Wavell had prepared the best plan he could for Operation ANAKIM, and he thought that it had some prospect of success. The difficulties of fighting in Burma were apparent. The jungle prevented the use of our modern weapons. The monsoon strictly limited the length of the campaigning season, and there was no means of bringing sea power to bear. Should, however, ANAKIM be successfully carried out, he was advised that it would not be till 1945 that the Burma Road could be reopened, and even then its capacity would not be more than 20,000 tons a month. Nevertheless, he had not gone back on the status of ANAKIM. He attached the same degree of importance as before to activity in the Indian Ocean theater of war. Was there any means by which China could be helped in 1943 other than the air route? How could this be improved? The British readily shouldered their responsibility to establish and guard the air facilities required in Assam. If further study showed that it would be better to bypass Burma, he was anxious that another means should be found of utilizing the large forces standing in India. He thought that this alternative might well be found in an operation against the tip of Sumatra and the waist of Malaya at Penang. He was most anxious that we should find in that theater some means of making use of those advantages which had been so valuable in TORCH. In that operation, sea power had played its full part; complete surprise had been possible; we had been able to seize a territory of importance which not only brought in a new Army on our side, but forced the enemy to fight in a place most disadvantageous to him. These conditions might apply to an attack on the area he had described. The fleet to cover the operation would come from the Mediterranean after the elimination of Italy. This meant that the operation could not be launched before March, 1944, which would, however, be a suitable moment from the point of view of weather.

He felt that the time had now come to study the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan. He would like once more to state the British determination to carry the struggle home to Japan. The only question was how best to do it. He thought that the United States Chiefs of Staff should lead in a joint study, on the assumption that Germany would be out of the war in 1944, and that we could concentrate on the great campaign against Japan in 1945. If the underlying strategic conception was agreed, then operations could be planned to fit in, and the requisite specialized apparatus could be got ready in time.

If, of course, Russia could be brought in against Japan, that would prove the best solution of all. Stalin had shown plain indications that Russia would want to be in at the death, but the timing of Russian action must obviously depend upon what happened to Hitler, and when.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister said that he hoped his remarks would be of use in framing an Agenda for Combined Chiefs of Staff Conferences, and would be some guide as to the emphasis and priorities which should be assigned to the various theaters of operation as well as to their relationship and reciprocal reactions.

The President expressed his gratitude to the Prime Minister for the open manner in which he had presented his views. He said that the Combined Staffs must approach their problems with open minds, giving full consideration to the priorities and relative importance of the many problems which they would consider in the course of the conferences.

The President stated that he has always been a firm believer in attrition as an effective weapon. He pointed to the North African campaign and suggested that it might not have been so successful had sufficient force been sent to capture Tunisia on the initial landing. As a result of the Tunisian campaign there will be perhaps some 200,000 enemy casualties. He felt there would have been considerably less had Tunisia been taken at the outset.

He pointed out that the United Nations are now outproducing both the Germans and the Japanese and that if we break even in our losses of airplanes and other munitions we are, in effect, forging ahead.

The President then said that with the large armies and naval forces that are available to the United Nations every effort should be made to keep them engaged with the enemy. He felt that the United Nations were losing ground when their forces remain idle.

The President expressed optimism as far as the situation in Turkey was concerned. When the Prime Minister went on his fishing trip after the Casablanca Conferences, he, the President, had been surprised by the cordial reception that the Prime Minister had received. He felt that Turkey was now in a better political position than she had ever been before. Perhaps Turkey could be brought to a favorable attitude toward the United Nations by diplomacy alone. If so, this would permit the use of her airfields for combined air operations against Ploești and the Germans’ right flank and their lines of communication. If Turkey could be brought into the war, there would be the possibility of combined operations toward the Adrianople line, thus threatening Bulgaria, and inducing that country to withdraw from the war. He felt that the Russians would welcome any effort on the part of the United Nations which would result in breaking the Germans’ lines of communication. He pointed out also that attrition would be at work during any operations from Turkey.

The President then asked “Where do we go from HUSKY?” He said he had always shrunk from the thought of putting large armies in Italy. This might result in attrition for the United Nations and play into Germany’s hand. He indicated that a thorough investigation should be made of what an occupation of Italy proper, or of the heel or toe of Italy, would mean as a drain on allied resources. At the same time, he pointed out that the Mediterranean area contained large armies of the United Nations, perhaps about a total of 25 divisions, and that these must be kept employed. He said there was not much time in 1943, because planning future operations is a lengthy procedure. The question to be decided quickly, is how to use the Mediterranean troops this year. He said that conditions in Italy are known to be precarious. Italy might drop into the lap of the United Nations, who would then have the responsibility of supplying the Italian people. Everyone was agreed that Italy must be reconstituted, but that the mistakes regarding possession of the Northern Adriatic, which occurred at the peace table after the last war, must not be repeated.

Summing up, the President said a survey should be made to determine the cost of occupying Italy or parts of it as opposed to the cost of achieving the same results by air offensives from Sicily or the heel and toe of Italy.

The President said that regardless of operations undertaken in the Mediterranean there would be a surplus of manpower. He said that this surplus should be used to build up BOLERO. Preparations for such buildup should begin at once. He felt that all were agreed that no ROUNDUP or SLEDGEHAMMER was possible of accomplishment this year, but if one or the other were to be mounted in the spring of 1944, preparations should begin now. ROUNDUP and SLEDGEHAMMER have been talked about for two years but as yet none of these operations had been accepted as a concrete plan to be carried out at a certain time. Therefore he wished to emphasize that SLEDGEHAMMER or ROUNDUP should be decided upon definitely as an operation for the spring of 1944.

The President then directed his remarks toward the Pacific. He said that at the present time a landing was being made in the Aleutians, on the Island of Attu. Approximately 3,000 men had already been put ashore. By this operation it was hoped to put Kiska in a box between Attu and Amchitka which would also result in imposing attrition on the enemy. So far, the operations in the Aleutians had resulted in a net gain to the United Nations. The operations in the Solomons and in New Guinea had had the same result.

The President said that while things are apparently going along all right in the Pacific, attention must be devoted to the length of the Japanese supply lines. He likened them to a segment of pie in which Japan proper was at the apex, and the line from the Solomons through the Dutch East Indies to Burma represented the outer crust. While there was some attrition going on against the outer crust, the most effective way to get at the Japanese shipping was to strike at the apex. So far the United Nations have done well in sinking Japanese merchant tonnage. Proof of this has been in the fact that the Japanese have been taking shipping from the Yangtze and using it, together with junks they are building, for coastal runs, in order to release coastal shipping for ocean work. Since the war started the Japanese have suffered a net loss of 1,000,000 tons of shipping or approximately one-seventh of the shipping which they had available at the beginning of the war. If they continue to lose shipping at this rate they cannot maintain the outer rim of the pie and will have to contract in their operations**. The President** said that the same was true with regard to aircraft. Attrition suffered by the Japanese air forces has resulted in their having less strength available now than at the beginning of the war.

The President repeated that the most effective way to strike the Japanese shipping was to strike it leaving Japan proper. This could best be done from bases either in China, or from China and Russia. Therefore much depends upon keeping China a going concern. He said he did not believe the Chinese were crying wolf when reporting the critical condition which exists in their country today. He said that the conference could not justify overlooking the possibility of a Chinese collapse. This brought up the question of the priority for aid to China with regard to 1943 and 1944.

ANAKIM and similar plans proposed at Casablanca might not have an effect which would be immediate enough to keep China in the war; the results of ANAKIM would not be felt until March or April of 1944 and the Burma Road would not be fully open to traffic until 1945. The necessity was for doing something for China now. The President said that the question resolves itself to assisting China by air.

The President said that to assist China by air it was essential to reconstruct and maintain the security of the airfields in Assam to the west of the mountains. They must be made secure regardless of the cost in manpower and matériel, and they must also be protected. On the east side of the mountains the Chinese are building landing fields and now have five or six fields in good condition. General Stilwell has two divisions in training for the protection of these fields. The President said that the Generalissimo does not fear a ground attack in Yunnan.

He said that air in China would accomplish three objectives: it would be able to harass Japanese troops South of Hankow or those advancing from the South against Chungking; it could harass Japanese attacks against Chungking from the North; and it could stop Japanese attacks against Chungking which might be made up the Yangtze. The President said he doubted if reliance could be placed on the Chinese army, excepting those troops being trained in Yunnan and Ramgarh. However, he thought it important to give the Generalissimo, who is the head of both the Army and the State, what he wants at this time. This, he said, is a strong buildup of the American-Chinese Air Forces. Such an air force can be built up to strike against Japanese shipping and against Japan itself. He emphasized that the Chiefs of Staff must bear in mind the political fact that China is in danger of collapse.

The President pointed out that aid to China at the present time does not have an immediate effect of taking weight off Russia but that it would have an ultimate effect when Russia joins up with the United Nations in their war against Japan. This he predicted would take place within 48 hours after Germany has been defeated.

The President said, with regard to taking weight off Russia, that the United Nations [should] continue with strategy which would compel the Germans to fight. It was for that reason that he questioned the occupation of Italy, feeling that this might result in releasing German troops now in that country. He said he felt the most effective way of forcing Germany to fight was by carrying out a cross-Channel operation.

The Prime Minister said that he did not feel that an occupation of Italy would be necessary. In the event of an Italian collapse, the United Nations would occupy the necessary ports and air bases from which to carry on operations against the Balkans and Southern Europe, but they should let an Italian Government control the country, subject to supervision on the part of the United Nations.

The President and the Prime Minister then indicated that the possibility of securing the use of the Azores was under consideration. An attempt would be made to accomplish this by diplomacy, and, if necessary, the diplomacy might be coupled with threats or an actual surprise arrival of forces. They thought that an arrangement might be made with Portugal whereby the use of the Azores could be obtained on a rental basis. However, they indicated that the question was largely political.

Field Marshal Sir John Dill asked if consideration had been given to the present attitude of Spain.

Both the President and the Prime Minister indicated that they felt that Spain was much relieved by the turn of events in Africa, that it was becoming more favorably disposed toward the United Nations, and that it had in mind constantly the threat of the American forces facing Spanish Morocco.

The President announced that the next meeting would be on Friday, 14th May, at 2:00 p.m., at which time it was desired to have the Commanders in Chief, India, and Generals Stilwell and Chennault present to discuss conditions in the Burma-China Theater.

The Pittsburgh Press (May 12, 1943)

High Far East war leaders arrive in U.S.

President, Prime Minister to review strategy on all fronts
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

778818_view 05_04
Third visit to Washington finds Prime Minister Winston Churchill riding to the White House with President Roosevelt after his arrival in the United States yesterday. The meeting of the two war leaders is their fifth.

Washington –
New Allied blows against Japan were believed to be foreshadowed by disclosure today that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill brought to Washington his top military and naval officers in India.

There was no doubt that Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt, master strategists of Allied arms, will review plans for all fronts, including the invasion of Europe. They also face several knotty political problems such as the Polish-Russian relations and the Giraud-de Gaulle friction.

But the apparent emphasis on the war against Japan in this fifth Roosevelt-Churchill conference tended to confirm belief of many observers here that the plans for direct blows against the European continent have been pretty well perfected before this.

Wavell in party

Membership of the Churchill party was disclosed by the White House today.

With the Prime Minister were Field Marshal Sir Archibald P. Wavell (Commander-in-Chief of British forces in India and former commander of their army in the Middle East), Adm. Sir James Somerville (Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Fleet), and Air Mshl. Sir Richard Peirse (commanding British air officer in India).

Other members of Mr. Churchill’s party included Gen. Sir Alan Brooke (Chief of the Imperial General Staff), Adm. of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound (First Sea Lord), Air Chf. Mshl. Sir Charles Portal (Chief of the British Air Staff).

Also Lord Leathers (Minister of War Transportation), Lord Cherwell (the Prime Minister’s statistical officer), Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay (chief staff officer to the Minister of Defense), and Brig. E. I. C. Jacob (Assistant Secretary [Military] of the British War Cabinet).

It was noted in London that no African or U.S. commanders in Britain accompanied Mr. Churchill.

White House Press Secretary Stephen T. Early said the war experts who accompanied the Prime Minister would meet with the American staff chiefs, while Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill hold a series of intensive conferences.

Heavy blows pledged

From time to time, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill will probably participate in the Joint Staff meetings.

The presence of Marshal Wavell, Adm. Somerville and Marshal Peirse was taken as a strong indication that considerable emphasis in the talks between the President and the Prime Minister will be on the Far East and the South Pacific. Mr. Roosevelt has promised that heavy blows will be struck this year against the Jap homeland.

Obviously, however, they will also review Allied strategy all over the world, particularly in the light of the Allied cleanup in Tunisia.

Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, U.S. Commander-in-Chief in China, Burma and India, has been in Washington recently and is believed still in this country. He may join the war planning sessions.

Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, chief of the U.S. 14th U.S. Army Air Force in China, has also been in Washington.

Mr. Roosevelt and the Prime Minister conferred at great length last night after dinner, and resumed their talks again today.

To dine at Embassy

Tonight, the Prime Minister will go to the British Embassy to have dinner with his Ambassador, Lord Halifax, while the President is entertaining President Edvard Beneš of Czechoslovakia, who will arrive at the White House at 4:30 p.m. today to be an overnight guest.

Mr. Roosevelt and the top leaders of the U.S. government will greet President Beneš upon arrival and later attend a stag state dinner for him at the White House tonight.

Only the brief announcement of Mr. Churchill’s arrival was made last night, but observers here believe that in addition to European military plans they are giving keen attention to these matters:

  1. Plans to reemphasize their “unconditional surrender” decision reached at Casablanca last January and to reassert their lack of interest in peace offensives, except on that condition, whether emanating from the Axis directly or through such agents as Gen. Francisco Franco of Spain.

  2. Incessant demands of the Australian and Chinese leaders that more material, especially planes, be thrown into the war against Japan. some sources suggested that the comparative case of the Allied victory in Tunisia might possibly permit an increase in the Pacific allotments determined at the Casablanca Conference.

  3. The Soviet Union’s relations with the rest of the United Nations, which have been clouded by Soviet-Polish friction. A Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin meeting might be in the cards later, but was not considered probable in the immediate future.

  4. Post-war plans. In this connection, it was noted that the international food conference, first big meeting that will bear on post-war matters, will begin next week at Hot Springs, Virginia.

Two schools of thought

Washington generally had not expected another Roosevelt-Churchill meeting until mid-summer. Two conflicting schools of thought developed as to basic purposes of the meeting at this time:

One said:

He has come to map out with the President the new offensive in Europe, now that German resistance in Tunisia is out of the way.

The other said:

The next move was decided when Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill met at Casablanca. This time they are meeting to take up what goes on after the invasion of European continent gets underway.

In any event, it seemed certain that the improved military situation resulting from the Axis rout in Tunisia was bound to figure in the new calculations here.

Meanwhile, reports from London predicted that the present White House parleys would lead to a Churchill-Roosevelt meeting with Premier Joseph V. Stalin of the Soviet Union, such reports obviously based on the “second mission to Moscow” of former U.S. Ambassador Joseph E. Davies who is bearing a highly-secret message from Mr. Roosevelt to Mr. Stalin.

End near for Axis in Africa

British capture Germans’ commander in Tunisia, Gen. von Arnim
By Virgil Pinkley, United Press staff writer

Many of Axis prisoners will work on U.S. farms

Some Germans from Tunisia already sent to America; Canada to share in influx
By Phil Ault, United Press staff writer

Italy reported seeking peace

Secret broadcast tells of parley with Americans
By John A. Parris, United Press staff writer

He says he’ll go, now –
When Lambertson berated Roosevelt boys, own son was fighting Army duty

Congressman who attacked war record of President’s family has some explaining to do as story comes out

WAVE sentry ‘bops’ drunk, wins citation

Ruml-type tax to be speeded

Senate debate due to end by last of week

Meat prices cut as much as 20¢ pound

Another 10% rollback likely in June; new ceilings start Monday

House-revised strike bill due for early approval

Stiffened Connally measure would prohibit Lewis-called walkout in coal mines

Donay is found guilty of aiding traitor Stephan

No limit placed on letters sent to war captives

Delivery is fairly certain in Germany and Italy, word from Japan is less definite; methods are outlined
By Dick Thornburg, Scripps-Howard staff writer

WAACs to observe first anniversary