Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3145

The Ambassador in France to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs

Paris, July 31, 1945
Secret
No. 669

Excellency: Acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor to transmit a communication on behalf of my Government to the Government of France relating to political principles which the Government of the United States considers should govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period. It is the earnest wish of my Government that the Government of France will be able to associate itself with these principles.

Your Excellency will note that my Government will be grateful if the Government of France would treat the present communication as strictly secret until such time as an official statement is issued by the Conference.

I avail myself [etc.]

JEFFERSON CAFFERY

[Enclosure]

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed upon the following political principles which they consider should govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period. It is their intention to communicate the text of these principles to the Commanders-in-Chief of their respective forces of occupation in Germany after the conclusion of the present Conference and to instruct them to be guided by these principles in their action in their respective zones of occupation, and to concert with their colleagues on the Control Council in working out the application of these principles in such a way as to ensure the appropriate uniformity of action in zones of occupation.

It is the earnest wish of the three Governments that the Provisional Government of the French Republic will be able to associate itself with these principles and to send similar instructions after the conclusion of the Conference to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces of Occupation.

The three Governments would be grateful if the French Provisional Government would treat the present communication as strictly secret until such a time as an official statement is issued by the Conference.

Agreement on Political Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period

  1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council.

  2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

  3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are:

    (i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:

    • (a) All German land, naval and air forces, the SS, SA, SD and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers’ Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans’ organizations and all other military and quasi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism;

    • (b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.

    (ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

    (iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.

    (iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.

  4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discrimination on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

  5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

  6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

  7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

  8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.

  9. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:

    (i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation;

    (ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;

    (iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;

    (iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

  10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

Paris, July 31, 1945

Harriman conversation with members of the Polish Delegation, afternoon or early evening

Present
United States Poland
Mr. Harriman

Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister

[Babelsberg, July 31, 1945]
[Translation]

Mr. Harriman called in the afternoon. On behalf of President Truman, as chairman of the meeting of the Big Three which began at 4 o’clock, he invited the Polish Delegation to see President Truman the next day, when the latter would communicate the results of the meeting today.…

Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Brown United Kingdom Mr. Golunsky

Brown’s diary entry: “… Communiqué Committee met after Big Three meeting. We were well up with our work. …”

The Pittsburgh Press (July 31, 1945)

Big Three meets again after 2-day delay

Sessions near end; Stalin slightly ill

POTSDAM, Germany (UP) – President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee and Premier Stalin met for three and a half hours today after a two-day delay caused by the slight illness of the Soviet generalissimo.

The Potsdam conference was believed to be drawing to a close, but a spokesman said the Big Three plenary consultation was not yet finished.

ABC reported that armed officers had taken up guard over he broadcasting studio at Potsdam “to prevent premature disclosure of the end of the Big Three Conference.”

A London dispatch said Prime Minister Attlee was expected to return to London in time for the opening of the new Parliament tomorrow.

Stalin remained in his Berlin quarters Sunday and yesterday. His physician described his illness as a “slight indisposition” – presumably a cold or indigestion.

Others in conference

There was no explanation why official spokesmen told newsmen that the three leaders were continuing to meet during the period while Stalin was unable to attend the sessions.

Soviet Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov met with President Truman and Mr. Attlee on behalf of Stalin Sunday.

Molotov also conferred with U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin both Sunday and yesterday.

Censorship blamed

The conference was originally scheduled to have ended yesterday with an important communiqué, but Stalin’s illness prolonged it through today and possibly tomorrow.

Although the delay was first disclosed last night, heavy censorship at the top made a major mystery out of it by banning all mention of the reason for the interruption.

It was believed that the three chiefs of state still have major decisions to make on explosive problems relating to the Pacific War and occupation of Europe.

Truman slated to visit Britain

LONDON, England (UP) – Well-informed sources said today that President Truman will land in British soil late this week and be greeted by King George.

Informants reported that the King will go to some British port, probably Plymouth, to welcome Mr. Truman to Britain in a meeting unprecedented in royal history.

Indications were that the meeting would occur Thursday or Friday. That presumably meant that the Big Three meeting will be ended by then.

The King was originally scheduled to leave London tonight, it was reported, but the plans were changed because Premier Stalin’s indisposition delayed the Potsdam proceedings for two days.

Court circles said the King’s reported journey to welcome a foreign dignitary to Britain for a few hours will be the first time the sovereign ever paid such an exceptional honor. Normally he stays in the Palace and receives visitors to his court.

The King’s reported decision to break precedent was said to be based on a desire to honor the United States and repay the courtesies tendered him during his visit to America.

Big Three meeting bogs down?

LONDON, England – The impression is gaining ground that the Big Three meeting at Potsdam, acclaimed in advance as one of the great meetings of modern history, will fall somewhat short of expectations.

There appears no other explanation for the widespread confusion, which has marked the course of the conference, and the hasty manner in which it appears to be ending.

One thing is certain. Many matters which were pressing for consideration at the meeting cannot possibly have been settled up to now and must remain in abeyance if, as reported, the leaders are leaving Potsdam tonight. This may not have been the result of disagreement, but it must have resulted from a feeling that agreement at this time was not possible on certain problems.

Editorial: New warning to the Japs

Background of news –
Tangier

By Frank Aston

Youngstown Vindicator (July 31, 1945)

Editorial: Mr. Truman’s new position

Stowe: Russia ahead of her allies in building program in Reich

By Leland Stowe

U.S. State Department (July 31, 1945)

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Tuesday, July 31:

At 0900 Brigadier General Stuart Cutler, Commanding General, Berlin Headquarters District, came to the Little White House and called on the President and General Vaughan.

1000: Mr. Rowan, Prime Minister Attlee’s secretary, called on the President.

Mail was dispatched to Washington this afternoon.

1545: The President left the Little White House for Cecilienhof.

1600: The eleventh meeting of the Big Three was convened. This turned out to be a long session as the meeting did not adjourn until 1915. The President left immediately for the Little White House.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Syonan Shimbun (August 1, 1945)

Stalin resumes talks after short indisposition

LISBON (Domei, July 31) – Soviet Premier Josef Stalin who had been slightly indisposed and absent from the discussions since Sunday, resumed the talks this afternoon with American President Harry Truman and British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, according to a Berlin dispatch.

It is understood that during Stalin’s illness, Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov represented Stalin in the discussions with Truman and Attlee.

Berlin press reports state that Attlee will be returning to Britain after today’s meeting to attend the swearing-in ceremony, of the newly appointed British Cabinet Ministers, scheduled for tomorrow, leaving British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin to carry on at Potsdam.

Salzburger Nachrichten (August 1, 1945)

Potsdamer Konferenz verzögert

L’Aube (August 1, 1945)

À Potsdam –
La conférence se poursuivra-t-elle sans Attlee ?

U.S. State Department (August 1, 1945)

740.00119 Potsdam/8-145

Report by the Technical Subcommittee on Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine

[Babelsberg, August 1, 1945]
Enclosure[s]: (A) Decisions of the Tripartite Conference on Distribution of the German Navy
(B) Decisions of the Tripartite Conference on Distribution of the German Merchant Marine
  1. The Committee met at 1030, 31 July, 1945, in consideration of above subject. The Committee’s recommendations, Enclosures (A) and Enclosure (B), are based upon tentative decisions reached during plenary sessions of the Tripartite Conference beginning 17 July, 1945. These enclosures are drafted in the form of decisions in order to facilitate final action in the plenary session of the Tripartite Conference. [For?] Those parts of the enclosures in which agreed recommendations could not be made the divergent views are set forth in each of the specific paragraphs involved.

  2. The Committee feel bound to draw the attention of the Conference [to] the possibility that any public announcement that German warships are to be divided amongst the Allies may result in the German crews scuttling ships which might be ordered to sail to Allied ports. It is therefore desirable that no announcement of the division of the German Navy be made, at any rate until the expert commission has completed its investigations, which should include the detailed arrangements for carrying out the transfer of ships. A similar delay is necessary before making any definite announcement about the division of the surrendered German merchant ships. The Committee accordingly recommend that the Conference might confine publicity to the following announcement:

    The Conference agreed in principle upon arrangements for the use and disposal of the surrendered German Fleet and merchant ships. It was decided that the Three Governments would appoint experts to work out together detailed plans to give effect to the agreed principles. A further joint statement will be published simultaneously by the Three Governments in due course.

КУЗЊЕЦОВ
Admiral of the Fleet

C M COOKE JR.
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

E D B MCCARTHY
Rear Admiral, Royal Navy

[Enclosure A]

Decisions of the Tripartite Conference on Distribution of the German Navy

  1. The Tripartite Conference agree upon the following principles for the distribution of the German Navy:

    (a) The total strength of the German surface navy, excluding ships sunk and those taken over from Allied Nations, but including ships under construction or repair, shall be divided equally among the USSR, U.K., and U.S.

    (1) (The British representatives expressed the view that a portion of the German Navy should be allotted to France and that, therefore, full agreement with the above principles must be subject to final decision of the Plenary Conference.)

    (b) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair may be completed within three to six months, according to the type of ship. Whether such ships under construction or repair shall be completed or repaired shall be determined by the technical commission appointed by the Three Powers and referred to below, subject to the principle that their completion or repair must be achieved within the time limits above provided without any increase of skilled employment in the German shipyards and without permitting the reopening of any German shipbuilding or connected industries. Completion date means the date when a ship is able to go out on its first trip, or, under peace-time standards, would refer to the customary date of delivery by shipyard to the Government.

    (c) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. The Committee are not able to make a recommendation as regards the number of submarines to be preserved for experimental and technical purposes.

    • (1) It is the opinion of the British and American members that not more than 30 submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the USSR, U.K. and U.S. for experimental and technical purposes. Paragraph 1 (a) (1) also applies to submarines.

    • (2) It is the view of the Russian members that this number is too small for their requirements and that USSR should receive about 30 submarines for its own experimental and technical purposes.

    (d) All stocks of armaments, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy appertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to subparagraphs (a) and (c) hereof shall be handed over to the respective powers receiving such ships.

    (e) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite naval commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German warships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German fleet. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than August 15th, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect German warships wherever they may be located.

    (f) The Three Governments agree that transfers, including those of ships under construction and repair, shall be completed as soon as possible, but not later than February 15th, 1946. The Commission will submit fortnightly reports, including proposals for the progressive allocation of the vessels when agreed by the Commission.

[Enclosure B]

Decisions of the Tripartite Conference on Distribution of the German Merchant Marine

  1. The Tripartite Conference agree upon the following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine:

    (a) (1) It is proposed by the Soviet and American representatives: The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located, shall be divided equally among the USSR, the U.K., and the U.S. The actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the end of the war against Japan. This distribution shall not preclude any of the Parties from making such further allocation of part of its share to other Allied Nations.

    (2) The British representatives considered it essential to allot a share of not less than one quarter to the lesser maritime Allied States whose merchant marines have lost so heavily in support of the common cause against Germany. Accordingly, the British Delegation proposed the following alternative draft of subparagraph (a) (1):

    One quarter of the German merchant marine surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located shall be allotted to the Soviet Union and the remainder shall be divided between the U.K. and the U.S. who will provide an appropriate share to the Allied States whose merchant marines have suffered substantial losses in support of the common cause against Germany. The actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the end of the war against Japan.

    (b) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships during the Japanese War period shall fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority.

    (c) While actual transfer of the ships will be delayed until after the end of the war with Japan, a Tripartite Shipping Commission shall inventory and value all available ships and recommend a specific distribution in accordance with subparagraph (a) (as approved).

    (d) The British and American representatives propose the following sub-paragraph: “German inland and coastal ships determined to be necessary to the maintenance of the basic German peace economy by the Allied Control Council of Germany shall not be included in the shipping pool thus divided among the Three Powers.”

    The Soviet representatives do not agree to this inclusion.

    (e) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite merchant marine commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German merchant ships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German merchant ships. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than September 1st, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect the German merchant ships wherever they may be located.

    (f) The British representatives suggested the need to add the following provision: “The shares of the various Allied States will be counted as reparation receipts.”

    The Soviet Delegation considered that this was unnecessary in view of the new policy agreed by the Conference on reparations.

    The American representatives took no position in this matter.

Truman-Bierut conversation, 10 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Truman President Bierut
Secretary Byrnes Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk
Mr. Bohlen Vice President Grabski
Mr. Harriman Mr. Modzelewski
Mr. Żebrowski

Truman reported at the Twelfth Plenary Meeting “that the President of the Polish Provisional Government and members of the Polish Delegation had called on him this morning and he had informed them of the action which the Conference had taken with respect to Poland.”

Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister

August 1, 1945
[Translation]

Notes of a Discussion with President Truman on August 1, 1945, in Babelsberg

Present on the American side: Truman, Byrnes, Bohlen, and Harriman. On the Polish side: Bierut, Mikołajczyk, Grabski, Modzelewski, and interpreter Żebrowski.

President Truman opens the session. He states that on behalf of the three Great Powers he wishes to inform us of the following:

The territorial boundaries have been established in accordance with the Polish proposal, and the Polish Government is responsible for the administration within these boundaries. The Russians have agreed to withdraw their armies from these territories, and will retain only two lines of communication for transit across Poland. (In answer to my question, Bohlen stated that one of these lines is the Kraków–Lwów line; the other one is in the north.)

We have acknowledged the fact that representative Poles from Poland and from abroad had agreed to the formation of a Provisional Government of National Unity. We had recognized that Government and therefore we were able now to hear its views. After hearing its views, we were able to make a unanimous decision which we are now communicating to you. As a result, the Arciszewski Government has ceased to exist and the two states – Great Britain and the United States – undertake to do everything in their power in order to protect Polish property abroad, to make it impossible to transfer or sell such property, and to help recover it.

All of the Three Powers promise every assistance to help Poles and the Polish Army in returning to Poland from abroad. In this connection they express their conviction that all Poles who return will be treated on the same terms as apply to all other Polish citizens.

Having heard the statement of the President and of the Government concerning obligations under the resolutions of the Crimean Conference to hold elections as soon as possible, as well as the statement that the foreign press shall have free access to Poland, we were able to make unanimous decisions.

Mr. Bierut thanks the President for both the decisions and the assistance.

President Truman stresses the fact that he speaks on behalf of the three Great Powers and can accept thanks only in that capacity.

In parting I approached Truman and told him that only now was I free to thank him as the President of the United States.
President Truman answered, “Thank you; we did it out of friendship toward Poland”, and said that he himself was greatly interested in Poland … and that he hoped that Poland would be free and happy.

Then there was a brief conversation with Harriman, who stressed once more the necessity of keeping secret the decision announced by President Truman until the Communiqué4 had been published. He then pointed out that as a result of the statements made by Mr. Bierut and of discussions between Mr. Mikołajczyk and himself, Dunn, Bohlen, and Matthews, the American Delegation had been able to propose the final text, which had been approved unanimously by the Three Powers, and the decision is now that of the three Great Powers.

Since Harriman expressed a desire to see me again, I suggested that he could pay me a farewell visit, which was arranged for 12:30.

Enclosure A
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945

Western Frontier of Poland

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimean Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea through Swinemünde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

Enclosure B
860c.01/7-2145

Text Approved by the Heads of Government

[Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945
Top secret

Statement on the Polish Question

We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property of the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The three powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal rights and rights on property on the same basis as all Polish citizens.

The three powers note that the Polish Provisional Government in conformity with the Crimea decision has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied powers [press] shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon the developments in Poland before and during the elections.

The President’s Special Counsel to the Secretary of State

[Babelsberg,] August 1, 1945

Bob Jackson tried to reach you, and when he couldn’t, asked for me, and he discussed with me the present situation on war criminals.

The meeting scheduled for this morning did not take place, because of the opening of Parliament and the necessity of the Lord Chancellor being present at the opening. The meeting has been postponed for tomorrow. I told Bob that anything that was to be done had to be done at today’s meeting.

His views are:

  1. That we should refuse emphatically to name any of the war criminals.
  2. That we should not commit ourselves here to an international tribunal for purposes of trial.

As to the second point, Bob has come to feel very strongly that it would be better not to have a joint tribunal because of the difficulty of working with the Russians in a trial. He feels that if the Russians, however, in London accept the various propositions which we have made, that he is committed to favor a joint tribunal, and does not feel that he can back out of it merely on the ground that it would be difficult to get along.

If, however, they do not accede to our suggestions as to definition of a war crime and certain other matters, he will then take the course of having each nation try the criminals in its respective jurisdiction. He was even of the thought that the British, French and Americans might agree to a joint trial, leaving the Russians out. I expressed to him my personal opinion that that would be quite a slap at the Russians, leading to recriminations, whereas it would not be quite so bad if it was decided that each nation would try its own war criminal prisoners.

At any rate, nothing will be done before tomorrow, and I said I would phone him from some place in England and find out what has happened.

S[AMUEL] I R[OSENMAN]

740.00119 (Potsdam)/8-145

The Ambassador in France to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs

Paris, August 1, 1945
Secret
No. 675

Excellency: Acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor to transmit herewith the text of the document “Western Frontier of Poland” approved on July 31, 1945.

I avail myself [etc.]

JEFFERSON CAFFERY

Eleventh meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:25 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Bevin Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Dunn Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Clayton Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Page Major Theakstone Mr. Gusev

Department of State Minutes

Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 11:25 a.m.
Top secret

The final meeting of the Foreign Ministers opened at 11:25 a.m. on August 1, 1945 under the chairmanship of Mr. Byrnes.

German Reparations

MR. BYRNES stated that he would read a list of questions which were pending. First was the question of German Reparations. He inquired whether the Committee [Subcommittee] was ready to report and stated that he was informed that this Committee was now in session. Therefore, for the time being the subject would be passed over. He believed Mr. Vyshinski was on the subcommittee and wondered whether there was anything Mr. Vyshinski could say.

MR. VYSHINSKI replied that the subcommittee had examined this matter and that some questions were in a state of suspense. Also new questions had arisen.

MR. BYRNES stated his assumption that the Committee would not be able to report in this case.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed.

MR. BYRNES announced that the subject would therefore be submitted to the Big Three at 3 p.m.

MR. VYSHINSKI stated that this had been assumed.

MR. BYRNES suggested that the agenda for the Big Three be prepared as the meeting progressed.

German Economic Principles

The second question concerned German economic principles. The same subcommittee had this question and was drafting on it, particularly on paragraph 19.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that not one economist was present.

MR. BEVIN interjected to state that the meeting might settle the matter if the economists were absent.

German Fleet

MR. BYRNES stated that the third question concerned the disposition of the German fleet. He understood that there was a division of opinion on this subject and wondered whether it could be discussed profitably at this meeting.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that members of the Committee were not present.

MR. BYRNES stated that he had received a report from the U.S. representative and assumed that the British and Soviet delegates had also received reports. He inquired whether this is true.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the members of the Committee be called in since he did not know about their last conclusions.

MR. BYRNES remarked that he had been advised regarding the differences of opinion and that the British Foreign Minister had also received information. If members of the Committee were called in the question could be discussed.

MR. MOLOTOV then stated that he would try to become acquainted with recent developments while the meeting was in session. He went on to suggest an adjournment of ten minutes when the representatives arrived in order that the matter might be studied.

War Crimes

MR. BYRNES then raised the matter of war crimes which had not been settled by the Big Three. The British draft on this subject had the approval of the U.S. delegation and the substantial approval of the Soviet delegation which desired, however, to name certain criminals.

MR. BEVIN stated that the British delegation was opposed to naming the specific criminals and felt on this matter like the American delegation. He thought that it would be misunderstood if it was done before the court sat. It would contravene certain principles upon which the British Judiciary works. The British therefore feel strongly that the British proposal meets the case. It also feels that every step should be taken in our power to get on with the trials at the earliest possible moment.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that the U.S. delegation, as stated yesterday, feels that the determination of prisoners to be prosecuted should be left to the prosecutors selected by the three governments and that the decision should not be taken from them. He hoped that our Soviet friends could agree.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested reference to the Big Three.

MR. BYRNES agreed.

Allied Property Used in Satellite Reparations

MR. BYRNES next raised the matter of the use of Allied property in the settlement of satellite reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that on this question it was difficult to do without the Commission [without consideration by a subcommittee?] particularly since the proposal had only been received yesterday.

MR. BYRNES replied that the proposal had been circulated on the 25th of July.

MR. MOLOTOV insisted that that had been a different document.

MR. BYRNES stated his belief that he was misunderstood. He asked for the consideration of the document circulated on the 25th which referred to the property of Allied nationals.

MR. MOLOTOV again asked whether they were discussing the July 25th document.

MR. BYRNES confirmed this.

MR. BEVIN then asked for a copy.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that it was probable that the July 25th document had not been circulated at a regular meeting but had been distributed in a Committee. He and Mr. Vyshinski had only seen this document yesterday. It is an important question which should be given full consideration. He again wondered how the meeting could proceed without the commission. He asked whether the commission could consider the matter today.

MR. BYRNES agreed and stated that a Committee would be appointed.

MR. BEVIN again asked which document was meant and read one before him.

MR. BYRNES agreed that this was the document.

MR. MOLOTOV interjected that Mr. Bevin knew as little about it as the Russians. He pointed out that there were two documents.

MR. BYRNES asked to look at the two documents and then stated that on July 25 the paper in Mr. Byrnes’ hand regarding the removal of Allied property from Rumania [Germany] had been circulated. On the same day another one regarding the use of Allied property in satellite reparations had been distributed. This was the one which he wished to have discussed.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired about the first document.

MR. BYRNES stated that the paper referring to Germany was withdrawn. He would not ask for consideration.

MR. BEVIN stated that the question now concerned the appointment of a drafting committee.

MR. BYRNES named Mr. Russell and Mr. Cannon.

MR. MOLOTOV named Mr. Gusev and Mr.———.

MR. BEVIN named Mr. Turner and Mr. Coulson.

German External Assets

MR. BYRNES stated that the next paper circulated concerned German external assets. This subject was before the economic subcommittee and would have to be passed.

Oil for Western Europe

MR. BYRNES stated that the document regarding oil for Western Europe was also before the Economic Subcommittee which was waiting to hear from the Soviet representative.

Allied Oil Equipment in Rumania

MR. BYRNES pointed out that the latest British proposal regarding Allied oil equipment in Rumania had not yet been acted upon.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that on this question the Soviet delegation had made a written proposal to the British five days ago.

MR. BEVIN asked whether he would receive this written proposal today.

MR. MOLOTOV repeated that it had been sent several days ago, probably on July 28.

MR. BEVIN then stated that he had the document before him now. Mr. Bevin pointed out that there were real differences between the British and Soviet drafts since the British have proposed arbitration and the Soviet proposal was for a joint Soviet-British investigating committee.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that this Commission would make a general spot investigation of all documents and facts.

MR. BEVIN replied that the British preferred a neutral, since investigation on a lower level would mean no agreement.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that until now the question had been discussed on a diplomatic level. The Soviet Government now proposes that representatives of both sides should be appointed to investigate. Neither the documents nor the facts in this case have been examined.

MR. BEVIN wished to know what would happen when the investigation had been made.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that they hoped for a settlement. If the Committee failed, however, the next step should be examined. However, no investigation had yet been made.

MR. BYRNES stated that he wished to add that when the paper on this subject had been presented, the U.S. delegation had pointed out that American as well as British interests were involved. Therefore any Commission must have an American representative.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that so far as the American proposal was concerned, a bilateral commission should also be set up.

MR. BYRNES agreed. He thought that they should first make an effort to settle this matter between themselves. He pointed out that American experts have been there for several weeks but up to now have been unable to obtain any agreement from the Soviet experts. He thought that the orderly way to settle this matter is for Mr. Molotov to have his experts meet ours.

MR. BEVIN stated that he wished clarification. He inquired whether it was proposed to set up two bilateral commissions.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he had suggested two bilateral investigations.

MR. BYRNES asked whether a date could be agreed upon since our experts were already there. He suggested a meeting in 10 days.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that this meeting would be in Rumania.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that it would be on the basis of their documents.

MR. BYRNES asked that the investigation not be limited by any document.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed that the Commission should discuss this matter.

MR. BYRNES insisted that the Commission should not be limited by a document but should be permitted to investigate the facts.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Russians would not limit discussions.

MR. BYRNES agreed.

MR. BEVIN stated his assumption that steps would be taken to give all necessary facilities to the experts to go about in Rumania.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that this went without saying. Both the British and Russians would take the necessary steps.

Protocol

MR. BYRNES then stated that he had been advised by the Protocol Committee of certain differences. He wished to know whether his colleagues had also received a report on this subject in order that the points of difference could be discussed. He stated that the questions before the meeting are:

1. Trusteeship Territories
MR. MOLOTOV interjected to state that the Soviet delegation had circulated a document regarding activities in Germany and Austria hostile to the Soviet Union.

MR. BEVIN stated that this document had been sent to London for the preparation of a reply.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether it could not be agreed that the British and American delegates will insist upon a rapid investigation of this case and take measures to stop such activities.

MR. BYRNES stated that he had thought that we had made it plain that we had taken steps to investigate. An inquiry had been sent to the Army Commander.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the meeting might confine itself to the following:

The American and British Delegates had taken steps to investigate and will let the Soviet Government know of the results and also stated that activities of hostile organizations will not be tolerated.

MR. BYRNES repeated that we have asked for a report from our Army Commander. If he reports that there is nothing to these allegations there will be nothing to do. If these statements are substantially correct, proper steps will be taken.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether if it were evident that such organizations existed, then they would not be tolerated.

MR. BYRNES replied that when a report was received, it would be sent to Mr. Molotov. Then there could be a discussion of the steps to be taken.

MR. BEVIN pointed out that at Crimea we had undertaken not to allow hostile activities against the USSR. Therefore he could see no necessity for another document. If the Soviet Union had complaints to the effect that such activities were being carried on contrary to the agreement, attention should be called to that fact as had been done. It would then be our duty to act in accord with the spirit of the agreement.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed that this was sufficient. He went on to refer to another document presented by the Soviet Union regarding the repatriation of Soviet citizens coming from the Baltic and the Western Ukraine who were now in Norway and England. This document had been circulated on July 29. The memo was of primary interest to the British.

MR. BEVIN stated his belief that this case which had been handed to him after his arrival would be an easy matter to settle through diplomatic channels. He had asked London to go into it immediately and he undertook to deal with it immediately upon his return.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that this is satisfactory. Mr. Molotov went on to state that he was going to circulate another document dealing with complaints received from citizens who state that the agreement with the Soviet Union regarding Soviet prisoners of war is not being observed. This was a sore question with the Soviet Union. Many Soviet nationals had not yet been returned to their homes despite the fact that the war had been over for some time. He wished to ask that Soviet representatives on repatriation be admitted to camps where Soviet nationals were held.

MR. BEVIN pointed out that this matter had nothing to do with the Protocol.

MR. BYRNES replied that Mr. Molotov had asked for delay in consideration of the Protocol in order that other matters could be taken up.

MR. MOLOTOV continued that the question was contained in the document circulated beforehand [just circulated?]. He had no other questions if his colleagues promised to assist on this.

MR. BYRNES stated that he had been informed that our military was doing everything in their power. They want all of these people to return. We have enough people to feed without encouraging other people to remain. Mr. Molotov could rest assured that we would do everything possible to facilitate this matter.

MR. MOLOTOV repeated that he wished to have some attention paid to this question which was a burning one. There were many complications.

Trusteeship Territories

MR. BYRNES again referred to disputed questions before the Protocol Committee. The first question under dispute concerned trusteeship territories. He was informed that the Soviet representative had taken the position that the proposal should mention that the Soviet Government intended to raise with the Council of Foreign Ministers the disposal of all territories subject to trusteeship. The U.S. and British delegations want agreement among the [Big] Three to limit discussion to the disposal of Italian territory. They felt that only this could be mentioned in the Protocol.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that the Soviet memorandum which was circulated dealt with two questions. The first concerned the Italian colonies and the second the League of Nations Mandates. The Soviet question had been referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. The Soviet delegation had agreed. He wished to ask that in drawing up the Protocol there should be a short recapitulation of the Soviet memorandum inserted with the conclusion that the declaration had been referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. He wished to ask that the tone of the Soviet memorandum be reflected in the Protocol.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that this was not in accord with his recollection of the action taken by the Big Three. The fact is that the Soviet paper had asked for consideration of the whole question. Nevertheless discussion at the table was limited to Italian Colonies. The U.S. delegation contended that the question of what should be done to the Italian Colonies depended in the first instance on whether the Colonies would be separated from Italy. This question should be determined in the Peace Treaty, originally to be prepared in the Council of Foreign Ministers and therefore the question regarding trusteeship for Italian Colonies should be settled in the London Council of Foreign Ministers. The question of trusteeship as presented in the Soviet request was much broader and it was not his understanding that the Big Three had agreed to refer it to the Council of Foreign Ministers. In the discussion reference had been made to the language of the United Nations Charter which provided for agreement in certain circumstances but he did not understand that the Big Three had agreed to refer the whole question of trusteeships to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he would not press this matter. He would accept the wording of the British proposal with a slight amendment. He stated that the amendment would read as follows: (He read).

MR. BYRNES agreed.

Black Sea Straits

MR. BYRNES next raised the question of the Black Sea Straits. He stated that on this question he did not think there would be much trouble in reaching agreement. The Soviet draft had referred to the recognition of “necessity”. The British draft had mentioned “need.”

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had no objection to “need.”

Western Frontier of the USSR

MR. BYRNES stated that the third question concerns the Western Frontier of the USSR. There are a number of questions in dispute here including the title and the Soviet representative had also objected to certain qualifying words which make it clear that the arrangement is provisional and subject to the peace settlement.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that the President had taken a position on all discussions such as this that it must be understood that the cession of territory would have to be left until the peace settlement.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that everyone agreed to this.

MR. BYRNES replied that it seemed to him then that we should be careful to use language which would not mislead people into believing that we intended an immediate transfer of territory. The question was no doubt misunderstood because of the difference in language. The word “transfer” would in English carry a meaning of the cession of territory.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested an amendment to the title which would read “pending final settlement of territorial questions at the peace settlement.”

MR. BYRNES asked what difference the title made as long as the Soviet Union got the territory it wanted.

MR. MOLOTOV asked for suggestions.

MR. BYRNES replied that as long as there is no difference between us, they should be able to find words. He suggested that the title be changed to “city of Koenigsberg and Adjacent Area.”

MR. MOLOTOV and MR. BEVIN agreed.

MR. MOLOTOV went on to state that there were certain difficulties in the text. If his colleagues agreed to his language, there would no longer be any difficulty.

MR. BEVIN stated that he had read what Mr. Churchill had said and this draft expressed Churchill’s thought clearly. He wanted to keep as close to the undertakings given by Churchill as possible. He suggested that Molotov agree to the British draft and then the Conference would be unanimous.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that he also had a good text.

MR. BEVIN then asked that the British draft be read and added that he thought it was all right. His interpreter read the draft.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that this was all right except for the word “provisionally.” The same paragraph said “pending final decision.” The idea had already been expressed. He proposed that the word “provisionally” be deleted in the first paragraph.

MR. BYRNES stated that he agreed that the only reason he could see for this difference is that the question had been raised. There must be a meeting of minds. So long as we agree with “a transfer pending final determination,” he would not insist on this word. He again asked Mr. Molotov whether he agreed that there is no question but that this is a transfer pending final determination.

MR. MOLOTOV replied “Of course.”

MR. BYRNES and MR. BEVIN then agreed to strike out the word “provisionally.”

MR. MOLOTOV then suggested that the last part of the sentence reading “subject to expert examination” be deleted.

MR. BEVIN stated that this wording is vital to the British. Churchill, speaking for the British, had made it quite clear. The Soviet delegation had at that time made no objection to these experts. He thought that during all history boundaries had been determined in such a manner.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed that it could not be otherwise. There would be no authority until the boundary had been mapped.

MR. BYRNES asked why in this case Mr. Molotov objected.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he thought this not nice but if you are so anxious we agree.

MR. MOLOTOV then proposed a last amendment. He suggested that the words “in principle” be deleted from the last paragraph since they appear in the preceding paragraph. It was enough to mention this once.

MR. BYRNES then suggested that the words “agreement of the conference” be inserted after the words “they will support.”

MR. MOLOTOV stated that this would be all right without the words “in principle.”

MR. BEVIN then suggested the words “conclusions of conference” instead of the word “agreement.” This would avoid misunderstanding.

MR. MOLOTOV then suggested the word “proposal.”

MR. BEVIN and MR. BYRNES agreed.

Austria

MR. BYRNES stated that the next question concerned Austria. The Soviet representative maintained that the Protocol should record the agreement of the three governments that the authority of the Provisional Government should be extended to all zones. The U.S. and British Governments were prepared to state that this question would be examined after the entry of their forces into Vienna.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had no objection to this. However, the last paragraph concerning Koniev had no bearing on the subject.

MR. BYRNES and Mr. Bevin agreed that it should go out.

MR. BYRNES then stated that so far as he knew, the differences of the Protocol Committee had been settled. He suggested that the Conference agree to direct the Protocol Committee to include only important decisions of the Conference. The Protocol should certainly be limited to decisions. Any attempt to insert proposals would lead to difficulties and the insertion of other proposals.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed.

MR. BYRNES stated that the Protocol Committee could then be asked to return to its work.

MR. BEVIN agreed and asked whether the decision regarding Rumania should be put in.

MR. BYRNES stated that only a factual statement should be inserted.

Revised Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary

MR. BYRNES stated that the U.S. delegation had yesterday asked for consideration today of a paper regarding revised Allied Control Commission Procedure for Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. He had the impression that there is no serious difficulty here and would like to dispose of the matter, if possible.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he could accept this proposal but that the second sentence was not exact. He suggested the deletion of the second sentence.

MR. BYRNES suggested that this sentence be read. Mr. Byrnes noted that our representatives in these countries had been saying that there had not been regular and frequent meetings of the Control Commission and that no information had been advanced before the issuance of directives.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Soviet proposals contained these points.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that the difficulty is that Mr. Molotov was asking to have deleted the assurance that is really important to our representatives there. Nothing would hearten them more than to know that there would be a change and that there would be frequent meetings. He was sure that the Soviet delegation would agree that this was the right thing. He asked to have the second sentence remain.

MR. MOLOTOV insisted that it was all in the Soviet proposal in detail and in accurate form. He pointed out that we had agreed to accept the Soviet proposal as a basis for discussion.

MR. BYRNES remarked that if it was really meant that we intend to do what is in this sentence, he could not see why it was objected to.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that if it was thought necessary to keep the second sentence, it should be drafted more accurately. He had no objection. However, he thought that since the Soviet proposal had been accepted as a basis for discussion, the second sentence was not necessary.

MR. BYRNES asked what proposal.

MR. MOLOTOV went on to state that regular meetings were all right but not too frequent. He suggested the deletion of the word “frequent.”

MR. BYRNES asked why they should not have frequent meetings.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he was not opposed to frequent meetings but that the words might mean they would have to meet every day. The Soviet proposals had contained specific language regarding frequency.

MR. BYRNES suggested regular meetings weekly and added that we do not want regular to mean three times a year.

MR. MOLOTOV then suggested regular meetings two or three times a month.

MR. BYRNES replied that this was better than two or three times a year. He pointed out that in the proposed directive for Rumania it was drafted that there should be meetings every 10 days.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that they would perhaps be more frequent.

MR. BYRNES suggested that it should be stated that they would meet at least once in 10 days.

MR. MOLOTOV reiterated that perhaps the meetings would be even more frequent. He added that it was not a question for decision at Berlin.

MR. BYRNES replied that we had not been able to fix this matter otherwise.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that the Soviet delegation had made a written proposal which had been accepted.

MR. BYRNES stated that it had not been accepted as to details.

MR. MOLOTOV admitted that it had been accepted as a basis for discussion.

MR. BYRNES agreed and stated that he would now accept Mr. Molotov’s provision for meetings at least once in ten days.

MR. MOLOTOV said all right and inquired about the language concerning the importance of facilities for American and British representatives. It was not clear what was implied. The Soviet draft had contained specific proposals. Were these accepted or not.

MR. BYRNES asked for a moment to read.

MR. BEVIN asked whether Mr. Molotov referred to the document relating to Rumania as his specific proposal.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the proposals concerned Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. He pointed out that the Conference had settled the question of the meeting at least once in ten days or oftener, if required.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that his wording “at least” would permit meetings every day, if necessary. He submitted that the language in the U.S. draft regarding the importance of facilities is the wisest suggestion. The Soviet proposal concerned two question[s]. Mr. Byrnes considered that it would be better to have general language. If the British have a copy of the Soviet proposal and will accept the language contained in their paper dated July 12 referring to Hungary, he considered the language in 3, 4 and 5 to be entirely satisfactory. It could apply to all countries and might do good and remove the source of irritation.

MR. BEVIN stated that he would accept the draft on Hungary as applicable to all countries.

MR. BYRNES stated that he would so instruct the drafting committee.

MR. MOLOTOV asked that Mr. Bevin’s proposal to extend the Hungarian proposal to Bulgaria and Rumania be accepted.

MR. BYRNES suggested reference to a drafting committee.

MR. MOLOTOV asked why it should go to a drafting committee.

MR. BYRNES replied that this would be done only to insert 3, 4 and 5 in the paper instead of the language Mr. Molotov wished to have deleted.

MR. BYRNES named Mr. Russell and Mr. Cannon.

MR. BEVIN suggested reference to the Protocol Committee.

MR. MOLOTOV thought that it should be a special committee. He named Mr. Novikov and Mr.———.

MR. BEVIN named Mr. [Hoyer] Millar.

MR. BYRNES then stated that the sentence to which Mr. Molotov had objected would be eliminated and the three paragraphs proposed by him would be inserted instead.

Freedom of the Press

MR. BYRNES pointed out in the papers concerning Poland and Rumania and Bulgaria reference had been made to freedom of the press. On the paper regarding Admission to United Nations Organization and on the Polish paper where the words “freedom of the press” were used, he had been informed that radio was not necessarily governed. He therefore suggested the addition of the words “and radio.”

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that the press and radio were not the same thing.

MR. BYRNES agreed although in some places they were construed to mean the same thing and in others not. He assumed that Mr. Molotov would not desire to discriminate against radio.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that in some cases radio was run by the government unlike the press. The American rules hardly apply in these cases. He hardly thought it was possible to find a common rule.

MR. BYRNES stated that the only result of the present wording is to give representatives of the Allied press full freedom to report to the world. He was sure that the Soviet Delegation would not feel that representatives of Allied radio should not be permitted to report. There was no essential difference between a newspaperman reporting to his paper and a radioman reporting over the radio.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that they conform to the decision already adopted.

MR. BEVIN asked whether it was meant that correspondents and radio representatives would be allowed to repeat [report?] on the same basis.

MR. BYRNES replied that the insertion after the word “press” of the word “radio” would mean this. If this word were not included, newspapermen would be all right but radiomen would not.

MR. BEVIN asked whether Mr. Molotov objected to radiomen being able to report.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Soviet Delegation would not be able to deal with this question at this moment since different things were involved. He suggested that the question not be raised at all at this time. There should be neither permission nor prohibition.

MR. BYRNES remarked that every morning at eight he listened to a correspondent reporting the news from Moscow.

MR. MOLOTOV rejoined that the Soviet Government would not permit a Hearst correspondent to talk over its radio. It all depended on the situation.

MR. BEVIN stated that he did not want Mr. Molotov to put British socialized institutions like the BBC at a disadvantage as compared to private press.

MR. MOLOTOV doubted that the Conference had time to examine this question.

MR. BYRNES suggested that it be passed and that the Big Three be advised.

Chinese Acceptance of Invitation to Join Council of Foreign Ministers

MR. BYRNES announced that he had just received word that the Chinese Government has accepted with pleasure the invitation sent to them to join the Council of Foreign Ministers.

German Fleet

MR. BYRNES stated that according to the naval subcommittee the unresolved questions on this subject are__________

MR. MOLOTOV interrupted to ask for a ten-minute adjournment.

MR. BYRNES agreed.

MR. BYRNES after the adjournment again raised the question of the German fleet and merchant marine. He stated that the first unresolved question is that of distribution. The British Delegation had asked that the French share in the distribution of certain ships.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that it had already been decided by the Big Three that the fleet would be divided equally among the three powers.

MR. BYRNES asked for British comment.

MR. BEVIN asked whether they were now dealing purely with the fleet since he had reservations regarding merchant vessels. After receiving an affirmative answer, he agreed to the one-third division.

MR. BYRNES then passed to the question of the merchant marine.

MR. BEVIN interrupted to mention the question of submarines. There were some differences here. The question is how many submarines should be saved and how many should be destroyed and how should they be divided. Churchill had laid down the British position on this subject to the effect that only token submarines should remain. The British were very sensitive on this point. The British and American Delegations had agreed that thirty submarines should be saved and the rest destroyed.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that the Soviet Union would like to save more.

MR. BEVIN replied that he knew this. However, if the Russians asked for a big submarine fleet after what the British had suffered, no statesman would survive. Mr. Molotov must go along with him on this. It was a tender point with the British Navy. U-boat warfare had cost the lives of 30,000 British seamen carrying supplies. The main thing, therefore, is that submarines be saved for experimental purposes only. The number suggested by the American and British Delegations would be adequate for this purpose. He hoped that the Soviet Delegation would agree.

MR. MOLOTOV after asking whether any addition could be made agreed to saving thirty submarines.

MR. BEVIN thanked him.

MR. BYRNES then reverted to the subject of the merchant marine.

MR. BEVIN stated that the British were anxious to see a reasonable amount of shipping left to care for the German economy. He was willing to have the Allied Control Commission examine the problem very carefully in order to determine the number and type of ships suitable for Baltic and other uses. When the Control Commission had determined the amount of tonnage and type, there would be a balance left. He would then agree to a division provided that the Soviet Delegation out of their one-third would take care of Poland proportionately as the British and Americans would take care of others.

MR. MOLOTOV proposed that the British-American Delegation draft be accepted. This does not mention specific countries.

MR. BYRNES remarked that Holland may make claims, and Norway also. As he understood Mr. Bevin he had agreed that after the German economy had been taken care of there would be a division, provided that the Soviet Union took care of Poland and we of the others.

MR. MOLOTOV again referred to the necessity for determining the ships necessary for the German economy.

MR. BYRNES stated his understanding that the British Foreign Minister had covered this point and had said that thereafter there would be a one-third division but that the Soviet Union would take care of Poland and we would provide for the reasonable claims of others.

MR. BEVIN interjected to state that he wished to limit distribution of the British and American portions to Norway, France, the Dutch and possibly Belgium.

MR. BYRNES inquired about Greece.

MR. BEVIN agreed that Greece should be included.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the question be decided in accordance with the agreement by the American and British Delegations, namely that subparagraph (d) states that part of the German [merchant] fleet shall be held for the German economy.

MR. BEVIN pointed out now that this had been accepted.

MR. MOLOTOV went on to state that the rest of the merchant fleet should be divided into three parts.

MR. BYRNES stated that this was correct and in accord with the committee report but the British Delegation wished to make clear which countries should not look to the Soviet Union for part of their share.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he understood but added that it had been provided in the [text on?] reparations that the Soviet Union will meet Polish claims and the other Allies other claims.

MR. BEVIN stated that this must be clarified. This concerns the distribution of booty, not reparations. He wished to know who has a claim to booty. The British lost 48 percent of their merchant fleet, the USA 15 percent, Norway 10½ percent, France 7 percent, the Dutch 5½ percent. He interrupted himself at this point to state that he had been quoting wrongly and that the figures mentioned by him applied to the percentage of total loss. After recapitulating he stated that the USSR had suffered one percent of the losses and that he had no figures for the Poles.

MR. MOLOTOV asked where he had gotten the Soviet figure, which was not correct.

MR. BEVIN replied that he had a figure of 240,000 tons lost. His position is that in the distribution of booty he could not admit legal claims on the British in accordance with the Churchill statement but will give a fair interpretation to what Churchill had stated in this connection. Therefore he was willing, together with the U.S. to meet the claims of the other Allies, but he asked for a definite understanding that Poland should out of this booty have their proportionate share out of the Soviet one-third. He undertook with American approval to deal with the Norwegians, the French, the Dutch and the Greeks.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired about the Yugoslavs.

MR. BEVIN said “No. Why?”

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he thought their opinion should be sought. Otherwise, they would be offended.

MR. BEVIN replied that he would leave the Yugoslavs to the Soviet Union out of their generosity.

MR. MOLOTOV asked why.

MR. BEVIN stated that he did not think that Great Britain after their tremendous losses should satisfy the claims of every other Ally. This is asking too much.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired about the United States position.

MR. BYRNES stated that in consideration of this question heretofore it had been recognized that ships, even merchant marine, was war booty in British possession, Churchill had agreed at this table to a division subject to the condition that ships under the Combined Maritime Authority would be used in the war against Japan. He wondered whether it was wise to enumerate the countries whose claims are to be considered. He thought that it might induce them to file claims. He thought some South American countries had lost ships and would like to file claims. If agreement was reached that the Soviet Government would out of its one-third care for the Polish claim and in addition look after Yugoslavia, it would make it easy.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the question is whether there would be any ships left after their use by Russian allies against Japan.

MR. BYRNES replied that there would be [an] ample number of ships left if the Soviet Union looked after Poland only.

MR. MOLOTOV again asked if there would be any left after the Far Eastern war.

MR. BYRNES replied that no one could say but he believed that we were not losing many merchant ships at this time. He again repeated his belief that to enumerate ships would be to invite others to make claims. He wondered whether it was necessary.

MR. BEVIN stated that he only mentioned it as an example.

MR. BYRNES restated his understanding that the ships were in the possession of the British and when division had been made other claims would be determined. We did not want to commit ourselves. It would be for British and American Governments to decide whether Yugoslavia would be allowed any ships.

MR. BEVIN stated that if the Soviet Union would agree that Poland would receive the same percentage of losses as America and Great Britain gave the other Allies, then he would undertake with the United States to take care of Yugoslavia. He wanted to get this point settled.

MR. MOLOTOV reserved his views on this matter.

MR. BEVIN referred to the proposed public announcement regarding ships and submarines.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that there is a draft announcement for publication, which seems to be proper.

MR. BYRNES suggested that this question be submitted to the Big Three unless Mr. Molotov wished to let us know his view later.

MR. MOLOTOV thought it should be submitted to the Big Three.

MR. BEVIN asked what was to be submitted.

MR. MOLOTOV stated the proposal regarding the fleet and merchant marine.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that certain items had been agreed upon and that if they were not referred it would save time.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed that what had been agreed upon was all right, but he reserved his views on other sections. He referred to the last subparagraph of the British proposal.

MR. BEVIN stated that this had been withdrawn.

MR. MOLOTOV then referred to the agenda for the Big Three.

MR. BYRNES replied that the Big Three agenda had been made up as we went along.

External Assets of Germany

MR. BYRNES stated that a report had been received from the Economic Subcommittee regarding external German assets.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that this question must go to the Big Three.

MR. BYRNES said that it would be placed on the agenda.

Article 19 – Economic Principles

MR. BYRNES reported that the Economic Subcommittee had failed to agree on Article 19 of Economic Principles.

MR. BEVIN asked whether agreement could be reached now.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested adjournment until three.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that the Big Three would meet at three – the meeting adjourned.

740.00119 Potsdam/8-145

Rapporteur’s Report

Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 11:25 a.m.

German reparations

It was agreed that the heads of Government should be asked to consider the draft on this subject prepared by the subcommittee.

German economic principles

It was agreed that the report of the Economic Subcommittee on this subject should be presented to the Heads of Government.

War crimes

It was agreed that the Heads of Government should be asked to decide the one outstanding issue in this connection, that is, whether certain prominent war criminals should be referred to by name in the decision of the Conference.

Use of Allied property for satellite reparations or ‘war trophies’

A subcommittee was named to consider the U.S. paper on this subject which was circulated on July 25th. The American Secretary of State withdrew the U.S. paper circulated at the same time on “Removals from Germany of Properties of United Nations or Neutral Nationals.”

German external assets

The U.S. paper on this subject is still before the Economic Subcommittee, which will report to the Heads of Government.

Oil for Western Europe

The U.S. proposal on this subject is also before the Economic Subcommittee which will report to the Heads of Government.

Allied oil equipment in Rumania

The Foreign Ministers agreed that there should be two bilateral commissions, one British-Soviet and one U.S.-Soviet, to meet August 10 in Rumania to examine the documents and the facts in connection with this question. It was agreed that these commissions would be accorded all necessary facilities to perform their task in Rumania.

Fascist activities in U.S. and British zones in Germany and Austria

The U.S. and British representatives stated that their Governments are investigating the situation reported in the Soviet paper on this subject and that they will inform the Soviets of the results of these investigations and will at that time discuss what further steps should be taken.

Repatriation of Soviet citizens

The British representatives stated that they are looking into the situation reported in the Soviet paper circulated already on this subject and that they would deal with it as soon as they returned to London. The Soviet representatives circulated a new paper on the subject and laid great stress on the importance which they attached thereto. The U.S. and British representatives stated that they would deal with the matter as promptly as possible.

Disputed questions before the Protocol Committee

The American Secretary of State presented four questions on which the Protocol Subcommittee had been unable to reach agreement: (1) Trusteeship Territories; (2) Black Sea Straits; (3) the Koenigsberg Area; and (4) Austria. The Foreign Ministers were able to agree upon texts on all of these questions. They also agreed that only important decisions of the Conference should be included in the Protocol. They approved a suggestion that the decision reached this morning creating bilateral commissions to deal with the question of Allied oil equipment in Rumania should be mentioned in the Protocol.

Revised procedure for Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary

The U.S. draft on this subject was accepted with the exception of the second sentence. It was agreed that for this sentence there should be substituted the third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of the Soviet paper on the Control Commission in Hungary. A drafting committee was named to prepare the final document for presentation to the Heads of Government.

Facilities for radio representatives in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland

The American Secretary of State proposed that in the papers already approved by the Conference on the Polish question and on admission to the United Nations, where certain facilities were stipulated for representatives of the allied press, the words “and radio” be added in order that these same facilities might be available to representatives of the Allied radio. The Foreign Ministers were not able to reach agreement on this question and it was decided so to advise the Heads of Government who might then determine whether or not they wished to discuss the question.

Disposition of German fleet and merchant marine

The report of the subcommittee on this subject was considered by the Foreign Ministers. It was agreed that 30 German submarines should not be destroyed. Other points in dispute were not settled and it was agreed that they should be brought before the Heads of Government this afternoon.

Report by the Drafting Committee on Reparations from Germany

[Babelsberg, August 1, 1945]

No agreement was reached by the Committee on a protocol on German reparations. The U.S. and U.K. representatives considered that, in return for the percentages of capital equipment allocated to the Soviet Union under the terms of paragraph 4 of the attached draft, the USSR had agreed to refrain from asserting a claim to German external assets, gold captured in Germany or securities of German corporations in the Western Zones. Therefore, the U.S. and U.K. representatives maintained that German external assets should be included in paragraph 3, as a source of reparation to countries other than the USSR. Lacking this, the percentages in paragraph 4 would be unacceptable to the U.S. and U.K. representatives.

The Soviet representative considered that no agreed decision had yet been taken regarding relinquishment by the USSR of a claim to external assets, gold and securities. Therefore the Soviet representatives did not accept the addition of German external assets in paragraph 3 and recommended that the matter should be referred to the Heads of Government.

The attached draft would be acceptable to the U.S. and U.K. representatives upon condition that the Soviet representatives confirm the above understanding regarding external assets, gold and securities. The Soviet representative stated that he could not agree with the way this question had been raised.

[Attachment]

German Reparation

  1. Reparation claims of USSR shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the USSR.

  2. The USSR undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

  3. The reparations claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from German external assets[.]

  4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the USSR from its own zone of occupation, the USSR shall receive additionally from the Western Zones:

    (a) 15 percent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

    (b) 10 percent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

    Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously.

  5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

  6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the USSR in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

  7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect to such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6.