Québec Conference 1944 (OCTAGON)

132

U.S. State Department (September 16, 1944)

Tripartite press conference, 3:45 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Canada
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Roosevelt first reviewed in very general terms the work of the Second Quebec Conference, expressed hope for the surrender of Germany, and discussed joint action against Japan and logistic problems in the Pacific. He stated specifically that questions of command in the Pacific War had not been discussed, and he described the division of responsibility among Mountbatten, MacArthur, and Nimitz. Churchill then commented on the results of the Conference and on British and Canadian participation in the war against Japan. Mackenzie King made brief closing remarks.

133

Roosevelt-Eden conversation, afternoon

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Foreign Secretary Eden

Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden said goodbye to Roosevelt alone after the press conference. The President told Eden that he would visit England at the end of November whether he won or lost the election.

134 
Lot 60–D 224, Box 55: DO/PR/23

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

Washington, September 16, 1944

Subject: PROGRESS REPORT ON DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS – TWENTY-FOURTH DAY

Because of Sir Alexander Cadogan’s continued absence in Quebec (he did not return until late this afternoon) no official meetings were held today.

However, there were, as you are aware, a number of conferences both this morning and this afternoon with you at the Department and in my office at Dumbarton Oaks, in which various members of the American group participated, on the latest developments relating to the important question of voting procedure in cases of disputes involving a great power.

In addition, I met Sir Alexander Cadogan and Lord Halifax at the British Embassy just after Sir Alexander’s plane arrived late this afternoon.

As you know, the crux of these discussions revolved around the President’s wire on the voting question and consideration of the British position of non-acceptance of the possible compromise. When Sir Alexander told Ambassador Gromyko of the British position, the Ambassador told him that that was likewise the position of his Government, although he did not make it completely clear to Sir Alexander whether or not he had final official instructions on the matter.

135

Log of the President’s Visit to Canada

Saturday, September 16

The Governor-General and Princess Alice returned to the Citadel this morning from their inspection trip to Arvida.

At 12 o’clock Noon the second plenary meeting of the conference was held at the Citadel with the President, the Prime Minister and the British and American Chiefs of Staffs attending. This meeting marked the close of the 1944 Quebec Conference (OCTAGON). The plenary meeting adjourned at 1:30 p.m., when the President, the Prime Minister and the British and American Chiefs of Staff adjourned to the “sundeck” of the Citadel where they posed for pictures by news and service photographers.

The President lunched at the Citadel at 1:45 p.m. in company with the Prime Minister, Mrs. Churchill and Mr. Eden with and as guests of the Governor-General and Princess Alice.

Admiral Brown returned to Washington this afternoon by air, traveling in the “Executive Plane” with General Marshall. Mr. Early and Mrs. Rumelt also returned by air.

At 3:15 p.m., at a very colorful ceremony on the “sundeck” of the Citadel, Chancellor Morris W. Wilson and a party from the faculty of McGill University, Montreal, conferred honorary LL.D. degrees on the President and Prime Minister Churchill. Members of the Press and news and service photographers were present.

At 3:45 p.m., the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Prime Minister King held a joint press conference on the “sundeck” of the Citadel for the more than 150 press correspondents gathered in Quebec from all over the world to cover the Quebec Conference. Prime Minister King presided and spoke first; the President spoke next; and finally the Prime Minister of Great Britain. A prepared communiqué concerning the results and purpose of the conference, issued jointly by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, was handed to the press at this time. A copy of this communiqué is appended, marked “A.”

After the completion of the press conference the President returned to his quarters in the Citadel. Later during the afternoon Princess Alice, Prime Minister Churchill and Mrs. Churchill came to his quarters to bid the President goodbye.

The President left the Citadel at 5:30 p.m., together with Admiral Leahy, for his train which had now been moved from the Quebec railroad station back to Wolfe’s Cove. He was accompanied to the train by the Governor-General and Prime Minister King who remained at the station to see him off.

Our train departed Quebec (Wolfe’s Cove) at 6:00 p.m., for the return trip to Hyde Park and Washington. We traveled over the lines of the Canadian National Railway, crossing the St. Lawrence just below Quebec and coming via the Provincial towns of Cadorna, Val Alain, St. Leonard Junction, St. Hyacinthe and Southward East to Rouse’s Point.

Except for one day (Wednesday) when it rained most of the day, the weather at Quebec during our stay was most pleasant. However, his attendance at the numerous conferences and other engagements prevented the President from leaving the Citadel even once during his six days stay at Quebec.

136

Völkischer Beobachter (September 17, 1944)

Wer wird Erster sein?

h. b. Lissabon, 16. September –
Die gesamte amerikanische Presse spricht in ihrer Berichterstattung über die Quebecer Konferenz offen von den Wünschen der Amerikaner, die Engländer zu einer hundertprozentigen Beteiligung am Kriege gegen Japan zu gewinnen. Der Korrespondent der Baltimore Sun meldet, Morgenthau mit seinem großen Einfluß auf die englischen Finanzkreise wäre von Roosevelt eingespannt worden, um die Briten zu überzeugen, daß sie es sich auf keinen Fall erlauben dürfen, nur in geringem Umfange am Krieg gegen Japan teilzunehmen.

Aus militärischen und Marinekreisen will der Korrespondent erfahren haben, daß die militärischen Führer Amerikas die Leitung des Krieges gegen Japan allein behalten möchten. Sie gehen sogar so weit, daß sie die englischen Hilfskräfte, sowohl die englische Armee wie die Flotte, vor dem Einsatz im Pazifikkrieg nach amerikanischen Methoden ausbilden wollen.

137

The Pittsburgh Press (September 17, 1944)

U.S. and Britain to push Jap war but decide against one command

England promises to throw in full might into Pacific as soon as Germany falls

Québec, Canada (UP) –
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill today promised Anglo-American destruction of Japan as soon as Europe is wrested from Germany.

They agreed that massive new Pacific operations were planned at their week-long conference here.

The President, however, made a specific point that there is no prospect of creating an overall command to direct all Pacific operations. He said the overall command was not possible because of vast geographic and logistic considerations.

While the two leaders at a press conference in the Citadel accentuated the imminence of the new blows against Japan, the President explained that the new Pacific campaign had not been given a date because the conferees were not yet willing to set a date for the unconditional surrender of Germany.

Immediately after the press conference, a formal statement was issued saying that the two statesmen and their staffs reached decisions of all points concerning the completion of the war in Europe “now approaching its final stages,” and the destruction of Japan.

Land space lacking

The chief difficulty confronting the conferees, the statement added, was the lack of land space in the Pacific to marshal the war resources of the Allies.

Both leaders stressed the unanimity of their meeting here and said there was complete agreement on all matters but Mr. Churchill made the point that Great Britain had wanted a greater share in the forthcoming battle for Japan and that this small dispute had been cleared up.

Mr. Churchill, speaking with strong-voiced feeling as he and the President and Canadian Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King met reporters on a terrace overlooking the St. Lawrence, said the full might of the British Empire would be thrown into the Jap campaign.

Churchill promises action

Mr. Churchill explained that the large forces of all description involved in the Battle of Europe would, immediately upon the fall of Germany, be applied forcibly and speedily to reduce Japan and “bend that evil, barbarous nation to the will of those they’ve outraged.”

Mr. Churchill denied vehemently that Britain wanted to shirk her share in the Jap war, saying that on the contrary Britain had a “stern resolve to be in at the kill with forces proportionate to their national strength.”

Mr. Roosevelt explained that the conference covered a great manner of things, east and west, with a firm decision reached to do the job on Japan, with the British and Americans fighting side by side, as rapidly as possible.

Canada to help

Mr. Roosevelt also said that the Dominion of Canada would have an active part in the Pacific show.

We are going to see this thing through together, he said, nodding towards Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill nodded back and puffed on his cigar.

Then speaking of the task of making certain the end of barbarism in the Pacific, the President said the vast distances of the Pacific must never be forgotten. A Navy or an Army could not be ordered to any given point, he said, without making certain in advance that they could be supplied and fed when they reached their objective.

Problems stressed

This tremendous problem of logistics and geography, he continued, means endless planning. Because of these factors, he said, one person cannot be appointed to run the whole show.

There are, he reminded, three major commands in the Pacific: the Mountbatten Command in Burma, the MacArthur Command in the Southwest Pacific and the Third, a Naval Command, the sea-fighting part of the operation, under Adm. Chester W. Nimitz with headquarters at Pearl Harbor.

While the President did not say so, it had been reported that Adm. Nimitz would move to headquarters nearer Japan and Adm. Ernest J. King, commander of the U.S. Fleet, would move into the Pearl Harbor base.

Enemy to learn soon

Mr. Churchill, after explaining the necessity for secrecy on decisions reached in a conference of this type, pointed out that decisions reached at the last Québec Conference – in August 1943 – were now “engraved on the monument of history.” These decisions, he said, led to the liberation of “dearly beloved France which was so long held under the corroding heel of the Hun.”

The enemy, Mr. Churchill added, would learn of these decisions soon enough and in a deadly fashion.

He said:

Victory may be achieved in the shortest limit of time, but none of us can tell exactly when.

Get honorary degrees

Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill met about 150 reporters on the King’s Bastion, a large terrace outside their Citadel quarters, shortly after receiving honorary doctor of laws degrees from McGill University, Montréal. The academic robes and caps were placed on them in a ceremony on the terrace.

Mr. Churchill permitted himself to be quoted directly in the press conference but the President followed his regular White House rule of not allowing direct quotation.

Mr. Churchill was frequently at his phrase-making best during the conference, raising his voice to cry out new damnation against the Axis and promise the complete obliteration of German and Jap military might.

He said, for instance, that Japan, that “guilty, greedy nation must be… forced to take a place where neither their virtues or their vices can inflict themselves on future man.”

With obvious levity, Mr. Churchill spoke several times of having to “insist” that Britain be given a much larger share in the job of defeating Japan.

“You can’t have all the good things to yourself,” he said with a sidewise glance at the President. “You must share.”

Mr. Churchill emphasized two other points:

  • That the conference was not in any way confined to military matters and this was to be expected because “the business of government in these times is all one.”

  • The great friendship and cooperation between the President and myself is a “firmly-established friendship which is of great aid to the fighting troops” because this close cooperation has led to the fighting of a successful war.

The conference, as Mr. Churchill put it, was “conducted in a blaze of friendship.” And then the Prime Minister bade the reporters farewell by saying, “I hope that should we meet here [in Québec] again in another year, I hope we’ll be able to tell you more about the plans we made there this time.”

Mr. Roosevelt himself dwelt at length on the friendship theme, saying this conference took less time and produced less argument than any before.

Mr. Churchill also forecast that the “same processes” which led the “great western democracies” from the “dark days of Dunkirk and Pearl Harbor” to the presently clearer skies would bring “the toiling millions of the world out of this period of trial.”

138

Message sent to Pontiff

Vatican City (UP) –
Authoritative Vatican City quarters indicated today that Cardinal Rodrique Villeneuve of Canada, who arrived in Rome by airplane, has an important message for Pope Pius XII containing the points of view of the U.S. and British governments regarding a number of problems which the Pope and Prime Minister Winston Churchill discussed during the latter’s recent trip to Rome.

These Vatican City quarters said it was understood that during the Québec conversations, Mr. Churchill called to Mr. Roosevelt’s attention the Pope’s ideas on a number of important international questions principally concerning Italy and Poland.

On Sept. 12, Myron C. Taylor, Mr. Roosevelt’s special envoy to the Vatican City, and d’Arcy Osborne, British Minister to the Holy See, during a visit to the Papal Secretariat were understood to have given assurances that the Pope’s suggestions would be given every consideration possible by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt.

140

Editorial: Will Russia fight Japan?

Will Russia help us lick Japan when the time comes? The question pops up again because of Marshal Stalin’s failure to attend the Québec Conference. His letter, explaining that he was busy with the offensives against Germany, is interpreted by some as needlessly abrupt and lacking in any cordial greeting to the conference.

If there is a cooling off in the relations of the Big Three, that is big news. It is important not only to Tokyo but also to Berlin, which still hopes somehow to wangle a separate peace and thus divide the grand alliance. But we have no knowledge of a serious rift, or of any reason strong enough to cause Marshal Stalin to boycott the Québec meeting if he were free to attend.

On the contrary, Marshal Stalin should set a higher value on Allied cooperation now than ever before. It is paying off for Russia. He would have to be stupid indeed to upset it.

What he wanted most was a “second front,” by which he meant a Western European invasion. For a long time, he – or at least his propaganda agencies – seemed to doubt the often-repeated promises of the Western Allies, particularly because the invasion was not launched as early as he understood from the Molotov meeting in Washington. But since the Moscow and Tehran conferences last fall, there has been a clear agreement on the time and coordination of the western and eastern offensives. Now that the agreement is being carried out so successfully, and with such mutual profit, there is less excuse for misunderstanding.

Likewise, Marshal Stalin has received in abundant measure the American supplies and equipment needed for his summer and fall campaigns. He has spoken enthusiastically of this.

There is difference of policy between Moscow and Washington regarding Eastern Europe. The United States objects to Russia dictating territorial and governmental changes. We have the same objection to a British sphere of influence in Western Europe. Our government and people believe that such a British-Russian domination of Europe would play into the hands of defeated Germany and Fascism, and that it would produce another war. But there is nothing new about this American policy, and it has restrained neither Marshal Stalin nor Mr. Churchill.

This does not change Russia’s stake in the Far East, which is even greater than our own. Japan is a closer and worse menace to Russia than to the United States. Marshal Stalin knows that our Pacific offensive saved him from attack by Japan and allowed him to concentrate on defeating the Nazi invader. Marshal Stalin also knows that Russia, unless she joins in the defeat of Japan, will have Jess voice in the Far Eastern settlement so vital to her.

On the basis of self-interest, which has determined Marshal Stalin’s foreign policy hitherto, it is highly probable that he will join in the war against Jap aggression when Germany is defeated. For him to do so before that time would prolong the European war and sacrifice the best Siberian bases to Japan. That would help the Axis, not the Allies.

141

U.S. State Department (September 17, 1944)

840.50/9-1744

The Secretary of State to the President

Washington, September 17, 1944
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

I note from your record of conversation with the Prime Minister on September 14, 1944 that lend-lease aid during the war with Japan will exceed, in food, shipping, et cetera, the strategic needs of Great Britain in carrying on that war and will, to that extent, be devoted to maintaining British economy. Would it not be well to make clear to the Prime Minister at this time that one of the primary considerations of the Committee, in determining the extent to which lend-lease might exceed direct strategic needs, would be the soundness of the course adopted by the British Government with a view to restoring its own economy, particularly with regard to measures taken to restore the flow of international trade? My thought on this, which applies to financial assistance through lend-lease or in other forms, is developed in the last enclosure, of which a copy is attached, to my memorandum to you of September 8, 1944.

C H

142

The Secretary of State to the President

Washington, September 17, 1944
Top secret

Subject: CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE RECOGNITION BY PRINCIPAL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE

In my opinion the time has come to give serious consideration to the question of announcing this Government’s recognition of the de facto French authority as the Provisional Government of France. Of course, the word “provisional” would not be dropped until after general elections are held in France.

I believe that this step is not inconsistent with the policy which we have carefully followed, namely, to refrain from any action which might have the effect of impairing the opportunity of the French people freely to exercise their will in the choice of their leaders.

The following factors suggest the advisability of taking this step at this time.

  1. There is every indication that General de Gaulle has been accepted for the initial period as the national leader in liberated France. This is fully corroborated by reports from our military authorities, who have been in touch with the local population in many parts of France. It likewise does away with the possibility of this Government ever being charged with imposing General de Gaulle on the French people.

  2. There are increasing indications that the resistance groups and others in France have no intention of permitting the establishment of a personal dictatorship under General de Gaulle. The base of the governing authority has already been broadened by the inclusion of numerous representatives of metropolitan resistance. General de Gaulle’s desire to maintain the thread of legal continuity and to work with democratic elements is likewise shown by the appointment of M. Jeanneney, President of the Senate.

  3. The Political Advisor on General Eisenhower’s staff (Eeber) reports that the Committee, with possible occasional changes of individual Commissioners, should be able to maintain control in France until such time as elections can be held.

  4. It will probably be many months before elections can take place owing to the absence of over a million prisoners-of-war and deportees in Germany.

  5. Lack of recognition will make it more difficult for the Committee to maintain the internal stability necessary for the prosecution of the war and orderly rehabilitation of the country.

  6. Our present popularity in France is high. It will suffer if we delay recognition unduly. Many Frenchmen undoubtedly understand and sympathize with our refusal to recognize the Committee when it was established in Algiers, but they will not understand this refusal now that France is largely liberated.

  7. General Eisenhower’s headquarters agree that there is no reason to delay a further degree of recognition from a military point of view.

  8. Recognition would greatly simplify the solution of a number of practical problems of an economic and financial nature.

  9. A number of Governments have already extended recognition to the Committee as the Provisional Government of France and there are indications that the British and Canadians may shortly take this action even if we do not. American prestige would suffer severely if we were to be the only major power withholding recognition.

If you agree to the desirability of taking this step, either of the following two possibilities would present a suitable occasion for the extension of recognition, after consultation and agreement with Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

  1. The passage of a vote of confidence in General de Gaulle, and the de facto French authority as presently constituted, by the Provisional Consultative Assembly, established in Paris and broadened to include at least fifty percent of resistance membership.

  2. The setting up, with the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander, of zones of the interior, thereby emphasizing the change from a strictly military to a predominantly civilian administration.

C H

143

Draft of a suggested telegram to be sent by the President and the Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin

In the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers before Tehran, the Prime Minister of Great Britain submitted a draft proposing the local punishment of war criminals in the countries and, if possible, at the scenes where their atrocities had been committed. With some small amendments this document was approved and has been published to the world with general acceptance and approval. This document however did not attempt to deal with the cases of the major war criminals “whose offences have no particular geographical localization.” This matter was touched on in conversation at Tehran without any definite conclusion being reached. It has now become important for us to reach agreement about the treatment of these major criminals. Would you consider whether a list could not be prepared of say 50 to 100 persons whose responsibilities for directing or impelling the whole process of crime and atrocity is established by the fact of their holding certain high offices? Such a list would not of course be exhaustive. New names could be added at any time. It is proposed that these persons should be declared, on the authority of the United Nations, to be world outlaws and that upon any of them falling into Allied hands the Allies will “decide how they are to be disposed of and the execution of this decision will be carried out immediately.” Or alternatively, “the nearest General Officer will convene a Court for the sole purpose of establishing their identity, and when this has been done will have them shot within one hour without reference to higher authority.”

It would seem that the method of trial, conviction and judicial sentence is quite inappropriate for notorious ringleaders such as Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Goebbels and Ribbentrop. Apart from the formidable difficulties of constituting the Court, formulating the charge and assembling the evidence, the question of their fate is a political and not a judicial one. It could not rest with judges however eminent or learned to decide finally a matter like this which is of the widest and most vital public policy. The decision must be “the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.” This in fact was expressed in the Moscow Declaration.

There would seem to be advantages in publishing a list of names. At the present time, Hitler and his leading associates know that their fate will be sealed when the German Army and people cease to resist. It therefore costs them nothing to go on giving orders to fight to the last man, die in the last ditch, etc. As long as they can persuade the German people to do this, they continue to live on the fat of the land and have exalted employments. They represent themselves and the German people as sharing the same rights and fate. Once however their names are published and they are isolated, the mass of the German people will infer rightly that there is a difference between these major criminals and themselves. A divergence of interests between the notorious leaders and their dupes will become apparent. This may lead to undermining the authority of the doomed leaders and to setting their own people against them, and thus may help the breakup of Germany.

We should be very glad to have your views upon this proposal at your earliest convenience. It is of course without prejudice to the great mass of German war criminals who will be handed over for the judgment of the countries where their crimes have been committed.

17.9.44

144

Log of the President’s Visit to Canada

Sunday, September 17

We crossed the International Border at Rouse’s Point, NY, at 12:15 a.m. At Rouse’s Point we dropped off our Royal Canadian Mounted Police escort, and also transferred over to the lines and facilities of the Delaware and Hudson Railroad for the continuation of our journey to Hyde Park.

We arrived in Albany, NY, at 6:45 a.m., where our train was turned over to the New York Central Railroad (West Shore Division).

We arrived at Highland, NY, at 9:15 a.m. Mrs. Roosevelt met the President on his arrival here. The President detrained at 9:20 a.m. and motored to Hyde Park. He was accompanied to Hyde Park by Mrs. Roosevelt, Admiral Leahy, Lieutenant Commander H. G. Bruenn, Medical Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve – who had joined our party at Quebec – Miss Tully and Mrs. Brady. Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill were to join the President and Mrs. Roosevelt at Hyde Park on Monday, September 18, for a brief visit.

Admiral Mclntire, General Watson, Lieutenant Rigdon, Chief Yeoman Hoying, Mr. Jack Romagna and Mr. Dan L. Moorman proceeded on to Jersey City with the President’s train. The others of the party remained at Poughkeepsie. At Jersey City one car of the special train was detached and hitched on to the Baltimore and Ohio’s “Capitol Limited,” so that Admiral Mclntire, General Watson, Lieutenant Rigdon, Chief Yeoman Hoying, Mr. Romagna and Mr. Moorman arrived in Washington at 5:10 p.m.

The President, Admiral Leahy, Lieutenant Commander Bruenn, Miss Tully, Mrs. Brady and all other members of the party stopping off at Poughkeepsie and Hyde Park returned to Washington at 8:00 a.m., Thursday, September 21.

145

U.S. State Department (September 18, 1944)

PR 10 Foreign Relations of U.S./8-20-71: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to the British Foreign Secretary

Hyde Park, September 18, 1944
Personal and top secret

Following for Foreign Secretary from Prime Minister.
My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of message for Marshal Stalin.

We are sending a full account of the conclusions which we have reached in our Conference here. We both much regretted that circumstances which we well understood made it impossible for you to be present with us and thus to repeat the historic precedent of Tehran.

In sending you our account of this essentially military conference we feel that we should be less than frank if we did not also express to you certain anxieties which are much in our minds about political developments in Europe. With the defeat of the enemy’s armies, political problems will arise in all parts of Europe. It is essential that we should work together to solve these. We mention in particular the situation in Yugoslavia and Greece, in both of which countries there has been, and in the former of which there still is, the danger of civil war. There is also the position in Poland, which causes us much anxiety. We were all much encouraged by the success of the visit of Monsieur Mikołajczyk, the Polish Prime Minister, to Moscow, and we hope that the conversations which were there opened can be carried to a successful conclusion with your help. It would be gravely embarrassing to the smooth working of our affairs if events should so fall out that we were left recognizing Monsieur Mikołajczyk and his Government while you supported some other authority in Poland.

These and all other matters which affect our relations towards other powers we are at all times ready to discuss with you, in order to seek agreement through the diplomatic channel or by any other means. As you know we think it extremely important that we should meet on this and other important topics as soon as the war situation allows.

W S C

146

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the President

London, 18 September 1944
Secret

To the President from Winant.

Immediately following your directive that a mission to drop supplies on Warsaw was authorized clearance was obtained from Moscow and the project organized. Bad weather has delayed the mission. I thought you would like to know that I just received a message which was flashed back stating that one hundred and seven ships today in clear weather had dropped supplies over Warsaw.

The Pittsburgh Press (September 18, 1944)

Editorial: Fair words from Québec

No starting news came out of the Québec Conference. The President and the Prime Minister said Britain would help America lick Japan – a promise made 13 months ago at the First Québec Conference.

The fact that the official statements were on the thin side does not mean nothing was accomplished. Probably some secret agreements were made regarding German armistice terms after unconditional surrender, and the Polish-Russian dispute; and doubtless preparations were made for a fall meeting with Stalin. All this is surmise, however, because the Big Two operate more and more in the dark – not only in military matters, where secrecy is essential, but also in international policy which should not be kept from the public in a democracy.

The combined publicity efforts of the President and the Prime Minister to put the Pacific War into the spotlight is good politics in this country, and is in line with the recent Roosevelt visit to Pearl Harbor. There is the obvious implication that only the Roosevelt-Churchill team can beat the Japs.

Actually, Britain will not get into the Pacific War fully much before “the kill,” to use the Churchill phrase. Apart from China, the United States will have to do most of the job. The Québec propaganda will be harmful if it lulls Americans into believing otherwise.

Of course, Britain intends to get in at the end, and Russia probably does also. Both have large interests in the Far East. Neither can afford to be out of the settlement following Jap defeat.

But, regardless of intent, there are two effective barriers to large British participation in the Pacific War during the decisive period ahead. At least six months will be required after European peace for Britain to shift strength from west to east; and, assuming this is done by next spring, the monsoon season from May to October will prevent major campaigns in the Southeast Asia area where Britain operates.

Help is needed now in the Far East. China is desperate – her base, which American bombers have been using to such good advantage, are being lost to the enemy. Adm. Nimitz and Gen. MacArthur are sweeping across the Pacific faster than anyone could have expected. But the failure of London and New Delhi to support Lord Louis Mountbatten’s command in Southeast Asia is prolonging the war, despite Mr. Churchill’s high promises at the First Québec Conference. One big blow struck by Lord Mountbatten this fall would be worth 10 blows a year later.

147

Komsomolskaya Pravda (September 19, 1944)

К конференции в Квебеке

Совместное заявление Рузвельта и Черчилля

Квебек, 16 сентября (ТАСС) –
Рузвельт и Черчилль сделали следующее совместное заявление о результатах квебекской конференции:

Президент н премьер-министр, а также начальники объединённых штабов провели ряд совещаний, на которых обсуждались все виды войны против Германии н Японии. В очень короткое время они достигли решений по всем вопросам, касающимся как завершения войны в Европе, приближающейся теперь к своей Финальной стадии, так и разгрома варваров на Тихом океане Наиболее серьезная трудность, с которой встретились участники квебекской конференции, заключалась в том, чтобы найти способ и возможность использования против Японии огромных сил, которые каждая из заинтересованных стран в отдельности и все они вместе стремятся использовать против врага.

На состоявшейся сегодня пресс-конференции Рузвельт заявил, что союзные руководители не делают никаких предсказаний относительно точной даты полного поражения Германии, но они надеются достигнуть быстрого окончания войны в Европе, а затем перебросить все силы западных держав против Японии, чтобы вынудить ее к безусловной капитуляции. Рузвельт заявил, что руководители заполных держав разработали на квебекской конференции планы совместных усилий Соединенных Штатов, Великобритании и доминионов для проведения решающей кампании на Дальневосточном театре военных действий.

Рузвельт заявил далее, что союзники не будут создавать единого командования на Тихом океане, а сохранят три раздельных командования, а именно: генерала Маунтбэттена – в Юго-Восточной Азии, генерала Макартура – в юго-западной части Тихого океана и адмирала Нимица – на море.

Выступая на той же пресс-конференции, Черчилль заявил, что быстрое развитие военных событий сделало крайне необходимым для руководителей союзных стран созывать частые совещания для обсуждения «их великих дел». Величайшие победы союзников, особенно в Европе, были предначертаны в союзных планах, разработанных на предыдущих конференциях в Каире н Тегеране.

Черчилль сделал оптимистический обзор военного положения в настоящее время, указав, что квебекская конференция собралась в тот момент, «когда большая часть нашей задачи близится к выполнению». Черчилль заявил, что Великобритания не намерена отступать от своих обязательств после поражения Германии. Великобритания, так же как н доминионы, настаивает на необходимости взять на себя огромную долю участия в операциях на Тихом океане и не возлагать на Соединенные Штаты «слишком большую тяжесть».

Немедленно после достижения победы в Европе – сказал Черчилль – вся огромная сила западных держав, сконцентрированная в настоящее время в Европе, будет обращена против Японии. Указывая, что союзные операции в. Европе Проводились «с точностью часового механизма», он выразил уверенность, что действия против Японии будут проводиться с той же точностью.

Касаясь присутствия Идена на квебекской конференции, Черчилль заявил, что обсуждение различных вопросов на конференции не могло строго ограничиться вопросами военного характера и, естественно, были затронуты различные проблемы, касающиеся Экономических, финансовых и дипломатических сторон.

В заключение Черчилль указал, что за последний год «фортуна так благоприятствовала» Объединённым нациям и они достигли таких решающих успехов в победе над врагом, «что за их будущее можно Ее беспокоиться».

Отъезд Черчилля из Квебека Возвращение Идена в Лондон

Лондон, 18 сентября (ТАСС) –
Как передает корреспондент агентства Рейтер, чернядь выехал поездом из Квебека.

148

Völkischer Beobachter (September 19, 1944)

Québec-Konferenz beendet

Stockholm, 18. September –
Die Besprechungen in Québec zwischen Roosevelt und Churchill haben ihren Abschluß gefunden. In einer bemerkenswert kurzen amtlichen Verlautbarung heißt es: Der Präsident und der Premierminister und die vereinigten Staatchefs hielten eine Reihe von Konferenzen, in deren Verlauf alle Probleme des Krieges gegen Deutschland und Japan erörtert wurden. Die ernsteste Schwierigkeit, so wird weiter ausgeführt, der sich die Konferenz in Québec gegenübersah, war die Aufgabe, Platz und Möglichkeit der besten Ordnung für jene Streitkräfte zu finden, die alle davon betroffenen Nationen gegen den japanischen Feind einzusetzen begierig sind.

Beim Zusammentritt der Québec-Konferenz haben wir bereits festgestellt, worauf es Roosevelt bei diesem Treffen mit Churchill vor allem ankam: Die Briten auf eine vollgültige Teilnahme am Kampf gegen Japan festzulegen, den bis jetzt die Yankees fast ausschließlich zu bestreiten hatten, und damit angesichts des heranrückenden Wahltermins der populären Meinung entgegenzukommen, daß der Krieg im Pazifik für die USA die Hauptaufgabe sei. Daß sich die Briten in Québec auf diese Linie festlegen ließen, ergibt sich aus der Erklärung Churchills: „Wir werden uns an diesem Krieg im Pazifik mit Streitkräften beteiligen, die im guten Verhältnis zu unserer nationalen Stärke stehen.“ Er stellt also dem englischen Volke vor Augen, daß es außer den hohen Blutopfern, die ihm das Ringen auf dem Kontinent abfordert, auf einen weiteren langfristigen Einsatz in Ostasien gefasst sein muß, wenn es überhaupt in diesem Raum noch eine Mitbestimmung ausüben will.

Was den Gang der Dinge in Europa angeht, so enthält die Verlautbarung von Québec darüber nichts Genaues. Die Haltung der beiden Mächte gegenüber den Völkern des Kontinents beschränkt sich nach wie vor darauf, sie den Bolschewisten ins Netz zu treiben. Diesen Tatbestand konnten die Roosevelt und Churchill nicht in Abrede stellen oder auch nur ansprechen da er für sie alles andere als rühmlich ist und nur ihre Mitschuld an der Ausbreitung des bolschewistischen Machtbereichs beweist Hingegen wird man erwarten dürfen, daß sie dem deutschen Volk mit ähnlichen Einflüsterungen zu nahen versuchen, wie sie bei leichtgläubigen und weniger standfesten Nationen Gehör finden und diese veranlassten, mitten im Strom die Pferde zu wechseln. Das Ergebnis liegt bei Italien und auf dem Balkan offen zutage. Es wiegt schwerer als alle Drohungen und Verheißungen, deren man sich drüben bedienen könnte um die militärische durch eine politisch-propagandistische Offensive zu unterstützen deren Misserfolg von vornherein feststeht, weil starke und stolze Völker nur der Stimme ihres eigenen Gewissens folgen.

vb.

‚Typisches Agitationsbeispiel‘

Tokio, 18. September –
Die Erklärung Roosevelts und Churchills zum Abschluß der Québec-Konferenz über Japan wurde von dem Sprecher der japanischen Regierung als ein typisches Agitationsbeispiel bezeichnet.

Der Sprecher verwies auf die Erklärungen des japanischen Premierministers und des Marineministers vor dem Reichstag, in welcher festgehalten wurde, daß die See- und Landstreitkräfte völlig intakt seien und nur auf eine Großoffensive des Gegners warteten, um ihm dann den entscheidenden Schlag zu versetzen.

149

U.S. State Department (September 19, 1944)

Note by the Secretaries of CCS

Washington, 19 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 678/1

Planning date for the end of the war against Japan

The President and Prime Minister approved the recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the date for the end of the war against Japan, for planning production and for allocation of manpower, should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

A. J. McFARLAND
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES
Combined Secretariat

150

The President to the Secretary of State

Hyde Park, September 19, 1944

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

I have had lengthy talks with the Prime Minister in regard to recognition of the Provisional Government in France. He and I are both very much opposed to it at this time. The Provisional Government has no direct authority from the people. It is best to let things go along as they are for the moment.

F D R

151

Draft of a statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

This was not sent. It was one of many drafts. F D R
[Undated]

The Italian people, freed of their Fascist and Nazi overlordship, have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the side of the democracies, and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice.

We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our enemies.

Italy has made real progress these last twelve months. [and other essential supplies.] We believe the United States and Great Britain should give her [Italy] greater political recognition, and we propose to invite the Italian government to send its own direct representatives to Washington and London, and on our part we will give our representatives at Rome the status of ambassadors.

First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we have instructed our representatives at the pending conference of UNRRA to declare for the sending of food and clothing and medical aids to Italy.

Along with this is the need for first steps to be taken [At the same time, first steps should be taken] toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy – an economy wrecked [laid low] under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. We should assist the Italians in the restoration of their power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications, and send our engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to speed the work of rehabilitation.

The Italian prisoners of war should be given opportunity to volunteer their full efforts in the fight against the enemy, to carry the flag of Italy into battle against Germany and Japan.

We should all look toward that day [We all wish to speed the day] when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, when the last German will have left Italian soil, and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain – the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy. [and when Italy can begin to take her own high place in the great family of democratic nations.]

152

Draft of a statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Hyde Park, September 19, 1944

The President and the Prime Minister held further discussions Monday and Tuesday at Hyde Park, on subjects dealing with post-war policies in Europe. The result of these discussions cannot be disclosed at this time for strategic military reasons, and pending their consideration by our other Allies.

The present problems in Italy also came under discussion, and on this subject the President and the Prime Minister issued the following statement:

The Italian people, freed of their Fascist and Nazi overlordship, have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the side of the democracies, and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice.

We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our common enemies.

The American and British people are of course horrified by the recent mob action in Rome [the lynching on September 18, 1944, of Dona to Carretta, former vice director of the Regina Coeli Prison], but feel that a greater responsibility placed on the Italian people and on their own government will most readily prevent a recurrence of such acts.

An increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian Administration, subject of course to that Administration proving that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration of justice. To mark this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed “The Allied Commission.”

The British High Commissioner in Italy will assume the additional title of Ambassador. The United States representative in Borne already holds that rank. The Italian Government will be invited to appoint direct representatives to Washington and London.

Our governments are also willing to consider a revision of the present long terms of the Italian armistice, to bring them more in line with the present realistic situation.

First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we have instructed our representatives at the pending conference of UNRRA to declare for the sending of food and clothing, medical aids and other essential supplies to Italy.

At the same time, first steps should be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy – an economy laid low under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. For military reasons we should assist the Italians in the restoration of such power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications as enter into the war situation, and for a short time send engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to help them in their own rehabilitation.

The application to Italy of the Trading with the Enemy Acts should be modified so as to enable business contacts between Italy and the outside world to be resumed on the basis of exchange of goods.

We all wish to speed the day when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, when the last German will have left Italian soil, and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain – the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy, and when Italy can earn her proper place in the great family of free nations.