19 August 1942
Atlantic Ocean : German submarine U-507 stopped Brazilian sailing vessel Jacyra at 0530 hours, forced her crew of six man crew to abandon ship, and scuttled her at 0800 hours with charges. At 0907 hours, U-510 torpedoed and sank British merchant ship Cressington Court 200 miles off French Guiana; 8 were killed, 36 survived.
Off Azores , Blucher wolfpack attack on Convoy Sierra Leone SL-118 continues. German submarine U-406 attacked Allied convoy SL-118 450 miles west of Portugal at 1622 hours, fatally damaging and sinking British cargo ship City of Manila with torpedoes; 1 was killed, 95 survived.
Caribbean Sea , Gulf of Mexico : German submarine U-162 attacked an Allied convoy 40 miles west of Grenada, torpedoed and sinking US cargo ship West Celina at 0437 hours (1 was killed, 43 survived); at 1007 hours, U-564 joined in on the attack, torpedoed and sinking British cargo ship Empire Cloud (3 were killed, 51 survived) and British tanker British Consul (2 were killed, 40 survived).
German submarine U-217 sank British sailing vessel Sea Gull D. with her deck gun 75 miles southeast of Bonaire island in the southern Caribbean Sea at 2112 hours; 3 were killed, 71 survived.
Dieppe , France : 5,000 Canadian troops, 1,000 British Commandos, 50 US Rangers, and 58 British Churchill tanks landed at Dieppe, France at 0500 hours in Operation Jubilee via 9 landing ships, covered by 8 destroyers, many smaller warships, and many aircraft. British and Americans were successful in destroying a German battery near Varengeville, but British and Canadian troops on a nearby beach were pinned down, suffering 1,179 killed before the missionâs end. As German aircraft counterattacked, British destroyer HMS Berkeley and several smaller ships were sunk. The operation was called off by 1100 hours in dismal failure. 2,190 Allied troops were captured along with all of the tanks and heavy equipment. The British RAF lost 106 aircraft. The Germans suffered only 311 killed and 48 aircraft shot down in the defense.
On the night of 18/19 August, RAF Coastal Command carried out anti-surface vessel (ASV) patrols of the coast from Boulogne to Cherbourg; after sunrise the patrols were carried out by fighters. The Allied fleet left the south coast of England during the night, preceded by minesweepers from Newhaven clearing paths through the English Channel, followed by the flotilla of eight destroyers and accompanying Motor Gun Boats escorting the landing craft and Motor Launches.
The initial landings began at 04:50 on 19 August, with attacks on the artillery batteries on the flanks of the main landing area. These were Varengeville â Sainte-Marguerite-sur-Mer (known as Orange Beach) by No. 4 Commando, Pourville (Green Beach) by the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Queenâs Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, Puys (Blue Beach) by the Royal Regiment of Canada, and Berneval (Yellow Beach) by No. 3 Commando. On their way in, the landing craft and escorts heading towards Puys and Berneval ran into and exchanged fire with a small German convoy at 03:48. The Allied destroyers HMS Brocklesby and ORP ĆlÄ
zak noticed the engagement, but their commanders incorrectly assumed that the landing craft had come under fire from the shore batteries and did not come to their rescue.
Yellow Beach : No. 3 Commando was assigned the task of attacking the Goebbels Battery, landing on the eastern flank, under Durnford-Slaterâs command. The battery was located near Berneval-le-Grand, about half a mile from the sea with steep cliffs in front of it. It was decided that No. 3 Commando would land on two beaches to the east and west of the battery, from which gullies rose towards the battery and which would provide concealment while the Commandos approached the battery
As the convoy of landing craft and other vessels ferried the Commandos across the English Channel; however, they had a chance encounter with a German tanker escorted by a number of armed trawlers which proceeded to fire upon them. In the confusion that followed a number of the landing craft were damaged and forced to turn back, while others were reported as missing and believed sunk. As a result the decision was made to abandon the attack.
Nevertheless, unbeknown to their commanders and each other, and having lost communications, the seven landing craft that had been reported missing made for their assigned beaches, determined to press on with the attack. In the end two parties landed, one party consisting of six craft carrying approximately 120 men under Captain R.L Willis landed on the beach opposite Le Petit Berneval to the east of the batteryâYellow Iâwhile the other, consisting of only one craft of 20 men from No. 6 Troop under Captain Peter Young landed to the west at Yellow II.
Of the 120 men that landed at Yellow I, 37 were killed, 81 were captured, mostly after having been wounded, and just one managed to evade capture and return to Britain.[28] Among those that were killed was Lieutenant Edward Loustalot, a United States Army Ranger, who was the first American soldier to be killed in the European theatre of operations. The smaller party, under Young, however, fared better and managed to advance within 200 yards (180 m) of the battery, however, due to lack of numbers they were unable to launch an assault on the battery and instead proceeded to harass the gunners for a number of hours and distract them from their purpose of firing on the anchorage before they were forced to withdraw back to their boats. They succeeded, albeit briefly, to divert the guns from their task of firing on the ships off the coast.
Orange Beach : No. 4 Commando made the crossing to Dieppe on board HMS Prins Albert. The crossing was uneventful and at 04:50 just before daybreak Group one landed unopposed.[33] Using two Bangalore torpedoes to blow a hole in the barbed wire, they managed to scale the cliffs. As they approached the battery at 05:45 it opened fire on the main landing force coming ashore at Dieppe. This was 30 minutes before Group one was expected to be in a position but Mills-Roberts responded by speeding up the advance to get their guns into action sooner. Once in position they opened fire on the battery with their mortars, Bren machine guns and sniper rifles. One of the mortar bombs landed inside the battery and exploded the stored charges, putting the guns out of action.
Group two had an opposed landing being greeted by machine gun fire from the two pillboxes guarding the beach. Leaving a section from A Troop to deal with them the rest of the Group ran the 1.5 miles (2.4 km) to the rear of the battery, bypassing German infantry positions on the way. The A Troop section having finished off the pillboxes, set out for Orange one beach, ambushing a German patrol en route. While this was happening Lovat and the other two troops, were preparing to assault the battery from different directions. The men from B Troop approached from behind the anti-aircraft tower, as they could still see some Germans moving about on it, they detached three men to deal with them. At the same time they stumbled across and captured a machine gun post. At 06:15 the assault started, F Troop discovered a group of Germans forming up to put in their own assault on the fire base. Charging into them they were dispersed without loss to the commandos. The troop continued their advance, moving between some buildings and an orchard, when they were themselves caught in the open by heavy gun fire. Two men in the lead the troop commander Captain Pettiward and Lieutenant McDonald were killed while Troop Sergeant Major Stockdale was wounded. It was during this action that the already wounded Captain Porteous, acting as the liaison officer between the two groups was awarded the Victoria Cross.
The two Groups were in position, when a pre arranged strafing attack by the Royal Air Force commenced, this signalled an increasing in the rate of fire from Group one. At 06:30 a very flare fired by Lovat signalled the start of the assault. Group one ceased firing and B and F Troops charged the battery with bayonets fixed. The objective for B Troop was the battery buildings, while F Troop targeted the guns. Captain Porteous now commanding F Troop was wounded again, this time in the thigh but urged his men on. He was shot for the third time and passed out just as the guns were captured. Demolition experts from F Troop destroyed the guns with pre-formed charges while B Troop searched the battery buildings for intelligence materials. Carrying their wounded with them and escorting prisoners both troops withdrew through the fire base. Still in contact with the Germans both groups of commandos made it to Orange One beach and at 08:15 were taken off by the LCAs. They crossed the channel without incident arriving at Newhaven docks at 17:45 the same day.
For their part in the raid Lovat was awarded the Distinguished Service Order and Mills-Roberts the Military Cross. The cost to the Commando was at first thought to be 23 dead but six were only severely wounded and were eventually reported to be prisoners of war. No. 4 Commandosâ assault on the battery was the only successful part of the whole operation. The War Office claimed it as âa classic example of the use of well trained infantryâŠand a thoroughness in planning, training and executionâ
Blue Beach : The naval engagement between the small German convoy and the craft carrying No. 3 Commando had alerted the German defenders at Blue beach. The landing near Puys by the Royal Regiment of Canada plus three platoons from the Black Watch of Canada and an artillery detachment were tasked to neutralize machine gun and artillery batteries protecting this Dieppe beach. They were delayed by 20 minutes and the smoke screens that should have hidden their assault had already lifted. The advantages of surprise and darkness were thus lost, while the Germans had manned their defensive positions in preparation for the landings. The well-fortified German forces held the Canadian forces that did land on the beach. There was a twelve-foot-high sea wall, topped with barbed wire and studded by concrete pillboxes, from which machineguns covered the beach. All the defending troops were on high alert by the time the first Canadian landing craft came into view. Thomas Hunter was one of the first to make the shoreline:
âThe raid was supposed to be in the dark, but we were delayed because a ship got tangled up. It was broad daylight as we approached the beach. They dropped the front and we jumped in. We were up to our chests in water, and I had to pull a buggy with the three-inch mortar and the mortar bombs up the beach.Machinegun fire swept through the men, cutting down one after another. We were slaughtered. We were up against cliffs either side, and no way out, pillboxes with machineguns at either end of the beach, machineguns just raking away killing everybody that came off the ships.â
"The guy who was pulling the buggy with me got shot, and I couldnât pull it by myself because it weighed three hundred pounds, so I left it.Hunter crawled into a little niche in the cliffs and started aiming rifle fire at the tiny slits in the concrete pillboxes.Jimmy Elliot was firing into one and I faced another one, and we were just firing into them. We had rounds and rounds of ammunition, we just kept loading. I donât know how they missed us. They were throwing grenades, one came near me but I threw it in the water. I was very calm. Thereâs nothing you can do about it, I told Elliot. âCanât do much about it now, weâre stuck here, weâll just survive as long as we can.â
âAll along the beach men were lying wounded with medical orderlies bandaging them as best they could.We honestly didnât expect to live. Just stay quiet and see what happens, I thought, and then, How did I get into this mess ?â
As soon as they reached the shore, the Canadians found themselves pinned against the seawall, unable to advance. With a German bunker placed to sweep along the back of the seawall, the Royal Regiment of Canada was annihilated. Of the 556 men in the regiment, 200 were killed and 264 captured.
Green Beach : On Green beach at the same time that No. 4 Commando had landed at Orange Beach, the South Saskatchewan Regimentâs 1st Battalion was headed towards Pourville. They beached at 04:52, without having been detected. The battalion managed to leave their landing craft before the Germans could open fire. However, on the way in, some of the landing craft had drifted off course and most of the battalion found themselves west of the River Scie rather than east of it. Because they had been landed in the wrong place, the battalion, whose objective was the hills east of the village and the Hindenburg Battery artillery, had to enter Pourville to cross the river by the only bridge. Before the Saskatchewans managed to reach the bridge, the Germans had positioned machine guns and anti-tank guns there which stopped their advance. With the battalionâs dead and wounded piling up on the bridge, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Merritt, the commanding officer, attempted to give the attack impetus by repeatedly and openly crossing the bridge, in order to demonstrate that it was feasible to do so. However, despite the assault resuming, the South Saskatchewans and the Queenâs Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, who had landed beside them, were unable to reach their target. While the Camerons did manage to penetrate further inland than any other troops that day, they were also soon forced back as German reinforcements rushed to the scene. Both battalions suffered more losses as they withdrew; only 341 men were able to reach the landing craft and embark, and the rest were left to surrender. For his part in the battle, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt was awarded the Victoria Cross.
Pourville Radar Station : One of the objectives of the Dieppe Raid was to discover the importance and performance of a German radar station on the cliff-top to the east of the town of Pourville. To achieve this, RAF Flight Sergeant Jack Nissenthall, a radar specialist, was attached to the South Saskatchewan Regiment landing at Green Beach. He was to attempt to enter the radar station and learn its secrets, accompanied by a small unit of 11 men of the Saskatchewans as bodyguards. Nissenthall volunteered for the mission fully aware that, due to the highly sensitive nature of his knowledge of Allied radar technology, his Saskatchewan bodyguard unit was under orders to kill him to prevent him from being captured. He also carried a cyanide pill as a last resort.
After the war, Lord Mountbatten claimed to author James Leasor, when being interviewed during research for the book Green Beach, that âIf I had been aware of the orders given to the escort to shoot him rather than let him be captured, I would have cancelled them immediatelyâ. Nissenthall and his bodyguards failed to overcome the radar station defences but Nissenthall was able to crawl up to the rear of the station under enemy fire and cut all telephone wires leading to it. The operators inside resorted to radio to talk to their commanders which was intercepted by listening posts on the south coast of England. The Allies were able to learn a great deal about the improved accuracy, location, capacity and density of German radar stations along the Channel coast which helped to convince Allied commanders of the importance of developing radar jamming technology. Only Nissenthall and one South Saskatchewan of the party returned to England.
Red And White Beaches : Main Canadian landings : Preparing the ground for the main landings, four destroyers were bombarding the coast as landing craft approached. At 05:15, they were joined by five RAF Hurricane squadrons who bombed the coastal defences and set a smokescreen to protect the assault troops. Between 03:30, and 03:40, 30 minutes after the initial landings, the main frontal assault by the Essex Scottish and the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry started. Their infantry was meant to be supported by Churchill tanks of the 14th Army Tank Regiment landing at the same time, but the tanks arrived on the beach late. As a result, the two infantry battalions had to attack without armour support. They were met with heavy machine-gun fire from emplacements dug into the overlooking cliffs. Unable to clear the obstacles and scale the seawall, they suffered heavy losses. Captain Denis Whitaker of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry recalled a scene of absolute carnage and confusion, with soldiers being cut down by German fire all along the sea wall while his commanding officer, Colonel Bob Labatt, desperately tried to use a broken radio to contact General Roberts while ignoring his men. When the tanks eventually arrived only 29 were landed. Two of those sank in deep water, and 12 more became bogged down in the soft shingle beach. Only 15 of the tanks made it up to and across the seawall. Once they crossed the seawall, they were confronted by a series of tank obstacles that prevented their entry into the town. Blocked from going further, they were forced to return to the beach where they provided fire support for the now retreating infantry. None of the tanks managed to return to England. All the crews that landed were either killed or captured.
Unaware of the situation on the beaches because of a smoke screen laid by the supporting destroyers, Major General Roberts sent in the two reserve units: the Fusiliers Mont-Royal and the Royal Marines. At 07:00, the Fusiliers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Dollard MĂ©nard in 26 landing craft sailed towards their beach. They were heavily engaged by the Germans, who hit them with heavy machine gun, mortar and grenade fire, and destroyed them; only a few men managed to reach the town.Those men were then sent in towards the centre of Dieppe and became pinned down under the cliffs and Roberts ordered the Royal Marines to land in order to support them. Not being prepared to support the Fusiliers, the Royal Marines had to transfer from their gunboats and motorboat transports onto landing craft. The Royal Marine landing craft were heavily engaged on their way in with many destroyed or disabled. Those Royal Marines that did reach the shore were either killed or captured. As he became aware of the situation the Royal Marine commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Phillipps, stood upon the stern of his landing craft and signalled for the rest of his men to turn back. He was killed a few moments later.
During the raid, a mortar platoon from the Calgary Highlanders, commanded by Lieutenant F. J. Reynolds, was attached to the landing force but stayed offshore after the tanks on board (code-named Bert and Bill) landed. Sergeants Lyster and Pittaway were Mentioned in Despatches for their part in shooting down two German aircraft and one officer of the battalion was killed while ashore with a brigade headquarters.
Corporal Laurens Pals landed in the middle of Red beach. All around him were bodies and broken-down tanks.
âThe barges, soon as they hit the beach, they were lucky to get ashore at all. Some of them, instead of pumping water out of their bilges, you could see they were pumping blood. Then there was the continuous noise: dogfights overhead, planes hitting the water right alongside of you and bombs and shells.â
Pals pulled his injured friends out of the water and carried them to a makeshift field hospital in one of the captured buildings. The Canadians had charged into a deathtrap and there was little they could do about it but try to bring small-arms fire on to the German positions and wait for evacuation.
At 1100 Pals was ordered to surrender. He walked behind the one German prisoner his unit had managed to take, holding a white flag.Of the 4,963 Canadians who had crossed the sea, 3,369 were killed, wounded or captured.
At 09:40, under heavy fire, the withdrawal from the main landing beaches began and was completed by 14:00.
At 04:16 six Bostons attacked German coastal artillery in the twilight which led to the results not being observed. Soon afterwards 14 Bostons flew to Dieppe to drop smoke bombs around the German guns on the eastern heights, bombing the Bismarck batteries between 05:09 and 05:44 with a hundred and fifty 100 lb (45 kg) smoke bombs at 50â70 ft (15â21 m), flying through a storm of anti-aircraft fire. A smoke screen 800â1,000 yd (730â910 m) drifted 4â5 mi (6.4â8.0 km) seawards, thickened by the smoke of a burning field of wheat. Six Bristol Blenheim bombers from 13 Squadron and one from 614 Squadron dropped 100 lb (45 kg) phosphorus bombs south of German FlaK sites. Nine of the twelve Bostons were damaged, two crashed on landing and one Blenheim smoke layer from 614 Squadron was damaged and the pilot wounded, the aircraft crashing on landing and bursting into flames. Just before 08:00 two squadrons of cannon-armed Hurricanes were ordered to attack E-boats coming from Boulogne; they were accompanied by two fighter cover squadrons.
The airfield at Abbeville-Drucat was attacked by 24 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses, escorted by four squadrons of USAAF Spitfire IXs at 10:30 putting it out of action for âtwo vital hoursâ. After the attack, a wing of Typhoons made a feint towards Ostend. The Mustangs reconnoitred outside the main area looking for reinforcements on the roads to Dieppe and from Amiens, Rouen, Yvetot and Le Havre. Flying from RAF Gatwick, they contacted the HQ ship then, having flown a sortie, passed information to the HQ ship before returning to Gatwick and phoning report to the air commander. Reconnaissance sorties were stopped after 12:00. Although taken by surprise, the German fighters soon began to attack the air umbrella. The RAF was moderately successful in protecting the ground and sea forces from aerial bombing but were hampered by operating far from their home bases. Spitfires were at the limit of their range, with some only being able to spend five minutes over the combat area. One German FQ-190 fighter bomber hirt and sank Royal Navy destroyer HMS Berkeley.
As more German aircraft appeared, the number of British aircraft over Dieppe was increased from three to six squadrons and at times up to nine squadrons were present. German submarine trawler UJ-1404 Franken was rammed by a Royal Navy motorgunboat MGB 338 then sunk by gunfire from destroyer HMS Brocklesby.
Six squadrons (four British, two Canadian) flew the Spitfire Mk IX, the only British fighter equal to the Fw 190, on its operational debut at Dieppe. During the battle, Fighter Command flew 2,500 sorties over Dieppe. The plan to centralise information gleaned from German radar, W/T and R/T and other transmissions failed because the Luftwaffe operation against the landing overwhelmed the reporting system and the war room at 11 Group HQ was overwhelmed with reports as the Luftwaffe reaction increased. RAF Kingsdown was not informed about developments and failed to identify German fighter reinforcements arriving from all over France and the Low Countries.
The capture of a copy of the Dieppe plan allowed the Germans to analyse the operation. Rundstedt critised the planâs rigidity, saying that âthe plan is in German terms not a plan, it is more a position paper or the intended course of an exerciseâ Other senior German officers were equally unimpressed; General Konrad Haase considered it âincomprehensibleâ that a division was expected to overrun a German regiment that was supported by artillery, ââŠthe strength of naval and air forces was entirely insufficient to suppress the defenders during the landingsâ. General Adolf-Friedrich Kuntzen could not understand why the Pourville landings were not reinforced with tanks where they might have succeeded in leaving the beach. The Germans were unimpressed by the Churchill tanks left behind; the armament and armour were compared unfavourably with that used in German and Soviet tanks.
The Luftwaffe was pleased with how it had performed during the air battle. One report judged the FW-190, which formed the bulk of the air defence, to be âin every way suitable as a fighter-bomberâ. It ascribed its good performance despite its marked numerical superiority to the âaggressiveness and better training of the German fighter pilotsâ. The Luftwaffe had been so active during the battle that only 70 of the 230 airframes available at the start of the day were combat ready by dayâs end. The Luftwaffe had consumed all its 20mm cannon ammunition available in the West, so much so that there was not enough for routine flight operations in the next couple of days.
The Germans were pleased with their successful defence whilst noting faults in their own communications, transport and location of support forces but recognised that the Allies were certain to learn some lessons from the operation and set about improving the fixed defences.[19] As the overall theatre commander in the West, Rundstedt was adamant that the Germans must learn Dieppeâs lessons. He was anxious that the Germans were not left behind in learning from Dieppe: âJust as we have gained the most valuable experience from the day of Dieppe, the enemy has learnt as well. Just as we evaluate the experience for the future, so will the enemy. Perhaps he will do this to an even greater extent because he has paid so dearly for itâ.
The Dieppe raid also provoked longer-term strategic decisions. In October, Hitlerâs high command produced a âMemorandum Regarding Experiences in Coastal Defenceâ, which was provoked in large part by Dieppe. This document provided a framework for German commanders to plan coastal defence in the future. It laid down, amongst other principles, that air superiority was the key to a successful coastal defence strategy.
For Allies , Dieppe became a textbook example of âwhat not to doâ in amphibious operations and laid the framework for the Normandy landings two years later. Dieppe showed the need for
-preliminary artillery support, including aerial bombardment
-surprise
-proper intelligence concerning enemy fortifications
-avoidance of a frontal attack on a defended port
-proper re-embarkation craft.
While the Canadian contingent fought bravely in the face of a determined enemy, it was ultimately circumstances outside their control which sealed their fate. Despite criticism concerning the inexperience of the Canadian brigades, scholars have noted that even seasoned professionals would have been hard-pressed under the deplorable conditions brought about by their superiors. The commanders who planned the raid on Dieppe had not envisaged such losses. This was one of the first attempts by the Western Allies on a German-held port city. As a consequence, planning from the highest ranks in preparation for the raid was minimal. Basic strategic and tactical errors were made which resulted in a higher than expected Allied (particularly Canadian) death rate.
To help future landings, the British would develop specialist armoured vehicles for engineers to perform tasks protected by armour. Because the tracks of most of the Churchill tanks were caught up in the shingle beach, the Allies began to study beach geology where they intended to land and adapting vehicles for them. The Allies changed their view that capturing a major port was necessary to establish a second front; the damage inflicted on a port to capture it and by the Germans firing demolition charges would make it useless afterwards. Prefabricated Mulberry harbours were to be built and towed to beaches during the invasion.
While the RAF were generally able to keep German aircraft from the land battle and the ships, the operation demonstrated the need for air superiority as well as showing âmajor deficiencies in RAF ground support techniquesâ and this led to the creation of an integrated tactical air force for army support.
This is the first timeâ, mocked Hitler, âthat the British have had the courtesy to cross the sea to offer the enemy a complete sample of their weapons.â Later however, Hitler told his commanders: âWe must realize that we are not alone in learning a lesson from Dieppe. The British have also learned. We must reckon with a totally different mode of attack and at quite a different place.â
El Alamein , Egypt : One idea came up by Montgomeryâs Chief of Staff Brigadier Freddie de Guingand and Montyâs Chief of Intelligence Brigadier Bill Williams was planting a misleading fake map on edge of Axis minefields on No Manâs Land at Alamein line inside a damaged armored car. Eighth Army headquarters was aware that Rommel and Panzer Army Afrika were frantically trying to get hold any kind of intelligence about British defences at Alamein line before the attac since Axis intelligence resources like Col. Bonnar Belar reports from Cairo encrypted byt US State Department âBlack Codeâ that was decoded by Axis decoders or destruction of German Signal Company 621 during First Battle of Alamein at Tel El Eisa Ridge on 10th July 1942. The map was obviously put there to be captured by Germans and designed and drawn by British military intelligence to deceive the enemy. The aim was to deceive the Axis by displaying the southern sector of Alamein line ( the sector between Alam Nayil hill and Qaret el Himeimat box) as hard ground suitable for tanks and motorized vehicles and protected by a thin minefield and not held strongly.
Actually it was quite opposite. Southern sector of Alamein line south of Alam el Halfa was soft sand , highly unsuitable for armor and motorized / mechanized operations and British engineers planted some very deep minefield with multiple belts in that sector which was not displayed on planted map at all. They also dug heavily on high ground above Alamein at Alam El Halfa ridge , put 17 pounder anti tank guns of 44th Infantry Div. and 8th Armored Brigade plus elements of 7th Armored Division. Montgomery was expecting Axis attack from this location and wanted to manipulate enemy to assault on that sector.
The map planting operation was carried out on night of 19-20 August 1942. A âgoingâ map was a specially coloured map produced by the Survey Branch showing what parts of the desert were possible for vehicles and which areas were impassable. The map was specially drawn up to show that a wide flanking move around the Alam el Halfa position would be hard âgoingâ, while an advance against the south of the position would be relatively easy âgoingâ. The map was âagedâ with folds, creases, tea and oil stains and given to an 11th Hussar armoured car reconnaissance patrol. The patrol drove within sight of the German lines at Ruweisat ridge and attracted some fire, at which point the crew of the armoured car faked a breakdown. The crew bailed out, ran away to the safety of another vehicle in the patrol and sped off, leaving the map and several other documents behind. At morning British recon observed an Axis patrol arrived to damaged car and retrieved the map. Later that day General Brian Horrocks commanding 13th Corps in this sector informed Montgomeyâs Chief of Staff Brigadier Freddie de Guingand that âenemy took the eggsâ Reply âLets wait the chicks out of them thenâ
At the headquarters of Panzer Army Afrika on 21 August there was almost festive mood for this sudden intelligence boon they got just before their offensive on Alamein line would start ten days later , showing exact topography and defences British had on the sector exactly Afrikakorps would attack just like they needed. Rommelâs Chief of Staff General Fritz Bayerlein in exhilarant mood claimed âThat is extraodinary , the road to Alexandria has opened to us.â All German assault planning mostly based on this captured map.