De Gaulle going to Washington
…
Kärntner Nachrichten (August 17, 1945)
Die Sicherung des Weltfriedens
Bedeutsame Erklärungen britischer Staatsmänner
…
Suzukis Rat: Abkehr von der Vergangenheit
Admiral Suzuki, der zurückgetretene japanische Ministerpräsident, hat heute eine Rundfunkrede an das japanische Volk gehalten. Suzuki forderte die Japaner auf, die Vergangenheit ruhen zu lassen und alle persönlichen Betrachtungen über die Lage Japans beiseite zu schieben. Es gelte nun, die Existenz der japanischen Nation zu retten.
Wie aus Bern berichtet wird, hat der frühere japanische Militärattaché in Italien heute Selbstmord begangen.
L’Aube (August 17, 1945)
Hirohito se porte garant de la fin des hostilités
Un prince du sang devient premier ministre
…
L’AMÉRIQUE ANNULE LES COMMANDES DE GUERRE
…et s’emploie à ramener son industrie aux œuvres de paix
Mais 400.000 ouvriers sont déjà sans travail
…
U.S. State Department (August 17, 1945)
740.00119 PW/8-1745
President Truman to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union
[Washington,] 17 August, 1945
Replying to your message of August 16, I agree to your request to modify General Order No. 1 to include all the Kurile Islands to the area to be surrendered to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East. However I should like it to be understood that the United States Government desires air base rights for land and sea aircraft on some one of the Kurile Islands, preferably in the central group, for military purposes and for commercial use. I should be glad if you would advise me that you will agree to such an arrangement; the location and other details to be worked out through the appointment of special representatives of our two governments for this purpose.
Regarding your suggestion as to the surrender of Japanese forces on the Island Hokkaido to Soviet forces, it is my intention and arrangements have been made for the surrender of Japanese forces on all the islands of Japan proper, Hokkaido, Honshu, Shekoku, and Kyushu, to General MacArthur.
General MacArthur will employ Allied token forces, which, of course, includes Soviet forces, in so much of a temporary occupation of Japan proper as he considers it necessary to occupy in order to accomplish our Allied surrender terms.
740.00115 PW/8-645
The Department of State to the Swiss Legation
Washington, August 17, 1945
Memorandum
The Department of State transmits for the information of the Swiss Legation in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States a statement, with enclosures, prepared by the War Relocation Authority of the United States Department of the Interior, concerning the present situation of Japanese nationals residing in War Relocation Centers. Reference is made in connection with the enclosed statement to a recent telephone conversation between Mr. Weingartner of the Legation of Switzerland and Mr. Marcy of the Department of State during the course of which Mr. Weingartner requested information regarding War Relocation Centers in the United States.
If the Legation of Switzerland desires further information regarding War Relocation Centers the Department of State will be pleased to endeavor to obtain such information.
It is suggested that for the present the Legation of Switzerland send communications destined for the War Relocation Authority or Japanese evacuees in War Relocation Centers through the special War Problems Division of the Department of State which will promptly forward them.
The information contained in the attached statement with its enclosures is for the information of the Swiss Legation and it is requested that it not be communicated to the Japanese Government.
[Enclosure]
Statement Prepared by the War Relocation Authority
[Washington,] August 6, 1945
The following observations are submitted for the information of the Swiss Legation which may find them of interest:
In the first place, following the evacuation it was necessary for the War Relocation Authority to give major attention to providing food, clothing, housing, medical care, and other necessities to the persons whose evacuation from the West Coast was ordered by the military authorities. To this end relocation centers were established as places of temporary residence pending relocation. Almost immediately, however, provision was made for the relocation of some of the evacuees. In 1943 nearly 17,000 left centers on indefinite leave, and a considerable number left centers for temporary periods to engage in various types of work or to take care of miscellaneous personal business outside of centers. In 1944 an additional 18,500 left the centers on a permanent basis and several thousand left the centers temporarily to work or to take care of personal business.
In 1943 it became evident that there was a sharp cleavage between certain groups of evacuees. A majority adhered to the American way of life. Their sons enlisted in, or were drafted into, the American Army, and in various ways they lent their support to the American war effort and programs. Another group, on the other hand, by refusal to accept induction into the armed services through Selective Service procedure (applicable only to citizens), by requesting exchange to Japan, and by various other means, indicated their adherence to Japanese ideology and nationalistic aims. In the interest of maintenance of order in the Centers, and for the good of the great mass of evacuees, it became necessary, therefore, to designate one of the centers as a segregation center to which a majority of the pro-Japanese group were transferred. This was the period of “Segregation.”
The program of the Authority, up to this time, including Segregation, is summarized in Senate Document No. 96 entitled “Segregation of Loyal and Disloyal Japanese in Relocation Centers,” two copies of which are enclosed herewith, as Enclosure 1.
In December of 1944 an entirely new development occurred, consistent with the progress of the war, namely, the rescinding of the exclusion orders by the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command of the U.S. Army. This development permitted a renewed emphasis upon relocation and required the reshaping of a number of our policies in order that the evacuees might take their places as promptly as possible in the main currents of American life.
The principal policy change involved was a decision to close all relocation centers, other than Tule Lake, within six months to one year after revocation of the mass exclusion orders. With the great majority of the evacuees free to return to their former homes or resettle anywhere else in the United States, the Authority felt that it was neither necessary nor desirable to operate the centers beyond a period which would make reasonable allowance for resettlement of the remaining population. Three years of experience in managing the centers had indicated clearly that they could not and should not be more than temporary shelters. Isolated as they have unavoidably been from the main currents of American life, the centers have always been abnormal communities, destructive of initiative, self-respect, and personal dignity. Their effect on the people living in them, and particularly on the young people of school age, has been to retard rather than accelerate both their personal development and their adjustment to American social and economic life. Moreover, the acute manpower shortage and the plentiful employment opportunities for evacuees throughout the nation made it doubly desirable to complete the relocation job and liquidate the centers at the earliest practicable date. Accordingly, the Authority enlarged its relocation staff and now maintains 57 offices serving the principal cities, States, and production areas in the United States. The field offices expedite relocation, assist in locating housing, and provide for the various types of assistance evacuees need in regaining their position as self-reliant, self-supporting members of American society.
These changes and announcements are documented and explained by enclosures numbered 2, 3, 4, and 5.
At the present time certain persons are precluded from returning to their homes or from relocating in the United States generally. The War Department, through the Western Defense Command, has excluded certain individuals from the West Coast Areas and has required that certain others be detained. Most of those ordered detained are already at Tule Lake and the remainder are to be transferred there in the very near future. The result will be that as soon as this transfer has been accomplished, every person at any of the other centers will be free to leave and will not in any sense be detained. Consequently, visits by the representatives of the Protecting Power to Centers other than Tule Lake should no longer be necessary.
As indicated above, we are convinced that the welfare of the evacuees requires their absorption into American life as soon as possible. Quite recently we have worked out a definite schedule for closing the centers on a gradual basis between October 15 and December 15 of the current year. Our reasons for taking this action have already been indicated briefly and are set forth in some detail in enclosures 6 (see pages 12 and 13 especially) and 7. Our field staff is prepared to meet the many and varied problems involved in assisting individual families to accomplish their individual relocation.
The original evacuation affected approximately 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, two-thirds American citizens, and one-third alien. As of March 31, 1945, there were approximately 74,800 residents of centers, of whom 58 percent were citizens and 42 percent were aliens. Enclosure 8 presents these data by Centers. Enclosure 9 is the most recent report, “Net Absences on Leave by Center,” and presents the current picture on relocation, which in recent weeks has averaged in the neighborhood of 1,000 per week.
740.00119 PW/8-1745
Memorandum by Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln of the War Department to the Assistant Secretary of State
Washington, 17 August, 1945
General Hull has discussed the matter of a suitable reply to the Japanese on their latest message with the Chief of Staff and also with the Navy. They are in agreement that a suitable reply is substantially as that in the attached draft, which is the same as the one discussed yesterday in General Hull’s office. As discussed yesterday, the War and Navy Departments are agreed that requests of the kind in this Japanese message should hereafter be addressed to the Supreme Commander.
For your information, there is enclosed a copy of General MacArthur’s message on the subject. You will note the extremely high classification of his message.
G. A. LINCOLN
[Annex]
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Chief of Staff
[Manila,] 17 August, 1945
The Secret terms proposed by the Japanese are fundamentally violative of the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration and would completely traverse the previous attitude not only of the Allied Nations but of Japan herself in her initial successes and conquests of this war. The incidents of Bataan and Singapore are still fresh in the minds of the World. The enemy suggestion goes even to the point of preferential repatriative treatment of Japanese soldiers. The suggested ameliorations would relieve Japan of much of the physical and psychological burdens of defeat. I believe that public opinion throughout the Allied world would not support favorable consideration of these stipulations. In my opinion the Potsdam provisions should be put into effect as drawn and the suggestions made by the Japanese Government should be rejected. In China I believe the stipulations made by the Generalissimo as to the details of the surrender should be supported by the Allies.
740.00119 PW/8-1645
The Secretary of State to the Swiss Chargé
Washington, August 17, 1945
Sir: In response to your note to me of August 16 transmitting certain observations and requests of the Japanese Government with respect to the carrying out of the Japanese surrender, I have the honor to request that you transmit to the Japanese Government the following reply:
Such information as the Japanese Government requires to carry out the surrender arrangements will be communicated by the Supreme Commander at appropriate times determined by him. The four Allied Powers have subscribed to the Potsdam Declaration which assures the return to the homeland to peaceful occupations of all Japanese armed forces who surrender to United States commanders, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten, and Soviet commanders as directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. This return will be arranged through the Supreme Commander and will take place after the Japanese armed forces have been disarmed by the Allied commanders to whom they surrender and when Japanese and other transportation can be made available.
Accept [etc.]
[JAMES F. BYRNES]
740.00115 PW/8-1745: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland to the Secretary of State
Bern, August 17, 1945
[Received August 17 — 12:54 p.m.]
3914
American Interests – China. Ranking Foreign Office official just telephones according telegram Fontanel all CIs Shanghai liberated August 15. Because prevailing confusion resulting from great enthusiasm and joy, Fontanel requested internees remain camps several days until arrival Allied troops. He adds situation calm.
HARRISON
740.00119 PW/8-1145
The Department of State to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
[Washington,] August 17, 1945
AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN SEAC AFTER CESSATION OF JAPANESE RESISTANCE
I. The Problem
Whether there should continue to be American participation in SEAC after the cessation of Japanese resistance.
II. Facts Bearing on the Problem
The question is raised in Colombo’s telegram No. 179, August 11, whether, from the Department’s point of view, it would be desirable for American participation in SEAC to continue after cessation of Japanese resistance.
The SEAC theatre has been extended to include all of Thailand, the southern part of Indochina up to the 16th latitude, and the Netherlands East Indies. Japanese forces in these areas are expected to surrender to SACSEA or his deputy.
It is expected that a brief period of time will elapse in Thailand during which this Government will prepare to reestablish formal relations with a legal Thai Government and during which British and Thai officials will negotiate to bring to an end their mutual state of war. It is probable that no United States Foreign Service officers will be regularly established in Thailand during this interim and the only possible source of information of political importance from American observers will be through officials attached in some capacity to SEAC, perhaps OSS officials.
It is expected that a considerable period of time will elapse in the other areas before arrangements will be completed for the reestablishment of normal administration. During that period it is probable that the only sources of information of political importance from American observers will be through officials attached in some capacity to SEAC, perhaps OSS officials.
III. Recommendation
That there should continue to be American participation in SEAC after the cessation of Japanese resistance lasting at least until United States Foreign Service officers are established at regular posts in Thailand and other areas.