Editorial: Attlee’s change
…
U.S. State Department (July 28, 1945)
761.94/7-2145: Telegram
The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union
[Tokyo,] July 28, 1945 — 10:45 a.m.
[Translation]
Secret
urgent
952
Re my telegram No. 944
-
The position taken by the Soviet Union in connection with the Potsdam joint declaration made by Great Britain, the United States, and Chungking will henceforth have a bearing on our planning and will be a very important problem. When we consider that details of every conference (Quebec, Cairo, etc.) held by the above three countries have been supplied to the Soviet Union, it is not difficult to imagine that the Soviet Union will have detailed knowledge of the recent joint declaration.
-
However, we have been awaiting the Soviet reply regarding the dispatch of the special envoy and we cannot help but have doubts that there may be some connection between the new joint declaration and our request. Is there no connection at all between the new joint declaration and the above-mentioned request? Also, did or did not the Soviet Government inform England and the United States of our above-mentioned request? And what steps will the Soviet side take against the Japanese Empire from now on? These questions will all remain of interest to our side.
-
For the time being, countermeasures against the joint declaration will be decided after we receive and study the Soviet reply to our request. Thus, Mr. Ambassador, keeping this in mind, meet with Molotov without delay, and at the beginning make our aims clearly understood as described in our outgoing telegrams. Also, on that occasion, endeavor to find out the Soviet Union’s attitude regarding the joint declaration.
Press Conference Statement by Prime Minister Suzuki
[Tokyo, July 28, 1945]
[Translation — Extracts]
Premier Suzuki, at his press conference held at his Official Residence at 3 p.m. July 28, which lasted about an hour, answered questions on various government policies taken at this decisive stage of the war and expressed strong conviction of sure Japanese victory.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(Question): “What is the Premier’s view regarding the Joint Proclamation by the three countries?”
(Answer): “I believe the Joint Proclamation by the three countries is nothing but a rehash of the Cairo Declaration. As for the Government, it does not find any important value in it, and there is no other recourse but to ignore it entirely2 and resolutely fight for the successful conclusion of this war.”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clayton-Mikolajczyk conversation, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Poland | |
| Mr. Clayton | Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk | |
| Mr. Harriman | Mr. Modzelewski | |
| Mr. Collado | Mr. Minc | |
| Mr. Despres | Mr. Rajchman | |
| Mr. Bergson | Mr. Zebrowski |
Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister
July 28, 1945
[Translation]
Economic Conference with the American Delegation Held on July 28, 1945
(Present on our side: Messrs. Mikołajczyk, Mine, Modzelewski, Rajchman; on the American side: Clayton, Harriman, Bergson, and two experts.)
Minister Minc proposes to present a brief exposition for orientation purposes about our economy.
Agriculture: With regard to grain, we shall manage to make ends meet this year, however difficult it may be. On the other hand, the question of livestock presents very serious difficulties. The number of cattle was reduced to 25% as compared with the prewar period; the number of horses is even below 20% of the prewar figures. As to food, we should expect a certain unsteady balance in the supply of grain. We have a catastrophic deficit in the supply of meat and fats. We shall have a certain small surplus of potatoes and sugar. That is the situation in the entire area which is actually under Polish administrative control.
With regard to forests, we have suffered serious losses. It was principally the Germans, and partly also armies in transit, who depleted the forests to such an extent that for 16 years we shall not be able to do any substantial lumbering.
Mr. Harriman points out that the armies had to build bridges. Then he asks about the situation in Poland before the war with regard to lumber.
Minister Minc explains that Poland exported lumber, and now it will have to import it to cover the requirements of the reconstruction of the country. We shall have considerable difficulties in rural reconstruction; there is a shortage of industrial wood, beams for mining, and cellulose for the manufacture of paper and artificial fibers.
This picture represents the prospects for one year. It is to be assumed that there will be a balance in the supply of grains in the following year, but the problem of meat and fats is going to be a protracted affair.
Industry: We are reaching 50% of the prewar production within old boundaries. As far as coal is concerned, the daily production amounts to 81,000 tons according to data received in the past two days. That is the production in the entire area, including the western territories, with the exception of the Waldenburg coal basin, where the production amounts to from 7,000 to 8,000 tons daily. The production figures for German Silesia are: February – 40,500 tons; March – 92,000; April – 123,000; May – 258,000; June – 473,000. The number of workers in that territory was: February – 3,900; March – 6,900; April – 20,000; May – 21,000; June – 25,500. I point out that all workers employed there are Poles. In December we expect a monthly production of 3,750,000 tons, so that the monthly average for the five-month period up to December will be around 3 million. During those five months we expect a total production of 15 million tons.
Mr. Clayton asks whether it will be possible to export any of that amount.
Mr. Minc explains: During those five months Poland will need 6,250,000 tons. To cover export contracts to all countries, i.e., to Russia, Sweden, and those countries with which we are negotiating (Denmark, Finland, Rumania, and Norway), we shall need 5,500,000 tons. If we add the domestic requirements to the export obligations, we get the figure of 11,750,000 tons. That figure is incomplete, because it does not include reserves, which amount to 1,500,000 tons. The total coal balance sheet is therefore 16,500,000 less the requirements of 11,750,000. Our coal production is limited by (1) insufficient food supply for the miners and the resulting difficulties in hiring labor; (2) shortage of young people in the coal-mining industry (the average age of coal miners is over 45 years); and (3) transportation, shortage of freight cars and locomotives, shortage of motor vehicles, which is felt even more acutely because of the shortage of horses that were used before the war.
Mr. Clayton, in connection with the age of coal miners, asks about the decrease in productivity.
Mr. Minc says that, in spite of all, productivity is increasing. In previous months it was 0.4, and in the first ten days of June it was 0.84. These figures do not represent the actual productivity, because the productivity below surface is not very different from the prewar productivity. It is due to the disproportion in individual qualifications between miners working on the surface and those working in the mines.
The 4 to 5 million tons which we have available for export can be used only if we get additional transportation. At present the supply must be considered available only at the mines.
Mr. Clayton asks what the price of coal would be f.o.b. Gdynia or Danzig in dollars.
Mr. Minc: On the basis of Swedish contracts, $8.42 per ton.
Mr. Clayton asks whether the decrease in the productivity of the miners affects the quality of the coal.
Mr. Minc replies to this that the grading of the coal is very accurate.
Mr. Harriman asks whether the widening of railroad tracks makes transportation more difficult.
Mr. Minc says that, on the contrary, it makes it easier. The broad-gauge Breslau-Katowice-Kraków railroad line can transport coal to Russia on wide Russian freight cars. On the other hand, railroad lines running to the seashore have normal gauge. The broad-gauge line which was revamped by the Russians has lines of both gauges, and it can be easily shifted to normal gauge. Since we have only a few freight cars of our own, and the wide freight cars can carry more, we find ourselves in the paradoxical situation where we are in no hurry to rebuild the tracks and return to the normal gauge.
Mr. Clayton asks whether the present condition of the Polish transportation system warrants a discussion about exporting the surplus of coal.
Mr. Minc explains that the railroad lines do warrant it, but that the railroad rolling stock does not.
Mr. Clayton expresses his doubts as to whether the situation will permit an increase in coal production.
Mr. Minc points out that if we cannot export the surplus coal because of the lack of transportation, then we can use it in Poland in view of the fact that the internal consumption figures were determined rather modestly, and that we can use it especially for industrial purposes. Transportation for internal purposes should be sufficient, since the distances are short and industrial establishments are located within a radius of 150 to 200 kilometers.
Mr. Harriman: Are the port installations for loading coal in Gdynia and in Danzig in good condition?
Mr. Minc: The loading capacity before the war was 40,000 tons daily. Today it has decreased to 4,000 tons in both ports. We expect, however, that it will increase to from 16,000 to 17,000 tons by the middle of August. At present our cranes are destroyed, and not all power plants are working. The situation would improve considerably if the number of our ports were increased. Stettin is important, especially since the ports of Gleiwitz and Cosel are now active. We have more barges than before the war. There is also the port of Elbing, which can load from 10,000 to 15,000 tons daily provided we make minor investments. But Elbing can be used only for cabotage to Riga, Tallin, possibly to Denmark, to the Soviet Union, and to ports in southern Sweden during certain seasons of the year. The port of Elbing is rather shallow.
Mr. Harriman: How many freight cars would Poland need to export the 5 million surplus [tons]? Is it true that Poland is to receive freight cars from Sweden?
Mr. Minc: We are to receive 1,600 freight cars of 20-ton capacity. Whether we need freight cars for transportation depends on the destination.
Mr. Clayton: To the nearest port.
Mr. Minc: Have you considered transporting coal by railroad through western Europe?
Mr. Clayton: Unfortunately, nobody in Europe has a sufficient number of freight cars today.
Mr. Minc: Given the present condition of the railroads, we would have to figure 7 days to Danzig one way, which means 14 days both ways – in other words, 14,000 to 16,000 freight cars. If we calculated the figures through the whole year, we could reduce them by some 20%, because then we could organize the railroad transportation appropriately. I also point out that with regard to transportation to the west by railroad we are limited only by the number of freight cars, while with regard to ports we have to take into consideration the loading capacity of the ports, not counting the tonnage of the ships.
Mr. Harriman: Do you have enough locomotives? Could you get more locomotives and freight cars from Sweden?
Mr. Minc: Sweden says that we cannot.
Mr. Bergson: Are there freight cars from Germany in the rolling stock used in Poland?
Mr. Minc: Only in transit to Russia. We do not have any such freight cars.
Mr. Harriman: How many of your freight cars are damaged?
Mr. Minc: We have a certain percentage of incapacitated freight cars. The proportion is not much higher than before the war. The trouble is that we do not have the means to make repairs.
Mr. Clayton: How much coal could Poland produce in 1946 if it had means of transportation at its disposal?
Mr. Minc: The total production would be around 5 million tons a month. Of that total we could export from 2½ to 3 million.
Mr. Clayton: That would be 30,000 [30 million] yearly.
Mr. Minc: At least.
Mr. Clayton: Quite a considerable amount for export.
Mr. Minc: We say in Poland that coal is our foreign exchange.
Mr. Clayton: Is coal perhaps the most important item of Polish export?
Mr. Minc: It is the first item, but not the only one. Other important items are zinc and cement. In June we produced 21,000 tons of zinc ore, 3,501 tons of zinc concentrate, and 4,300 tons of zinc. These figures represent 35% of our capacity, and they apply to the Polish territory as of 1939. With regard to the new territories, zinc is found only on the very border, and the quantity is small. From August 1945 through December 1946, we shall have 40,000 tons of refined zinc according to estimates of our export capacity. In addition, we have a rare metal – cadmium. In the same period, between August 1945 and December 1946, we shall have at our disposal for export purposes 200 to 300 tons of cadmium, 7 million tons of coke, 350,000 tons of cement, 160,000 tons of steel and iron (the total production of steel and iron within the boundaries of the old Poland amounts to 40,000 tons a month). The production capacity of Upper Silesia before the war was 100,000 tons a month.
Mr. Harriman: Is the synthetic rubber industry greatly damaged?
Mr. Minc: It is destroyed in Silesia. In Poland it did not exist at all.
Mr. Bergson: Has Poland yet sold any steel and iron?
Mr. Minc: I am not informed as to how much has been sold.
Other export items are: glass panes for windows, ½ million meters; soda, 50,000 tons. Then there are various small items, which together can bring in a large amount of money, but it would take a long time to discuss them.
Mr. Harriman: How is your textile industry?
Mr. Minc: In December the industry worked at full capacity of the looms.
Mr. Clayton: What about the raw material?
Mr. Minc: Our supply is secure. The Soviet Union has a large quantity of cotton. On the other hand, we are very short of wool. The output of the looms represents about 60% of the prewar production. The Germans destroyed the textile industry to a great extent.
Mr. Clayton: I am amazed that you can import cotton from Russia, because Russia itself had to import cotton before the war.
Mr. Minc: The Soviet Union imported a certain amount of cotton before the war, but they did not use up the cotton during the war.
Mr. Harriman: They received a large amount of ready-made clothing through lend-lease. And how is the problem of footwear in Poland?
Mr. Minc: That is the darkest spot in the picture of our industry. We do not have leather and we do not have tannin. Our tanneries are undamaged and we have a labor force, but because of the shortage of raw material we have the largest deficit in this respect. I can see clearly today how to provide clothing for the people in Poland, but I do not know how to get footwear for them. We do not have rubber to use as a substitute. In some cases it affects us very painfully. In industry, where shoes wear out fast – for example, in coal mining and in those industries where acids are used in production – workers go around half barefooted.
Mr. Clayton refers to our requirements as regards farm machinery, factory equipment, trucks, etc., as well as raw material.
Mr. Minc reads an import program for the period from August 1945 to December 1946, not including UNRRA or long-term investments, and not specifying from which country the material is to be imported:
The approximate value of imports will be 380 million dollars (not including long-term investments on credit). The problem is to maintain current production and to satisfy the elementary needs of the economy and reconstruction.
| Rubber | 8,000 tons | Transmission belts | 60 tons |
| Automobile tires and other tires | 5,500 tons | Wool | 20,000 tons |
| Woolen rags | 15,000 tons | Cotton | 60,000 to 70,000 tons |
| Scrap iron | 300,000 tons | Copper | 30,000 tons |
| Aluminum | 2,500 tons | Nickel | 1,000 tons |
| Gasoline | 100,000 tons |
Foodstuffs: Meat – 100,000 tons; fish – 50,000 tons; butter – 20,000 tons; lard – [blank]; fat back – 20,000 tons
As for machinery, we must import steam boilers and parts, combustion motors, motorcycle and automobile engines, traction engines, water and steam turbines, pumps and springs, hydraulic presses, ventilators, wood lathes and metal lathes, moulding machines for foundries, textile machinery, sewing machines, road steam-rollers, excavators, and crushing machines, in a total amount of from 30 to 35 million dollars. River boats, dredges, and barges, and tugboats (not including seagoing vessels) in the sum of 10 to 15 million dollars. Potassium salts, 750,000 tons. Agricultural implements in the sum of from 10 to 15 million dollars, including tractors, of which we shall need about 5,000.
The imports indicated above represent the most indispensable needs, which should be covered by normal foreign trade, through our exports and credit in goods.
Mr. Minc, in answer to Mr. Harriman, explains that we shall have difficulties with regard to lumber for only eight or nine months and that in spite of these difficulties we intend to cover our needs through local production. We have made important experiments in that respect by replacing wood with cement, for example, in the production of railroad ties.
Mr. Clayton: Has not a large part of Polish exports been earmarked for the Soviet Union?
Mr. Minc: Our agreement with the Soviet Union is effective until January 1, 1946. As to the coal for export, the figure which I gave is free of any obligations.
Mr. Clayton: I do not see here capital investments for the construction of plants, railroads, ports, water-supply systems, sewage systems, etc.
Mr. Minc: Our foreign relations in the field of economics are divided into three parts: (1) trade; (2) assistance; (3) credit. I speak only about trade and credit.
Mr. Bergson: How much of the figure of 380 million dollars is to be covered by exports?
Mr. Minc: About 50%, and the rest by credits for about five years.
Mr. Clayton: And should the long-term credit cover only investments?
Mr. Minc: With regard to the normal trade turnover, we expect that the exports will increase, mainly with regard to coal and textiles. On the other hand, we figure that credit for reconstruction will be considerably higher. Furthermore, we have every reason to expect reparations.
Mr. Harriman: I suppose that after these 18 months the imports will decrease and the exports will increase.
Mr. Minc: Our imports will not decrease, but they will be covered by our exports in a higher proportion.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2845
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
[Babelsberg,] July 28, 1945
Subject: POLISH ECONOMIC POSITION, NECESSARY IMPORTS, AVAILABLE EXPORTS AND CREDIT REQUIREMENTS FOR RECONSTRUCTION
(Mr. Clayton presiding for the U.S.; speaker for the Poles, Mr. Minc, Ministry of Industry.)
1. Agriculture
A grain balance can be realized with some hardship in the year 1945-46. The livestock position, however, is bad, with cattle numbers at 25% of the 1939 level and the number of horses below 20% of prewar. Thus the meat and fat position is catastrophic. A small surplus of potatoes and sugar is expected. In the harvest year 1946-47 grain supplies are expected to increase. The meat and fat position will continue to be difficult. Reference is to the entire area currently administered by the Polish Government.
2. Lumber
While Poland was a pre-war exporter of lumber, cuttings now would have to be stopped for 16 years to restore reserves to normal. There will be shortages of timber for industrial purposes, e.g. in the coal mines and for the production of cellulose, and reconstruction generally will be limited.
3. Industry Generally
In the area of 1939 Poland, industry is operating at 50% of pre-war levels. In December 1944 the textile industry was worked at the capacity of available spindles, which was 60% of pre-war in old Poland. Raw cotton supplies are adequate under the trade agreement with Russia. There is a wool deficit. In the case of shoes, there is a serious deficiency due to the lack of raw materials, including tannery materials. The tanneries are intact.
4. Coal
Currently the daily output is 18,000 tons including output of German Upper Silesian mines but excluding the output of the Walden-burg area, which is about 7,000-8,000 tons. Production and employment in the German Upper Silesian mines has been as follows in the past five months:
| Production Thousands of Tons | Miners Employed | |
|---|---|---|
| February | 40.5 | 3,900 |
| March | 92.0 | 6,900 |
| April | 123.0 | 20,300 |
| May | 258.0 | 21,000 |
| June | 473.0 | 25,500 |
All the miners employed are Poles.
The total output including the output in German Upper Silesian mines, which was 1,860,000 in June, is expected to be 3,750,000 in December. The total production in the five months ending with December is expected to be 15,000,000 tons. Domestic consumption in the same period will be 6,250,000, while export commitments, which actually have been made or are expected to be made to the Soviet Union, Sweden, be a balance available for export over and above these commitments amounting to about 5,000,000 tons in the last five months of 1945. Stocks currently are 1.5 million tons. Coal export prices at the port of Danzig, as fixed in existing export commitments, average 8.42.
The surplus referred to above will be available at the pits. However, the transport situation is extremely tight. Unless additional transport facilities are available, it will not be possible to move this surplus to ports for export. The domestic consumption of 6,250,000 tons is a minimum, and the total will be increased if it is not possible to export the calculated surplus. Transport requirements to move the coal to local industrial users are small as compared with requirements to move the coal to ports of export.
To move the 5,000,000 tons of the calculated surplus in the next five months to, say, the port of Danzig, 14-16,000 additional railway cars would be required. Sixteen hundred 20-ton cars will be received from Sweden. Locomotives are not in as short supply as cars. No cars are currently being received from Germany. The percentage of “sick” cars is about the same as before the war.
The combined daily handling capacity at the ports of Danzig and Gdynia is now about 4,000 tons as compared with 30,000 pre-war. By the middle of August it is expected that 16-17,000 tons can be handled daily. If more transport facilities were available additional harbors would be accessible. By the summer of 1946 it is expected that the total output of coal will rise to 5 million tons monthly and that there will be an export surplus of 2½-3 million tons.
5. Other Exports Available, over and above those committed under trade agreements
a. Zinc – In the area of old Poland in June 1945, there was a surplus available for export for [of?] 21,000 tons of zinc ore, 3,500 of zinc concentrates, and 4,300 tons of zinc. Some additional supplies are available from German Upper Silesia. For the 18-month period, August 1945 through December 1946, 40,000 tons of zinc will be available for export, almost entirely from the area of old Poland (that is, old Poland west of the Curzon line).
b. Cement – For the same 18-month period, there will be a surplus available for export of 350,000 tons.
c. For the same 18-month period, there will be surpluses available for export of 200 to 300 tons of cadmium, 7,000,000 tons of coke, a half million meters of glass, and 50,000 tons of soda. These figures refer to the area of old Poland west of the Curzon line. For the entire area currently administered by the Poles, there will be a potential export surplus of 160,000 tons of iron and steel.
6. Import Requirements, other than capital goods for reconstruction, and not including supplies to be obtained from UNRRA
$380,000,000 of imports will be required in the 18-month period, August 1945 through December 1946. Among the requirements are:
| Tons | |
|---|---|
| Rubber | 8,000 |
| Industrial belting | 60 |
| Tires and tubes | 5,500 |
| Wool | 20,000 |
| Wool Waste | 15,000 |
| Cotton | 60-70,000 |
| Scrap iron | 300,000 |
| Copper | 30,000 |
| Aluminum | 2,500 |
| Nickel | 1,000 |
| Petrol | 100,000 |
| Meat, including: canned | 100,000 |
| Fish, including canned | 50,000 |
| Butter | 20,000 |
| Lard | 20,000 |
| Bacon | 20.000 |
| Potassium salts, nitrates | 750,000 |
Machinery imports of $35,000,000 are required, including steam boilers, combustion engines, locomotives, turbines, pumps and compressors, wood working, metal working, molding machinery, pneumatic drills, textile and sewing machinery, milling machinery, road construction machinery, excavators and crushers.
Ships of all types, including barges and tugs but excluding ocean going types, will be required to the amount of $15,000,000.
Agricultural machinery also will be needed, including 5,000 tractors, to the amount of $10-15,000,000; and 1,000 autos and 10,000 trucks. All the above imports are additional to future imports, the purchases of which have already been arranged.
7. Credit Requirements
Of the total imports of $380,000,000 referred to above, about 50% can be paid for with expected exports. Thus $190,000,000 credits would be required to purchase the balance. It is desired that such credits be for a period of about five years.
The imports of $380,000,000 do not include imports of capital goods required for long-term reconstruction purposes. These requirements are estimated at $500,000,000 over a period of six to seven years. Long-term credits are desired to finance these imports.
The above credit requirements are additional to any aid received from reparations.
761.94/7-2145: Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moscow, July 28, 1945 — 3:25 p.m.
[Translation]
Secret
urgent
1476
Re your telegram No. 944
-
Your above telegram (repeat telegram received on the 28th and decoding completed) and my telegrams numbered 1449, 1450, and 1458 crossed each other on the way. In the meantime Attlee, the newly appointed Prime Minister, returned to Potsdam on the same day and is reported to have joined the conference immediately. Thus, item No. 1 of your telegram is now out of the question. Even if we did make a request, there is no possibility that the Soviet side would agree to my visit, which would only result in exposing our uneasy emotion and would be of no benefit to us.
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Item No. 2 of your telegram stated that a request will first be made to the Soviet Union for its good offices, and, should the Soviet Government react coldly, that there is no other choice but to consider some other course or method. Praising or criticizing the Soviet Union will be regarded by them as being done to suit our convenience, and in view of the various circumstances the attitude mentioned above appears to lack applicability.
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According to item No. 3 of your telegram, a United States spokesman has hinted that unconditional surrender still stands; however, should Japan accept surrender immediately, in reality the terms may be mollified. What the spokesman said is only natural and after considering these circumstances I presented my opinion in telegram No. 1427.
I have no way of knowing the extent of the authority given to Captain Zacharias in his broadcast. His word, however, that Japan shall receive the benefit of the Atlantic Charter is in contradiction to the attitude taken by England and the United States when they rejected German participation under the said Charter prior to her surrender. Also, I find no reason why such attitude will be relaxed for present-day Japan when the same was not done at that time. Also, according to your opinion, you are not opposed to the restoration of peace based on the said Charter, Can this be interpreted to mean that the Imperial Government has already accepted demilitarization? Then, if this is the case, the question is, why did Japan not notify the Soviet Government of acceptance of demilitarization when Japan first asked to send the special envoy? In the same way, the question will arise regarding prior recognition of independence for Korea.
-
Although the BBC announced that the Prime Minister made a statement to the effect that the Japanese Government will “ignore” the July 26 tripartite declaration against Japan,6 we have not received any official telegram to this effect. Also, regardless of whether it is intended to ignore the above declaration, it was not reported through general information media. The tripartite declaration is an official expression of their will and not only does it supersede the above-mentioned statement of Captain Zacharias but in reality there is some difference on important points. (According to this declaration, it is interpreted that Japan’s territory shall be limited to Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, and Hokkaido, and the United States will reserve the right to occupy Okinawa even though the declaration did not substantiate this.)
-
Your telegram No. 893 mentioned sending the special envoy only. Telegram No. 931 clearly indicates seeking the good offices of the Soviet Government. Also, in your telegram No. 944, you have asked me to make it clear that the dispatch of the special envoy to the Soviet Union is to enable Stalin to acquire the position of advocate of world peace. This, to our sorrow, gives the impression that we are giving out our aims piecemeal. With regard to your comment that you have considered the possibility that the Soviet side might react coldly toward our request and that Japan may have to consider other ways and means, I feel embarrassed, since I am unable to understand what was meant by “other ways and means.”
-
All things considered, as mentioned in my telegram No. 1450, I am awaiting a reply from the Soviet side. If there is no reply all day on the 30th (Monday), I am inclined to press for a reply immediately.
-
Shortly after this telegram was drafted your telegram No. 952 arrived. With reference to the third item, please understand that the meeting with Molotov will [not?] take place as mentioned in the first item of this telegram unless a special, concrete, and definite proposal for termination of the war is presented by the Imperial Government of Japan.
811.79661/7-2845: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Ambassador in France
Moscow, July 28, 1945 — 5 p.m.
Secret
[259]
Question raised in your 214 July 26 of possible courier route to and from Moscow via Berlin and Paris is one which has preoccupied this mission for some time, since Tehran service is definitely unsatisfactory and no other regular air facilities are yet available. (Sent Paris 259 rptd Frankfurt for Harriman 37, rptd Dept 2702)
On June 29 Ambassador Harriman discussed with Vyshinski project of regular facilities for our passengers and mail via Berlin whereby Soviet and American airlines would connect at Berlin. Vyshinski seemed to think that this would be possible and that administrative and technical details could be promptly worked out. On July 7 Ambassador wrote Vyshinski specifically requesting his cooperation in speedy conclusion of arrangements for this service.
On July 11 Vyshinski replied by referring to a previous conversation of June 15 in which, he stated, he had drawn attention to fact that while considerable improvement had been made in air facilities on that route and while he recognized importance of matter question could not be considered sufficiently advanced for detailed consideration. He stated that he would communicate further as soon as further instructions were received from the Soviet Govt.
Ambassador Harriman left soon afterward for Berlin, and I have not heard anything further from Russians in his absence. I have no information as to whether subject has been discussed with Russians at Berlin. Meanwhile, Russians continue to take individual American passengers from here over this route when it pleases them to do so and to refuse to take them in other cases.
It would, of course, be helpful if American aircraft could travel as far as Warsaw. I believe, however, that any proposal for regular entry of American aircraft to Poland may encounter strong opposition in certain Russian quarters.
KENNAN
The Pittsburgh Press (July 28, 1945)
Attlee, Bevin off to resume Potsdam talks
New premier names six to cabinet
…
Youngstown Vindicator (July 28, 1945)
Japs planned harsh terms for losers
Nipponese leaders boasted of ruthless powers they would take
…
U.S. State Department (July 28, 1945)
Truman-Attlee meeting, 9:15 p.m.
Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Truman | Prime Minister Attlee | |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Bevin | |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Sir Alexander Cadogan |
Byrnes: “Soon after their arrival, Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin called on the President and the four of us discussed the work of the conference. The President mentioned the Soviet demand for East Prussia and indicated on a map the changes in the boundary lines of Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union that thus would be effected. Mr. Bevin immediately and forcefully presented his strong opposition to those boundaries.”
Leahy: “Prime Minister Attlee and his newly appointed Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, arrived shortly after 9 P.M. and called on the President. Byrnes and I were present and the conversation quickly centered on the possibility of settling the Polish boundary question and reparations.”
Tenth plenary meeting, 10:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| President Truman | Prime Minister Attlee | Generalissimo Stalin |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Bevin | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Vyshinsky |
| Mr. Davies | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | Mr. Gusev |
| Mr. Bohlen | Major Birse | |
| Mr. Cohen | ||
| Mr. Thompson |
Thompson Minutes
Potsdam, July 28, 1945, 10:30 p.m.
Top secret
MR. MOLOTOV read his reports of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers held on July 27 and July 25 (attachment no. I).
THE PRESIDENT inquired if the list of questions drawn up by the Foreign Ministers was agreed to.
There was no objection.
STALIN suggested that they add the question of the disposition of the German fleet. He inquired how much time they had at their disposal at the meeting and suggested that they meet for one hour.
This was agreed to.
STALIN went on to say that the Russian Delegation had received a new proposal from Japan. Although the Soviet Delegation had not been informed when the document was drawn up against Japan they, nevertheless, were informing the other countries of this approach.
The translator then read the communication from Ambassador Saito which was marked strictly confidential and which was to the following effect: At our last meeting on July 13 the Ambassador had had the honor to submit the proposal of the Japanese Government to send Prince Konoe to Moscow. He had received the reply of the Soviet Government which did not see the possibility of giving a definite reply to the approach because no definite proposal had been made. In order to make the matter more precise he was communicating the following. The mission of Prince Konoe was to ask the Soviet Government to take part in mediation to end the present war and to transmit the complete Japanese case in this respect. He would also be empowered to negotiate with respect to Soviet-Japanese relations during the war and after the war. Simultaneously, he wished to repeat that Prince Konoe was especially charged by His Majesty, the Emperor, to convey to the Soviet Government that it was exclusively the desire of His Majesty to avoid more bloodshed by the parties engaged in the war. In view of the foregoing he hoped that the Soviet Government would give favorable attention to his request and would give its consent to the arrival of the mission. He added that the Soviet Government was aware of the position which Prince Konoe occupied in Japan.
STALIN said there was nothing new in this except that it was more definite than the previous approach and that it would receive a more definite answer than was the case the last time, and that the answer would be in the negative.
THE PRESIDENT thanked Marshal Stalin. The President added that he understood the Soviet Delegation had two questions to take up this evening.
MOLOTOV said these were [the] questions of Italy and the satellite states and the question of reparations from Austria and Italy. He added that besides the questions covered in the report of the Foreign Ministers it would be desirable to discuss the disposition of the German fleet and the western boundaries of Poland.
THE PRESIDENT stated that they could discuss any question and that he would be prepared to express his opinion on any matter raised.
ATTLEE expressed regret that domestic occurrences in Great Britain had interfered with the work of the Conference and said that he was prepared to stay as long as necessary to complete the work of the Conference.
Admission of Italy and the Satellite States into the United Nations Organization
MOLOTOV said that this question had already been discussed at a previous meeting of the Big Three. The Foreign Ministers had held different opinions as to the results of this discussion. His own impression was that the proposal had been agreed to by the Big Three with respect to Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, subject to an amendment substituting the word “for” for the word “with.” The proposal had then been referred to the Foreign Ministers meeting for the final draft. In the Foreign Ministers meeting, however, the British representatives had proposed a new amendment.
STALIN said that this amendment had been rejected at the Big Three meeting. The question was whether to describe those satellite governments as “responsible” or to “recognize” them. The opinion of the Soviet Delegation was that the word “responsible” would offend the governments of those countries. If they said “recognize” it would not offend them and each of the governments represented at this conference could recognize them when it thought they were responsible. This had been accepted in principle by the Big Three, then the Foreign Ministers had gone to a meeting and had rejected it. This was not right.
MR. BYRNES said that at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers it was stated by Mr. Molotov that he was under the impression that the United States had agreed to the amendment offered by Marshal Stalin or offered by the Soviet Delegation and approved by Stalin. Mr. Byrnes stated that he had stated that this was correct. The President had agreed in principle with the amendment offered by the Soviet Delegation. The President did suggest that the question be examined by a drafting committee and he had had in mind changing one word, namely, the substitution of “examine” for “consider.” Therefore, there was no disagreement between the Soviet Delegation and the United States Delegation. Mr. Byrnes stated that he had stated to the Foreign Ministers meeting, however, that when the President had agreed, his recollection was that the Prime Minister did not agree. The Prime Minister had advised him at the conclusion of the meeting that he did not agree.
MR. BYRNES said that he had advised the meeting of Foreign Ministers that the United States had offered its proposal originally in order to give some confidence to Italy. We had asked only for a declaration that the Three Powers support the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization. The British Delegation had asked that we include neutrals and we had agreed. Then the Soviet Delegation expressed opinions with regard to the Franco Government of Spain and in the hope of getting an agreement we had added to the declaration that we would not support the entry of the Franco Government into the United Nations Organization. Then the Soviet Delegation had asked for the inclusion of the paragraph concerning Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland and we had agreed to that. Then the Soviet Delegation had asked that the paragraph regarding Italy be modified to accord with the language used in reference to the other satellite states and we had agreed to that. Unfortunately, we had found that if we agreed with the Soviet Delegation, the British Delegation did not agree; if we agreed with the British Delegation, the Soviet Delegation disagreed. It was now up to the Soviet and British Delegations to see if they could get together. If not, we would withdraw our modest request for the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization.
CADOGAN observed that the paper related to the entry of Italy and the other states into the United Nations Organization. There were two doubtful points. Otherwise, they were agreed. Marshal Stalin had referred to one in regard to which he thought there was no difficulty. The original text had said “responsible” governments and the Soviet Delegation proposed substituting the word “recognized.” Cadogan thought that several days ago they had been prepared to agree to that. A more formidable difficulty was the proposal of the Soviet Government for an addition to paragraph three. Mr. Churchill had explained that while he was prepared to agree to consider the recognition of these governments, to put this in a declaration might be misleading, because the British could not in fact re-establish diplomatic relations with countries with which they were technically still at war. Cadogan said he had suggested a compromise but that this had not been satisfactory to the Soviet Delegation.
STALIN said he understood Cadogan’s remarks to mean that he agreed to substitute the word “recognized” in place of the word “responsible.” Cadogan replied in the affirmative.
THE PRESIDENT said that this was satisfactory to us.
STALIN then continued that there was no difference in the position toward the arrangements for Italy on the one hand and the other satellite states on the other, because none of these countries had democratic governments except Finland because they had held no elections. Mr. Churchill had referred to the fact that Great Britain had recognized Italy 90%. Stalin pointed out that the proposal did not provide for the establishment of full diplomatic relations but only that they consider the question. He did not understand the distinction made between Italy and the other satellites.
BEVIN suggested that the difference was that they knew about the Italian Government but that they did not know anything about the other governments.
STALIN said it was not proposed that they recognize them; until such time as they did recognize them they could obtain information. Bevin inquired why they were being asked to commit themselves first.
STALIN rejoined that the Russians had also known little about the Italian Government when they had established diplomatic relations with them, perhaps even less than the British knew about the other satellites. He pointed out that with respect to Italy the first step was the resumption of diplomatic relations, which occurred six to eight months after their surrender. The proposal to admit Italy into the United Nations Organization was a second step. The task now was to give the other satellite governments the hope that eleven months after capitulation relations with them would be resumed. If they agreed to ease the situation of Italy, something should be done for the other satellites.
ATTLEE repeated that it was impossible for them to enter into diplomatic relations with countries with which they were not at peace and the proposed statement would give the impression that they would do what was impossible. The proposed British amendment stated what was possible.
STALIN then suggested that they might favor “to consider each separately the question of establishing of a complete or partial diplomatic relation.” He was willing to accept the American proposal to substitute “examine” for “consider.”
ATTLEE replied that the change of words did not alter the substance of the matter. One question in Parliament would bring out the real difficulty.
STALIN said that in any event the British would study the matter. He thought that the British Delegation could accept the proposal and lose nothing.
BEVIN said that Parliament would ask what they meant by what they had done and he wanted to be perfectly straight with the British people. If he were going to recognize these governments, he would recognize them and he did not want to clothe things with words. He would rather take the latest American view and leave the whole question to a later date.
STALIN said he agreed.
Italian Reparations
THE PRESIDENT said that as he had stated on the first day that this question had been discussed that we had found it necessary with the Government of Great Britain to contribute 500 million dollars for the feeding and rehabilitation of Italy. We recognized that probably that much more would be needed to keep Italy from starving to death. As he had made it plain at this conference, the United States did not intend to provide money for the payment of reparations. If there were war plants that the Soviet Government needed, we agreed that they should take them, but contributions made to support Italy should be a first claim on exports.
STALIN said that it was possible to agree not to exact reparations from Austria, as this could be understood but the Soviet people would not understand if this were the case with Italy. Italy had sent armies to the Volga. Austria did not have her own armed forces, whereas Italy did have.
THE PRESIDENT said that if any reparations could be obtained from Italy he was perfectly willing, but the United States could not spend money to rehabilitate Italy just to enable Italy to pay reparations to other countries.
STALIN said he quite understood this. He referred to the moral right of the Soviet Union to reparations as being based on the fact that for three and one-half years its territory had been occupied and much devastation caused. THE PRESIDENT had said that if there were some equipment available in Italy it could be used for reparations. He did not want to ask too much. It was necessary to find out what sum this would constitute. In the cases of Rumania, Hungary and Finland it had been 300 million dollars. He inquired what sum Italy could pay. Perhaps the President was not ready to answer. He repeated he wanted to know what sum this would amount to.
THE PRESIDENT said he was not able to answer now.
STALIN said that the answer could be postponed.
BEVIN inquired if this were on the assumption that the supplies furnished by the United States and Great Britain would be protected.
STALIN said that he did not wish to ignore the interests of America.
ATTLEE said he agreed with the President and said that they had full sympathy for the Russian people in the suffering they had undergone. He pointed out that Britain had also suffered from attacks by Italy. Britain also had ravaged lands and they could imagine the feelings of the British people if Italy had to pay reparations which actually came from Britain and America. The fact was that Italy had to receive help in order to live. If military equipment, there was no objection.
STALIN said he agreed to take reparations in the form of equipment.
BEVIN asked “military equipment?”
STALIN replied “yes, military equipment.”
ATTLEE inquired if this would be once-and-for-all removals and not levies on war production.
STALIN replied: “Yes, once-for-all removals.”
BEVIN inquired if this meant military equipment having no peace time value.
STALIN replied that military factories could be used for any purpose. It was the same as equipment taken from Germany.
ATTLEE said it should be equipment having no peace time usefulness.
STALIN replied that all equipment could be adjusted for peace time production. The Soviet Union was adjusting theirs now. There was no such equipment which would have no peace time use.
BEVIN observed that it was so difficult to tell what the Russians would take away.
STALIN said of course they could not say now. He wanted only a decision in principle.
THE PRESIDENT said he thought that Marshal Stalin wanted a decision in principle that Italy would pay reparations.
STALIN observed that the sum of reparations asked could be reduced.
THE PRESIDENT said he thought they were not far apart on the principle. He only wanted to protect the help we were giving.
STALIN said he agreed and that the Russians did not want to touch the advances the United States was making to Italy.
BEVIN inquired if it were not then a question of priorities. The first priority should be given to what Great Britain and the United States had supplied, reparations would be next.
STALIN said he wanted to give no bonus to aggressors without their paying a small part of the damage they had caused.
THE PRESIDENT said he agreed to this.
STALIN remarked to Attlee that he should not forget what Italy had done to Britain.
ATTLEE replied that they would not forget.
It was agreed to meet the next day at 4:00 p.m.
The meeting adjourned.
Cohen Notes
Potsdam, July 28, 1945, 10:30 p.m.
MR. ATTLEE and MR. BEVIN now head the British delegation.
MR. MOLOTOV reports on the last two meetings of the foreign secretaries.
At the July 26 [25] meeting of the foreign secretaries the following points were considered:
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The Secretary of State Byrnes proposed that the question of inland waterways be discussed and that the matter be referred to a subcommittee. It was so agreed.
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Secretary Byrnes brought up the question of the removal of Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland. Cadogan suggested that a procedure for collaboration to secure their orderly transfer be worked out. A subcommittee was appointed to consider this.
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Mr. [Sir Alexander] Cadogan suggested that the subcommittees for the drafting of protocol and communiqué at the conclusion of the conference be appointed. It was agreed to set up two committees for this purpose.
In the meeting of the foreign secretaries on July 27 the following questions were considered:
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The foreign secretaries made up a list of the pending questions on which final decision had not yet been made.
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There was further discussion of the paper regarding the admission of Italy and the other satellites and Spain into the United Nations. Secretary Byrnes stated that if the Soviets and British could not agree he would withdraw the paper from the agenda. Mr. Cadogan suggested an amendment to the effect that the conclusion of peace with responsible governments would make possible the resumption of diplomatic relations.
Mr. Molotov stated the amendment was not acceptable. It was agreed to refer the question to the Big Three.
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Reparations from Germany. Soviet delegation considered committee report unsatisfactory. It was agreed to refer the question to the Big Three. Molotov pointed out that Mr. Pauley had withdrawn the Crimea decision as a basis for discussion. Mr. Molotov asked Mr. Byrnes for an explanation of the American position. Mr. Byrnes explained that the Crimea figures were taken only as a basis for discussion and that the destruction wrought by the Allied armies as well as further study had indicated that that basis was impractical.
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Reparations from Austria and Italy. Molotov stated the committee report was unsatisfactory. Byrnes stated reparations from Italy impossible except for removal of war equipment not usable for peace purposes. It was agreed to report the differences to the Big Three.
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German economic principles. Secretary Byrnes suggested the discussion be postponed.
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European oil supplies. Discussion was deferred because committee was waiting for further information.
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Economic collaboration. In the solution of urgent economic problems (European), a report of subcommittee was approved for submission to the Big Three and was read.
TRUMAN: The last document was agreed to by the foreign secretaries? It is satisfactory to me.
ATTLEE: To me also.
TRUMAN: Shall we take up Poland?
STALIN: We have also the German fleet and Italy to discuss. How much time have we? An hour?
TRUMAN: ‘Til 12:00.
STALIN: I wish to make a statement. Last night the Russian delegation was given a copy of the Anglo-American declaration to the Japanese people. We think it our duty to keep each other informed. I inform the Allies of the message that I received from the Japanese Emperor through the Japanese ambassador. I sent a copy of my answer to this peace plea which was in the negative. I received another communication informing me more precisely of the desire of the Emperor to send a peace mission headed by Prince Konoye who was stated to have great influence in the Palace. It was indicated that it was the personal desire of the Emperor to avoid further bloodshed. In this document there is nothing new except the emphasis on the Japanese desire to collaborate with the Soviets. Our answer of course will be negative.
(The foregoing was the gist of the translator’s remarks, but they were not heard clearly and, consequently, they may be inaccurate as to detail).
TRUMAN: I appreciate very much what the Marshal has said.
If Mr. Molotov will now bring up the questions that he wants answered, I will endeavor to give my answers.
MOLOTOV: These are reparations, the admission of Italy, and the satellites, the German fleet and the western Polish boundary.
TRUMAN: We may discuss any question you wish. I will give my opinion.
ATTLEE: I regret our domestic situation has caused delay in the Conference. We are willing to sit as long as necessary.
STALIN: First question is the admission into the United Nations of Italy and the other satellites. This was discussed by the Big Three. The foreign ministers had different impressions of what was agreed. I thought it was agreed as to satellites as well as to Italy. Mr. Churchill’s suggestion of substituting “for” in place of “with” was accepted. Then draft was submitted to foreign secretaries for final polishing. Then Cadogan suggested new amendment. He suggested describing governments as “responsible.” “Responsible” – would suggest that these governments are now irresponsible. The Big Three have agreed on this question. It is not right for the foreign secretaries to change our decision.
BYRNES: At the meeting of foreign ministers, Molotov said he understood the United States had agreed to Soviet delegation amendment. In behalf of United States I said that was correct in that the President had agreed in principle. The President said he thought it should be submitted to drafting committee. He had in mind changing only a word. The word “examine” should be substituted for “consider” so there was no difference between the United States and the Soviet delegation. I stated that when the President agreed Mr. Churchill did not agree. I advised the foreign ministers that the United States had offered this proposal originally to give some comfort to Italy. We asked only for a declaration for the support of Italy’s admission into the United Nations on the conclusion of peace. The British ask that we include neutrals. We agreed. Soviet delegation asked express rejection of Franco’s admission. We agreed. Then Soviet asked inclusion of paragraph covering other satellites. We agreed. Then we were asked to modify language on Italy to conform to language on other satellites. We agreed. Unfortunately, we find when we agree with the Soviets the British disagree and when we agree with the British the Soviets disagree. If the British and Soviets can get together it is satisfactory to us. If they can’t agree we will withdraw our proposal. (Attlee asks Cadogan to state British position.)
CADOGAN: So far as I understand it, the text would be agreed except for two doubtful points. The Marshal refers to one. Stalin proposes “recognize” instead of “responsible”, governments. We agreed. The more formidable objection in the proposal is that we consider in the near future the establishment of diplomatic relations with satellites. Mr. Churchill explained we could agree to consider that but it would be misleading because we cannot constitutionally establish diplomatic relations with countries with which we are still at war. I suggested compromise. It is not satisfactory. I suggested a further compromise and it is not satisfactory to the Marshal.
STALIN: There is no difference between Italy and the other satellites. In none of the countries but Finland has there been an election. Italy was recognized by the Soviets, the United States and Great Britain, at least 90 percent. I cannot understand this difference.
BEVIN: We know about the Italian government, but we don’t know about the others.
STALIN: We are not asking an undertaking to recognize, only asking you to consider. We knew very little about Italy. We first recognized Italy. Now we propose to consider her admission to the United Nations. We should at least start with the first phase with the other satellites. That is recognition, when we are considering the second stage with Italy.
ATTLEE: The Soviets’ suggestion was not constitutionally possible for us.
STALIN: Say, then, that you will consider the establishment of complete or partial relations.
ATTLEE: I don’t think that the suggestion will meet the case.
STALIN: Take the American proposal. Say “examine” instead of “consider.” You will help yourselves with the satellite countries.
BEVIN: But I must be perfectly straight with the House of Commons. I do not quote things in words of doubtful meaning. I will take the last suggestion of the American delegation and leave the whole matter to later consideration.
TRUMAN: We now pass to Italian reparations. I stated that we found it necessary to go with the British government to contribute five hundred million dollars to the feeding of Italy. It will probably require that much more to get them through the winter. The United States does not intend to contribute money to pay reparations. War equipment may be transferred but we want it understood that our contribution to feed Italy is the first lien on her supportable surplus. That is all I have to say.
STALIN: We can agree not to exact reparations from Austria which had no separate army, but Italy sent her army to devastate our country.
TRUMAN: We don’t object to reparations, but we are not going to send the money to pay them.
STALIN: I understand the point of view of the President but I want him to understand mine. What gives the Soviet the moral right to reparations is the occupation and devastation of her land by Italy.
TRUMAN: I am in entire sympathy with the Russian point of view.
STALIN: The President says war equipment may be used for reparations. I do not ask much. It will be necessary to find what sum this equipment would come to. Hungary or [and?] Finland, [and?] Rumania agreed to pay 300 million dollars. I want to know the sum the Italian equipment represents.
BEVIN: This would not come out of what the American and British people have delivered to Italy.
STALIN: I don’t want to ignore the interest of America.
ATTLEE: I agree with the President. I have sympathy with Russia’s suffering. We have also suffered from Italy. You can imagine how our people would feel if having suffered at the hands of them, they felt they had to assist Italy to pay reparations.
STALIN: We quite agree to accept equipment as reparations.
ATTLEE: That would be once and for all, removal of war plants but not levy on the product. May I ask is this equipment military equipment, not peacetime?
STALIN: Have you in view the equipment of military nature which could be used for any purpose?
ATTLEE: I was suggesting machinery that has no peacetime utility.
STALIN: War equipment can be adjusted for peacetime production. There is no equipment which has no peacetime utility. Ammunition plants are producing motor cars, etc.
BEVIN: It is so difficult to define what you can take away without affecting the economic life of a nation.
STALIN: We want recognition of the principle.
TRUMAN: I think I understand that the Marshal wants the recognition of the principle.
STALIN: I agree that the amount should be reduced.
TRUMAN: We are concerned about our advances to keep Italy going.
BEVIN: Does that not resolve itself into the question of priorities? First claim is for advances, then reparations.
STALIN: We can’t let the aggressors inflict damage without holding them responsible for some compensation.
TRUMAN: I agree with that.
STALIN: England should not forget that they fared very badly at the hands of Italy.
ATTLEE: I do not understand whether [when?] we should meet in plenary session.
TRUMAN: Since foreign secretaries are not meeting tomorrow let us meet at 4:00 p.m.
Adjourned.