I hope these posts about Alamein battles explain why I put Bernard Montgomery as my avatar. As far as I am concerned he was the first and one of the most efficient Allied generals who was aware of capabilities , limitations of assets he had and used them as efficiently as possible. His post war critism especially somewhat popular narrative revisionist negative slant of him (helped by US writers , Hollywood and armor/cavalry minded Allied critics) , is mostly unfounded and unfair.
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Thanks for the many detailed posts and I totally agree with you. Your range of posts clearly shows this was a devastating victory 
Of Monty’s systemic approach. No matter what Hollywood movies and disingenuous types like Bayerlein like to portray.
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I think the British put Montgomery on such a pedestal during the war that the fall was inevitable. Of course the fall went too far the other way.
He was a great strategic general that excelled in the set piece battle: Alamein, Rhein Crossing and D-Day showed this.
He also showed great doggedness in combat, but this proved a two edged sword, immensely valuable in Egypt, but perhaps counter-productive in Normandy, and disasterous in Holland.
But he lacked the tactical flair, his only really adventurous and dynamic plan was Market Garden, which was deeply flawed.
A master of chess rather than backgammon.
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I think Monty pulled up and concluded Normandy Campaign extremely well considering circumstances , unforseen obstacles (like Channel storm that wrecked one Mulbery Harbour and countless landing craft in June 1944) , tactical and operational limits of his own forces (German Army was vastly over experienced , had excellent defensive firepower and weapons equipments for defence and built in depth defensive positions that lacked gaps to be exploited or open flanks to be turned mostly. Only time British tried to exploit a gap in Operation Perch during Normandy Campaign in 10-12 June 1944 , led the chaotic mess in Battle of Villers Bocage where in a great German propaganda triumphal procession ,four Tiger tanks checked an entire battalion ,4th County of London Yeomany of 7th Armored Division , all four German Tiger tanks were lost in this battle too. The thing was Monty could not always delegate and trust his subordinates especially in British armor due to insubordinate attitude of British armor commanders and lack of a combined arms doctrine in British Commonwealth Armies due to pre war neglect and lack of funds before the war) In Normandy just like in Alamein , Monty had to deploy his forces and attack frontally into enemy’s established kill zone , never giving initiative to enemy , enlarge the bridgehead he established in a classic dogfight to increase deployment room in bridgehead and divert eneny panzer divisions and he had to accomplish all with minimum British and Canadian losses because Britain and Commonwealth had been in a global total war since 1939 and their manpower reserves had been exhausted , they could not afford heavy casaulties and attack constantly in everywhere since few replacements or reinforcements were incoming for 2nd British Army and 1st Canadian Army in Normandy and later Rhine during 1944 , unlike US Army which had a vastly untapped fresh manpower resources , same in Soviet Union.
Under these conditions , Montgomery as overall Land Forces Commander till September 1944 (as commander of 21st Army Group and after activation of 12th Army Grup Monty remained overall Land Forces Commander till 1 September 1944) landed on Normandy on D-Day ,established beacheads and put up supply logistics network across Channel , repelled all German counter attacks to wipe out bridgehead and enlarged in instead albeit slowly due to Hitler’s nonsensical “Hold till Die” orders to his own generals that fixed most of the German army in Normandy (especially in Caen sector with concentration of entire German Panzer Group West in Caen-Orne flank hence accusation of “Ha ha he was slow since Caen was D-Day objective” ) and all its reserves in Normandy and crushed it in Falaise , a victory which led swift liberation of France , Belgium and southern Netherlands in a few months. D-Day plans assumed that Seine River would be reached in D+90 day earliest in mid September. Allied armies under Monty’s leadership crossed it in mid August 1944 and same allied planners also assumed that before D-Day due to systematic German retreat (which a professional German Army would do if not “Hold or Die” order of Hitler) they would reach West Wall , German border in the end of November earliest , instead Allied reached it in the beginning of September,almost three months ahead of their most pessimistic schedule.
That fast advance and liberation of France and Belgium in 1944 summer caused a premature over optimistic look in victory expectations and led Market-Garden strategic set back though unlike Hollywood and overpopulised myth , it was not a “disaster” etc , (for strategic disaster check Fall of France , Fall of Singapore , Fall of Philippines , Fallof Tobruk etc) Despite eventual strategic failure at its end , Allies liberated more strategic territory during Market Garden (from Antrwerp all the way to Nijmegen and further north , more than 90 km long advance , better than nothing in full half of glass) which they held and later used for future advance towards Rhineland than Hurtgen Forest fiasco later in 1944 autumn , Lorreine Caimpaign in 1944 autumn and winter or suprise Ardennes Offensive. Monty’s later operations to invade Rhileland in Operation Veritable and Operation Grenade and cross the Rhine river and enter all the way to Northern Germany in 1945 were good examples of staff work, planning and execution of operations.
Montgomery had a anti social personality , his character had been , vain , rude ,arrogant towards his peers and had very egoistic outlook. He was tactless and lacked diplomatic skills and easy to make enemies among his collegues. He would never win Mr Sympathy Award , nor he intended to. (though his constant badgering of Eisenhower for acquiring overall Land Forces Command after September 1944 had been tactless diplomatically and damaged his reputation a lot. Montgomery was probably thinking in terms of Marshall Fıoch becoming overall Land Forces Commander of Entante Armies in 1918 during WWI to win the final victory in Western Front BUT he could not see diplomatically and politically not to mention in Public Relations , that was impossible. In 1918 , Foıch was assigned as overall Land Forces Commander because most of the troops on Western Front had been French back then , after September 1944 , most of the troops in Western Europe had been American) His job was to complate his assigned missions and win the war with minimum casaulties as possible but win the war in most efficient way he knew. Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff summarised this to Monty “General , you are great to serve under , OK to serve with but hell to serve over !”
At the other hand he was meticilous , careful , great planner , know the capabilities and limits of his troops and officers and planned and executed oprations accordingly im a methodic and systematic way and a great leader of army in operations with tight grip over execution of operations and over his own subordinates , never let initiative slip or losing control of battle , always utilised firepower and material advantage properly to reduce casaulties and neutrilise enemy , always mindful conditions and morale of troops he commandeed and the casaulties they suffered therfore he was very popular at least among British , Australian and New Zealand troops. (Despite grating and making several of them angry during a press conferance which actually caused several misunderstandings after Battle of Bulge , even some US generals heaped praise to Monty especially during his conduct of operations during Battle of Bulge ,like General Matthew Ridgway , General James “Jumping” Gavin , General Bob Hasbrouck , General Bruce Clarke. Bruce Clarke went as far as declaring later “It was Montgomery who won Battle of Bulge” ,( a quote from Niall Barrt’s “Yanks and Limeys” book ) He never let any German offensive to break through his own front and capture his supply bases, made a huge supply and logistics build up before any operation because he could afford to and it made sense since that was how Allied armies were trained to operate rather than “hand of mouth” logistics system of German Army (German Army would love to have that logistics resources but usually in operations they have drawn objectives far beyond their own logistical resources especially in 1942-1944) and most importantly , never pursued any operation after the appearent failure was clear and to wage any failed operation would causer more casaulties in vain. He was willing to try in another place next day but not pursue any operation further and further that produces nothing but increwased casaulties.And he was willing to give up ground and make tactical limited retreats if the position was indefensible or strategic situation required. That makes him a comitted professional soldier , he was not a popular romantic Hollywood folk hero though.
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I think Monty pulled up and concluded Normandy Campaign extremely well considering circumstances , unforseen obstacles (like Channel storm that wrecked one Mulbery Harbour and countless landing craft in June 1944) , tactical and operational limits of his own forces (German Army was vastly over experienced , had excellent defensive firepower and weapons equipments for defence and built in depth defensive positions that lacked gaps to be exploited or open flanks to be turned mostly. Only time British tried to exploit a gap in Operation Perch during Normandy Campaign in 10-12 June 1944 , led the chaotic mess in Battle of Villers Bocage where in a great German propaganda triumphal procession ,four Tiger tanks checked an entire battalion ,4th County of London Yeomany of 7th Armored Division , all four German Tiger tanks were lost in this battle too. The thing was Monty could not always delegate and trust his subordinates especially in British armor due to insubordinate attitude of British armor commanders and lack of a combined arms doctrine in British Commonwealth Armies due to pre war neglect and lack of funds before the war) In Normandy just like in Alamein , Monty had to deploy his forces and attack frontally into enemy’s established kill zone , never giving initiative to enemy , enlarge the bridgehead he established in a classic dogfight to increase deployment room in bridgehead and divert eneny panzer divisions and he had to accomplish all with minimum British and Canadian losses because Britain and Commonwealth had been in a global total war since 1939 and their manpower reserves had been exhausted , they could not afford heavy casaulties and attack constantly in everywhere since few replacements or reinforcements were incoming for 2nd British Army and 1st Canadian Army in Normandy and later Rhine during 1944 , unlike US Army which had a vastly untapped fresh manpower resources , same in Soviet Union.
Under these conditions , Montgomery as overall Land Forces Commander till September 1944 (as commander of 21st Army Group and after activation of 12th Army Grup Monty remained overall Land Forces Commander till 1 September 1944) landed on Normandy on D-Day ,established beacheads and put up supply logistics network across Channel , repelled all German counter attacks to wipe out bridgehead and enlarged in instead albeit slowly due to Hitler’s nonsensical “Hold till Die” orders to his own generals that fixed most of the German army in Normandy (especially in Caen sector with concentration of entire German Panzer Group West in Caen-Orne flank hence accusation of “Ha ha he was slow since Caen was D-Day objective” ) and all its reserves in Normandy and crushed it in Falaise , a victory which led swift liberation of France , Belgium and southern Netherlands in a few months. D-Day plans assumed that Seine River would be reached in D+90 day earliest in mid September. Allied armies under Monty’s leadership crossed it in mid August 1944 and same allied planners also assumed that before D-Day due to systematic German retreat (which a professional German Army would do if not “Hold or Die” order of Hitler) they would reach West Wall , German border in the end of November earliest , instead Allied reached it in the beginning of September,almost three months ahead of their most pessimistic schedule.
That fast advance and liberation of France and Belgium in 1944 summer caused a premature over optimistic look in victory expectations and led Market-Garden strategic set back though unlike Hollywood and overpopulised myth , it was not a “disaster” etc , (for strategic disaster check Fall of France , Fall of Singapore , Fall of Philippines , Fallof Tobruk etc) Despite eventual strategic failure at its end , Allies liberated more strategic territory during Market Garden (from Antrwerp all the way to Nijmegen and further north , more than 90 km long advance , better than nothing in full half of glass) which they held and later used for future advance towards Rhineland than Hurtgen Forest fiasco later in 1944 autumn , Lorreine Caimpaign in 1944 autumn and winter or suprise Ardennes Offensive. Monty’s later operations to invade Rhileland in Operation Veritable and Operation Grenade and cross the Rhine river and enter all the way to Northern Germany in 1945 were good examples of staff work, planning and execution of operations.
Montgomery had a anti social personality , his character had been , vain , rude ,arrogant towards his peers and had very egoistic outlook. He was tactless and lacked diplomatic skills and easy to make enemies among his collegues. He would never win Mr Sympathy Award , nor he intended to. (though his constant badgering of Eisenhower for acquiring overall Land Forces Command after September 1944 had been tactless diplomatically and damaged his reputation a lot. Montgomery was probably thinking in terms of Marshall Foch becoming overall Land Forces Commander of Entante Armies in 1918 during WWI to win the final victory in Western Front BUT he could not see diplomatically and politically not to mention in Public Relations , that was impossible. In 1918 , Foch was assigned as overall Land Forces Commander because most of the troops on Western Front had been French back then , after September 1944 , most of the troops in Western Europe had been American) His job was to complate his assigned missions and win the war with minimum casaulties as possible but win the war in most efficient way he knew. Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff summarised this to Monty “General , you are great to serve under , OK to serve with but hell to serve over !”
At the other hand he was meticilous , careful , great planner , know the capabilities and limits of his troops and officers and planned and executed oprations accordingly im a methodic and systematic way and a great leader of army in operations with tight grip over execution of operations and over his own subordinates , never let initiative slip or losing control of battle , always utilised firepower and material advantage properly to reduce casaulties and neutrilise enemy , always mindful conditions and morale of troops he commandeed and the casaulties they suffered therfore he was very popular at least among British , Australian and New Zealand troops. (Despite grating and making several of them angry during a press conferance which actually caused several misunderstandings after Battle of Bulge , even some US generals heaped praise to Monty especially during his conduct of operations during Battle of Bulge ,like General Matthew Ridgway , General James “Jumping” Gavin , General Bob Hasbrouck , General Bruce Clarke. Bruce Clarke went as far as declaring later “It was Montgomery who won Battle of Bulge” ,( a quote from Niall Barrt’s “Yanks and Limeys” book ) He never let any German offensive to break through his own front and capture his supply bases, made a huge supply and logistics build up before any operation because he could afford to and it made sense since that was how Allied armies were trained to operate rather than “hand of mouth” logistics system of German Army (German Army would love to have that logistics resources but usually in operations they have drawn objectives far beyond their own logistical resources especially in 1942-1944) and most importantly , never pursued any operation after the appearent failure was clear and to wage any failed operation would causer more casaulties in vain. He was willing to try in another place next day but not pursue any operation further and further that produces nothing but increased casaulties. And he was willing to give up ground and make tactical limited retreats if the position was indefensible or strategic situation required. That makes him a comitted professional soldier , he was not a popular romantic Hollywood folk hero though.
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I think you are being over generous to Monty in your assessment of both Market Garden and closing out Normandy.
The Mulberry that was wrecked was the American one, so not an issue for Monty.
While he was facing the cream of the German forces in Normandy, he kept applying the same failing tactics time after time. And he failed to make a maximum effort to close the Falaise pocket.
At Market Garden, while it wasn’t a disaster on the scale of France 1940, it was definitely a disaster. Yes, they made a deep penetration, but it was a narrow salient which took several months to consolidate. And even if they had taken the Arnhem bridge the resources to exploit it didn’t exist.
His failure to focus on opening Antwerp was bordering on negligence. He ignored Antwerp because, as he wrote to Alan Brooke, the Commonwealth armies would only need one of the French channel ports to supply it’s drive into Germany. He totally ignored the bigger picture.
He never won a battle from the weaker side. He never had to face a numerically superior enemy.
I would also take exception to your view that the British were poor at combined operations. British integration of artillery and close air support was second to none. So what is your evidence?
You also criticize the British armoured commanders; now there is definitely some support for that in N Africa, but I don’t think it is justified in NW Europe.
It could equally be argued that Montgomery’s over planning stifled initiative among his subordinates.
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You can always invent a time machine ,go back and show him how it is done in 80 years of hindsight. Eisehnower definetely agreed with UK Ambassadors summary of Montgomery in 1952 during his predidency “Whatever you think of him , he eventually got us there” (D-Day and Battle of Normandy)
I am really getting tired of all “Montgomery was mediocre because he had numbers and material of everything” accusation as if this is a sin because war is a sportsmanship match that should be on equal terms or a numerical advantage always guarantees victory (Allied armies from Western Allies including US and UK to Soviet Union had numbers and equipment superiorty till 1942 and they mostly lost their campaigns) And all of their campaigns from Mediterranean to Pacific to North West Euerıope etc in 1942-1945 were won with numerical superiorty and logistical and material build up concluded first. Where is your critisms about say : Omar Bradley , George Patton , Douglas MacArthur , Georgy Zhukov , Konstantin Rokossovsky , Chesty Puller AND William Halsey or Chester Nimitz when they conducted they faced a friction of their strength in Guadalcanal (whre US Marines drove numerically very inferior attackers each time) Operation Uranus , Operation Bagration , island hopping campaign in Pacific or Phillipinnes Campaign in 1944 with five or seven times more manpower and material build up than defending enemy ? Which Allied or Axis general avoided to go operations with numerical supertiorty if they could have a choice. Why only Montgomery is singled out for that ? Isn’t that unfair in comparison ? You do not see any other accusation or insult thrown to any other Allied general on terms of numbers and material superiorty but when Montgomery had them (which was smart and professional thinking on his part since it reduced casaulties and compansated operational deficiency of British Army in Combined Arms) ,all hell breaks loose against him.
What was his crime anyway ? Yes he had a very flawed and egoist character , antisocial and vain type and annoyed a lot of his collegues British or American but he WON all of his campaigns. He knew the army he was commanding and how it functioned and what its limits and strengths were. Allied armies were citizens in uniform ,trained hastily with sudden mobilisation in “order based approach” (especially British Commonwealth Armies) and could be easily demoralised with high casaulties. In Normandy , German Panzer Group West had no gaps in their frontlines or open flanks undefended (unlike say Polles 1939 , French 1940 , Italians 1940 , Russians 1942) , British 1941-42 in Africa before Monty arrived to take over Eighth Army. The only option to enlarge Normandy bridgehead he established (for which he was under huge pressure from Defense Ministry in London and SHEAF led by Eisenhower and Teddler and RAF to breakout as if Germans would let him or make it easy in a compacted battlefield barriered by Orne river and entire Panzer Group West with multiple defensive lines established ) was frontal attack. In frontal attack against an extended enemy , three to one superiıorty (AT LEAST) in numbers is essential for an offensive campaign frontally in enemy killzone. The defensive firepower in miltary had advanced a lot at this stage. “He never faced a numerically superior enemy” accusation is (I am sorry no offense intended if any) shows the prejudice. Can you show what was he supposed to do , what tactics he was supposed to do again (in 80 years hindsight) ? If your army is operationally deficient (British Canadian Armies were and they had exhausted manpower reserves so no infantry replacements arriving and incoming ones were inexperienced) you use material , firepower superiorty and tactics. His men approved that and kept their morale up due to reduction in casaulties. Just because their numbers were superior ,Allied armies were not operationally in same level with Germans.
Falaise pocket myth is something else. Due to disappointment of half of 5th Panzer Army escaped (but so reduced in strenth with less than 100 tanks out of 2.300 tanks they started in Battle of Nıormandy and saved only 50.000 men out of 120.000) and dashed the hopes of an early premature end of war in 1944 and Allies inability to pull a Kesselschract pincer encirclement like Germans did several times especially in Eatern Front , they unjustly blame Montgomery (by later authors especially by Ambrose ilk) , and constant accusation Montgomery is baseless. 1) Falaise Pocket was a sucess as much as it could be for Allies 2) Germans when cornered and encircled , outperformed Allied armies till 1945 due to operatiıonal effectiveness and experience and always tried to breakourt of any encirclement , they did it in Korsun Pocket in February 1944 , they did not instantly surrounded as Monty critics asumed to happen , even Red Army did it in 1941 at Smolensk 3) Omar Bradley ,cmdr of 12th Artmy Group knew it 4) So he halted US 15th Corps at Argentan because and this is his quote "I preferred a solid shoulder at Argenrtan rather than a broken eck in Falaise 5) 15th US Army Corps of Bradley had an undefended open space in north of Argentan , unlike Monty’s 1st Canadian Army which had been fighting tooth and nail with 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Corps before Falaise. If Bradley had been that confident he could extend the front in midf August till rthere and extend the pincer. If one arm of pincer in Kesselschract maneuver is halted other pincer should close the sack. BUT Bradley rightfully and correctly did not do it. Over extending 15th US Army would expose it to 2nd SS Panzer Corps counter attacks to open brakout route from pocket and since Bradley did not trust them holding and plugging the gap , he correctly prefffered to leave one escape eroute to enemy albeit under heavy Allied air attack and gunfire to maximise German casaulties. (Falaise pocket in souuth of Seine had been Bradley’s idea by the way. Montgomery intended to make a longer hook and pincer encirclement in north of Seine but ageed with Bradley later to follow his plan. ) If you are not confident of your forrces doşing an operation , do not commit to it unless you have no other choice like receiving ortders from superiors etc. Bradley preffered not to plug the gap (in right reasons) becauser he was not confident the plug would hold.
Scheldt Campaign and Late Opening of Antwerp had been blunders I agree. In those Montgomery made mistakes. but the reason is everyone in Allied ranks from SHEAF , Army Group HQs under influance of premature Allied press reports and overoptimism after swift liberation of Belgium and Northern France (thanks to Monty’s 21st Army Group advance from Normandy to Antwerp in seven days) were looking to Rhine , cross the Rhine and hope (vainly) to conclude the war quickly by reaching Ruhr and Northern Germany basin. Focusing on opening Antwerp would admitting that they needed a supply base for huge logistics build up to commit an extensed campaign till 1945. In over optimismm in Serptember 1944 , no one in Allied ranks (including Montgomnery who was still under pressure to conclude campaign due to V2 missile attack from Netrherlands to London) wished to hear that.
Besides 15th German Army cornered in Scheldt and Waslchared had 90.000 or so entrenched troops and General Von Zagen had orders to defend the Antwerp approaches till last man and last bullet. All garrisons in Channel Ports took same orders from Hitler and OKW. So cleaning up Scheldt would be delayed no matter what even if 30th Corps cut the peninsula in September 1944. When cornered Germans outperformed Allies operatiınally so delay of opening the Antewerp and cleaning the mines at Scheldt would extend till November 1944 probably too late to accelare Allied momentum on land against Rhineland.
As for Market Garden ,yes Montgomery’s aims to march to Ruhr had been over optimistic and mostly unrealistic (Eisenhower preferred a limited strategic objetive for Market Garden , just establishing a bridgehead on Rhine would be enough for him) but failure to hold a bridgehead at Arnhem had been due to bad and improvised hasty planning of 1st Airborne Army and Allied Air Transport Fleets (they made a bad airborne plan to land and capture the bridges) ,not Montgomery’s (who just gave his orders for Market Garden to his subodinate commands and focused te campaign in Northern Belgium in September 1944) He only made a mistake of not sending a fully authorised liason officer to 1st Airborne Army HQ otherwise General Browning ,General Brereton , Urqhuart and Gavin would not make such a bad airborne landing plan in Arnhem and Nijmegen. Eventually once the failure of Market Garden became clear , Montgomery terminated the operation eight days later and preferred to hold airborne salient he captured till Nijmegen island (and repulsed all counter attracks by Germsans to recapture it)
I can list several incidents where British armor arm although developing and improving combined operations and supporting other arms constantly ,still letting down British and Commonwealth infantry several times even in 1944-45. It was not a constant rule.Several British tank formations like 11th Armored Division or 8th Armored Brigade solved those problems and performed much much better. But the main crippling factor in combined arms warfare factor had been “Britain’s manpower crisis and lack of infantry replacements crisis in 1944” because UK manpower resources were exhausted. They had been in war for five years in multiple fronts ,started the war with much less manpower reserves than Soviet Union or United States. So it left armor , air force and artilley much more prominent in later campaigns and armor (especially in Normandy) acted alone without support of other arms and failed (Operation Perch in Villers Bocage , Operation Goodwood , Battle of Nijmegen Island in Operation Market Garden during September 1944) The combined arms problems of British Army never went away till end of war but they could be mitigated under close scrunity of Montgomery’s autocratic command from above (like Operation Veritable when after prtoperly build up his forces and logistics he crushed 1st Parachute Army) Because he rightfully distrusted his subordinates especşially in armor , like Operation Perch , Battle of Villers Bocage in June 1944 when General Bucknall of 30th Corps failed to exploit the gap in German lines by counter attack of four German tanks. German Army vastly more experienced ,and trained with way more better Mission Oriented Operation Battle Doctrine , had been outperforming Allies on field and Montgomery had no time to retrain his armies who were drilled in Order Based Approach that stiffled initiative. Germans developed their Mission Oriented operation doctrine in last 70 years since Franco-Prussia War in 1870-71 (according to Robert Citino) , Montgomery did not have that time even if he tried to change operatşinal culture mindset of an entire army. (he was a product of Order Based Approach also anyway) He needed numerical , material and firepower build up to compensate. And it worked most of the time. Not flashily but worked way better than given credit for. Under his overall Land Fores Command ,Allied armies reached Rhineland and West Wall frontier in September 1944 , three months earlier than previously drawn pre D-Day plans in May 1944 (check St Paul’s briefing in 16 May 1944)
And no , Market Garden WAS NOT a disaster strategically, it failed strategically but it gained valuable ground , the air borne corridor to Waal river shielded Antwerp from any German counter attack from north (therefore Germans counter attacked from south via Ardennes three months later) , Nijmegen sailient had been so valuable to advance to Rhineland , Germasns launched several counter attacks to recover it , and Eindhoven airbases were captured. Let’s compare that with Battle of Hurtgen Forest. that started after Markert Garden and went on for three months , inflicted two times more casaulties on US Army , tried to capture a wood that was strategicallty worthless and could by passed in first place but Bradley and Hodges massed and lost more ansd more men and machines but advanced only one tenth of Market Garden territorial gainand that territory captured in Hıurtgen Forest was strategically worthless. But unlike Market Garden , no Hollywood United Artist movie made about Hurtgen Forest. Neither about Lorreine Campaign where Patton suffered so many infantry losses in headlong attacks on Metz , he had to push rear logistics troops as infantry around Metz in vain (no movie made abut that either) or destruction of one US infantry division in Ardennes offensive (106tth Division ,largest mass surrender of US Army in Europe without a shot in three days due to Bradley and Hodges decision tohold Schnee Eiffel) because no movie again made that either.) You can consider them bigger disasters. But Market Garden and Montgomery , advanced more territory and suffered less casaulties thsan the list above , is open target due to one book intended to be converted and then produced to a movie. Hell even Rommel, who recklessly advanced to Egypt in premature optimism and suffered four times more casaulties and almost destruction due to his glory seeking in 1942 and after 1942 summer constantly defeated , lost ground and eventually deserted his army in Tunisia , is reverred like a wargod even today ,compared to Montgomery.
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Maybe you could add some small maps in the text to provide an overall view
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