| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Major General Smith | General Brooke |
Smith anticipated that a solution to the problems regarding future strategy would be put forward which would limit operations in the European area for the benefit of the Pacific Theater.
U.S. State Department (May 19, 1943)
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General McNarney | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Admiral Noble | |
| Vice Admiral Horne | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Major General Smith | Major General Holmes | |
| Major General Streett | Captain Lambe | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Brigadier Porter | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Colonel Smart | Brigadier Macleod | |
| Commander Freseman | ||
| Commander Long | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Redman | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Commander Coleridge | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup |
May 19, 1943, 10:30 a.m.
Secret
Admiral Leahy suggested that it might be preferable to eliminate the words “and in the light of the probable operation and employment of the French forces” in the conclusion to item 6 of the 87th Meeting.
The British Chiefs of Staff agreed with this view.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 87th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held on Tuesday, 18 May 1943, subject to the deletion of the words “and in the light of the probable operation and employment of the French forces” at the end of the conclusion to item 6.
Admiral Leahy stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff wished to defer consideration of CCS 232/1.
Admiral Leahy asked for the comments of the British Chiefs of Staff on the United States Planners’ paper, CCS 235.
Sir Alan Brooke said that it appeared from the two papers before the Committee that there were certain basic factors on which the U.S. and British Staffs were in agreement. On others there were differences of opinion which must be eliminated.
With regard to the target date for cross-Channel operations, April 1 had been selected for two reasons. This date coincided with the conclusion of the fourth phase of the bomber offensive, and it was the earliest practicable from the point of view of weather. He would like to suggest, however, that April 1 might be too early a date to select. At that time the Russian Front was likely to be static since it was the period of the thaw. The weather conditions 0in western Europe would not be as favorable on that date as later, say the end of May or early June, which would also coincide with the end of the thaw in Russia. If the first of May or the first of June was accepted as the target date, the buildup in the United Kingdom would also be further advanced.
Though in the United States paper the elimination of Italy was considered and accepted as a possibility, yet no appreciation was given as to the steps necessary to deal with this or to take advantage of it. We might be called upon by some political party other than the Fascists to enter Italy, or we might be confronted with complete collapse and a state of chaos. In either case we should be faced with a decision as to what action was necessary to take advantage of this situation, and the result such action would have on other operations. There were obvious advantages in going into Italy which could be used as a naval and an air base, but how far we should be drawn in was a matter for discussion. There were great advantages in obtaining the northern plains for use as an air base. German air defense was not organized on this sector, and its occupation would force the Germans to detach forces to protect the northern and western frontiers of Italy. We should also examine the possibility of limiting the extent of our occupation of Italy and examine the magnitude of the commitments and the action required to implement our plans.
The next point in the United States proposals was the period of inactivity on land for a period of some six to seven months after HUSKY. In paragraph 5 c it was pointed out that Germany intended to concentrate on the defeat of the Russian Armed Forces in 1943 and that Germany would either fail or succeed in Russia this summer. This year was the most critical time for Russia, and we must take all possible steps to assist her. It would, he felt, be most difficult to justify failure to use available forces for this purpose.
Without crippling ROUNDUP in 1944, we could, he believed, with the forces now available in the Mediterranean achieve important results and provide the greatest measure of assistance to Russia in this critical period and at the same time create a situation favorable for cross-Channel operations in 1944.
It was difficult from paragraph 17 of the paper to visualize the shape of operations to defeat Germany, but it appeared that it was proposed to capture ports to enable a direct buildup from the United States. This concept, he believed, would present considerable difficulties since a study of this problem had shown that the sustenance of the forces used to cover these ports would absorb the larger part of their capacity. After the capture of a bridgehead, Cherbourg might be seized, but the provision of the necessary forces to cover this would be difficult unless the Germans were greatly weakened or unable to find reserves. For this reason active Russian operations were essential. If the Russians suffered defeats in 1943, the possibility of any landing was bad.
In conclusion, he felt that the first of May or the first of June was a better target date for ROUNDUP since this would be the period when the summer fighting in Russia would be starting. By maintaining pressure with limited forces in the Mediterranean, German troops estimated at some 20 to 30 divisions would, by the elimination of Italy, be dispersed and tied down.
He would like to add one minor point. The United States’ buildup envisaged would, he believed, require at an early date additional SOS troops, possibly even at the expense of SICKLE, to prepare the depots to receive them. This was necessary since the manpower situation in England was very serious.
Admiral Leahy said that he understood the British proposal to be for Mediterranean operations and a magnified SLEDGEHAMMER. He was interested to know what effect the British proposals had on the ANAKIM operation since he believed some form of operation to help China to be essential.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British proposals for Mediterranean operations contemplated only a deduction of some 3½ to 4 divisions from the forces available for ROUNDUP. Landing craft was a critical item, and the shortage would anyhow necessitate the assault going in on a relatively narrow front. In any event it was not proposed to move any forces from the Mediterranean for use in ANAKIM since all the troops required were already in India, but any operations in Burma would be hampered by a shortage of shipping, naval covering forces, and landing craft. If it was decided only to open the Ledo Road to China, then, of course, naval operations could be dispensed with, but this operation would probably be at the expense of the capacity of the air route. Before discussing Burmese operations in detail, he felt it wise to await the report of the Combined Staff Planners.
General Marshall said that he personally believed that the postponement of the target date for ROUNDUP to the first of May would be acceptable in view of its relation to Russian operations, and the extra time given for the buildup. He agreed also that the action required in the event of the collapse of Italy must be studied and preparations made to meet it.
He agreed with Sir Alan Brooke’s view on the importance of helping Russia in 1943, but he believed that it would take some time to mount any operation subsequent to HUSKY which itself might not be completed until September. We should, therefore, be helping Russia up until the end of the period of the German campaign.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that he considered that operations in the Mediterranean, with a consequent diversion of German forces, were important throughout the entire year.
General Marshall, commenting further on the British plan, believed that the calculated buildup through the ports was pessimistic. Experience had shown that estimated port capacities were likely, in practice, to be doubled.
In general, he believed that the British plan magnified the results to be obtained by Mediterranean operations and minimized the forces which would have to be used and the logistic requirements. It was too sanguine with regard to the results of enemy reaction, and in this connection, it must be remembered that in North Africa a relatively small German force had produced a serious factor of delay to our operations. A German decision to support Italy might make intended operations extremely difficult and time consuming.
General Marshall then turned to detailed comments of the British plan. Paragraph 2 a visualized it as essential for invasion that the initial assault must be on a sufficiently large scale to enable the rate of our buildup to compete with that of the enemy. In this connection a deteriorating German situation was visualized earlier in the paper. As he saw it, the first step was aimed, not at the immediate defeat of the German Army, but at the establishment of a bridgehead which would have results not only psychologically, but on the U-boat campaign, and would provide airfields, giving better bases for operations against the enemy which in turn would result in the destruction of a growing percentage of the enemy’s air fighting capacity. These were immediate and important results, and these, rather than an immediate advance to the Rhine, should be our first objective. He did not believe that the British paper gave sufficient weight to the devastating effect of our air bombardments with the resulting diminution not only of Germany’s power but of her ability rapidly to build up forces in western Europe. The effects of the bombing offensive were becoming more and more apparent daily.
Paragraph 7 of the British paper, while showing the limitations imposed on cross-Channel operations by lack of landing craft, did not sufficiently stress the expenditure of these craft in Mediterranean operations. The limitations of landing craft production in the United States must be remembered. In addition, the need for these craft for Operation ANAKIM was not brought out.
In paragraph 27 it was suggested that Ploești could not be attacked except from bases in Italy. This matter had, of course, been discussed at the previous meeting when it had been agreed that an attack could be carried out from bases already in our hands.
In paragraph 35 he believed that the Italian people’s will to deal with the Allies was overestimated. If Germany decided to support her to the full, serious delay might be imposed on our plans, our resources would be sucked into the Mediterranean, and we should find ourselves completely involved in operations in that theater to the exclusion of all else.
With regard to the proposal in paragraph 38, that, during the period of confusion after the collapse of Italy, we should secure a bridgehead at Durazzo, he believed that such an operation would so commit us that through shipping and landing craft limitations no other important operations would be possible.
The summary of commitments contained in paragraph 42 might be an accurate estimate but it was axiomatic that every commander invariably asked for more troops than were originally estimated as being necessary. We should, he believed, if Mediterranean operations were undertaken, find ourselves overwhelmed with demands for resources over and above our original estimates.
He had read the British estimate on the shipping requirements to sustain Italian economy in the event of her collapse. He believed that these were too optimistic and that some 32 to 40 sailings a month would be required. It must be remembered that there was a large Italian element in the United States who were politically powerful and who would not permit the undue curtailment of supplies to Italy.
He believed that the shipping requirement for the BOLERO buildup was larger than had been estimated. Even if the personnel and cargo shipping required was available, the limitations of escorts would curtail the full BOLERO buildup if operations in the Mediterranean continued. If operations in any magnitude were undertaken in the Mediterranean after HUSKY there would, in all probability, be no landing craft available to be returned to the United Kingdom for cross-Channel operations.
In general, he considered that the British paper throughout was over-pessimistic with regard to the possibilities of cross-Channel operations, particularly in so far as the results of our vast air power and its relation to ground operations. On the other hand, in considering Mediterranean operations, the British paper was very optimistic with regard to the forces required, the Axis reaction and the logistic problem.
Admiral King, with reference to the suggestion that the target date for ROUNDUP should be postponed to the 1st May or 1st June, agreed that the weather would be better at a later date but considered that to achieve the maximum results in relation to the operations on the Eastern Front, it should take place before the thaw finished. The target date was seldom met, but he believed that it would be wise to plan the target date for 1 May which would be reasonable in all the circumstances.
At this point all officers with the exception of the Combined Chiefs of Staff themselves, left the meeting.
After a full discussion the Secretaries were recalled.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Informed the Secretaries of the lines on which draft resolutions were to be drawn up.
b. Instructed the Secretaries to prepare these draft resolutions for their consideration at a meeting to be held later that day.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General McNarney | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Redman | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Commander Coleridge |
May 19, 1943, 4:30 p.m.
Secret
The Committee considered the draft resolutions contained in CCS 237 and agreed to certain amendments which are incorporated below.
(These resolutions to be subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 237/1.)
At this point the Secretaries entered the meeting.
In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, Admiral Leahy said that he understood the term ANAKIM to mean operations in Burma and not to cover other operations based on India against such places as Sumatra or the Malayan Peninsula. The Chinese believed that they had received a firm promise that the British and Americans would, towards the end of 1943, undertake operations in Burma aimed at opening a road to China. He personally now accepted that the original operations which included the capture of Rangoon were impracticable, but he believed nevertheless that an operation to open a land route to China must be undertaken. This might take the form of attacking in North Burma with a view to capturing Mandalay and opening a route through Ledo, at the same time seizing Akyab and Ramree Island.
In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, Sir Alan Brooke said that the Andaman Islands contained only one small airfield and their capture, except as part of large-scale operations, was not worthwhile.
Sir Charles Portal said that despite the additional aircraft promised there was still a deficiency of 80 transports for the new HUSKY plan. He had discussed the subject with General Smith who was most anxious that every possible step should be taken to provide them. If trained crews were the bottleneck the Royal Air Force could provide them. He suggested that this matter might be further discussed at a future meeting, say Friday, of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
General McNarney said that crews were not the limiting factor. The additional 80 aircraft required could only be provided at the expense of the South Pacific. He believed that if the airborne troops visualized were essential to the success of the plan, these could all be dropped by using the same aircraft for two drops. He fully appreciated the timing of these drops would not be perfect, but was convinced that by this means all the airborne troops required could be put across.
General Marshall said that the theater commander must be and had been backed to the limit but in this case the limit had been reached and the aircraft required were not available.
General McNarney agreed.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General McNarney | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Brigadier Jacob |
May 19, 1943, 6 p.m.
Secret
The President inquired what progress had been achieved in the Conferences between the Chiefs of Staff.
Admiral Leahy said that he hoped that it would be possible to furnish the President and the Prime Minister with some tentative conclusions in time for the weekend. ANAKIM had only been dealt with in a very general way up to the present, but would be considered in more detail the following day.
The Prime Minister said that he was entirely in favor of carrying out whatever operations might be possible in Burma without trenching too deeply on shipping and naval resources. Of course, any troops who could be placed in contact with the enemy should not be allowed to stand idle.
General Brooke agreed.
The Prime Minister said that he very much hoped it would be possible in time to arrange for some British squadrons to take part in the operations in China. Sir Charles Portal agreed that it would be very desirable.
General McNarney said that logistical difficulties would prevent any employment of British squadrons in the near future.
The President drew attention to the importance of political and personal considerations in planning action in China.
The President inquired whether in the opinion of the First Sea Lord the U-boat war was proceeding reasonably well.
Sir Dudley Pound said that results recently had been fairly satisfactory.
Sir Charles Portal said that the air operations against submarines were being extended and it was hoped to increase not only the total sinkings by this means but also the rate of sinkings per aircraft employed.
General Marshall inquired whether the President had yet considered the possibility of securing the use of the Azores.
The President said that he had been considering the matter and he thought that one method of procedure might be to ask President Vargas of Brazil to make a secret approach to the Portuguese Government. The President then read to the meeting a telegram drafted by the Secretary of State putting the matter to President Vargas. He said that he had mentioned the idea to President Vargas when he had last seen him, and had suggested that if a token Brazilian force were sent to the Islands, the Portuguese might be enabled to transfer back to the mainland some of the good troops which they had serving in the Islands. This might be an added inducement to the Portuguese to allow the United Nations to make use of bases in their Island territory.
In the discussion that followed the following were the main points made:
a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were all agreed as to the great military advantages which would follow the occupation of the Azores and considered that no time should be lost in carrying it out.
b. Mr. Hopkins thought the chances of the Portuguese willingly conceding the use of bases in the Azores were extremely remote. He thought therefore that before any approach was made we should be quite sure in our minds that we were prepared to occupy the Islands by force if our request was refused.
c. Although on the face of it it might appear to be an action savoring somewhat of German or Japanese technique, the occupation by force of the Azores could hardly be condemned when it is remembered that Portugal, together with the other small nations depended for their very existence upon the victory of the United Nations, and that as long as the latter were debarred from making use of the Azores, their shipping was subjected to damaging attacks, against which a proper defense could not be provided. In the last war it had been found necessary to make a technical breach of neutrality by occupying the Piraeus, but the incident had eventually been settled to everyone’s satisfaction. It should not be forgotten that it was on the margin of shipping that the Allies depended for their warmaking capacity.
d. Probably the best way of handling the matter would be to have ample force available off the Islands, and to inform the Portuguese Government that the Islands would be occupied the following morning and that resistance would be hopeless. Solid inducements would be offered, and if the Portuguese desired it, the Brazilians could ostensibly provide the occupying troops.
In conclusion, it was agreed that the Prime Minister should telegraph proposals on these lines to the British Government for their comments, and that in the meanwhile the Combined Chiefs of Staff should have a plan prepared for carrying out the operation as soon as possible. The plan should be ready for examination by the President and Prime Minister on Monday, 24 May.
The Prime Minister asked how the discussions regarding the Mediterranean and BOLERO had been progressing.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had today reached an agreement which provided for a buildup in England of a sufficient force to secure a bridgehead on the Continent from which further offensive operations could be carried out. This was to involve approximately nine divisions in the assault and a buildup of twenty additional divisions. At the same time, the Chiefs of Staff had agreed that the Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as would be best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and contain the maximum number of German forces. These operations would, of course, be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Eisenhower was to be told that he might use for this purpose those forces available in the Mediterranean Theater except that four American divisions and three British divisions would be held in readiness from the first of November onward for withdrawal to take part in the operations from the United Kingdom. Sir Alan Brooke said it was also agreed that these decisions would be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a meeting in July or early in August in order that the situation might be reexamined in the light of the results of HUSKY and the situation then existing in Russia.
The President asked what the situation concerning the troops in Syria was at the present time.
Sir Alan Brooke informed the President that there were not many divisions available in Syria at this time. Most of them were being trained for HUSKY either in Syria or in Egypt. There were two Polish divisions now in Iraq.
The Prime Minister observed the Polish troops would be much improved if they could be actively engaged.
The President asked what use could be made of Yugoslav troops.
Sir Alan Brooke said that there was only a handful of these troops, about a battalion. He said the Greeks had also organized one brigade.
The Prime Minister said that he thought September of this year would be a good time to urge Turkey to permit the United Nations to use air bases in that country. He felt that the relations with Turkey would have been considerably strengthened by that time because of having supplied them with considerable munitions of war and that they might be receptive to such an approach.
In reply to a question from the President, Sir Charles Portal said that weather for flying conditions out of Turkey was not too reliable after the late summer.
The Prime Minister indicated that it would be desirable, of course, to obtain Turkey’s permission to use her air bases prior to September and thought it might be possible if Italy were to be eliminated from the war. In the latter case, we should get free access to Rhodes and the Dodecanese.
The President then indicated to General Marshall that he had sent him a message concerning General Eisenhower’s proposals that pre-HUSKY propaganda should contain a promise of peace with honor to Italy. The President and the Prime Minister both agreed that such a promise should not be made.
The Prime Minister indicated his pleasure that the Conference was progressing as well as it was and also that a cross-Channel operation had finally been agreed upon. He had always been in favor of such an operation and had to submit to its delay in the past for reasons beyond control of the United Nations. He said that he thought Premier Stalin would be disappointed at not having an invasion of northern France in 1943 but was certain that Mr. Stalin would be gratified by the results from HUSKY and the further events that were to take place this year.
The President and The Prime Minister agreed that the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be held at 5:00 p.m. on Friday, 21 May.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Canada |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | Prime Minister Mackenzie King |
This conversation followed a dinner at the White House attended by Roosevelt, Churchill, Mackenzie King, and several other unnamed guests. During the conversation, peacemaking and postwar international organizations were discussed, and Roosevelt set forth his proposal for a Supreme Council of the United Nations.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Canada | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Mackenzie King |
Roosevelt told Mackenzie King that he had sent a message to Stalin asking for a bilateral meeting. Roosevelt was concerned about Churchill’s possible reaction to the proposal.
U.S. State Department (May 20, 1943)
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General McNarney | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Stilwell | Field Marshal Wavell | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Admiral Somerville | |
| Vice Admiral Horne | Air Chief Marshal Peirse | |
| Major General Streett | Admiral Noble | |
| Major General Chennault | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Major General Fairchild | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Major General Smith | Major General Holmes | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Captain Lambe | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Brigadier Porter | |
| Colonel Cabell | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Commander Freseman | Brigadier Macleod | |
| Commander Long | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Redman | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Commander Coleridge | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup |
May 20, 1943, 10:30 a.m.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 88th and 89th Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held on Wednesday, 19 May.
Admiral Leahy said that at the meeting at the White House on the previous day, the President and Prime Minister had signified their disagreement with certain points in General Eisenhower’s proposals put forward in NAF 221.
The U.S. Chiefs of Staff recommended therefore that General Eisenhower should be informed that his proposals were not approved and that he should continue to base his propaganda policy on the previous directive.
Sir Alan Brooke said that this matter had been referred to the Foreign Office and he would like to await their reply before giving any instructions to General Eisenhower. Until such instructions were issued General Eisenhower would, of course, continue to act on his previous directive.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer action on CCS 185/3 pending the receipt of the views of the Foreign Office.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had examined this plan with great interest. The plan was, however, not in any great detail. The ways and means of achieving the various courses outlined had not been examined nor their possibilities assessed. He suggested that machinery should be set up at once to examine the proposals and to draw up a more detailed plan.
Admiral Leahy explained that CCS 220 was not intended to be a detailed plan. He suggested that it might be accepted as a basis for study and elaboration.
Sir Charles Portal said that it was very important to examine carefully this great field of operations. He believed that a full appreciation should be prepared. The facts should be assembled, the objects set out, together with alternative courses of action to achieve these objects with full facts and arguments for and against each course. Only by starting from first principles could we decide on the most advantageous plan.
Admiral Leahy said that he was in entire agreement with Sir Charles Portal’s views.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Accepted CCS 220 as a basis for a combined study and elaboration for future plans.
b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners to initiate a study and prepare for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff an appreciation leading up to an outline plan for the defeat of Japan including an estimate of the forces required for its implementation.
Sir Alan Brooke said the British Chiefs of Staff believed there was great danger in extensive operations from Ledo and Imphal, which would be dependent on two very precarious roads, whereas the Japanese forces would be supplied by road, rail and river, and would be operating out of a relatively dry area. The maintenance of our forces at the ends of their lines of communication would be particularly difficult during the monsoon season. Even if a road to China were opened, he believed that the Japanese could bring stronger forces to bear than we could maintain to defend it. With regard to operations on the coast, he believed that the capture of Akyab and Ramree was feasible but we had not the resources or the necessary landing craft to undertake the two more southerly amphibious assaults. The danger, as he saw it, was that by aiming both to build up the air route to the maximum capacity and to undertake a land offensive, we should do neither very efficiently. The undertaking of land operations would limit the amount of supplies which could be taken up to the air bases. He believed that the right course was to expand the air route to the maximum in order to increase the strength of the air forces operating in China and to provide limited maintenance of the Chinese ground forces. Dr. T. V. Soong, in his memorandum, had emphasized the necessity for maintaining General Chennault’s force at the highest possible level. Sir Alan Brooke believed that operations aimed at the capture of Mandalay were not possible of achievement and that instead we should concentrate on building up the air route and at the same time undertake limited operations from Ledo and Imphal in order to protect it, and capture Akyab and Ramree.
Field Marshal Wavell said he had only had a short time to examine the paper under discussion and was therefore not in a position to comment in detail. In general, however, he believed the possibilities outlined in the paper to be far too optimistic. He reminded the Committee of the administrative difficulties in connection with operations in Burma. The lines of communication were bad, heavy casualties had to be expected from malaria, trained lorry drivers were scarce, and, in general, the administrative difficulties invariably exceeded paper calculations of their magnitude. A margin of some 50 to 100 per cent had to be allowed on this account.
There were obviously great advantages to be derived from the capture of Mandalay and the control of Upper Burma to the northward of it. A land route would be open to China with consequent effect on Chinese morale, though it would be but an indifferent route and would carry but little for a long time. He was quite certain that even if Mandalay could be captured, it would be impossible, certainly during the monsoon season, to maintain there forces large enough to withstand the scale of attack which the Japanese, with their better lines of communication, could bring against them.
In planning, his personal tendency had always been to be optimistic, but after 18 months’ experience in the area, he felt it only right to warn the Committee that he believed it unlikely to be feasible to maintain forces as far south as Mandalay. In his opinion, the correct and possible courses of action were: Firstly, to make every effort to increase the air ferry route to its maximum capacity and to build up our own air superiority over Burma. These two objects should be our first charge. Then if the required resources, engineering facilities, boats and vehicles were made available, it should be possible to make attacks by land into Upper Burma from Yunnan on Lashio, from Ledo on Myitkyina and Bhamo, and from Imphal into the Chindwin Valley whence touch would be gained to the eastward with the Chinese moving in from Yunnan. These three advances must keep step, and our first objective should be a line from a point where the Burma Road crossed the Burma-Chinese border, through Bhamo, Katha, Pinlebo, Kalewa, and thence to the west. To gain a line of that kind might well be possible, and it would give sufficient cover to the Myitkyina airfields and the route to Burma. If on achieving this line the Japanese were weakened, we should then consider the possibility of going further south, but any idea, at this stage, that the capture of and subsequent maintenance of our forces in Mandalay was possible was likely to be falsified. We must decide our future operations in the light of events.
With regard to coastal operations, he believed we should most certainly try to capture Ramree and Akyab, though this was a difficult proposition since it was now heavily defended. It was not, in his view, worthwhile to endeavor to capture Sandoway and Taungup since they would be difficult to maintain during the monsoon owing to sea conditions and would be cut off from the rest of Burma by the Arakan range. The paper suggested the use of the long-range penetration brigade on An and Mimbua. He would examine this, but he believed that a better use for this unit would be in Upper Burma to maintain contact between the Chinese and the British. The possibility of an attack on Rangoon through Bassein had been examined by his Planning Staff, but they had reported adversely on its practicability, since it entailed a long and difficult advance through thick jungle country interspersed with creeks. Another possibility was to proceed up the railroad from Bassein to Henzada, using trucks on the railway, but from that point there were 40 miles of difficult jungle before the good road north of Rangoon was met. It had been judged that a direct assault on Rangoon up the river was less hazardous and more likely to succeed than either of these two plans.
Air Chief Marshal Peirse said that he wished to emphasize that wherever operations in Burma were undertaken air superiority was essential, both to defend the air route and to assist in land operations. Additional airfields for the fighting air force would therefore be required. If land operations were undertaken stronger air forces would be required including transport aircraft to maintain ground forces, particularly during the monsoon season. This necessity would probably cause a diversion of transports from the air ferry route.
Admiral Leahy said that as he understood it, the British proposals consisted of a maximum concentration on the air route and limited ground operations, including the capture of Ramree and Akyab.
General Marshall said that he was impressed both with General Wavell’s comments on the magnitude of the logistic problem and Air Marshal Peirse’s on the air diversion resulting from land operations. In his view, however, a great increase in the air route alone without offensive ground operations would produce a strong Japanese reaction. He believed ground operations to be essential for their effect both on Chinese morale and on operations in the South and Southwest Pacific. If no aggressive action were undertaken in Burma the results on Pacific operations would be most unfortunate. Similarly, if no aggressive action were taken in the Pacific it would have a serious effect on the Burmese operations.
Operations in New Guinea and Guadalcanal under somewhat similar conditions, with disease, monsoon and logistic difficulties had been successfully accomplished. Bombers had been used for supplies when transports had not been available.
He believed that lack of real aggressive action in Burma would be unfortunate for the South and Southwest Pacific and fatal to China. He did not believe that we should bank all on the attractive proposition of do everything by air. He realized that full-scale ground operations might limit supplies to China by air, but the Japanese must be threatened on the ground and this could only be achieved by hard fighting. Results on other theaters must be considered. Adequate shipping must be provided to build up the necessary resources. He was in no doubt as to the difficulties of the operations but equally he was in no doubt as to their vital importance.
Admiral Leahy said that he believed that without aggressive action by ground forces we should lose the air route. How far it was possible to go was a matter of some doubt but he believed that we should direct our attack on Mandalay in order to occupy the Japanese to the full, to save the air route and to insure Japanese withdrawals from other theaters. It must always be remembered that Japanese communications were open to sea and air attack. The two Governments were, he believed, decided that operations in North Burma must be undertaken.
Sir Charles Portal said that the main difference of opinion appeared to be as to whether or not limited land operations could succeed in insuring the safety of the air route. He believed that the maximum effect against the Japanese could be achieved by air superiority and the buildup of the air route into China, thus freeing our lines of communications and our air forces from the need to support and feed troops engaged in extensive ground operations. He firmly believed that we should put all our resources into the air and that the problem as a whole must be regarded as a military one, the object of which was to achieve the maximum effect on the Japanese.
General McNarney said that he had always been surprised that the Japanese had not made more effort to cut the air supply route, particularly Myitkyina where it was very exposed to fighter attack. He believed that they would do this as soon as the air effort being built up in China was sufficient to cause them serious worry. To prevent the airline being cut, it was necessary to advance our fighter bases as far as Myitkyina and the air warning line still further. Unless Mandalay and Lashio were captured, we should not have sufficiently far advanced bases for the air warning system to cover the fighters at Myitkyina. He did not believe that the necessity for supplying ground forces by air would necessarily limit the supplies taken into China. There were some 90 C-47s in India used for this purpose, and this number could possibly be increased. Further, heavy bombers could be used for this purpose.
Field Marshal Wavell pointed out that he was concerned not only with the problem of maintaining the supplies to our forces as far south as Mandalay, but also with the fact that the Japanese could bring and maintain stronger forces to bear at that point.
Sir Charles Portal, with regard to the vulnerability of the air route to China, said that he believed if adequate airdromes were available in Assam, the Japanese fighters could be bombed out of their bases.
General Chennault said that he believed it to be practicable to defend the two terminals of the air route with the air forces now available, since these could prevent the Japanese from concentrating and maintaining heavy air forces within range of these terminals. The major attack which had occurred at the Chinese end was against Kunming on the 8th of May, when 40 fighters and 36 bombers had attacked. Out of these, 13 fighters and 2 bombers had been shot down, with 10 further probables. No confirmed attacks on transports had been made. Occasional fighter patrols were flown from both ends, with an overlap at the center. The Japanese could, in any event, only maintain sporadic attacks on the route, and the forces available to the 10th and 14th Air Forces could reach all the Japanese airdromes within range of the route. If attacks developed, the route could be moved some 60 miles further north in the area of Myitkyina, which, though over higher mountains, would only increase the distance by 15 miles.
Sir Charles Portal said that General Chennault had expressed his own views exactly.
Sir Alan Brooke said he was in entire agreement that some sort of aggressive action was required and the forces available used, but, if operations were carried beyond a certain point, we should face a possible defeat with its consequent bad effects both on China and in the Pacific. An advance far to the south would put us at a severe logistic disadvantage with regard to the Japanese. In Assam we were relatively safe since the Japanese would have to operate over bad lines of communication to reach our own forces.
General Marshall pointed out that the Japanese now possessed an air barrier from Bougainville to Burma, along which they could rapidly effect concentrations in any area. The Japanese had not yet concentrated at the Burma end, but he believed that when powerful bombing from China was undertaken, the Japanese reaction against the air route would be strong, unless the Japanese air forces were tied down by active operations elsewhere.
Admiral Leahy said the Japanese must be prevented from attacking the airline to China. The maintenance of China was essential to successful operations against Japan, and therefore we must conduct operations toward Mandalay.
General Somervell said that General Wavell’s calculated requirements were some 180,000 tons per month. A large part of this, however, had no relation to the operations envisaged. There were 33 divisions in India, with a further 10½ overseas, but only 12 engaged in the operation. He believed there was no real justification for a tonnage greater than 90,000 per month for ANAKIM. 27,000 tons a month of the requirement was for civilian supplies.
Field Marshal Wavell and Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that India must be maintained and this could not be divorced from the operational requirement. India’s requirements had already been cut in order to make good the British import program. If the so-called civilian requirements were not met, India’s output of munitions could not be maintained.
With the aid of a map, General Somervell then outlined the amounts which he believed could be supplied over the various routes.
General Somervell said that he believed that the industrial capacity of India could be maintained without the figure of 180,000 tons per month being met. Many of the requirements would not bear examination in detail and some could be cut in half. For instance, the Indian requirement of 4,000 amphibious or special vehicles appeared excessive. It was greater than the number available to the entire United States Army.
He believed that the river route to Ledo had not been expanded to its maximum capacity. He outlined his views on the logistic possibilities of the routes to Mandalay and Lashio. The Japanese had only some four or five divisions in Burma and he saw no reason why stronger forces could not be maintained on the Mandalay line against them.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he could not agree with this estimate. The Japanese had excellent lines of communication available to them. It was not wise to decide on operations which were not feasible. These operations had to be carried out by the British. He believed that the maximum possible land operations should be undertaken but it must be appreciated that these would encroach upon the air route tonnage. An advance to a line through Bhamo and Kalewa was as far as the Commander in Chief considered possible.
In reply to a question, General Stilwell said that if they moved at all, he believed that the Chinese forces could get as far as Mandalay. He could see no object in stopping operations on the edge of the good road network. If the British forces could be supplied at Katha and Kalewa, the two rivers would permit their supply at Mandalay. The Chinese had been promised a major effort in Burma. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would probably make any action by his forces conditional on the recapture of the whole of Burma.
Admiral Leahy suggested that the Chiefs of Staff should project the campaign towards the seizure of Mandalay, and proceed as far as possible with this object in view. The Japanese might stop us, but he believed it to be a wasted effort to limit the objective to Kalewa.
Field Marshal Wavell said that he was prepared to go as far as he could while maintaining a force equal to the Japanese. If the Japanese proved weaker than was expected, or, if he found he could maintain a stronger force than he believed, he was naturally prepared to advance further, but he believed it useless to accept a liability until he was certain he could carry it out. Any operations he undertook were dependent on the action taken by the Chinese forces since, if they did not advance, his eastern flank would be exposed. The Chinese and British must keep in step.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to postpone further discussion on this matter until a later meeting to be held in closed session at 3:30 p.m. the same day.
Admiral Leahy said that all reference to the expansion of the air route to more than 10,000 tons should be deleted from the paper. The possibilities of any increase above 10,000 tons was problematical.
In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal as regards the limiting factor to the expansion of the air route, General McNarney said that the Planners’ estimate had been based solely on the availability of aircraft from factories and not in relation to other demands for them. It would be dangerous to put forward a figure of 20,000 tons based on the premise that no other commitments existed for these aircraft. Further, an examination had shown that to increase the air route to 20,000 tons would mean getting some 50,000 tons per month into Assam which would require a large number of additional transports. The total requirements were higher than could be met by the end of December.
Sir Charles Portal said that although there might be a limit to the aircraft, he considered it wise for the terminals to be developed on the basis of a load of 20,000 tons/month. The development of the air route terminals would take far longer than the provision of additional transport aircraft. It might be possible for the British to provide certain of these.
Admiral King said that it appeared to be the suggestion that the Generalissimo should be offered 20,000 tons a month by air as an alternative to the opening of the Burma Road. His fear was that the increased bomber effort from China, resulting from the increased capacity of the air route, would force the Japanese to take strong action and the terminal points would be attacked. Even if the bases in Assam were secure those in Kunming were open to attack. The retention of China as a base for the defeat of Japan was as essential as the continuance of Russia in the war as a factor in the defeat of Germany.
General McNarney said that he saw no objection to expanding the facilities for the air route to 20,000 tons. The present limiting factor was hard standings rather than airfields.
Sir Charles Portal agreed that the date for the achievement of 20,000 tons might be optimistic, but believed that it should be laid down as the ultimate objective.
Admiral King pointed out that the President had laid down, and the Prime Minister concurred in, a figure of 10,000 tons a month for the air route being achieved by November. Anything we could do above this figure would provide a cushion which could be used for the support of ground operations against Mandalay. Though the opening of the Burma Road was a symbol to China, it might be possible to convince them that an air route would achieve the same results.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to consider CCS 229 further at 3:30 p.m. that afternoon in closed session.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Canada |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | Prime Minister Mackenzie King |
| Mr. Hopkins | Ambassador Halifax | Minister McCarthy |
| China | Australia | New Zealand |
| Foreign Minister Soong | Minister for External Affairs Evatt | First Secretary of Legation Cox (representing Minister Nash) |
| Netherlands | Philippines | |
| Ambassador Loudon | President Quezon |
Washington, May 20, 1943.
Secret
The thirty-first meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 12:05 o’clock p.m., Thursday, May 20, 1943, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, the White House, Washington, DC.
The President informed the Council that he considers the Prime Minister’s address to the Congress to be the clearest and best exposition of global war that has ever been given. There appeared to be general agreement with this statement.
President Roosevelt then, with the aid of a chart, gave a brief explanation of the operations now in progress for the capture of the Island of Attu – the westernmost of the Aleutians. He described the physical difficulties that had to be overcome and laid special stress on the almost continuous bad weather that has prevailed during the month of the year when the best weather of the year is to be expected in the Bering Sea area. The commencement of the attack had to be delayed several days because of fog and gales; fog and occasional gales have kept up ever since; we have rarely been able to use either aerial or gun support; the physical difficulty of moving through the tundra is great; snow has impaired progress in the high spots; more men have been hospitalized with frozen feet than from enemy bullets; but nevertheless we have progressed and have now squeezed the defending forces into the high land surrounding Chicagof Harbor where they are making a final stand. The President stated that so much misinformation has been written and expressed about the significance of the capture of Attu Island that he thought members of the Council should have in mind that the capture of Attu and the establishment of an airfield there will not open the way to bombing the Japanese homeland even though we have moved appreciably nearer our final objective. The reason Attu will not facilitate bombing of Japan is due to the tremendously uncertain weather which is such that, even if we launched attacking squadrons, the chances of their return would be very slim. The occupation of Attu will secure and tend to neutralize the value of enemy bases at Kiska. This should enable us, in time, to push the Japanese out of the Aleutians. When, and if, Russia should join in the war against Japan, our position in Attu will help very much to take full advantage of Siberian bases. The Honorable Mackenzie King stated that the Japanese occupation of the Aleutians had been a matter of grave concern to Canada and that Canada welcomes and applauds every measure to evict the Japanese from the Aleutian Area.
President Roosevelt stated that he had not any further information to give the Council except that throughout the world we are assiduously continuing our pressure on our enemies and weakening his [their] position by daily attrition of his land, sea and air forces. In the case of Japan, the combined submarine and air action is steadily reducing the Japanese merchant marine to the point where the maintenance of her outlying stations will become more and more difficult. He wished to inform Dr. Soong that the Prime Minister plans to lend material help in revitalizing the air forces in China and that British air squadrons are to be added to the American and Chinese air forces in order that we may create in China a united Allied force that may learn by experience to work together effectively.
Dr. Soong stated that this prospect of additional aid would be highly valued by China.
President Roosevelt stated that, of course, everyone realized the principal difficulty of building up a powerful air force in China is in providing sufficient petrol; but that General Chennault, who is now here, feels perfectly confident that sufficient petrol can be brought in by air and that if we will give him sufficient planes he can accomplish two very positive things: (a) He can break up any extensive Japanese land offensive that aims at the demolition of Chinese airfields; (b) Within a year he can destroy 500,000 tons of Japanese shipping by constantly raiding their sea lanes and their river boat supplies. Dr. Soong stated that the people of China are very much heartened by the Prime Minister’s speech to Congress yesterday and that they, too, are very hopeful that the difficulties of maintaining a strong air force in China will be solved. However, he wishes to state with all earnestness that it is the opinion of his government and of all the Chinese that it is essential that we must continue the offensive in Burma for the purpose of restoring the Burma Road, as it is through the Burma Road alone that sufficient supplies can be brought into China to enable that country to drive out her invaders. Dr. Soong stated that he felt sure everyone would agree that air force alone cannot win the war and that we must provide a land route to equip Chinese armies. To do this we must carry out the promises made at Casablanca and send a combined naval and land expedition to recapture Burma.
The Prime Minister said that (while we will continue our offensive in Burma when the weather permits) it is his understanding that the Burma Road has been so damaged by the Chinese and Japanese that it could not possibly be restored to a point where it would be of any value in bringing in supplies until the year 1945.
Dr. Soong stated that, although it had been badly damaged, the Japanese are repairing their part of the road and the Chinese are repairing the part they still control, so that the road could be restored to useful condition very soon after we gain physical control.
Dr. Evatt, the Australian Minister of State for External Affairs, stated that he thought perhaps all of the members of the Council failed to realize what extremely heavy casualties are involved in tropical warfare. He stated that in New Guinea the combined Australian and American forces have suffered nearly 45,000 casualties up to February and that of the 50,000 Australians who had fought in New Guinea, over 7,000 have been lost in [action?] killed or missing, but that malaria had run the combined casualties up to above 40,000. President Roosevelt agreed that in the New Guinea campaign the casualties had amounted to nearly fifty percent of the forces involved, and that this was, of course, a terribly high mortality rate; but that, on the other hand, we must remember that the Japanese losses had been very much greater than ours and that he thought, in general, the proportion was nearly three to one. It was agreed by the President and Dr. Evatt that the bad eases of malaria should not be sent back into malaria countries, but it was also agreed that patients who have recovered could be used very effectively for garrisoning important non-malarial stations and thereby release other men to fight who had not been exposed to malaria.
The President asked Prime Minister Churchill whether he had anything to say to the Council.
The Prime Minister said that he welcomed the opportunity to inform the Council of several problems that he had very much in mind. He then delivered a very able brief statement of his theory of the general strategy that should be followed by the Allies now that we have gained the initiative and while we are building up an overpowering superiority in all weapons. In brief, the Prime Minister stated that we must recognize that we are limited in what we can do by the number of ships we have available to carry men and supplies to the chosen theatres of war and that, therefore, our purpose must be to force the enemy to fight in areas that are advantageous to us and disadvantageous to him. Tunisia was selected as a fine example of what the Prime Minister considers sound strategy. The enemy was compelled to lengthen his lines of communications; to overstrain his line of supply and to eventual collapse, because of his inability to maintain and reinforce his armies.
The Prime Minister expressed the opinion that an extensive campaign in Burma, instead of putting the enemy at a disadvantage, would place all of these burdens on our forces, because the rainy season would give us only six months to gain our objective; the heat of the jungle would decimate our forces, as had been demonstrated by our fighting in New Guinea; and that the problems of supply for our troops would be tremendous. The Prime Minister stated that he noted a comment of an American Senator that the British had two million men in India who were apparently unable to drive a few thousand Japanese out of Burma. The Prime Minister stated that such a declaration completely ignored the practical problems of logistics; that the forest and swamps of Burma are such that only a limited number of men can work and fight in any given area, and that, therefore, it becomes a question of quality rather than quantity – when we put troops into Burma they must be experienced fighters who can overcome difficulties and defeat superior numbers of the enemy; and it is for that reason that the Prime Minister has offered British air squadrons to fight in China as the most effective assistance that Great Britain can contribute at this time. The Prime Minister stated that this is in support of the view that President Roosevelt has held and enforced for the past several months. Mr. Churchill said that he wished to go on record as believing that President Roosevelt has a penetrating insight into the sound strategy of the present world war and that his instinct for lending immediate air support to China is wholly sound.
The Prime Minister also stated that, as a result of recent conferences, he was pleased to be able to announce for himself and for President Roosevelt that at least 450 planes would be added to the Australian Air Force for the prosecution of the war in that area. He stated that everyone knows that the Australian fliers are among the best in the world and that the planes would be provided for the Australians to man in order that they might take a more active part in the defense of their homeland.
The Prime Minister said there was only one other subject that he wished to touch on and that was that a disturbing rumor had reached him that China is massing troops on the borders of Tibet, and that he hoped that it was in error, both because the borders of Tibet had been secure for so many years and, also, because it would mean diverting forces away from the true enemy – Japan – and that he would regret to see the Chinese take offensive action against a neutral.
Dr. Soong stated emphatically that there was no truth whatsoever to the rumor, either that troops were being massed on the border or that China had any present intention of attacking Tibet. He stated, however, that Tibet is not a separate nation; that it is a part of China and that eventually China may have to take necessary action to maintain her sovereignty, but that they have no intentions of taking such action at the present time. Dr. Soong went on with considerable heat to state that he cannot accept the Prime Minister’s statement about the impossibility of undertaking a campaign in Burma. He stated that his people are greatly cheered by Allied successes in Tunisia and that it has demonstrated to the people of China that the Allies are able to defend their own. He stated that in his country the question is often asked, “How can the Englishmen, who were so feeble in their conduct of the war in Malaya, fight such magnificent battles as they have fought in Africa?” Dr. Soong said that his answer is that the Briton is always a good soldier when properly led and that perhaps the difficulty in Burma rested with the leadership. The Prime Minister interrupted to say that he hoped that no country would feel that it was their privilege to select the generals for the armies of their allies and that he believed that the leadership in Burma left little to be desired.
Dr. Soong stated with great earnestness that China expects and hopes that the United States and Great Britain will live up to their commitments.
The Prime Minister stated emphatically that he denied that any commitments had ever been made.
Some discussion continued, during which Dr. Soong held that the military discussions at Casablanca and later at Calcutta and Chungking were definite commitments; whereas, Mr. Churchill held that the Allied governments had never made any pledges to recapture Burma but that they had lent their full support to military studies which necessarily had to be modified from time to time as conditions changed. He stated that he had not seen the plans of attack until February. Dr. Soong said he did not understand how that could be so. The Prime Minister stated that it would be of no help to an ally to do anything foolish and that it would be a very foolish thing to consider pushing troops into Burma at the present time.
President Roosevelt intervened to state that he thought perhaps we were talking at cross purposes and about different things and that if Dr. Soong had gotten the impression that we had abandoned all thought of a Burma campaign that he was entirely wrong; we do expect to prosecute that campaign as soon as conditions will permit, but in the meantime our present need is to provide something that will benefit China at once and that there is a general agreement that air power can do this more effectively than any other way. He repeated that there was no change in intention and that the general policy remains the same, whereas the tactics of the situation had to be modified since the studies were initiated at Casablanca.
President Quezon stated that when an authority like Mr. Churchill informed him that an actual invasion and restoration of Burma was not practical at this time, he fully accepts that statement. He is, therefore, glad to support the request for additional aircraft for the Western Pacific as the best step that can be taken now to bring about the eventual defeat of Japan.
Dr. Evatt asked to be informed of the Japanese troop strength in China at present. He said that he had been given to understand that the Japanese had been withdrawing troops from China for some time and that, therefore, it would appear that the threat to China is not as great now as it has been at times in the past. Dr. Soong stated emphatically that he believes Japan will try to finish China this summer and that rather than removing troops from China they have merely replaced some of their troops that have been there for some time and are using China as a training ground for inexperienced troops.
The Prime Minister stated that Russia is, of course, the real answer to bringing about the coup de grâce of Japan, but because of the tremendous burden Russia is already bearing, neither the Prime Minister nor the President had ever requested Russia to join in the war against Japan as she is already doing her full share. When Germany is defeated, however, it is the Prime Minister’s personal opinion (he gave it only as a personal opinion without any suggestion that he had received any assurances) the Russians will be glad to join in the final defeat of Japan, as Russia disapproves of Japan’s treachery and her menace to stability as much as any other country.
Dr. Soong stated with considerable feeling and emotion that he must impress on the Council that the situation of China is indeed desperate and that she requires help by land as well as by air. He stated that the recovery of the Burma Road is not only a material necessity; that its recovery is necessary for the psychology of the Chinese people; that they regard it a symbol of the armed support of their allies.
Dr. Evatt stated that Australia also feels that she is seriously threatened and that the Japanese must be pressed on all fronts in order to prevent them from again assuming the initiative.
President Roosevelt reminded the Council that one of our most serious problems has been the German submarines in the North Atlantic. He stated that measures taken recently to increase our offensive action against enemy submarines, both by surface craft and by aircraft, encourage us to hope that our shipping situation will improve rapidly and that we may then develop more ambitious plans of action. However, he pointed out that the Japanese submarines have had marked success against our shipping in the South Pacific during the past month and that this requires more planes and more escort vessels to keep existing lines of communication open.
Mr. Churchill stated that he wished to make it perfectly clear that the British Empire would do everything humanly possible to support China but that he is convinced that the only effective aid we can give to China this summer is an increase of her air power and that this measure will be pressed with every possible atom of our energy. He hopes that Dr. Soong will not send a report home that will be too discouraging to his people. We must all try to maintain the morale of all of our allies.
Dr. Soong said that he greatly appreciated the Prime Minister’s assurances; that he had the highest respect for Mr. Churchill’s great ability as a strategist and an authority on war and that he begged the Prime Minister to devote his great talent to the relief of the people of “Tortured China,” to whom he had referred in his speech the day before. Dr. Soong repeated that the people of China are indeed a tortured people after four years of war and that the results of the failure to help them in time could not be predicted.
Mr. Evatt stated that before the Council adjourned he wished to express his sincere thanks to the soldiers, sailors and airmen of Holland who have continued to render outstanding services in the war against Japan.
At the suggestion of President Roosevelt, the Council then adjourned to have a photograph of the group taken by news photographers.
WILSON BROWN
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Churchill’s concern was valid in 1943 as well as far into the future.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Canada |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | Prime Minister Mackenzie King |
| Mr. Hopkins |
The post-luncheon conversation (at which Hopkins was not present) was given over to a consideration of post-war international organizations. Roosevelt also took the opportunity to suggest the raising of the Canadian Legation in Washington to Embassy rank.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General McNarney | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Redman | ||
| Brigadier General Deane |
May 20, 1943, 3:30 p.m.
Secret
The Combined Chiefs of Staff met in closed session and resolved on:
a. The concentration of available resources as first priority within the Assam-Burma Theater on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to:
i) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
ii) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China;
iii) Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China.
b. Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.
c. The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations.
d. The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff also directed that CCS 229, CCS 231, and CCS 238 be withdrawn from the agenda.
Washington, 20 May 1943.
CCS 237/1
Secret
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
Resolved:
a. That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944:
| Assault: | 5 | Infantry Divisions (Simultaneously loaded in landing craft) |
| 2 | Infantry Divisions – Follow-up | |
| 2 | Airborne Divisions | |
| Total: | 9 | Divisions in the Assault |
| Buildup: | 20 | Divisions available for movement into lodgment area |
| Total: | 29 | Divisions |
b. That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Each specific operation will be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY will not be considered available.
c. The above resolution shall be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a meeting in July or early in August, the date to be decided later, in order that the situation may be examined in the light of the result of HUSKY and the situation in Russia.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Canada | |
| Secretary Hull | Prime Minister Mackenzie King |
711.42/255
Washington, May 20, 1943.
S – Mr. Secretary You will be seeing Mr. Mackenzie King at dinner tonight. This brief memorandum on our relations with Canada may be of interest to you in connection with your conversation with Mr. King.
Our relations with Canada are excellent. The only cloud on the horizon is that the extent of our War Department expenditures and activities in western Canada has been so great in connection with the war effort that some people in Canada have privately expressed apprehension. In other words, some people feel that we may have a vested interest there and be reluctant to leave when the war is over. That is of course nonsense but not all Canadians realize it. I don’t think this is particularly serious. We have done everything we can to dispel any apprehensions on that point.
The only other thing about our relations with Canada which troubles me is the fact that in spite of the President’s close personal relations with Mr. Mackenzie King and your own personal friendship and close relations with him, and in spite of the traditionally close and direct relations between our two Governments, Canada continues to receive what information she gets about high policy discussions between the White House and London from London rather than direct from Washington.
Mr. Norman Robertson, the Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, whom you met during the Trade Agreement negotiations in 1938, is here with Mr. King. He told me at lunch today that the Prime Minister might discuss with you the advisability of appointing an American Minister to Canada at an early date.
There is attached a brief telegram from our Legation in Ottawa summarizing the general political situation in Canada [not printed].
JOHN D. HICKERSON
U.S. State Department (May 21, 1943)
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General McNarney | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Commander Long | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Admiral Noble | ||
| Lieutenant General Macready | ||
| Air Marshal Welsh | ||
| Field Marshal Wavell | ||
| Admiral Somerville | ||
| Air Chief Marshal Peirse | ||
| Captain Lambe | ||
| Brigadier Porter | ||
| Air Commodore Elliot | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Redman | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Commander Coleridge | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup |
May 21, 1943, 10:30 a.m.
Secret
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the conclusions of the Minutes of the 90th Meeting subject to substituting the words “an outline plan” for the words “a plan” in paragraph b, Item 3.
b. Approved the conclusions of the 91st Meeting.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed that for purposes of the TRIDENT Conference only, the word ROUNDHAMMER should be used to designate cross-Channel operations.
b. Directed the Secretaries to obtain recommendations from appropriate military security agencies in the U.S. and U.K. regarding code names for all operations agreed upon in the TRIDENT Conferences.
Sir Alan Brooke said that at the ANFA Conference (CCS 63rd Meeting), it was agreed that Turkey lay within a theater of British responsibility and that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British. It was also agreed that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to both Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. He pointed out that no decision has been recorded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the priority to be accorded to the supply of equipment for Turkey as compared with other commitments and no instructions have yet been issued by the American Chiefs of Staff to their representatives on the various Assignments Committees in Washington as to the attitude to be adopted towards British bids for equipment on behalf of Turkey. As a result, there had been some inclination to treat Turkish requirements as unimportant.
Sir Alan Brooke said that in CCS 206, dated 30 April, the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff informed the American Chiefs of Staff of the British view with regard to the provision of equipment for Turkey, and enclosed a list of the proposed supplies. This list has recently been somewhat increased.
General Marshall questioned what was included in the words “important commitments” in the conclusion proposed by the British. He said the proposal was acceptable to him with the understanding that requirements for training of U.S. forces and the rearmament of French forces were considered as “important commitments.”
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of the action already taken or proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff with regard to the provision of military supplies for Turkey.
b. Agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of the equipment as proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least possible delay.
At this point the following entered the meeting:
- Field Marshal Dill
- General Ismay
- Admiral Noble
- Admiral Macready
- Air Marshal Welsh
- Field Marshal Wavell
- Admiral Somerville
- Air Chief Marshal Peirse
- Captain Lambe
- Brigadier Porter
- Air Commodore Elliot
- Commander Long
Admiral King first related CCS 239 to CCS 168 and CCS 155/1, and then gave a statement of the proposed strategy in the Pacific.
Admiral King stated that the remarks he would make would give a general outline of the situation in the Pacific and the scope of the operations visualized in the paper which had been submitted for consideration (CCS 239).
During the past 30 or 40 years, since acquisition of the Philippines, the United States had been studying the possible courses of action which might have to be undertaken in the Pacific. A great number of studies prepared at the Naval War College had been premised on the necessity for supporting or recovering the Philippines. Briefly, there were three routes, one straight through from the Hawaiian Islands, the others detouring to the north or south of that line. The increase in the capabilities of aircraft had necessitated a revision of some of the previous plans. In any case, decisive action against the Japanese Fleet and the seizure of the Marianas Islands were of primary importance.
On December 30, 1941, when he took office as Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, there were numerous plans in existence for operations in the Pacific. He had, however, immediately sent a dispatch to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet stating that his mission was first to hold the Hawaiian–Midway line and the communications with the Pacific Coast, and, secondly, to hold the remainder of the line of communications to Australia and New Zealand. Prior to the fall of the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, plans for the employment of naval forces presumed fueling in that area; however, with their loss, it was essential to establish safe bases elsewhere. One of the most urgent uses of naval forces during the early stages of the war in the Pacific had been in the support of the lines of communication from Hawaii to Australia. The U.S. Navy had, therefore, established refueling points in Bora Bora, in the Fijis and in New Caledonia. Ground forces had been sent for the protection of these bases. Operations during the recent months had rendered these lines of communication to Australia relatively safe, except in the case of Samoa, which was still exposed to some possibility of attack.
All operations in the Pacific should be directed toward severing the Japanese lines of communication and the recapture of the Philippines. The Philippines could be captured by a flank action, whereas the capture of the Netherlands East Indies must of necessity be the result of a frontal attack. The intermediate objectives should be Rabaul, Truk and thence to the Marianas. Regardless of which route might be taken, the Marianas are the key to the situation because of their location on the Japanese lines of communication.
In referring to the situation in the Aleutians, he stated that the United States had bided its time in undertaking the operation against Attu. He considered that there was little danger to Alaska or the western part of the North American continent unless the Japanese should succeed in reaching Kodiak Island. This probability, in his opinion, was remote. An effort on our part to reach Japan by way of the northern route and the Kurile Islands would be beset with difficulties because of the rugged nature of the latter. According to reports received from our submarines, the Japanese were now actively engaged in fortifying the Kurile Islands.
The ultimate defeat of Japan would be accomplished by blockade, bombing, and assault. Of these measures, attacks on warships and shipping along enemy lines of communication were inherent in all offensive operations. It has been our purpose to work toward positions of readiness from which Japan can be attacked. Allied offensive measures comprise continued and intensified attacks on enemy ships and shipping, in cutting or threatening to cut enemy lines of communication between Japan and Japanese holdings and in attack on enemy sea, air, and ground forces, thereby obliging them to fight to retain their holdings and retain their lines of communication. The scope and intensity of the Allied war effort in the Pacific must insure that the means at hand are actively employed to the best advantage.
The general capabilities of the Allied effort comprise:
a. Keep Japan from further expansion and from consolidating and exploiting her current holdings.
b. Maintain the vital Midway–Hawaii line (key to the Pacific).
c. Secure the lines of communication to Australia and New Zealand.
d. Block the enemy approaches to Australia from the northward by way of Rabaul and from the northwestward by way of the Malay barrier.
e. Attain positions which menace enemy lines of communication with the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and the South China Sea.
f. Open the line of communications with China by way of Burma.
g. Make ready to support Russia in case of war with Japan.
h. Continue to intensify attrition of enemy strength by land, air, and sea (including submarine) action.
In referring to Japan’s potentialities for offensive action, he listed as possibilities:
a. The Maritime Provinces, Eastern Siberia – Russia.
b. Alaska by way of the Aleutians.
c. Midway-Hawaii line (key to the Pacific).
d. The Hawaii-Samoa-Fiji-New Caledonia line which covers the line of communication to Australia and New Zealand.
e. Australia and New Zealand – by way of the Bismarck Archipelago and/or the Solomons.
f. Australia by way of Malay barrier.
g. India – by way of Burma.
h. China.
He summed up his comments on Japan’s potentialities and their probable courses of action with the general statements:
a. That there was an impending threat to the Maritime Provinces; why action had not been precipitated only the Japanese could answer.
b. That the developing situation may dictate that the Japanese undertake completion of the conquest of China.
c. That it was unlikely that the Japanese would undertake major operations against Alaska.
d. That, since the decrease in the scale of activity in the Solomon[s] area, Japan had not given any definite indication of where she would strike next. Her reserve potentialities were certainly great enough to permit offensive action. It was, therefore, necessary that the United Nations be alert to anticipate the direction of this attack.
He stated that it was necessary to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan, particularly by intensifying action to cut her lines of communication and to attain positions of readiness from which a full-scale offensive could be launched as soon as the full resources of the United Nations could be made available. The yardstick which must be used in measuring any operation undertaken in the Pacific was:
a. Would it further threaten or cut Japanese lines of communication;
b. Would it contribute to the attainment of positions of readiness from which a full-scale offensive could be launched against Japan.
It was with these objects in mind that the conclusions reached in CCS 239 have been set out; namely, offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-44 have the following objectives:
a. Conduct of air operations in and from China.
b. Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China.
c. Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
d. Seizure of the Marshalls and Caroline Islands.
e. Seizure of the Solomons-Bismarck Archipelago and Japanese held New Guinea.
To these should be added:
Intensification of operations against Japanese lines of communication.
Admiral King, in response to several questions, explained briefly the methods used by the Japanese in employing their submarines and the results which had been attained by the United States submarines operating against Japanese shipping.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
Approved CCS 239 subject to the following amendments:
Deletion of the word “retain” on pages 1 and 2;
Deletion of subparagraph 2b (6) on page 2 and substitution for it of:
(6) Intensification of Operations Against Enemy Lines of Communication
“All the foregoing operations are essential to the attainment of positions which enable the intensification and expansion of attacks on the enemy lines of communication in the Pacific.
Addition of subparagraph 3 a (6) as follows:
(6) Intensification of Operations Against Enemy Lines of Communication.
At this point the following withdrew from the meeting:
- Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell
- Admiral Sir James Somerville
- Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse
- Captain C. E. Lambe, RN
- Brigadier W. Porter
- Air Commodore W. Elliot
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Directed the Secretaries to prepare a report to the President and Prime Minister on the results of the Conference thus far.
Washington, May 21, 1943.
Confidential
[Extracts]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Q. Mr. President, you have had a number of recent conferences with Dr. (T. V.) Soong. Is there anything you can tell us about that?
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think so. There isn’t any particular news, one way or another.
Q. I wondered if there was anything special you had up between you?
THE PRESIDENT: No. I suppose the– the principal thing relates to getting war materials of all kinds into China.
Q. Did you say more material?
THE PRESIDENT: War materials – and medical things – things of that kind. That is going along pretty well.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Q. Mr. President, is there anything you can tell us about the visit of Prime Minister Mackenzie King (of Canada) here?
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think so. He is just– just down here on the same– same thing that everybody else is here – furtherance of the war. I am seeing him again this morning.
Q. Mr. President, back to Dr. Soong, we have noticed that he has been in here, particularly since Prime Minister Churchill arrived. Could you say if your talks with the Prime Minister concerned something about China?
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, sure. We talked about China. It isn’t the only place we have been talking about.
Q. Mr. President, when you referred to the majority of our forces, you were speaking then of a majority of these forces which are outside the continental United States?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.
MR. GODWIN: (aside) How about it?
Q. Mr. President, any sort of progress report you can give us on your talks with the Prime Minister (Churchill)?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I suppose the best way to put it is this: that, so far, most of the work has been done by the Combined Staffs. And they have been at it, and we expect to get some preliminary recommendations from the Combined Staffs – you might call them tentative recommendations – probably in tonight’s meeting. Then those will be gone over – and I might say the Combined Staffs have been getting along extremely well – and then over the weekend we will be going over them, and take up the preliminary recommendations next week and iron out any kinks that are in them and make them final.
Q. Mr. President, has any consideration been given to the political future of Italy?
MR. GODWIN: (aside) What?
THE PRESIDENT: Unconditional surrender. I think that—
Q. (interposing) Thank you, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: (continuing)—speaks for itself.
Q. Thank you.
Q. Thank you, Mr. President.
MR. GODWIN: Italy?
THE PRESIDENT: What?
MR. GODWIN: Italy?
THE PRESIDENT: Italy.
MR. GODWIN: He asked about Italy?
THE PRESIDENT: Unconditional surrender.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | China | |
| Admiral Leahy | Foreign Minister Soong |
Soong spoke of Burma and made a “categorical statement” that Chinese forces would not undertake a campaign in Burma unless an attack were launched on Rangoon.
Regarding this meeting and the 91st meeting, the Stimson Diary for May 21, 1943, records the following observations:
The minutes of the proceedings of yesterday by the Combined Chiefs of Staff were not so encouraging. They dealt with the serious situation in Burma and the possibilities of action there. The conclusions evidenced in their final resolution in the afternoon seem to me so inconclusive and unsatisfactory that I called in General Stilwell who had been there and got him to explain to me and to McCloy on the maps his own plans and the extent and method in which the British propositions fell short of what Stilwell thought were the requirements of the situation. Later in the afternoon I had a talk with Marshall over it and he gave me his difficulties. He agreed that the matter had been left in a very unsatisfactory situation. The President has gone over solid to the support of an air attack by Chennault as sufficient to secure China and to that end he is giving to Chennault the lion’s share of the capacity of the Burma airline during the first approaching months. This will cut off the indispensable supply for the ground troops in Yunnan which Stilwell is laboring so hard to get. Marshall told me of his difficulties in getting Stilwell to report clearly and intelligently to the conferees. I told him that in my interview with him this morning I found that, while he was shy, by proper questions I could get it all out and I wished very much that someone had been able and willing to do that yesterday in the conferences but apparently Stilwell shut up like a clam and made therefore an unfavorable impression.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Canada | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Mackenzie King |
This was a farewell meeting between the President and the Prime Minister. Matters discussed included Roosevelt’s letter of May 5, 1943, to Stalin asking the Soviet leader for an informal meeting, and Roosevelt’s proposal for a summer trip to Canada.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins |
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Dill | |
| General Marshall | General Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Lieutenant General McNarney | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General Ismay | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Brigadier Jacob |
May 21, 1943, 5 p.m.
Secret
The Meeting had before them a draft of agreed decisions prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and submitted to the President and the Prime Minister (CCS 242). The draft was considered paragraph by paragraph.
The Prime Minister reiterated the view which he had expressed at the previous meeting that nothing would be gained by a diplomatic approach to the Portuguese Government which was not backed up immediately by force. In his opinion, the Portuguese should be presented with the fact of an imminent occupation with only sufficient time in which to send a message to order that there should be no resistance. He therefore suggested that if the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in agreement, it would be better to omit from this paragraph of the agreed decisions the following words: “(b) That an effort should first be made to secure the use of these Islands by diplomatic means without making military commitments to the Portuguese” and also in the last sentence of the paragraph the words “in case diplomatic efforts should fail.”
Admiral Leahy said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would certainly agree to the omission of these words which had only been inserted because it was understood that it was the wish of the Governments to proceed in this manner.
The Prime Minister thought that the question of the diplomatic approach should be left to the President and himself and he hoped shortly to have the views of the British Government on the subject. At the same time, it would be necessary to have on record a statement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff showing the reasons why it was of such importance to occupy the Islands without delay. This could be achieved by expanding paragraph 1 (a).
It was agreed that in their final report the Combined Chiefs of Staff should expand their recommendation in the manner suggested by the Prime Minister and should omit the words quoted above.
General McNarney gave the meeting a short account of the process which had been gone through in building up the plan for the combined bomber offensive. In view of the expansion of the German fighter forces, it had been found necessary to include in the plan attacks on the manufacturing plants. According to a conservative estimate based on experience, it was hoped to reduce the German fighter strength down to 500 as against the 3,000 to which it would otherwise rise in the middle of 1944. 25% of the bomber effort would go on submarine targets. About 425,000 ground personnel would be required to implement the plan.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that this figure included the ground personnel for ROUNDHAMMER.
The Prime Minister asked whether the figure could not be reduced. He recalled that when he had asked Monsieur Maisky why the Russians had refused the 20 squadrons for the Caucasus, the latter had pointed to the large number of ground personnel who would have to accompany the aircraft and the complication this would cause to the Russian communications. Every man brought to the U. K. on the ground staff of the Air Force would exclude a soldier. He earnestly hoped there could be a reduction.
General Marshall said that he had appointed a special group under an experienced and capable officer whose duty it was to survey the establishments of the Army and of the Air Corps. General Arnold had already made an arbitrary cut in the numbers of ground personnel for the United Kingdom and it was hoped that a further reduction might be secured, though the figure was already lower than that set by General Arnold.
The Prime Minister said that he attached the greatest importance to this combined plan. There had not yet been an opportunity for the American scheme of daylight bombing to be applied in full, and he had been from time to time critical of the account of the few occasions when the bombers could go out and the comparatively small loads thus delivered on Germany; but he could see in the future, when several raids could be made in one day, most deadly results would be produced. He therefore welcomed the plan and hoped that it could be developed to the full.
General Marshall observed that in the latest raid which the U.S. B-17s had carried out from England three separate forces had been employed on three different objectives. One had had 6% casualties, and the other[s] had had nil. The overall loss had been 3½%. This was as [an] indication of what might be achieved in the future. He assured the Prime Minister that he was just as anxious as he was to reduce the number of ground personnel to be transported to the United Kingdom.
The Prime Minister thanked General Marshall for this assurance.
The President drew attention to the value of occasional raids, say 5% of the effort, on the smaller towns where factories were known to exist. It would greatly depress the Germans if they felt that even the smaller towns could not escape.
General agreement was expressed with this view.
The President inquired whether the forces listed in paragraph 3 (a) would be sufficient to hold the Brest Peninsula.
Sir Alan Brooke said that they should be sufficient to enable this area to be held and extended. The latter would be most necessary in order to secure more ports for the buildup.
The Prime Minister inquired what would be the buildup after that shown in this paragraph. Could not something be added to indicate the subsequent rate?
General Marshall said that he would very much like to include something to show the subsequent buildup. It would be purely a matter of shipping and this was being examined. The probable rate would be three to four divisions per month.
In response to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, it was pointed out that the “Air Forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY consisted of certain British and American air reinforcements which had been specially lent to the Mediterranean Theater from the United Kingdom for a short period immediately around the HUSKY date.
The Prime Minister suggested that it would be desirable to include a statement to show what Army forces would be available in the Mediterranean Theater for use after HUSKY. He did not think it would be right to leave North Africa entirely in the hands of the French, some of whom should certainly move forward in the general advance.
The President said that no French Division was shown as taking part in the first attack on the Continent: he thought that politically it might be very desirable that one should be included. He agreed that a statement of forces which would be available in the Mediterranean Area should be drawn up. For example, it would be well to know what would be available to send into, say Salonika, if the Germans withdrew from the Balkans. One would also want to know what could be done supposing Italy collapsed immediately after HUSKY.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that this matter had been considered, and a survey of the troops in the Mediterranean Area, and of the various garrisons required, had been drawn up.
After further discussion it was agreed that the final report should include a statement of the troops which would be available in the Mediterranean Area after HUSKY, excluding the American and British Divisions earmarked for the United Kingdom.
It was also agreed that the words “Italy and” should be inserted before the word “Russia” at the end of paragraph 3 (c).
The Prime Minister drew attention to the need for a new code word to cover post-HUSKY operations in general.
Admiral Leahy said that the security staffs had already been instructed to propose code words for a number of different operations and final suggestions would be put forward by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The President read the Combined Chiefs of Staff’s decision concerning the Burma–China Theater. At the conclusion, he questioned the statement given in paragraph 4 d with regard to interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma. He wished to know if it implied an operation against Rangoon.
Admiral King replied that it did not, that actually it envisaged submarine operations against Japanese communications in the Bay of Bengal and the approaches to all the ports of Burma.
The Prime Minister then stated that he was in agreement with paragraph 4 of the Chiefs of Staff’s report on the proposed Burma operations, but was unhappy that it did not include any mention of offensive action against Kra, Sumatra, or Penang.
Sir Alan Brooke informed the Prime Minister that the whole conception for the defeat of Japan was now the subject of study by the Combined Staff Planners and all of the operations which the Prime Minister had referred to would be considered in this study; the present report included only the operations proposed for Burma.
The President was concerned about the failure to mention Rangoon in the decision. He thought the Chinese would be much happier if some mention of Rangoon was included and thought it would be wise to do so if only for political reasons.
The Prime Minister suggested that paragraph 4 c might be amended to read: “The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations with possible exploitation toward Rangoon.” After some discussion it was agreed that the words “toward Rangoon” should be deleted from the amendment suggested by the Prime Minister in order that it would not be interpreted as a promise by the Chinese.
The Prime Minister informed Admiral King that as soon as the Italian Fleet had been neutralized the First Sea Lord intended to send six or seven battleships, with necessary auxiliaries, from the Indian Ocean to operate in coordination with the United States Fleet in the Pacific.
Admiral King felt that mounting operations against Sumatra, Kra, or Penang, would depend upon the availability of shipping. He doubted if they could be mounted in conjunction with the operations planned in the report under consideration. He pointed out that the shortage of shipping also limited the use of troops from India in the Burma Theater. He said, however, that he felt some such operation as an attack on Sumatra or the Kra Peninsula was eventually indispensable to induce the Japanese to split their naval forces. If this could be accomplished, an augmented Indian Ocean Fleet, operating in coordination with the U. S. Pacific Fleet, might inflict severe damage on the enemy.
The Prime Minister said that the Chiefs of Staff had shown in their report that they had considered all of the operations that are essential. He felt that subsidiary plans should also be worked out in order to be prepared to take advantage of opportunities that might present themselves.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound said that the program under discussion would probably take all of the resources available. As a matter of fact, the Planners were now investigating to see whether or not the operations envisaged could actually be carried out with the resources available.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the relating of resources to the operations would occur on Saturday and Sunday and the results would be included in the final report to be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister on Monday.
The President , after reading paragraph 5, concerning operations in the Pacific, commented that it included no sub-paragraph concerning air coverage for U.S. convoys, or regarding patrolling for enemy submarines.
Admiral King said that aircraft were being sent to the Pacific for this purpose as rapidly as possible but there are not sufficient numbers available to give the complete cover everywhere. He pointed out that other operations, particularly HUSKY, absorb many aircraft of the types necessary for this work.
The President said that while everything possible was being done in this regard nothing was said concerning it in the report.
Admiral King pointed out that the submarine situation in the Pacific was difficult to explain. He could not understand why the Japanese had not attacked our West Coast. He felt that they had great potentialities which they were not using, and indicated that he was concerned constantly over the possibility of a Japanese submarine effort carried out in accordance with a well-conceived plan.
Admiral Leahy said he thought the President had made a good point and suggested adding paragraph 5 b (7) which would make provision for the protection of the U.S. lines of communications.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the question of security to lines of communications would be covered in a paper that was being prepared on global strategy.
The Prime Minister thought perhaps it would be better to leave the question of protection of the lines of communications out of the report under consideration as most of the decisions recorded were conceptions of the offensive. Defensive measures, therefore, might more properly be included in the global strategy paper. He asked Sir Dudley Pound how many submarines had been sunk in the last four days, to which the Admiral of the Fleet replied that the United Nations had been maintaining an average of about one per day.
After the President had read a paragraph on this subject, the Prime Minister asked for further information. He pointed out that large quantities of captured material had been taken from the Germans and suggested that investigation be made to determine whether it would be worthwhile to start manufacturing a limited amount of ammunition of German calibers.
General Marshall informed the Prime Minister that General Smith, the Chief of Staff at Allied Force Headquarters, had informed him that a rapid survey was being made to determine what captured material could be used for equipping the French forces.
The Prime Minister then asked Admiral King if ammunition was being manufactured for use on the Richelieu. When Admiral King replied in the affirmative, the Prime Minister suggested that something of similar nature might be accomplished with regard to manufacturing ammunition for captured German weapons.
General Marshall said he would have General Somervell make an immediate investigation of the possibilities in this connection.
The Prime Minister then asked how many French Divisions were to be armed.
General Marshall replied that it was proposed to rearm a maximum of eleven. At the present time three and a half divisions have been reequipped, including two and a half infantry divisions and one armored division.
The President asked if use was being made of French pilots.
General Marshall replied that the British have provided airplanes for one French squadron, and the United States has equipped another.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that the British were also supplying the French with airplanes for patrolling purposes off the coast of West Africa. However, apart from the one squadron which they had already given the French toward the buildup of a French Air Force, the entire project was in the hands of the United States.
After reading a paragraph on this subject, the President asked how far the Ploești oil fields were from North Africa.
General McNarney replied that Ploești was 895 miles from Tobruk and 875 miles from Aleppo.
The Prime Minister asked when it was envisaged conducting the proposed operation.
General McNarney said that it should be accomplished either in June or early July because of the excellent weather conditions which obtain in those months, and also because a blow struck then would coincide with the summer campaign in Russia. He said it would require two B-24 groups to be taken from the United Kingdom for a period of about four weeks, that is, two weeks prior to mounting the operation and two weeks after it had been completed. Additionally, one B-24 group on its way to the United Kingdom would be diverted to this operation and thus be about two weeks late in its arrival in Great Britain. He said that officers with special sights for low level bombing which would be required for the attack on Ploești were now on their way to England and North Africa to give instructions in the use of these sights. Those going to North Africa were to present the plan to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, who was then to submit his comments to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Sir Charles Portal said that there were two considerations which were of paramount importance in deciding whether the proposed bombing of Ploești should be undertaken. The first was whether or not aircraft should be diverted from pre-HUSKY preparation. The British Chiefs of Staff were doubtful if this should be done. The second consideration was that unless the operation was fully successful, it would make subsequent operations from more suitable bases, which might later become available, more difficult. This could be attributed to the additional defenses that the enemy would install. He added, however, that since the prize was so great and because of weather conditions, the subject should be thoroughly explored before a decision was made.
General Marshall said that if there was a fair degree of success, an attack against Ploești would be a staggering blow to the enemy, probably the greatest single blow that could be struck.
The President pointed out that even if the operation were not successful, it would result in diverting considerable German anti-aircraft equipment from the Russian Front.
The Prime Minister then asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider the subject report in the light of the discussion that had taken place, with a view to making appropriate amendments.
Sir Alan Brooke informed the Prime Minister that the report submitted included only those decisions which had been agreed upon thus far. They were still to be related with the resources that are available. When this was done, the items which had been considered would be incorporated in a final report, which would be submitted on Monday.
The President called attention to a news report concerning the German evacuation of Norway and suggested that the staffs might consider what action should be taken in the event such report proved true.
The President and The Prime Minister both expressed their gratification regarding the work accomplished by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and regarding the decisions which had been reached.
The Prime Minister said that what appealed to him most was the spirit of the offensive that permeated the paper, and the provisions which it made for the full utilization of our troops and resources.