Quebec, 15 September, 1944
It was agreed between the President and the Prime Minister today that the time had not yet come to recognise formally the FCNL as the Provisional Government of France, but the matter should be kept constantly under review.
W S C
16.9
F D R
Quebec, September 15, 1944
Draft 1. HMJr. dictated this.
At a conference between the President and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill said that he would sum up the discussion that we had been having in regard to the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar. He said that they would permit Russia and any other of our Allies to help themselves to whatever machinery they wished, that the industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar would be shut down, and that these two districts would be put under an international body which would supervise these industries to see that they would not start up again.
This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is part of a programme looking forward to diverting Germany into largely an agricultural country.
The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement upon this programme.
Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret
Memorandum from the President for the Secretary of State.
After many long conversations with the Prime Minister and Lord Cherwell, the general matter of post-war plans regarding industries has been worked out as per the following memoranda. This seems eminently satisfactory and I think you will approve the general idea of not rehabilitating the Ruhr, Saar, etc.
I think that I have also worked out the locations of the occupying forces.
I am going to leave here Saturday evening and go to Hyde Park where I will be joined Monday morning by the Prime Minister and his wife for a couple of days.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | Lord Cherwell |
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mrs. Churchill | ||
| Foreign Secretary Eden | ||
| Mr. Law | ||
| Sir Alexander Cadogan |
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Canada |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | Prime Minister Mackenzie King |
Mackenzie King apparently came to the Citadel for the purpose of asking Roosevelt and Churchill to accept honorary degrees from McGill University. The rest of the conversation is described as follows in Mackenzie King’s notes:
… Churchill … then spoke to the President about our participation in the war in the Pacific; of our desire to be in the Northern part and have our forces to serve in North Pacific; also our wish to have our Chiefs of Staff have a talk with his. The President replied: Mackenzie and I had a talk together on that, last night. That is all understood.
The President then said something about the Kuriles needing a good deal of patrolling, also Northern China, probably requiring Japs to be driven out later. When he stressed that he would have his divisions leave Seattle, and that Canadian forces could leave Vancouver, Churchill referred again to naval forces coming through the Panama Canal into the Pacific.… I did not want to leave matters to just the North and indicated that we were prepared to operate in the central area as well. Churchill also indicated that we were prepared to go as far South as Burma.
Churchill said it would not do to have our Canadians fighting in the Tropics…
Washington, September 15, 1944
Top secret
MR-out-412
Personal and secret to Miss Grace Tully from Harry Hopkins.
I sent to the President memorandum entitled French Lend Lease Agreement and dated September 11 from the State Department. FEA and State Department are anxious to know whether the President has initialed it.
Could you help me get an answer on this tomorrow?
HARRY HOPKINS
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill |
Roosevelt and Churchill had reached agreement on the allocation of zones of occupation in Germany as between United States and British forces. The agreement assigned the south western zone of occupation in Germany to United States forces and the northwestern zone to British forces; changed the boundary between the two zones by transferring the province of Hessen-Nassau and Oberhessen from the northwestern to the southwestern zone and by transferring an area west of the Rhine comprising Saarland, the Palatinate, and Rheinhessen from the southwestern to the northwestern zone; and provided that United States forces would have access “through the western and northwestern seaports” and rites of passage through the British zone of occupation.
Which was a bit hehind time because the provisional goverment was:
The Pittsburgh Press (September 15, 1944)
Spokesman indicates parley may continue elsewhere; Eden joins discussions
Québec, Canada (UP) –
Official spokesmen of the Roosevelt-Churchill war talks said today the conference here has moved into its closing stages, but indicated the President and the Prime Minister might continue their discussions elsewhere.
White House Press Secretary Stephen T. Early said the President and the Prime Minister will finish their work by noon tomorrow, then added this would “conclude their conferences in Québec.”
Reports leaped at this indication of another meeting as contained in Mr. Early’s emphasis of the words “in Québec.”
“Does this mean,” one reporter asked, “the Prime Minister will go to Washington for further conferences?”
“I can’t answer that,” Mr. Early replied.
Eden joins parley
Robin Cruikshank, British spokesman, was similarly reticent about discussing Mr. Churchill’s plans beyond noon tomorrow.
Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, and Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, were at the Citadel today to talk primarily with Mr. Churchill. They were with Mr. Churchill and the President last night until a late hour.
Plans for Germany
Peace terms for Germany obviously were the most pressing problem in which Mr., Eden was involved in talks with Mr. Churchill and the President. But a backlog of other problems was building up.
Mr. Eden was believed to have brought with him a new summary of activities of the European Advisory Commission which is dealing with the detailed planning for post-war Germany.
Following his talks here with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden is expected to hurry back to London with their latest views – and orders.
Québec, Canada (UP) –
A new U.S. command setup, dominantly Navy and geared to the Pacific war plans being formulated at the Churchill-Roosevelt conferences here, is expected to be announced soon.
Decisions on the command setup have already been made, White House Secretary Stephen T. Early said, but what the command setup will be has not been revealed. Nor is there any official information as to the British part in it, if any.
More integration seen
Recent developments, together with information from usually reliable sources, permits this picture to be drawn:
The present likelihood is that there will be no super-command of all Allied forces for the whole Pacific and Asiatic theaters. Rather the outlook is for more efficient integration of certain of the present command areas.
Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, one of the President’s advisers here, is expected to relinquish his other post of Chief of Naval Operations and to move to a Pacific base for a more active role as fleet commander. Adm. King had been assigned the dual jobs shortly after the Japs attacked Pearl Harbor. But many functions of the Naval Operations office were subsequently transferred to the jurisdiction of the fleet commander’s organization.
The information here is that the Naval Operations post will be turned over to Adm. Frederick J. Horne, now Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
Use of British units seen
Adm. Nimitz, Pacific Fleet commander, may move to an advanced Pacific base, closer to the scene of operations, moving ever nearer the Japanese homeland.
Since the British Navy is expected to take a part in the Pacific campaign, its fleet units may be attached to Adm. Nimitz’s fleet, rather than operate as an independent force.
Some British units have operated with the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the past as integral elements of the American force. But this was done largely for training and indoctrination in U.S. naval tactics adapted to the special needs of the Pacific.
With impending collapse of Germany, ticklish issue can’t be avoided longer
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor
Québec, Canada –
With the arrival here of British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, there is talk of a settlement of the ticklish, if not dangerous, quarrel between Poland and Russia.
With the impending collapse of Germany, European boundary problems become acute, especially in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Russia has staked out expansive territorial and political claims. Thus far, Britain and America have shied away from such questions, preferring to cross those bridges as they come.
But the Polish issue can no longer be avoided. She is an ally. If she is to lose half her territory and her political independence to appease an ally, it may knock post-war world collaboration into a cocked hat.
In Washington recently, I learned that the Polish government in London was willing to meet Moscow more than halfway.
Up to the present, Moscow’s attitude toward Warsaw has been frigid.
Russia ever refused aid to Gen. Bor’s Polish Patriots, fighting in Warsaw. The British and Poles had to fly all the way from Britain to drop supplies for Gen. Bor. Russia, with airfields 10 minutes from Warsaw, refused to do anything.
It is a reasonable assumption that Mr. Eden came to give Mr. Churchill and the President a fill-in on important developments since Mr. Churchill’s departure. He may have brought news that the end of the war in Europe is nearer than was thought, and perhaps to urge upon the “Big Two” a new and early meeting of the “Big Three” – a meeting with Marshal Stalin.
By Bertram Benedict
The first conference of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Québec was held a little more than a year ago, from Aug. 17 to Aug. 24, 1943. There were rumors that the conference would produce a notable declaration like the Atlantic Charter, which had come out of the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting on the high seas two years before, or like the “unconditional surrender” demand which had come out of the Casablanca Conference in the previous January, but the 1943 Québec Conference produced nothing of the sort.
The joint Roosevelt-Churchill statement issued at the close of the conference said merely that military operations all over the world, including the war against Japan, had been surveyed. Decisions had been made, but could not be disclosed. It had been resolved to hold another Anglo-American conference before the end of the year, “in addition to any tripartite meeting which it may be possible to arrange with Soviet Russia.” Russia would be fully informed of the decisions reached as to the war against Germany and Italy.
The President’s address at Ottawa following the conference was in the nature of a “peptalk,” telling the world that Germany was about to be defeated.
Invitation denied by Moscow
In 1943, as in 1944, Soviet Russia was not represented. President Roosevelt was understood to say that Marshal Stalin had been invited to come. Thereupon Moscow denied flatly that any such invitation had been received.
While the conference met, Soviet publications continued to criticize the United States and Great Britain for not opening a real second front. The magazine War and the Working Class explained that the Québec Conference was all right as an Anglo-American parley, but said that the real need was for a tripartite Soviet-Anglo-American conference soon in Moscow.
The 1943 Québec Conference met amid fears that Russia would insist on playing a lone hand. There were rumors that Germany had offered Moscow a separate peace.
Several weeks before the 1943 Québec Conference met, Mussolini had been deposed in Italy, and Gen. Badoglio had been named Italian Premier. There was confusion as to Gen. de Gaulle’s status. After the conference adjourned, the United States recognized Gen. de Gaulle’s French Committee of National Liberation as the “administrative authority” of the French overseas territories actually under the committee’s control.
Action on war fronts
While the conference was meeting, the conquest of Sicily was completed. American and Canadian forces occupied Kiska, from which the Japanese had departed unscathed. There was hard fighting on New Guinea. In the east, the Russian advance retook Kharkov.
Goebbels told the German people over the radio that a new secret weapon was under construction which would soon give them relief from Allied air raids.
At Québec in 1943, President Roosevelt made public his executive orders allowing the War Manpower Commission to withdraw draft deferment from recalcitrant strikers and allowing union dues to be placed in escrow in any plant taken over by the government.
The War Labor Board took jurisdiction of the wage dispute in the anthracite mines. The Board also ordered Montgomery Ward to enforce a maintenance of union membership clause. Under Secretary of State Welles was said to be on the point of resigning. Mrs. Roosevelt was in New Zealand.
U.S. State Department (September 15, 1944)
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| President Roosevelt | ||
| Archduke Otto |
Roosevelt had tea with Empress Zita of Austria, her sons the Archdukes Otto and Felix, her lady in waiting, and Miss Tully. The following paper is a translation made in the Department of State of a memorandum prepared by the Archduke Otto regarding his conversation with Roosevelt on this occasion:
Right at the beginning Roosevelt remarked that today they had been working over the maps and had noted (namely, he and Churchill) that Austria and Hungary would of all countries undergo the least territorial changes. The situation was unclear only where Transylvania was concerned because there were differences of opinion between the Russians and the Rumanians in that respect, and “we don’t know much about it.” Immediately following this he remarked “that our main concern is now how to keep the Communist out of Hungary and Austria.” This was extremely important to them, especially Hungary.
The remainder of the conversation was rather disjointed, as is the custom with R., and each problem was touched upon repeatedly. The following is a summary of what was said on the various points:
HUNGARY. This was evidently one of the cardinal issues of the conversation. R. kept coming back to this problem time and again. Apart from the President’s personal sympathy for Hungary, the main reason for this is probably the hope of making Hungary a bulwark against Russia. He stressed that he wished Hungary would make an unconditional surrender only to the Americans and British. If this were done, Hungary could be saved from communism. Hungary would surely receive mild terms. Military operations are now being planned which are designed to make it possible for the Hungarians to establish liaison with the civilized Allies. In the course of the discussion, R. took up the idea of having the Hungarian envoys act as transmitters of his proposal for Hungary. Specific mention was made of Apor, whom he would approach through Myron Taylor. His former sympathy for Horthy had been forfeited through the latter’s weakness and senility. He was very receptive to the idea that we might perhaps be helpful to him with respect to Hungary’s surrender. It was also agreed that I would immediately send him a message for the Hungarian government. He also asked in detail about Béla Kun, concerning whose atrocious deeds he was well informed. Attempts had also been made to prejudice him very strongly against Mihály Károlyi, but obviously he does not know much about him.
RUSSIA. It is evident that the relationship between R. and the Russians is strained. While the President emphasized that he liked Stalin personally – although he said a little later that he was “untrustworthy” and deceitful (my personal impression: the praise of Stalin was merely a gesture to put a little damper on our joy, and so was not genuine) – the President was bitterly critical of the men around Stalin. All the men around Stalin were old Bolsheviks whom one could not trust. There was a general interest in keeping the Russians away as far as possible. R. seems to have been particularly disgusted by Russia’s handling of the Bulgarian question. It is obvious that the Anglo-Saxons were tricked by the Russians. From all of R.’s remarks it is quite evident that he is afraid of the Communists and wants to do everything to contain Russia’s power – naturally short of war.
POLAND. R. is in an ill humor about Poland. Apparently there is a disposition to yield there. Sharp criticism of the Warsaw revolt, which was launched without consulting the Allies.
AUSTRIA. Austria’s independence will be restored and efforts will be made to protect the country from Bolshevism. The question whether Austria would want to form a federation with South Germany was raised at the Conference, but R. said that this should be left to the Austrians themselves. He thought that the Austrians would not care for that. When he asked for my opinion, I said that Austria would primarily wish to associate with the Danube countries, especially Hungary, but if Hungary were to fall into the hands of the Russians, Austria might consider a union with Catholic South Germany on the condition that Vienna would be the capital. German, R. remarked at this point, would be divided into three parts, North, West, and South Germany. R. apparently had no knowledge of the Hull Declaration. He shared our opinion that an uprising would be far too premature at this time. The question of the Austrian underground did not seem to interest him greatly. He seems to think that the underground is so strong that nothing needs to be done for it except supply it with arms at the last moment. South Tyrol was discussed with him. He is sympathetic to our efforts. It is not clear, however, whether anything has been done in this respect. He has reports from Italy about the present Italian government: they are relatively unconcerned about any territorial questions regarding Austria, they are interested in only one thing: they want to keep Trieste. He has proposed, and the proposal seems to have been accepted, that Trieste, Pola, and Fiume become free ports under international guarantee and administration. (The same régime, by the way, is also planned for the German ports.)
VATICAN. Understanding for the power of the Holy See. An interesting item is a report by Myron Taylor that Stalin had offered Rome, as the price of an understanding, to bring about a merger of the Orthodox Church with the Catholic Church.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
YUGOSLAVIA. R. stresses once more, as in previous conversations, that Yugoslavia is in his view an unnatural state. It should be transformed into a federation. Whether that would be done he did not say. Said: Poor Peter is in a very bad shape.
MISCELLANEOUS. Marked sympathy for Leopold of Belgium. – In view of Brazil’s weakness he will propose to the United Nations the establishment of American or United Nations bases in Dakar or the Cape Verde Islands. – Is very angry at Argentina. – Beneš or Czechoslovakia was not mentioned at all. – Made the remark that Stalin had harassed Churchill constantly at Tehran.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | ||
| Admiral Leahy | ||
| Miss Tully |
Morgenthau’s diary entry reads as follows:
While I was waiting for the President between five and six, I was sitting there talking with Grace Tully and Admiral Leahy joined us. He said that they had only settled that afternoon what part of Germany the English would go into, and what part the USA should go into. In the morning when I arrived at twelve, the President was sitting alone in his room with three different colored pencils and a map of Europe, and he then and there sketched out where he wanted us to go and where he wanted the English to go, and by that I mean our Armies. He had before him a map of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which he said was terrible. According to Admiral Leahy, this afternoon the President showed Churchill his map, and got what he wanted. When I let Leahy read the memorandum on the Ruhr and the Saar, he was very happy because he said that the English were going to occupy the Ruhr and the Saar and they would have to carry this thing out.
Quebec, September 15, 1944
In regard to proposal for Lend Lease to France, my recommendation is that for the time being we postpone taking any action.
H M Jr.
Approved: F D R
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| President Roosevelt | ||
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau |
Morgenthau’s diary entry reads as follows:
…I got in about six o’clock and stayed until after seven-thirty… He was completely relaxed, and the conversation was entirely on the week’s work.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Late in the afternoon in my discussion with the President, to my surprise he told me that Leahy had been favorable to my plan. The President said that he had withheld bringing up this question of where our Armies should go because he wanted to get Churchill in a good humor and he wanted everything else settled.
… I asked him what he meant about the suggestion of having the United Nations meet the end of October, and he said that he felt it had taken much too long to bring up the League of Nations after World War I, and he wanted to do this in October. So I said, “Well, it makes good window dressing for the campaign,” and he said, “Yes.” His idea is to have it about the 27th of October and run through and after election.
During my conversation with the President – I think it was in the morning – I said, “Look, Mr. President, now that we have this Ruhr and Saar stuff straightened out, the thing should be presented to Stalin, and I think if Stalin knew how we felt you would find he would act much better.” The President said, “Well, I will have Harriman come back and explain it to him, and let him go back and sell it to Stalin.” “Listen,” I said, “Harriman can’t do this. You ought to send me.” I said, “I get along very well with the Russians, and you could check with Stalin as to whether I do or whether I don’t.” The President said, “Oh, I have far too important things for you to do around Washington. I can’t spare you for a thing like this.” I said, “Well, it would only be a matter of 10 days.” He thought a minute and said, “Well, it might take two weeks,” and he seemed to like the idea…
The other amazing thing that happened was he turned to me, when Grace Tully brought in a telegram in the afternoon addressed to her asking her to try to find out what happened on the French Lend-Lease, and said, “You let Harry know that we are not going to do it,” …
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | Lord Cherwell |
Morgenthau and Cherwell discussed the words “or sold for profit” which had been inserted in the record of the Roosevelt-Churchill discussion of lend-lease on September 14.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mrs. Churchill | ||
| Foreign Secretary Eden | ||
| Sir Alexander Cadogan |
Washington, September 15, 1944
Since the meeting with you on September 9 attended by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Hopkins, and myself, I have had an opportunity to read the latest papers submitted to you by the Secretary of the Treasury on the treatment of Germany. There is no need to make any extended or detailed reply to these papers. My views have already been submitted to you in other memoranda. I merely wish to reiterate briefly that I still feel that the course proposed by the Treasury would in the long run certainly defeat what we hope to attain by a complete military victory – this is, the peace of the world, and the assurance of social, economic and political stability in the world.
The point of difference is not one of objective – continued world peace – it is one of means. When we discuss means, the difference is not whether we should be soft or tough on the German people, but rather whether the course proposed will in fact best attain our agreed objective, continued peace.
If I thought that the Treasury proposals would accomplish that objective, I would not persist in my objections. But I cannot believe that they will make for a lasting peace. In spirit and in emphasis they are punitive, not, in my judgment, corrective or constructive. They will tend through bitterness and suffering to breed another war, not to make another war undesired by the Germans nor impossible in fact. It is not within the realm of possibility that a whole nation of seventy million people, who have been outstanding for many years in the arts and the sciences and who through their efficiency and energy have attained one of the highest industrial levels in Europe, can by force be required to abandon all their previous methods of life, be reduced to a peasant level with virtually complete control of industry and science left to other peoples.
The question is not whether we want Germans to suffer for their sins. Many of us would like to see them suffer the tortures they have inflicted on others. The only question is whether over the years a group of seventy million educated, efficient and imaginative people can be kept within bounds on such a low level of subsistence as the Treasury proposals contemplate. I do not believe that is humanly possible. A subordinate question is whether even if you could do this it is good for the rest of the world either economically or spiritually. Sound thinking teaches that prosperity in one part of the world helps to create prosperity in other parts of the world. It also teaches that poverty in one part of the world usually induces poverty in other parts. Enforced poverty is even worse, for it destroys the spirit not only of the victim but debases the victor. It would be just such a crime as the Germans themselves hoped to perpetrate upon their victims – it would be a crime against civilization itself.
This country since its very beginning has maintained the fundamental belief that all men, in the long run, have the right to be free human beings and to live in the pursuit of happiness. Under the Atlantic Charter victors and vanquished alike are entitled to freedom from economic want. But the proposed treatment of Germany would, if successful, deliberately deprive many millions of people of the right to freedom from want and freedom from fear. Other peoples all over the world would suspect the validity of our spiritual tenets and question the long-range effectiveness of our economic and political principles as applied to the vanquished.
The proposals would mean a forcible revolution in all of the basic methods of life of a vast section of the population as well as a disruption of many accustomed geographical associations and communications. Such an operation would naturally and necessarily involve a chaotic upheaval in the people’s lives which would inevitably be productive of the deepest resentment and bitterness towards the authorities which had imposed such revolutionary changes upon them. Physically, considering the fact that their present enlarged population has been developed and supported under an entirely different geography and economy, it would doubtless cause tremendous suffering involving virtual starvation and death for many, and migrations and changes for others. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to understand any purpose or cause for such revolutionary changes other than mere vengeance of their enemies and this alone would strongly tend towards the most bitter reactions.
I am prepared to accede to the argument that even if German resources were wiped off the map, the European economy would somehow readjust itself, perhaps with the help of Great Britain and this country. And the world would go on. The benefit to England by the suppression of German competition is greatly stressed in the Treasury memorandum. But this is an argument addressed to a shortsighted cupidity of the victors and the negation of all that Secretary Hull has been trying to accomplish since 1933. I am aware of England’s need, but I do not and cannot believe that she wishes this kind of remedy. I feel certain that in her own interest she could not afford to follow this path. The total elimination of a competitor (who is always also a potential purchaser) is rarely a satisfactory solution of a commercial problem.
The sum total of the drastic political and economic steps proposed by the Treasury is an open confession of the bankruptcy of hope for a reasonable economic and political settlement of the causes of war.
I plead for no “soft” treatment of Germany. I urge only that we take steps which in the light of history are reasonably adapted to our purpose, namely, the prevention of future wars. The Carthaginian aspect of the proposed plan would, in my judgment, provoke a reaction on the part of the people in this country and in the rest of the world which would operate not only against the measures advocated but in its violence would sweep away the proper and reasonable restrictive measures that we could justifiably impose.
I have already indicated in my memorandum of September 9, 1944, the lines along which I would recommend that we should go pending further light on other questions which can only be obtained after we have acquired greater knowledge of conditions and trends within Germany as well as of the views and intentions of our Allies.
HENRY L STIMSON
Secretary of War
Friday, September 15
At 12:00 o’clock, Noon, the President met in conference with Prime Minister Churchill, Secretary Morgenthau, Lord Cherwell, Mr. Eden and Mr. Cadogan.
At 1:00 p.m., the President lunched at the Citadel together with the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Cadogan, Mrs. Churchill and Mr. Law. Prime Minister King dropped in on the group after lunch and joined in conference discussions that lasted until 3:00 p.m.
The President had tea with Empress Zita of Austria, her sons Archduke Otto and Archduke Felix and her Lady in Waiting, Countess Kerssenbrock, and Miss Tully in his quarters at the Citadel at 5:00 p.m.
At 6:00 p.m., Secretary Morgenthau called on the President and was in conference with him until 7:15 p.m.
Dinner at the Citadel was at 8:00 p.m. The President dined with Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill, Mr. Eden and Mr. Cadogan. After dinner the motion picture Wilson and a Navy film of the recent air fighting at Saipan were shown at the Citadel. Mrs. Churchill attended with the President but Prime Minister Churchill could not attend because of a scheduled British conference. This was a lengthy motion picture program and was not concluded until past midnight. The President retired immediately after the movies.
U.S. State Department (September 16, 1944)
Quebec, 16 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 320/27
Upon the collapse of organized resistance by the German Army the following subdivision of that part of Germany not allocated to the Soviet Government for disarmament, policing, and the preservation of order is acceptable from a military point of view by [to] the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
For disarmament, policing and preservation of order:
The British forces under a British Commander will occupy Germany west of the Rhine and east of the Rhine north of the line from Koblenz following the northern border of Hessen and Nassau to the border of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.
The forces of the United States under a United States Commander will occupy Germany east of the Rhine, south of the line Koblenz–northern border of Hessen–Nassau and west of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.
Control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, and the necessary staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the Commander of the American Zone.
American area to have in addition access through the western and northwestern seaports and passage through the British controlled area.
Accurate delineation of the above outlined British and American areas of control can be made at a later date.