Québec Conference 1944 (OCTAGON)

Note by the Secretaries of CCS

Quebec, 12 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 654/8

Basic policies for the OCTAGON Conference

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on all the basic policies for inclusion in the final OCTAGON report to the President and the Prime Minister, with one exception.

This exception is as follows:
a. The British Chiefs of Staff have proposed the following as paragraph 6(i) of CCS 654:

Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority, having regard to other inescapable commitments, as soon as the German situation allows.

b. The United States Chiefs of Staff have proposed that this paragraph should read as follows:

Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, as a matter of highest priority, having regard to other agreed commitments, as soon as the German situation allows.

The decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this wording is requested.

A. J. McFARLAND
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES
Combined Secretariat

Memorandum by the British CS

Quebec, 12 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 675

Priorities for personnel shipping subsequent to termination of hostilities in Europe

It is clear that the global personnel movement problems which will arise immediately before and following on the termination of hostilities in Europe will be of considerable magnitude and complexity, and that decisions will be necessary as to the priorities to be afforded to the various movements involved.

In order that consideration may be given to this matter, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff instruct the representatives of the United States Service Departments and the British Service Departments to undertake immediately, in conjunction with the appropriate shipping authorities, an examination of the scope of the movement problems involved and of the availability of shipping resources with which to meet the requirements.

Memorandum by the USCS

Quebec, 12 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 676

General progress report on recent operations in the Pacific

The enclosure, compiled from reports of the area commanders in the Pacific, is presented for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosure
Top secret

Progress of Pacific and Southwest Pacific operations, 15 November 1943-15 September 1944

North Pacific
Operations in the North Pacific have been limited to periodic air raids and surface ship bombardment of Paramushiru and Shimushu and other islands in the northern Kuriles. Concurrently the establishment of bases to support future operations in the North Pacific is being carried to completion.

Central Pacific
In furtherance of the approved strategic concept of the war against Japan, the amphibious forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas, supported tactically and strategically by combatant units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, have successively occupied principal objectives in the Gilbert, Marshall and Marianas Islands.

The Gilbert Islands operations were initiated on 17 November 1943, and resulted in the occupation of Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama. Tarawa was well defended. In particular the beach defenses were extensive and difficult to overcome.

The Marshall Islands operations were initiated the 31st of January and resulted in the occupation of Kwajalein and Majuro Atolls. This was followed by the occupation in mid-February of Eniwetok.

Operations for the seizure of Saipan were initiated on the 15th of June. This was followed by the occupation of Tinian and Guam in late July.

The next operation scheduled in this area is the occupation of the Palaus. The target date is 15 September 1944.

From bases established in the Marshalls and Gilberts continuous air raids have been conducted against isolated Japanese held islands. Particular attention has been given to neutralization of Truk. These operations have been coordinated with similar operations conducted from bases in the Southwest Pacific.

During the operations for the occupation of the Marianas strong units of the Japanese Fleet were engaged by air action from our carriers in the Philippine Seas. Severe damage was inflicted on the Japanese in this engagement.

The submarine campaign in the Western Pacific has been prosecuted with vigor and the results attained have been most gratifying. Heavy toll has been taken of Japanese shipping as well as of escorting forces.

The occupation of the Marianas has presented the opportunity for development of bases for VLR bombers for operations against Japan proper. Preparations for conducting these operations are underway with all speed.

South Pacific
Operations in the South Pacific have been principally harassing operations against the isolated Japanese garrisons by air forces. The Royal New Zealand Air Force participated in combat missions with U.S. Army and Navy air units from bases in the South Pacific. The South Pacific area is being progressively “rolled-up.” Bases developed in that area are currently being used for rehabilitation of troops for further operations in the Western Pacific. The naval base at Espiritu Santo has proved very useful in repairing battle damage. Repairs have been successfully accomplished on all classes of ships.

On 15 February, the 3rd New Zealand Division (less one brigade) seized Green Island.

Southwest Pacific
A U.S. task force landed in the Arawe area of New Britain on 15 December 1943 and terminated organized enemy resistance on 16 January 1944.

One U.S. marine division, supported by Allied air and naval forces, landed in the Gloucester area on 26 December 1943 and succeeded in capturing the airfields by 30 December. Japanese killed were 3,686 as against our losses of 326. As a result of the Arawe and Cape Gloucester operations, western New Britain was secured by the middle of March.

Preceded by heavy naval and air bombardment, a successful, unopposed landing was made near Saidor on 2 January 1944. The airstrip was captured and ready for landing of transport aircraft by 7 January. Commencing 16 January, the remainder of the U.S. division employed reinforced the original landing. In expanding the beachhead, only weak resistance was encountered.

One U.S. cavalry division, supported by naval and air force units, made initial landings in the Admiralty Islands on 29 February 1944. The landing was made in Hayne Harbor, Los Negros Island, against little resistance and Momote airdrome was seized on D-Day. Several enemy counterattacks were repulsed resulting in large Japanese casualties and by 23 March enemy forces on Los Negros were completely surrounded. Adjacent islands in the group were reduced and occupied and by the middle of April complete control of the Admiralty Islands had been obtained.

Two independent task forces, under the command of the Sixth Army, made simultaneous landings at Aitape and Hollandia on 22 April 1944. Landings were preceded by heavy naval bombardment and air strafing attacks.

a. The Hollandia Task Force made landings in the Humboldt Bay and Tanahmerah Bay areas respectively and formed a pincers movement in attacking the three airstrips. Only slight enemy resistance was encountered and by 1 May control of the area had been definitely established.

b. The Aitape Task Force established landings against practically no opposition and the airdrome was reported operational by 25 April.

c. The element of surprise played an important part in the success of both operations resulting in an estimated 54,000 troops to the eastward being cut off.

A U.S. task force, supported by air and naval forces, made unopposed landings on Wakde Island and near Arara on 17 May 1944. All enemy resistance on Wakde was overcome by 18 May. The Arara perimeter was extended between the Tementoe River and the Tor River on 17 May with increasing enemy resistance west of the Tor River. Strong enemy attacks failed to penetrate the perimeter and were repulsed. The task force perimeter was extended and by 3 July included the Maffin airdrome. Casualties suffered by the Japanese are 3,650 killed and 70 prisoners. Active patrolling is continuing.

On 27 May 1944 one U.S. infantry division, with the support of air and naval forces, made landings in the Biak Island areas and encountered little opposition initially. Enemy strength developed on 5 June and the Mokmer airstrip was crossed on 7 June under artillery, mortar and machine gun fire. Artillery fire prevented work on the Mokmer airdrome until 11 June and the enemy launched several unsuccessful counterattacks in an effort to regain the field. Boroke, Sorido and Mokmer dromes were entirely cleared of enemy artillery and small arms fire by 22 June. General patrolling and mopping up operations continue.

One U.S. regimental combat team, closely supported by air and naval forces, landed unopposed near the Kamiri drome on Noemfoor Island on 2 July 1944. On 3 July and 4 July three U.S. parachute battalions were dropped on the Kamiri strip, assisting the infantry. By 6 July enemy resistance had been overcome and the Kamiri, Koransoren and Namber dromes were firmly held.

A U.S. infantry task force made an unopposed landing near Cape Opmarai in the Cape Sansapor area on 30 July 1944. No opposition other than patrol skirmishes has been encountered and active patrolling continues. Japanese dead for the period 30 July to 10 August numbered 92.

Air operations conducted in the Southwest Pacific Area have been especially effective in neutralizing Japanese forces and enabling the Allies to conduct further offensive actions aimed at gaining complete control. In all advances, their mission in each case called for securing airfields and other bases from which to conduct further operations. Air supremacy has been achieved to such an extent that only in isolated instances are the Japanese offering any determined air resistance.

Australian land force activity in the Southwest Pacific Area consisted primarily of participation in the Finschhafen and Kaiapit-Dumpu operations and the occupation of the Madang-Sepik River coast line. The 9th Australian Division captured Finschhafen on 2 October 1943 and drove the remaining Jap troops to Satelberg. Satelberg fell on 29 November. Elements of the 9th Australian Division, utilizing armor to great advantage, then advanced up Huon Peninsula coast line to contact U.S. Saidor Task Force at Yaut River, southeast of Saidor, to complete occupation of Huon Peninsula on 10 February.

Simultaneously, the 7th Australian Division was deployed into the Ramu Valley to reinforce independent Australian units and to stop the threatened Jap drive overland through the Ramu-Markham Valley from Madang. The 11th Australian Division relieved the 7th Australian Division 8 January and continued the Australian advance to a final juncture with U.S. troops near Yalua on 13 April. Subsequently, U.S. troops were withdrawn and the Australian units continued pressure on the Jap forces which withdrew up the New Guinea coast toward Wewak. By 6 June Australian troops had reached Hansa Bay and are now in contact along the Sepik River.

During this period, the RAAF carried on continued attacks from the Darwin area. Australian fighter units attached to U.S. task forces were used in each of the landings along the New Guinea coast as the initial occupation forces with their light P-40s.

They operated in the advance airdromes before the airdromes were suitable for the operation of U.S. units equipped with heavier aircraft.

The Netherlands East Indies Air Forces operating in the Southwest Pacific Area consist of the 18th Medium Bomber Squadron and the 120th Fighter Squadron. Elements of these forces participated in daily bombing and strafing strikes against enemy shipping and installations in the Aroe-Tanimbar-Kai and Timor areas.

Future operations in this area will advance our forces into the southern and central Philippines via Morotai, Talaud, Sarangani and the Leyte-Samar area, with a target date of 20 December for Leyte-Samar.

Tripartite luncheon meeting, 1:00 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Canada
President Roosevelt The Earl of Athlone Prime Minister Mackenzie King
Mrs. Roosevelt Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone
Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Churchill

According to Mackenzie King’s notes, the topics of discussion included the Soviet position vis-à-vis Japan after the end of the war in Europe, conditions in India, Japan, the instability of French governments, the United States Constitution, the negro problem in the Union of South Africa, entry of troops into Berlin and Vienna, de Gaulle, the possibility of civil war in France, and China.

The Log states that the party assembled after luncheon in the conference room at the Citadel, where Churchill demonstrated some models of ships and equipment used to form artificial harbors for the invasion of France.

The Secretary of State to the President

Washington, September 12, 1944

Memorandum for the President

Subject: BRITISH ECONOMIC COOPERATION TOWARD ARGENTINA – MEAT NEGOTIATIONS

It is no exaggeration to say that effective implementation of our Argentine policy depends on British cooperation in economic matters. Up to the present we have received only tentative and highly qualified promises from London to investigate the possibility of such cooperation.

As you know, we have considered that it is of the greatest importance that if the British ultimately find it necessary to sign a meat contract rather than to purchase on a month-to-month or spot basis, such contract should be for the shortest possible term. However, the rumor has persisted that the British intend to sign a four-year contract and Mr. Eden has now written to Ambassador Winant stating among other things that:

We have no desire to conclude a contract running for a longer period than is strictly necessary. … But our paramount duty both to our people and to [certain of] our Allies is to ensure that, during the acutely difficult post-war years, they shall be adequately fed; and the case made out by our Ministry of Food that only a longer-term contract will ensure this as regards meat is entirely convincing.

In view of the situation developing on food surpluses as pointed out in Judge Byrnes’ report to you of September 7, it would appear that longer term commitments with the Argentine could be avoided. As Judge Byrnes has indicated, “Production in the areas under Allied control with the exception of Russia is approximately one third above normal production. War reserves have been established. When peace comes the reserves in the military theatres will become surplus.”

With respect to meat specifically, which the Combined Food Board may consider in relatively short supply, although it has not as yet analyzed or allocated the supply for the period November [1944] to November 1945, it appears that with the overall ample food situation, that some provision could be made for supplying additional meat to the United Kingdom from the United States, Canada, Australia and South American countries other than Argentina. I understand that there is a surplus of utility beef in the United States and with the current prospects of slaughter this fall that the surplus undoubtedly will be increased. It is also my understanding that there may be some surplus of commercial grades of beef. It may be possible for us to arrange to increase lend-lease of certain quantities of utility and commercial grades of beef to the United Kingdom provided a similar reduction of British purchases of beef in the Argentine is obtained.

I therefore suggest that you urge upon the Prime Minister that:

  1. British purchases of meat in the Argentine be continued on a spot basis and that no agreement for a period of four, or even two, years be concluded.

  2. The British Ministry of Food reduce its meat purchases in Argentina by resorting to the above-mentioned possible alternative sources of supply and by giving due weight to the promising food supply situation in Europe and elsewhere. I have been informed that our Army has terminated all purchases of Argentine canned beef through the British Ministry of Food, which, as you know, purchases meat in Latin America for us under an arrangement of the Combined Food Board.

CH

865.48/9-1244: Telegram

The Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy to the Secretary of State

Caserta, September 12, 1944
Secret
362

General Wilson has received word from London that the War-Cabinet has requested British Service of Supplies to submit data on existing arrangements for administration of relief in Italy, expenditures thereon up to present time and has inquired as to what steps are being taken to get agricultural and industrial production restarted in Italy. This message adds that General O’Dwyer has apparently taken a full report to Washington which will undoubtedly become available to British in due course but that the War Office would be grateful if General Wilson in the meantime could transmit a copy of this report with his comments urgently so that it might be available to the War Cabinet. War Office also requested any additional pertinent information on this subject.

KIRK

The President’s Special Assistant to the President

Washington, September 12, 1944

Mr. President: I think this is O.K. – it gives the final decision to you and in the present situation, that I think is essential.

If you will initial this, the matter will be handled that way.

HARRY

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke
General Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell General Ismay
Vice Admiral Willson Admiral Noble
Rear Admiral Cooke Lieutenant General Macready
Rear Admiral McCormick Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Handy Major General Laycock
Major General Fairchild
Major General Kuter
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Hollis
Captain Graves Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes

September 12, 1944, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret

Machinery for coordination of United States-Soviet-British military effort (CCS 618/3)

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the proposals for improvement of liaison with the Soviets originated from a suggestion put to Mr. Harriman by Marshal Stalin some two months ago.

Admiral King said that the U.S. Planners had examined the previous British proposal (CCS 618/2) and were of the opinion that while there were advantages in the establishment of a combined committee at Moscow, this would not expedite rapid coordination of operations in the field which would require separate liaison arrangements.

Admiral Leahy stressed the value of improved liaison with the Russians.

Sir Alan Brooke said he felt Marshal Stalin’s offer should be dropped. In Moscow there were already United States and British missions and all that was required was that the Russians should appoint a suitable high-ranking officer.

Sir Charles Portal said that he felt the proposal to exchange missions between field commanders would not work. It would not be right for the Russian High Command to be represented at a field headquarters. All our own plans would flow back to Moscow and we, in turn, would gain nothing. A committee in Moscow would be a better arrangement if, indeed, the Russians could be induced to appoint a really responsible high-ranking officer. Missions in the field, he felt, would be useless and even dangerous.

Admiral King said he felt that liaison between field commanders might follow from the achievement of successful cooperation in Moscow.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the recommendations of the British Chiefs of Staff in CCS 618/3.

b. Instructed the Secretaries to draft and circulate for approval a message to the Heads of the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow based on CCS 618/3.

Zones of occupation in Germany

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the Prime Minister and the President might be invited to give consideration to the outstanding problem of the zones to be occupied by United States and British forces in Germany and to give instructions to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral Leahy agreed. He had already mentioned this matter to the President but would do so again. He would take the line that in view of the political aspects of the problem, guidance from the heads of State was necessary.

In reply to a question by Sir John Dill, Admiral Leahy said that from a United States point of view there were, he felt, no military considerations. There was, however, the problem of transportation and supply of United States troops if they went into the southern zone.

Sir Charles Portal said that from the British point of view there were very considerable military implications involved and there were strong reasons why, militarily, the British Chiefs of Staff would want to occupy the northwest zone.

Admiral Leahy explained that the utilization of United States troops for occupation was politically difficult and in fact would be politically impossible with regard to France, Italy, and southern Europe. Whereas the occupation of Germany could be justified, that of France would meet with enormous difficulty.

Sir Charles Portal said there was, of course, no question of occupying France.

Admiral King said that he felt it would be easier for the United States to occupy the southwest zone if it could be arranged that the evacuation of American troops and supplies for the occupational troops could be undertaken through north German ports.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed that the question of zones of occupation in Germany had such serious political implications that they were unable to make any recommendation without guidance from their respective governments.

b. Decided to report in this sense to the President and Prime Minister and, in doing so, to invite their attention to the need for an early decision on this matter.

Control of strategic bomber forces in Europe (CCS 520/3)

General Arnold, during consideration of the British memorandum in CCS 520/3, asked why the present method of control was stated to be unsatisfactory as a long-term arrangement.

Sir Charles Portal explained that in the opening stages of OVERLORD the present system of control had been necessary and effective. However, with the move of General Eisenhower and Air Chief Marshal Tedder to France, they were divorced from General Spaatz’ headquarters and from the Air Ministry, and strategic control by General Eisenhower became almost a formality. Air Marshal Tedder had only a small air staff and the large staffs of the Air Ministry, Bomber Command and the U.S. Strategic Air Force in Europe had, of necessity, to exercise control over the actual strategic bombing operations.

General Arnold asked why large staffs were necessary to control strategic bombing.

Sir Charles Portal explained that full knowledge of all available enemy intelligence and adequate and rapid methods of interpreting the results of bombing attacks were essential to the effective control of strategic bombing. In addition, it was essential to keep in close touch with the degree of enemy air opposition to be expected.

General Arnold asked why no mention was made of communications in the priority of targets.

Sir Charles Portal said that communications had largely become targets for medium and fighter bombers rather than strategic forces. The proposed directive on priorities was, of course susceptible to alteration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff or at the request of General Eisenhower. In fact, the priority list set forth was, he understood, that now enforced by General Eisenhower himself.

General Arnold asked what would occur if General Spaatz and the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff should disagree with regard to the control of the strategic bombing forces.

Sir Charles Portal explained that in this unlikely eventuality they would refer respectively to General Arnold and himself who, if they could not give a ruling, would refer the matter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision.

With regard to the declaration of an emergency by a supreme commander, Sir Charles Portal explained that this same procedure had been in force for approximately a year in the Mediterranean where it had worked satisfactorily. An emergency could be declared either for offense or for defense.

General Arnold said he was particularly interested in the full utilization of the strategic bombing force since the United States had in the United Kingdom 2970 heavy bombers and in the Mediterranean 1512 heavy bombers, making a total of 4482. Of these, 2980 were operational and each aircraft had two crews available and therefore could be used every day. Was the proposed chain of command the best setup to obtain the maximum use from this very large force?

Sir Charles Portal said he felt that it was. The Supreme Commander’s role in the chain of command, which had been valuable in the first phases of OVERLORD was, in his opinion, no longer useful and better results would be obtained from the proposed command arrangements.

Admiral Leahy questioned the proposed directive with regard to the right of a commander in the field to get from the strategic air forces the air support which he requested. This, he felt, was essential.

Sir Charles Portal said that the system was exactly the same as had been used in the Mediterranean where the Supreme Commander had declared an emergency on only one occasion. This, as he remembered, was on the fifth day of the battle at Salerno. The declaration of an emergency by a supreme commander was in effect a direct order from the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the use of the strategic air forces as directed by the supreme commander. He said he could guarantee on the British side that the supreme commanders would always get what they needed when they needed it. The use of the emergency procedure should be regarded only as “the big stick” which could be used but probably would never have to be.

General Marshall suggested an alternative arrangement whereby a small assignment of strategic air might be made to supreme commanders, the remainder being controlled as suggested in the British paper.

Sir Charles Portal agreed that this was a possible solution. He felt, however, that in a real emergency the supreme commander must have all the bombers that he needed. Divided control might result in the supreme commander’s allotment not being fully used on all occasions.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to consider this matter further at their meeting the following morning.

Memorandum by the British CS

Quebec, 12 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 618/3

Machinery for coordination of United States-Soviet-British military effort

References: a. CCS 129th Meeting, Item 3
b. CCS 618 Series

The problem
The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agree that it is necessary to create additional machinery through which the military efforts of the United Nations forces on the European fronts may be coordinated. The form of this machinery is considered below.

Facts bearing on the problem
Close liaison is needed between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Soviet General Staff on matters of strategy and military policy in Europe. It will, moreover, be highly desirable to open discussions with the USSR on the war against Japan as early as politically practicable.

In June 1944 Marshal Stalin raised the question of improving the machinery for coordinating the military efforts of the Allies, and in July, Marshal Vassilievsky informed General Deane that the Soviet General Staff were interested in the matter and would like to know the proposals of the Chiefs of Staff in this respect.

As agreed at SEXTANT, the creation of any form of United Chiefs of Staff Committee would be unacceptable.

Discussion
We consider the necessary liaison between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Soviet General Staff would be achieved by the creation of a Combined British, United States and Soviet Committee in Moscow, provided that it is clearly understood that this Committee:
(a) Is purely consultative and advisory and has no power to make decisions without reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff or the Russian General Staff respectively.

(b) Deals solely with strategic and operational matters and does not impinge upon the work that is at present being done by the European Advisory Commission, such as civil affairs, etc.

On the Russian side there has been reluctance in the past to discuss matters of any importance with the British and United States Missions, owing to the fact that the latter have usually to deal with officials of no authoritative standing. This difficulty should be overcome in the future provided that the Russian representative on the Committee is a senior member of the Russian General Staff. The Heads of the United States and British Missions already represent their own Chiefs of Staff and so might well serve as members of the Committee. Their rank should be similar to that of the Russian Member.

Conclusion
We conclude:
(a) That it would be to the advantage of the United Nations war effort to set up a Combined Military Committee in Moscow as a consultative and advisory body dealing only with strategic and operational matters.

(b) That the Committee should consist of senior representatives of the Russian General Staff and the British and United States Chiefs of Staff.

Recommendation
We recommend that the Heads of the British and American Missions in Moscow be instructed to approach the Soviet General Staff with the proposal to establish a Combined Committee in Moscow.

Note by the Secretaries of CCS

Quebec, 12 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 618/4

Machinery for coordination of United States-Soviet-British military effort

In accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the CCS 172nd Meeting, the Secretaries propose that the British Chiefs of Staff and the United States Chiefs of Staff send the messages attached hereto as Enclosures “A” and “B” to Generals Burrows and Deane respectively.

A. J. McFARLAND
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES
Combined Secretariat

Enclosure “A”
Top secret

Message from the British CS to General Burrows

The text of this message was the same, mutatis mutandis, as that of the message proposed to be sent to Deane in enclosure “B,” below.

Enclosure “B”
Top secret

Message from the USCS to General Deane

It is desired that you propose to the Soviet General Staff that a tripartite Military Committee be set up in Moscow consisting of senior representatives of the Russian General Staff, of the United States Chiefs of Staff, and of the British Chiefs of Staff. The idea of the United States Chiefs of Staff is that this Committee would deal with strategical and operational matters, but you should make it clear:

a. That it will be purely consultative and advisory and will have no power to make decisions without reference to the respective Chiefs of Staff and the Russian General Staff.

b. It must not impinge upon the work that is at present being done by the European Advisory Commission, such as civil affairs, etc.

The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that formation of this Committee should assist in eliminating the delays now existent in dealings between the Russians and the U.S. and British Military Missions. A cardinal point in the proposal, however, is that the Russian representative on the Committee should be a senior member of the Russian General Staff. On the U.S. and British sides, the Heads of the present Missions would represent the United States and British Chiefs of Staff respectively, each being responsible to his own Chiefs of Staff.

In view of the approach of the Russian, U.S. and British forces toward each other, you should initiate action at once with the Soviet General Staff in order that the Committee may begin to function in the near future.

The Pittsburgh Press (September 12, 1944)

Québec maps direct attack against Japs

Roosevelt, Churchill hold formal session

Québec, Canada (UP) –
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill held their first formal business session today on new plans for the final destruction of the Axis.

The basic subject was the Pacific War. Plans are expected to be made for a direct assault on the Jap homeland.

White House Secretary Stephen T. Early said that although the conferences were pointed primarily at the Pacific, he did not know whether Chinese representation here had been sought. He added, however, that the Chinese government would be kept informed of the proceedings.

General plan worked out

The President, the Prime Minister, Canadian Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King and their parties had dinner last night with the Canadian Governor-General, the Earl of Athlone.

Today in a face-to-face session, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill worked out a general plan for the discussions with their military, naval and air experts.

The new unified command for the Jap assault, to be headed by an American, raised many questions.

The proportions of U.S. and British forces to be transferred from Europe to the Fat East as soon as Germany’s defeat is complete must also be determined.

Many subjects faced

Mr. Roosevelt’s and Mr. Churchill’s talks were expected to cover a wide field, including many problems in Europe. But it was officially emphasized that the Pacific War was the No. 1 topic, and the absence of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin fits in with that program.

Converging drives on the Japs from the Central Pacific and the Southwest Pacific are forging ahead on schedule, but the enemy has recently made fresh progress in China. Those drives must be extended before a direct assault on Japan itself can be started.

But they are going so fast that now the top planners – who must work months in advance of the action – must begin to lay out the strategy of the final assaults.

Four commands active

There are now four commands fighting the Japs:

  • The U.S. Pacific forces under Adm. Chester W. Nimitz have struck swiftly across the Central Pacific and have penetrated Japan’s inner defense circle.

  • Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s forces have swept up from the south to place themselves in a position to invade the southern Philippines.

  • Forces in Lord Louis Mountbatten’s Southeast Asia Command – comprising Burma, Indochina, Malaya and Sumatra – succeeded in driving the Japs out of northern Burma. This will permit early reestablishment of a land supply route from India to China.

  • In China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s troops have been waging a desperate but so far losing battle to prevent the Japs from cutting the country in half.

Coordination lacking

These commands have been operating under broad plans developed at the Roosevelt-Churchill-Chiang conference in Cairo. But they have not had the benefit of the coordination such as Gen. Dwight Eisenhower’s campaign in Western Europe.

Already delicate questions have arisen involving the overlapping of some command areas. Unless a new command setup is achieved, these would multiply as the offensives progress.

Gen. MacArthur’s forces and the southern wing of Adm. Nimitz’s are both striking toward the Philippines. Gen. MacArthur’s and Lord Mountbatten’s sphere overlap in the Indies. Lord Mountbatten’s command was established at the first Québec Conference – in August 1943 – but results have not fulfilled expectations.

Editorial: Québec problems

International and European political questions doubtless will be dealt with by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill before their Québec Conference closes. There are plenty such hanging fire. Some, including the German and Polish problems, are of great urgency. But the early sessions of the conference are to be almost exclusively military.

European military decisions related to the approaching victory over Germany cannot be reached without Marshal Stalin, who has his hands too full on the Eastern Front to travel to Canada. Tentative Anglo-American agreements will be passed on to Moscow in preparation for the earliest possible meeting with Marshal Stalin. The weakness of this plan, however, is that smaller nations are still excluded. Unless they are called in noon, most of the basic questions will have been decided by the Big Three or by the swift passage of events – which would be neither fair nor effective.

Apparently Pacific military problems are first on the Québec agenda. Most of those boil down to the matter of British participation. Hitherto Britain has been too busy at home and in the Mediterranean to help much in the Far East. Most of her forces there are Indian and immobilized in India.

Lord Louis Mountbatten’s Southeast Asia Command, which was set up and over-advertised at a similar conference a year ago, has achieved little. The British have pushed back the Japs who slopped over the Indian border, and Gen. Stilwell’s American-Chinese forces have reclaimed much of northern Burma under hard conditions.

But Lord Mountbatten’s attack on South Burma, and his naval-air end run for Singapore and the South China sea, have not materialized. He, according to reports, is not to blame. London and New Delhi never felt they could give him the required equipment and forces.

Now the question is how much aid Britain will give in the Pacific War, and how long it will take after Hitler’s defeat. Officially the London government has given plenty of promises publicly of all-out war against Japan. But at the same time, Mr. Churchill has promised England large-scale demobilization of troops and reconversion of industry as soon as the European conflict ends. This policy is popular in England, where there is inevitable war weariness after five years and much less feeling than here about the Jap menace.

To a lesser extent the American policy of partial demobilization and reconversion after Hitler’s fall also influences Pacific war plans. Though our government says it will not permit the Army cutback or the changeover to peace production to interfere with Pacific requirements, there is hope in Tokyo and fear in Washington that there will be an American letdown.

Actually, most of our naval and air forces and many of our technical ground forces – along with increased war production in some lines – will be required for the big and bloody Pacific job ahead. Devoting one hand to military and industrial reconversion to peace, while using the other hand for so-called all-out war against Japan, calls for a near-miracle of coordination.

But a Québec agreement for a fair sharing of effort in the Pacific War can hasten Jap defeat.

U.S. State Department (September 12, 1944)

Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:00 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Canada
President Roosevelt The Earl of Athlone Prime Minister Mackenzie King
Mrs. Roosevelt Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone
Admiral Leahy Prime Minister Churchill
General Marshall Mrs. Churchill
Admiral King Field Marshal Brooke
General Arnold Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill

Arnold gives the following information which apparently pertains to the dinner meeting on September 12:

That night, at a dinner with the Governor General, the question of aid to Poland came up. Several messages [had] arrived from the Russians and from Harriman relating to Polish patriots in Warsaw. General Marshall and I talked this over at length. For some time, it had been apparent that if some help was not given to the Polish patriots in Warsaw, they would be exterminated…

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

It gave the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Churchill, and the President something serious to think about. Could we help the Poles in Warsaw, even though we wanted to? That rather large problem was never completely solved…

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

During that dinner the Prime Minister came out with new ideas about winning the war. At that particular moment he thought it a matter of vital British interest that we (including the RAF) get more planes, ships, and soldiers into the final battle of Japan as soon as we could. I told him the question of putting planes in there wasn’t quite that simple. There were not enough land masses in the Pacific Ocean to use the heavy bombers we would have available from Europe when that phase of the war was over. As a matter of fact, if we could use 1500 out of the 3500 we had in the ETO, we would be very, very lucky. Certainly, we would much rather have the B-29s, with their longer range and their heavier bomb load than we would the B-17, the B-24, the Lancaster, or the Halifax…

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

Quebec, September 12, 1944

My Dear Friend, Would it be agreeable to you to discuss with me sometime today our Italian policy? I must fill up the Chairmanship of the Allied Control Commission, and I feel the great need of a competent politician and Minister there, like Macmillan, rather than a General. I was distressed and disquieted by the tales I heard of serious food shortages in some parts of Rome and other great towns. Unemployment looms big in Italy. We may also soon have the populous North flowing on to our hands. I was hoping we might together make up an agreeable programme for Italy, which could be announced, comprising resumption of their export trade, interchange of diplomatic representatives à la Russe, and bringing them into the area of UNRRA as co-belligerents if that can be managed. If not, some other scheme of effective relief. You spoke of La Guardia having a Mission. This also I should like to discuss with you.

The Staffs are forming their contacts this morning and browsing over the Agenda on general lines. But would it not be well to have a plenary session tomorrow where you and I can put forward the fundamentals of our future war policy. This will enable them to go ahead much more rapidly and easily.

A small point. Leathers is longing for Admiral Land. You said you were keeping him handy; but if he could come up soon, these two would be together working out their complicated affairs, while we are busy with other things, and have results ready for us at each stage.

Some of the Boniface I sent you this morning appeared to me to be of profound significance. Alexander’s battle is a hard one, but now that Clark has crashed into the centre I am hopeful of speedy results.

Yours always,
W


Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

Quebec, September 12, 1944

My Dear Friend, Would you let me have your views on the following suggested time-table:

  • Wednesday, 13th – Plenary Meeting with Chiefs of Staff.
  • Thursday, 14th, and Friday, 15th – their further discussions.
  • They should report to us the evening of Friday, 15th, enabling a final Plenary to take place on Saturday, 16th.

It would probably be in conformity with, your wishes to return to Hyde Park on Saturday. If agreeable to you I would follow by Air with Clemmie early on Monday, 18th, and stay with you Monday and Tuesday. We could then have anyone necessary to wind up outstanding points. I must depart on Wednesday, 20th.

I have asked Eden to come over if possible tomorrow, so he should be here on Thursday or Friday. There are several important things to discuss with him including recognition of the French Provisional Government, as to which I am by no means convinced, I do not know whether you would require to have Hull or Stettinius for Friday, 15th.

One of the most important things I have to discuss with you is Stage II. Would Thursday, 14th, do for that? – in which case I hope you could have Morgenthau present. This matter is considered of extreme and vital importance by the British Government, for reasons which are only too painfully apparent.

Yours always,
W

The President to the Secretary of the Treasury

Quebec, 12 September 1944

Please be in Quebec by Thursday, 14 September, Noon.


The President to the War Shinning Administrator

Quebec, 12 September 1944

Please come to Quebec without delay.

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State

Twentieth Day, Tuesday, September 12, 1944
Restricted

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I then told the group in the strictest confidence that Cadogan had received a cable from Churchill asking him to come to Quebec and that he had asked my advice and opinion on the matter, and whether, if he went, we would be offended. I reported that I had told him we would have no objection to his flying up and spending the evening there if he could come back the next day. There was considerable discussion as to whether we should suggest that the President ask Church ill not to call him up, but this was entirely inconclusive. The point of view was also expressed that this changed the entire character of the Quebec conference from one of a military nature to one of a political nature and it was very serious to be having a political conference without Stalin present. Incidentally I informed the group that the President had assured me that if the British called any political men to Quebec he would do likewise. (This was not done, Morgenthau being the only person called up although through special arrangements we did have Ambassador Atherton at Quebec, although he did not participate in any direct way at the meeting.)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Talks During the Day With the Secretary
Early in the day I had a discussion with the Secretary on the voting procedure and also on the question of Cadogan’s being ordered to Quebec. I also told him of the possibility that Eden was coming to Quebec. Mr. Hull made the same point which was made at the American meeting by Mr. Long, that changing the character of the meeting in a political direction, and probably discussing the future of Europe without Stalin being present was quite a serious matter. …

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Secretary thinks that it would be most unfortunate if Cadogan goes to Quebec, not only from the point of view of our Conversations at Dumbarton but that it would throw that conference into a discussion of general diplomatic and political affairs. He asked me to do everything in my power to keep him from going.

Discussion During the Day With Cadogan
I talked privately with Cadogan and Jebb in the early afternoon … [Cadogan] inquired if Mr. Hull had heard from the President about going to Quebec and I told him he had not. …

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Later in the afternoon I had another private talk with him on the question of his going to Quebec. He immediately prepared a cable to his Prime Minister saying that Mr. Hull felt it would be a mistake for him to go as it would arouse all types of speculation in the press in this country. He said in the cable that if the Prime Minister felt keenly about it, he hoped he would discuss it with the President. Cadogan handed me the wire and I suggested that he take out the word “terrific.” He had originally used the expression that Hull thought it would be a terrific mistake.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Völkischer Beobachter (September 13, 1944)

Die Konferenz in Quebec

vb. Wien, 12. September –
Wie im August 1943 treffen sich auch diesmal Roosevelt und Churchill in Quebec. Wurde dieser Tagungsort wiedergewählt, weil man Kanada, das dieser Krieg entscheidend der Saugkraft des großen Nachbarn ausgesetzt hat, auch von London aus bereits als eine Art Niemandsland zwischen Empire und USA ansieht? 1943 fanden freilich die abschließenden Gespräche in Washington statt. Es spielte die Bitte Badoglios um Waffenstillstand hinein. Man rechnete im Lager der Westmächte schon mit baldigem Kriegsende und wollte sich vor den erstrebten Besprechungen mit den Sowjets auf eine gemeinsame Marschlinie einigen.

Die Konferenzen von Moskau und Teheran haben dann allerdings gezeigt, wer im Kreise der drei großen Räuber den Ton angab. Briten und Yankees wurden völlig an die Wand gespielt, sie durften nur die salbungsvollen Deklamationen über Freiheit, Toleranz und ähnliche Deckworte für den „Frieden durch Gewalt“ liefern, erhielten „gemeinsame Entscheidung der europäischen Fragen“ versprochen und mußten sich den Termin für die Invasion diktieren lassen. Stalin verlangte sie, um seine Verbündeten machtmäßig anderweitig festzulegen, weil er sie durch den Pazifikkrieg noch nicht genügend gebunden fand. Wie er dann zu verfahren gedachte, hat sich inzwischen erwiesen.

Die gefügigen Partner Moskaus werden sich in Quebec mit der Lage auseinanderzusetzen haben, die nun besonders auf dem Balkan entstanden ist und dort, wie schon in Polen, im Zeichen einer sichtbaren Ausdehnung des bolschewistischen Machtbereiches und damit der Unterjochung all der kleinen Nationen steht, die England und die USA den Sowjets ausgeliefert haben.

An der zweiten Konferenz in Quebec nehmen die Sowjets nicht teil. Stalin ließ Roosevelt und Churchill mitteilen, er sei jetzt durch die Ereignisse an der Ostfront zu sehr in Anspruch genommen, um Zeit für derartige Besprechungen erübrigen zu können. Aber auch die Tschungking-chinesen sind einstweilen in Quebec nicht vertreten, obwohl dort einer der wichtigsten Programmpunkte der Krieg im fernen Osten ist. Roosevelt sieht sich schon aus innenpolitischen Gründen veranlasst, von Churchill eine bindende Zusäge für die britische Beteiligung an diesem Kampf mit allen verfügbaren Kräften zu erhalten, und die englische Presse beeilt sich demgemäß, zu versichern, daß den Briten diese Aufgabe nicht weniger am Herzen liege wie Roosevelt die Kriegführung in Europa.

Was den Kampf an der Westfront betrifft, so entspricht die publizistische Behandlung dieser Frage in der englisch-amerikanischen Presse anlässlich der Quebec-Konferenz mehr dem agitatorischen Bedürfnis, bereits einen Sieg vorwegzunehmen als der wirklichen Lage, die im Zeichen der sich ständig verstärkenden deutschen Abwehr und der wachsenden Schwierigkeiten steht, die sich für die Fortführung der anglo-amerikanischen Operationen ergeben. Es besteht Grund zu der Annahme, daß jetzt Roosevelt und Churchill angesichts der unermesslichen Verluste, womit sie im weiteren Verlauf des Sturmlaufes gegen die deutsche Front zu rechnen haben, eine politische Offensive ins Auge fassen werden, um nach dem Beispiel Wilsons im Jahre 1918 sich den Sieg durch Hintertüren zu erschleichen. Sie wissen genau, daß Deutschland in naher Zukunft gewichtige Trümpfe auszuspielen hat und daß für sie alles daran hängt, zu einer vorzeitigen Beendigung eines Kampfes zu gelangen, dessen Gewinnung durch Waffengewalt immer fragwürdiger werden muß.

Das deutsche Volk sieht einem Wiederaufleben der Pläne von 1943 mit dem Bewusstsein feiner unbeugsamen Moral entgegen. Es erblickt in solchen Versuchen am untauglichen Objekt nur den Beweis dafür, daß der Gegner Umwege wählen muß, weil er am Ort der militärischen Entscheidung nicht mehr mit einem Erfolg rechnen kann. Nicht nur die Erinnerung an den Betrug und Wortbruch von 1918 stärkt es in seinem Willen, diesen Kampf für Freiheit und Leben bis zum Sieg durchzufechten, sondern vor allem das Wissen um die Vernichtungspläne des Feindes, die dem Krieg das Wesen eines Ringens um Sein oder Nichtsein geben und uns eine Verknechtung zudenken, die in der Geschichte nicht ihresgleichen hätte. Alle Versuche, uns von dieser Kernfrage abzulenken und uns den Blick für die Absichten zu trüben, die unsere Gegner hegen, werden völlig ins Leere stoßen und nur dazu beitragen, unsere Entschlossenheit zum Einsatz aller Kraft für die Verteidigung des deutschen Lebens zu steigern.

vb.

U.S. State Department (September 13, 1944)

The Secretary of State to the President

Washington, September 13, 1944

Ambassador Winant’s telegram number 7511 sent midnight September 12 reports that the European Advisory Commission on that date approved and signed, for submission to the three governments, the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany (State Department’s note: with British and American zones left in blank) and the administration of greater Berlin.

CH


The Secretary of State to the President

Washington, September 13, 1944
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

Subject: ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS RELATIVE TO BRITISH-ARGENTINE MEAT NEGOTIATIONS

I must again refer to the matter of the British meat contract about which I sent you my memorandum of September 12.

Our Embassy in Buenos Aires reports that the British Ministry of Food has informed the Argentine government that the British are disposed to sign a new contract for two years at the same prices as the current contract. The contract would be on the same basis as that recently concluded with New Zealand and Australia so that Britain would buy the entire exportable surplus for four years with prices subject to re-examination at the end of two years. The Embassy adds that this word from London came as a great relief to the Colonels.

I regret to say that it has become increasingly clear that the British continue to treat the Argentine Fascist threat as a matter of minor and relatively unimportant policy. To us it is a matter of major policy. If we fail in the implementation of that policy, the Nazis will have a powerful center to renew their fight in this Hemisphere economically, politically and eventually in a military way. This would mean inevitably the destruction of all that we have been trying to build since 1933.

In view of our enormous aid to the British on supply matters, it is certainly not asking too much to request that they forego the petty commercial advantages of a long-term bargain with a Fascist government. It is hard to believe that they will permit the Argentines to succeed in the “divide and conquer” tactics they are so obviously employing in the matter of the meat contract. As I have said time and again, the political implications of these meat negotiations are really tremendous. If they are concluded, as the Argentines hope they will be, their position will be greatly fortified and our own position correspondingly weakened throughout the Hemisphere.

CH

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 11:45 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke
General Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Rear Admiral Brown General Ismay
Major General Laycock
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Hollis
Captain Graves

McFarland minutes


September 13, 1944, 11:45 a.m.
Top secret

The Prime Minister, at the President’s request, opened the discussion. He said that since SEXTANT the affairs of the United Nations had taken a revolutionary turn for the good. Everything we had touched had turned to gold, and during the last seven weeks there had been an unbroken run of military successes. The manner in which the situation had developed since the Tehran Conference gave the impression of remarkable design and precision of execution. First there had been the Anzio landing, and then, on the same day as the launching of the great Operation OVERLORD, we had captured Rome, which had seemed the most perfect timing. He wished to congratulate the United States Chiefs of Staff on the success of DRAGOON, which had produced the most gratifying results. It was already probable that eight or nine thousand prisoners had been captured, and the south and western parts of France were now being systematically cleared of the enemy. He was firmly convinced that future historians would give a great account of the period since Tehran.

According to the British minutes of this meeting, Churchill said “that future historians would say that the period since Tehran had shown the successful working of an extraordinarily efficient inter-Allied war machine.”

The President said that no little of the credit for the conception of DRAGOON should be attributed to Marshal Stalin. It was close to being his suggestion rather than ours.

The Prime Minister, continuing, said that he was glad to be able to record that, although the British Empire had now entered the sixth year of the war it was still keeping its end up with an overall population, including the overseas Dominions and Colonies, of only 70,000,000 white people. The British Empire effort in Europe, counted in terms of divisions in the field, was about equal to that of the United States. This was as it should be. He was proud that the British Empire could claim equal partnership with their great ally, the United States, whom he regarded as the greatest military power in the world. The British Empire effort had now reached its peak, whereas that of their ally was ever-increasing. There was complete confidence in General Eisenhower and his relations with General Montgomery were of the best, as were those between General Montgomery and General Bradley. The part played by General W. B. Smith in directing and cementing the staffs was of the highest order. The control of operations in France was in capable hands. An efficient integrated American-British staff machine had been built up, and the battle was being brilliantly exploited.

Turning to Italy, the Prime Minister said that General Alexander had resumed the offensive at the end of August. Since then, the Eighth Army had suffered about 8,000 and the Fifth Army about 1,000 casualties. The Fifth Army had hitherto not been so heavily engaged, but they were expected to make a thrust that very day. The British have a great stake in Italy. The army in this theater was the largest representative British Empire Army in existence. There were in all sixteen British Empire divisions, consisting of eight British, two Canadian, one New Zealand, one South African and four British Indian divisions. He, the Prime Minister, had been anxious lest General Alexander might be shorn of certain essentials for the vigorous prosecution of his campaign. He now understood that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed that there should be no withdrawals from General Alexander’s Army until either Kesselring’s Army had been beaten, or was on the run out of Italy.

General Marshall said there was no thought of withdrawing any forces until the outcome of General Alexander’s present operations was known.

The Prime Minister emphasized that if the Germans were run out of Italy, we should have to look for fresh fields and pastures new. It would never do for our armies to remain idle. He had always been attracted by a right-handed movement, with the purpose of giving Germany a stab in the armpit. Our objective should be Vienna. If German resistance collapsed, we should, of course, be able to reach Vienna more quickly and more easily. If not, to assist this movement, he had given considerable thought to an operation for the capture of Istria, which would include the occupation of Trieste and Fiume. He had been relieved to learn that the United States Chiefs of Staff were willing to leave in the Mediterranean certain LSTs now engaged in DRAGOON, to provide an amphibious lift for the Adriatic operation, if this was found desirable and necessary. An added reason for this right-handed movement was the rapid encroachment of the Russians into the Balkans and the consequent dangerous spread of Russian influence in this area. He preferred to get into Vienna before the Russians did as he did not know what Russia’s policy would be after she took it.

The Prime Minister then reviewed the campaign in Burma. This had been on a considerable scale. 250,000 men had been engaged, and the fighting for Imphal and Kohima had been extremely bitter. General Stilwell was to be congratulated on his brilliant operation, resulting in the capture of Myitkyina. There had been 40,000 battle casualties and 288,000 sick of which latter, happily, the great proportion recovered and returned to duty. As a result of this campaign, the air line to China had been kept open and India rendered secure from attack. It was estimated that the Japanese had lost 100,000 men in this, the largest land engagement of Japanese forces.

In spite of these successes, it was, however, most undesirable that the fighting in the jungles of Burma should go on indefinitely. For this reason, the British Chiefs of Staff had put forward Plan DRACULA, which would be preceded by Plan CAPITAL Phase I and as much as was necessary of Phase II. Difficulties were being experienced in making available the necessary forces and transporting them to the Southeast Asia Theater in time to carry out DRACULA before the monsoon of 1945. The present situation in Europe, favorable as it was, did not permit a decision being taken now to withdraw forces. What was wanted was to keep an option open for as long as possible, and every effort was being directed to this end.

There were certain elements inimical to Anglo-American good relations which were putting it about that Great Britain would take no share in the war against Japan once Germany had been defeated. Far from shirking this task, the British Empire was eager to play the greatest possible part. They had every reason for doing so. Japan was as much the bitter enemy of the British Empire as of the United States. British territory had been captured in battle and grievous losses had been suffered. The offer he, the Prime Minister, now wished to make, was for the British Main Fleet to take part in the main operations against Japan under United States Supreme Command.

The President said that the offer was accepted on the largest possible scale.

According to the British minutes of this meeting, Roosevelt’s statement is recorded as follows: “The President intervened to say that the British fleet was no sooner offered than accepted.”

The Prime Minister , continuing, said there would be available a powerful and well-balanced force, including, it was hoped, at the end of next year, their newest 15-inch battleship. A fleet train of ample proportions had been built up, which would render the fleet independent for a considerable time of shore base resources. He said that the placing of a British fleet in the Central Pacific would not prevent a detachment being made to work with General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific if this was desired. This would include air forces. There was, of course, no intention to interfere in any way with General MacArthur’s command.

As a further contribution to the defeat of the enemy, the Royal Air Force would like to take a part in the heavy bombardment of Japan. A bomber force of 1500 planes could be made available for this purpose and would like a proportionate share with the four or five thousand American planes in striking at the heart of the enemy. As regards land forces, when Germany had been beaten, it would probably be possible to move six divisions from the European Theater to the East, to be followed perhaps by a further six at a later date. In Burma there were 15 divisions which might ultimately be drawn upon. He had always advocated an advance across the Bay of Bengal and operations to recover Singapore, the loss of which had been a grievous and shameful blow to British prestige which must be avenged. It would not be good enough for Singapore to be returned to us at the peace table. We should recover it in battle. These operations would not debar the employment of small British Empire components with United States forces in the Pacific.

There was nothing cast iron in these ideas. First, we should do DRACULA, and then survey the situation. If a better plan could be evolved, it should certainly not be ruled out in advance. Our keyword should be to engage the largest number of our own forces against the largest number of the enemy at the earliest possible moment.

The President thanked the Prime Minister for his lucid and comprehensive review of the situation. It was a matter of profound satisfaction that at each succeeding conference between the American and British representatives there had been ever-increasing solidarity of outlook and identity of basic thought. Added to this there had always been an atmosphere of cordiality and friendship. Our fortunes had prospered but it was still not quite possible to forecast the date of the end of the war with Germany.

It seemed clear that the Germans were withdrawing from the Balkans and appeared likely that in Italy they would retire to the line of the Alps. The Russians were on the edge of Hungary. The Germans had shown themselves good at staging withdrawals and had been able to save large numbers of personnel although much material had been lost. If the battle went well with General Alexander, we should reach the Piave reasonably soon. All forces in Italy should be engaged to the maximum intensity.

In the west it seemed probable that the Germans would retire behind the Rhine. In his view the “West Wall” was the right bank of the Rhine which would present a formidable obstacle. He thought we should plan to force the barrier of the Rhine and then consider the situation. We should have to turn the line either from the east or from the west. For this purpose, our plans must be flexible. The Germans could not yet be counted out and one more big battle would have to be fought. The operations in the East would to some extent depend on how the situation developed in Europe. He agreed that we should not remain in Burma any longer than it was necessary to clean up the Japanese in that theater. The American plan was to regain the Philippines and to dominate the mainland of Japan from the Philippines or Formosa and from bridgeheads which would be seized in China. If forces could be established on the mainland of China, China could be saved. American experience had been that the “end run” method paid a handsome dividend. Rabaul was an example of this bypassing technique which had been employed with considerable success at small cost of life. Would it not be equally possible to bypass Singapore by seizing an area to the north or east of it, for example, Bangkok? Singapore may be very strong and he was opposed to going up against strong positions.

The Prime Minister suggested that the seizure of localities such as Penang and the Kra Isthmus or Moulmein should be studied. As far as Singapore was concerned, he did not favor the bypassing method. There would undoubtedly be a large force of Japanese in the Malay Peninsula and it would help the American operations in the Pacific if we could bring these forces to action and destroy them in addition to achieving the great prize of the recapture of Singapore. If Formosa were captured, would the Japanese garrisons to the south be completely cut off?

Admiral King replied that these garrisons would be strangulated and must ultimately perish.

The Prime Minister said that all these projects were being examined and would be put in order. No decision could be taken until after Rangoon had been captured. It should not be overlooked that Marshal Stalin had volunteered a solemn undertaking at Tehran that Russia would enter the war against Japan the day that Hitler was beaten. There was no reason to doubt that Stalin would be as good as his word. The Russians undoubtedly had great ambitions in the East. If Hitler was beaten, say, by January, and Japan was confronted with the three most powerful nations in the world, they would undoubtedly have cause for reflection as to whether they could continue the fight.

The President referred to the almost fanatical Japanese tenacity. In Saipan not only the soldiers but also the civilians had committed suicide rather than be taken.

Sir Charles Portal said that he hoped to have available between 600 and 800 heavy bombers for operations against the mainland of Japan. These could be supplemented by a considerable number of medium bomber squadrons.

The Prime Minister asked about the employment to be made of the British Fleet.

The President said his thought was to use it in any way possible.

Admiral King said that a paper on this subject had been prepared for reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The question was being actively studied.

The Prime Minister asked if it would not be better to employ the new British ships in place of battle-worn vessels of the United States.

Admiral King replied that speaking for himself, he could only say that the matter was under examination.

The Prime Minister said that the offer had been made and asked if it was accepted.

The President replied in the affirmative.

The Prime Minister enquired whether an undertaking could be given for the British Air Force to participate in the main operations.

General Marshall said that he and General Arnold were trying to see how best to fit in the maximum number of aircraft for these operations. It was not so long ago that we were crying out for airplanes – now we had a surplus. He suggested that if the British were heavily engaged in Southeast Asia and in Malaya, they would require a large proportion of their air forces for these operations. Was there a distinction between these latter operations and the operations envisaged by Sir Charles Portal for heavy bombardment of Japan?

Sir Charles Portal replied that there was a distinction. The Lancaster bomber, if refuelled in the air, had a range nearly approaching that of the B-29. Without refuelling in the air these aircraft had a range of 800 or 900 miles.

The British minutes have the following additional statement by Churchill at this point:

The Prime Minister remarked that for the future good relations of the two countries, on which so much depended, it was of vital importance that the British should be given their fair share in the main operations against Japan. The United States had given the most handsome assistance to the British Empire, in the fight against Germany. It could only be expected that the British Empire in return should give the United States all assistance in their power towards the defeat of Japan.

The President observed that there were certain groups in the United States, and he had no doubt that similar groups existed in Great Britain, who evinced a kindly attitude towards the Germans. Their theory was that evil could be eradicated from the German makeup and the nation could be rejuvenated by kindness.

The Prime Minister said that such sentiments would hardly be tolerated in Great Britain. The British people would demand a strong policy against the Germans. The German working man should be allowed sufficient food for his bare need, and work, but no more. The more virulent elements such as the Gestapo and the young fanatics should be deported to work in rehabilitating the devastated areas of Europe. Plans for the partition of Germany were now in the course of preparation but no final decisions had been taken.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister said that it was clear that a very great measure of agreement existed between the American and British Staffs.

Admiral Leahy agreed that this was so. He did not foresee any insuperable difficulties in reaching agreement on all points at issue.

The Chief of the Military Mission in the Soviet Union to CSA

Moscow, 13 September 1944
Top secret

To AGWar for General Marshall information to General Eisenhower and General Spaatz from Deane TopSec MX 20947.

Copy sent direct to Eisenhower.

Simultaneously with the receipt of your OCTAGON 10 dated 12 September I received information from USSTAF that the project was scheduled for today, September 13. The British and American Ambassadors and I saw Mr. Molotov who arranged for approval to be given by the Red Army General Staff. General Spaatz was informed of approval and as a result the mission is now scheduled for September 14. I shall await word from General Spaatz as to whether this one mission completes the project or if he proposes to send representatives to Moscow to work out a plan for continued support. I do not believe it is necessary for representatives to come here since all details of plan should be worked out in London. Really, all that is necessary here is Soviet approval which the British and American missions can attempt to secure here once they have been informed of the plan.