Crisis in India reservoir of bitterness
By A. T. Steele
India is a real problem for the Allies, especially with Japan watching every move and likely to pounce on that troubled and divided country at any moment. This map shows how the various races and religions split India into small segments of strife.
Almost a year before Pearl Harbor, Arch Steele, of the Chicago Daily News foreign staff, took a trip into Japan and dug up startling facts about Tokyo’s plans against the United States. Then, to avoid censorship, he slipped back into China, and filed his now-famous series on “Japan Takes Aim.”
Since then, Mr. Steele’s accurate and uninterrupted war coverage has carried him into many battle zones – including Russia’s. And now – back in the United States for the first time in four years – he has written a fact-filled series on the task that faces us before we can come to final grips with Japan. The following is the last article in the series.
In the previous six articles, Mr. Steele discussed the difficulties facing the United Nations in the Far East. China, he pointed out, cannot last much longer unless she gets help on a large scale. She is near to economic collapse. He also said that Russia and Japan probably wouldn’t go to war against each other soon because the Japanese will not strike unless they are certain that the Reds will fold up quickly. That, he asserts, is not likely to happen.
Despite his 21-day fast, Mohandas K. Gandhi’s civil disobedience movement continues to lose ground in India, though the great and complex political issues which provoked it are no nearer solution than ever before.
With the indestructible Mr. Gandhi slowly regaining his weight and strength, tension has eased. But there has been no draining off of the huge reservoir of public bitterness built up in India by the events of the past six months.
If anything, the fast has shown how bleak are the prospects for the duration of the war, of any kind of a political situation which would bring the people of India wholeheartedly into the United Nations’ war effort.
Gandhi, who has referred to fasting as the “finest weapon” in his armory, doubtless hoped that his three weeks’ ordeal would reinvigorate his disheartened legions. The effect, while noticeable, was surely below expectations.
The British police had no difficulty in maintaining control. Nevertheless, Gandhi’s supporters claim gains. They point out that the fast brought the Indian problem back into the world spotlight and that Gandhi has won new prestige among the Indian masses. Once again, Gandhi has fooled the doctors, who said that his old body could not stand that much punishment. Millions of Hindus are convinced anew that Gandhi is favored by the gods – perhaps actually one of them. Gandhi-ites also claim that popular bitterness against the British has increased because of British refusal to release Gandhi unconditionally when he lay at death’s door.
The British, for their part, feel that they have scored an important moral victory and that their strong-hand policy has been vindicated. They have shown the Congress Party this time that they will not be coerced into making concessions.
Moreover, they believe their position has been strengthened through the deflation of tenacious Indian hopes that the United Nations might intervene at the critical moment. Some Indians had expected much from William Phillips, President Roosevelt’s personal emissary to India. Now they know that the Phillips appointment does not connote any marked change in American policy toward India.
No police problem
Gandhi’s movement will doubtless drag on, in a furtive, underground way, until the old man should decide to call it off – if ever. As long as Gandhi lives, no other man in India has the power to halt it completely. Yet, while the movement is still a thorn in the British side, it is no longer a critical police problem. The bloody, widespread disorders of half a year ago have given way to sporadic bombings, sabotage and non-violent demonstrations on a not very important scale. The British and Indian police have done an effective
It is hard to see how the Gandhi rebellion could be successfully resuscitated in any strength except in one of two ways. If, for instance, the Japanese should invade, or attempt to invade India, the British would be placed with the choice of appeasing the Indian people or of coping with a morale problem just as serious as that which cost them so dearly in Burma. British leaders have been confident, however, that the Japanese would not attack India. Doubtless, this conviction has been partly responsible for the firm line they have taken. There is another possibility which could perhaps stir up the Indians again. That is a Gandhian fast to the death. Even that would probably bring no change in British policy. British police now feel sure of their ability to handle any situation that might arise.
Several deterrents
There are many reasons why Gandhi’s movement has diminished in vitality. Prompt and vigorous police suppression and the arrest of all important Congress leaders after the August meeting in Bombay dealt a terrific blow to the revolt before it had even got well started. Then, too, there were thousands of thinking Indians who, while wholly sympathetic with Gandhi’s demand for independence, felt that the Congress resolution was too strongly couched and that this was no time for a rebellion which might seriously impede the Allied war effort.
Much had been expected from the United Nations. The lack of response from the United States and other countries discouraged many Indian nationalists. Another deterrent to sincere disciples of Gandhi’s non-violent doctrines was the bloody nature of the rioting and the bloody way in which it was put down. Gandhi had anticipated much support from Indian officeholders and soldiers of the Indian Army, thousands of whom are enthusiastic sympathizers with Gandhi’s cause. But reluctance to risk well-paying jobs and, in some cases, doubt as to the wisdom of civil disobedience at this time prevented them from joining in any numbers. The uncompromising opposition of the all-Indian Muslim League, which also demands independence, but on its own terms, also helped stall the movement. Except in isolated cases, the big Muslim minority (about 90,000,000) has remained coolly aloof.
Jap propaganda
The rebellion began when India seemed threatened with invasion, but British victories in Africa and the halting of the Japanese in Burma removed this threat almost overnight. This changed the views of many Indians on the probable outcome of the wear and did much to strengthen the British hand. Unquestionably, it was Gandhi’s intention to so dislocate the Indian war effort at a critical moment that the British would have to yield. Yet in the great mass of material that the British have published on the recent trouble, there is no evidence of any connection between the Congress Party leadership and the Japanese.
I am convinced that the majority of Congress leaders were sympathetic to the Allied cause. Acute distrust of Britain’s promises for the future and acute dissatisfaction over the Cripps plan, combined with the feeling that there would never be a better opportunity to force the British hand, led them to demand immediate freedom. There is of course a pro-Axis minority in India which exults over every Allied setback and swallows whole the propaganda focused on India from Japanese and German broadcasting stations. As for the impoverished masses, they are depressed and disinterested but easily whipped up to any point of view exploited by their popular leaders so long as it offers promises of more rice and fewer taxes.
The Muslim League is adamant in its demand for Pakistan (Muslim self-determination) and the Congress leaders are in jail. A large section of Indian opinion, including many who do not endorse Gandhi’s recent actions, believe that the old man has undergone a change of heart and that his release might facilitate a settlement. The British are unconvinced.
There is no doubt about Indian bitterness. I have encountered it everywhere in that country and among all races and sects. It stems partly from the inflexible British attitude (London refuses to budge from the Cripps offer) and partly from the fact that India has been drawn into a war which is being fought in the name of freedom though it remains a subject state.
The British say:
We can do nothing until the political parties compose their differences.
The Muslims say:
We can do nothing until Gandhi recognizes Pakistan.
Gandhi’s Congress Party says:
We can do nothing until the British show more willingness to compromise.
American correspondents, trying to make sense out of this hopeless muddle, say, simply, “Oh, Lord!”
