Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

343

Cohen Notes

Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m.

TRUMAN: Shall we discuss the Polish western frontier? I think the Prime Minister had something to say.

CHURCHILL: I saw Mr. Bierut this morning. The Foreign Secretary saw the Polish delegation last night. They all agree that there are about one and a half million Germans in this area. The issue is all mixed up with the reparation issue, and the four power zones of occupation.

TRUMAN: Secretary of State Byrnes expects to have further conversations with the Poles also. In view of the British and American conversations with the Poles, it might go over to Friday. The German fleet and merchant marine are also on the agenda. I thought we had agreed on that.

CHURCHILL: Obviously, we must have some concrete proposals.

TRUMAN: Secretary Byrnes tells me that [Assistant] Secretary Clayton and Admiral Land are working on such proposals.

STALIN: Let us postpone it.

CHURCHILL: We must at some time discuss the question of the transfer of populations. There are a large number of Poles [Germans] to be moved from Czechoslovakia. We must consider where they are to go.

STALIN: The Czechs have already evicted them.

CHURCHILL: The two and a half million of them? Then there are the Germans from the new Poland. Will they go to the Russian zones? We don’t want them. There are large numbers still to come from Sudetenland.

STALIN: So far as the Poles are concerned, the Poles have retained one and a half million Germans to help as laborers. As soon as the harvest is over, the Poles will evict them. The Poles do not ask us. They are doing what they like, just as the Czechs are.

CHURCHILL: That is the difficulty. The Poles are driving the Germans out of the Russian zone. That should not be done without considering its effect on the food supply and reparations. We are getting into a position where the Poles have food and coal, and we have the mass of the population thrown on us.

STALIN: We must appreciate the position of the Poles. The Poles are taking revenge for centuries of injuries.

CHURCHILL: That consists in throwing them on us, and the United States?

TRUMAN: We don’t want to pay for Polish revenge. If Poland is to have an occupation zone, that should be clearly defined, but at the present time there are only four zones of occupation. If the Poles have an occupation zone they should be responsible for it. The boundary cannot be fixed before the peace conference. I want to be helpful, but Germany is occupied by four powers, and the boundary cannot be changed [now;] only at the peace conference.

I must make clear at this point my constitutional powers. (Reads formal statement). Peace treaties must be confirmed by our Senate. When I indicate my support of a proposal, I will use my best efforts to secure its acceptance. That does not guarantee its acceptance, nor does it preclude my coming back and informing you that my continuing to press it might endanger our common interests in the peace.

I make this statement, not to change the basis of our discussions, but to make clear beyond misunderstanding my constitutional authority. This is particularly important with reference to the Polish question. I want a treaty of peace which can be ratified by the Senate.

STALIN: May I ask a few questions? Does your statement refer to peace treaties only, or to other questions?

TRUMAN: Only matters which must go to the Senate. I have large war powers, as have the rest of you, but I do not wish to use them to the point that they may endanger the final conclusion of peace.

CHURCHILL: If the conference ends in ten days without agreement on the present state of affairs in Poland, and with the Poles practically admitted as a fifth occupation power, and no arrangement for the spreading of food over the whole of Germany, it will mark the breakdown of the conference. I suppose we will have to fall back on the proposal of the Secretary of State, and each of us fall back on our own zones. Maisky’s definition of booty is a very wise one (???). I do hope that we will reach a broad agreement. We must recognize that we have made no progress so far on this point.

STALIN: Coal and metal from the Ruhr is more important than the food supply.

CHURCHILL: Coal will have to be paid for by food. We could not agree that Russia could dispose of everything in her zone and still claim supplies and reparations from our zone.

STALIN: Supplies will have to be drawn from the whole of Germany.

CHURCHILL: Why not food?

STALIN: That should be discussed. The question is under discussion. Germany has always had to import foodstuff.

CHURCHILL: How will she pay reparations?

STALIN: There is much fat in Germany.

CHURCHILL: I am not going to consent to arrangements which will lead to starvation in the Ruhr, when the Poles have all the feeding grounds.

STALIN: Only recently the Poles requested help by the way of bread from us until their new harvest.

CHURCHILL: We in England are going to have the most fireless winter since the war.

STALIN: How is this? England has always exported her coal. Let the prisoners of war work. They work in the mines in Russia. You have 400 thousand German soldiers in Norway who have not been disarmed.

CHURCHILL: It is our intention to disarm them. I thought that they were disarmed. I will inquire about it.

CHURCHILL: (continuing) We are short of coal because we export coal to France, Holland and Belgium. We find it odd, when we need coal, that the Poles should be selling coal from lands which we do not regard as Polish, to Sweden and other countries.

STALIN: The Poles are selling their own coal, not the coal from the former German territories. I am not accustomed to complaining. We have lost five million men in this war. We are short of coal and many other things. If I described our situation and our needs, I might make the Prime Minister weep.

CHURCHILL: We will sell coal from the Ruhr for food.

STALIN: This question must be discussed, or thought over.

CHURCHILL: We were only exchanging views. I am finished.

STALIN: What a pity.

TRUMAN: We shall adjourn until Friday at five p.m.

CHURCHILL: I hope to be back.

STALIN: Judging from the expression on Mr. Attlee’s face, I do not think he looks forward avidly to taking over your authority.

We have tackled the problems of the war successfully. We should be able to tackle the problems of the peace as well.

EDEN: The Prime Minister referred to the transfer of populations. President Beneš has sent some communication to us. May the Foreign Secretaries look at it?

STALIN: Yes. May we not have to summon the Czechs?

CHURCHILL: I shall be glad to see Beneš. He is an old friend.

STALIN: But is this not serving mustard after supper? The Germans have already been driven out.

CHURCHILL: They have some agreement for gradual transfer.

STALIN: No such agreement exists.

CHURCHILL: There is still the problem how this is to be done. May the Foreign Secretaries look into it?

STALIN: Yes.

TRUMAN: I should like my suggestion on the waterways, the Rhine, the Danube, the Kiel Canal and the Bosporus considered by the Foreign Secretaries.

STALIN: All right.

MOLOTOV: May I circulate a memorandum on the obstacles in the way of return of Soviet citizens from Austria and Germany, and also a memorandum on the presence of German troops in Norway.

TRUMAN: Yes.

CHURCHILL: I wish to assure the Marshal that I intend to disarm the troops in Norway. I am not keeping them up my sleeve for use, if any misunderstanding arises in the north. Perhaps the Marshal will let me make a report.

STALIN: I promise in advance, and I shall not criticise.

344

The War Shipping Administrator to the Assistant Secretary of State

[Babelsberg,] 25 July 1945
Secret

Assumption:
The Tripartite Conference will agree that USSR (Russia) will be given as reparations one-third (⅓) of the captured and/or surrendered German merchant tonnage. (This will exclude (a) Fishing vessels; (b) Harbor and Inland Water Craft; (c) Coastal shipping required for German use.)

If the above assumption is correct, the Protocol should definitely cover the following points:

(a) In this one-third distribution full consideration should be given to any enemy merchant tonnage captured or surrendered now in possession of USSR.

(b) Ships may be tentatively “earmarked” for delivery to USSR at the end of the war with Japan.

(c) The implementation should not take place until after the fall of Japan, preferably six months after VJ-Day which, by limitation, is the period of the United Maritime Authority.

(d) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships now fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority.

These ships are now engaged in providing shipping service for military and other tasks necessary for, and arising out of, the completion of the war in Europe and the Far East and for the supplying of all the liberated areas as well as the United Nations generally and the territories under their authority. They are being handled and integrated accordingly. (NOTE: Any change in the present military and civilian approved instructions covering these vessels will interfere with the successful prosecution of the war with Japan.)

E S LAND

[Attachment]

Secret

Notes To Accompany Attached Memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State Clayton

  1. Russia is not, at present, a signatory to the “Agreement on Principles having reference to the continuance of coordinated control of merchant shipping,” which was done in London on the 5th day of August, 1944 (United Maritime Authority).

  2. To date Russia has evinced no interest in joining the United Maritime Authority.

  3. Our records indicate that Russia endeavored to dissuade both Norway and Sweden from joining the United Maritime Authority but they were not successful. This attitude on the part of Russia indicates either a misunderstanding or a fear, or both, as to the intent and purposes of the United Maritime Authority.

  4. The shipping allocations to Russia by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board have been satisfactorily handled by the United States and the United Kingdom throughout the war and if Russia does not choose to accede to the United Maritime Authority, there is no reason why she should not henceforth apply to it for her shipping requirements. This leads to the conclusion that Russia’s accession to UMA is not vital provided that the Protocol definitely states that the delivery of ships to Russia will not take place until the limit of the UMA period, namely within six months after VJ-Day.

LAND

345

U.S. Delegation Working Paper

[Babelsberg, July 25 (?), 1945]

Draft Statement for President

When we are discussing matters which are appropriate for inclusion in the peace treaties, I am sure it is understood that these treaties under our Constitution must be made with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States. Of course when I indicate my support of a proposal, I shall use my best endeavors to secure its acceptance. That naturally does not guarantee its acceptance. Nor should it preclude my coming back and informing you when I find that political sentiment at home on a proposition is such that I cannot continue to press its acceptance without endangering our common interests in the peace.

I make this statement, not to change the basis of my discussions with you or the bases of President Roosevelt’s discussions with you, but only so that there will be no misunderstanding of my constitutional authority or any question of my exceeding it.

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2545

U.S. Delegation Working Paper

Berlin Conference, July 25, 1945

Subject: FREE AND UNRESTRICTED NAVIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATERWAYS

The USA, the UK and the USSR are in accord that there should be free and unrestricted navigation of such inland waterways as border on two or more states, the Kiel Canal, and the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, which are comprised under the general term “Straits”. The navigation on these waterways should be regulated by international authorities representative of all nations directly interested in navigation on the waterways concerned.

As an initial step there should be set up as soon as possible interim navigation agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. The functions of the interim navigation agencies should be the restoration and development of navigation facilities on the river concerned, the supervision of river activities in the interest of equal treatment for various nationalities and the establishment of uniform regulations concerning use of facilities, rules of navigation, customs and sanitation formalities, and other similar questions. Membership on these agencies should include the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, France, and the sovereign riparian states recognized by these Governments.

With respect to the Kiel Canal, it is likewise suggested that an interim navigation agency be established with functions similar to those for the Danube and the Rhine rivers. For the time being, membership on this interim navigation agency for the Kiel Canal should be restricted to the UK, USSR, USA and France, as the occupying powers of Germany. Consultation with other nations directly interested in the Kiel Canal could be subsequently arranged.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

346 
740.00119 EW/7-2545

The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the Assistant Secretary of State

Berlin, July 25, 1945
[Translation]

Dear Mr. Dunn: Under instructions of Peoples’ Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, I enclose herewith an aide-mémoire** on the question of the non-application of the unconditional surrender regime toward German troops in Norway.

I would appreciate it if you would acknowledge receipt of this letter.

Sincerely yours,
K NOVIKOV

[Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945
[Enclosure — Translation]

Aide-Mémoire

The Soviet Government has received information that with relation to German troops on Norwegian territory, the unconditional surrender regime provided for in the military capitulation of Germany, signed in Berlin on May 8, 1945 is not being applied in full. It is stated that the German troops located in the region between the cities of Mo and Trondheim, amounting to 260,000 men, and in the region of Tromsö, 140,000 men, are holding on to their arms and military “technique” (this probably means light military equipment). The personnel of these troops have not been interned and they have full freedom of movement. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw to the attention of the Government of the United States of America and the British Government this information, since the Supreme Allied Control with respect to the surrendered troops on Norwegian territory is effected by the Allied Command.

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-2545

The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the Assistant Secretary of State

Berlin, July 25, 1945
[Translation]

Dear Mr. Dunn: Under instructions of Peoples’ Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, I enclose herewith an Aide-Mémoire concerning the activities, which is unfriendly to the Soviet Union, in British, American and French Zones of occupation in Austria and Germany on the part of white-immigrants and other persons and organizations hostile to the USSR.

I would appreciate it, Mr. Dunn, if you would confirm the receipt of this letter.

Sincerely yours,
K NOVIKOV

[Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945
[Enclosure — Translation]

Aide-Mémoire

The Administration on the Repatriation of Soviet citizens has received information that in the British, American and French zones of occupation in Germany and also in the British and American zones in Austria, activities, having as their purpose to prevent the return to their homeland of Soviet citizens, are being carried on by white-immigrants and other persons and organizations hostile to the USSR.

On Austrian territory such activities are being carried on in areas occupied by the troops of the 8th British and 5th American Armies. It is stated that in the city of Salzburg under the official name “Engineering-Technical Firm of Karyakin” a committee is actually working and is carrying on this activity directed by a Russian immigrant, Colonel Bobrovi. In the suburbs of Salzburg a committee headed by Slipchenko and Mishshenko is working on the non-return of Ukrainians to their homeland. In the region of Klagenfurt agents of the former Vlasov Corps under the command of Colonel Rogozhin are in action. The general leadership in Austria of the hostile activities vis-à-vis the USSR is a “center” in which the well-known white-immigrants, General Kreiter, Engineer Voskresentsev, Ivanov and Lavrov, have entered.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw to the attention of the Government of the United States of America and of the British Government the above-mentioned facts.

347 
740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-2545

The Soviet Delegation to the U.S. Delegation

[Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945
[Translation — Extract]

Aide-Mémoire

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Information has also been received concerning similar activities of white-immigrants in Germany in the zone of the First French Army. Here this activity is carried on under the active support on the part of the French military authorities from the “Sécurité Militaire.” In the British and American zones of occupation the leadership of the hostile activities vis-à-vis the USSR is carried on by the so-called Committee led by the white-immigrants, General Skoropadski, Kostyushchenko, Mironenko and Shmega. According to information received by the Soviet military authorities this Committee in June 1945 created the so-called “Ukrainian Committees” in a number of German cities, including Weissenburg, Kassel and Nuremberg. Each member of such committee is supplied with certificates prepared in a print shop of the “Central Committee.” On each certificate there is the seal and signature of the “President of the Free Ukraine”. Persons supplied with these certificates are free to move about in the Allied zones of occupation in Germany and carry on without hinder [hindrance?] hostile activities vis-à-vis the USSR in camps for Soviet citizens located in the British, American and French zones.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw to the attention of the Government of the United States of America and of the British Government the above-mentioned facts.

348 
840.811/7-2545

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

Berlin Conference, July 25, 1945

Subject: FREE AND UNRESTRICTED NAVIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATERWAYS

The USA, the U.K. and the USSR are in accord that there should be free and unrestricted navigation of such inland waterways as border on two or more states, of the Kiel Canal, and of the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, which are comprised under the general term “Straits.” This free and unrestricted navigation on these waterways should be assured by international agreement.

As an initial step there will be set up as soon as possible interim navigation agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. The functions of the interim navigation agencies will be the restoration and development of navigation facilities on the river concerned, the supervision of river activities in the interest of equal treatment for various nationalities and the establishment of uniform regulations concerning use of facilities, rules of navigation, customs and sanitation formalities, and other similar questions. Membership on both these agencies will include the U.S., the U.K., the USSR, and France; on the agency for the Rhine River, Switzerland and the Netherlands will be invited to participate; on the agency for the Danube River, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania will be invited to participate. Arrangements with respect to the eventual membership of Austria and Germany will be subject to subsequent agreement among the U.S., the U.K., the USSR, and France.

In accordance with the principle of free and unrestricted navigation, it is likewise agreed that the Control Council in Germany shall provide for equal treatment of all traffic passing through the Kiel Canal.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

349

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m.
Top secret

Meeting of Heads of Governments, 25 July 1945

  1. The information herein regarding the meeting of the Heads of Governments held at Cecilienhof at 1100, 25 July 1945 was furnished by the Secretary General of the U.S. Delegation.

  2. The Heads of Governments acted on the items of the agenda as follows:

    a. Polish Western Frontier.
    Deferred until next meeting.

    b. Disposition of German Fleet and Merchant Marine.
    Deferred until papers have been prepared by U.S. and British representatives.

    c. German Reparations.
    Not considered.

    d. Transfer of German Populations from Czechoslovakia and Poland.
    Referred to Council of Foreign Ministers for examination and report.

    e. Free and Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways (Enclosure).
    This paper which had been introduced by the U.S. representatives was referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

  3. The Council of Foreign Ministers appointed sub-committees to study items d and e above, which had been referred to them, and a sub-committee to work on the Protocol of the Conference and on communiqués relative to the Conference.

  4. The next meeting of the Heads of Governments is scheduled for Friday, 27 July 1945 at 1700.

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2545

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m.
Top secret

Status of Problems Before the Conference July 25, 1945

I. Problems on which substantial agreement has been reached

  1. Council of Foreign Ministers. The final text of the agreement in regard to the Council of Foreign Ministers, a draft passage for inclusion in the final protocol and communiqué, and telegrams on the subject to the Governments of China and France have all been approved.

  2. Authority of the Control Council for Germany in Political Questions. The draft on this question has been approved but the British have asked for the inclusion of two additional paragraphs which the Russians did not believe were appropriate for the economic agreement concerning Germany.

  3. Disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine. It has been agreed in principle that the fleet and merchant marine shall be divided in three parts. It is also agreed, however, that (1) a substantial proportion of the submarines shall be destroyed and (2) all of the merchant marine, including the Russian share, shall be available for the prosecution of the war against Japan. The Russians are, however, asking for a specific and definitive agreement on this subject.

  4. Austria and Vienna. The Soviets have agreed that U.S. and British forces may immediately occupy their zones. The Soviets have also agreed to continue to feed the populations of the U.S. and British zones until the U.S. and British are ready to assume this responsibility. The U.S. and British moreover have agreed in principle that the administrative authority of a central Austrian government should be extended throughout Austria and that this question should be first on the agenda of the Control Council when we enter Vienna.

  5. The Polish Question – Liquidation of the London Government and Implementation of the Yalta Agreement. A document on this matter has received final approval.

  6. Trusteeship. It has been agreed that the disposition of the Italian colonies will be dealt with by the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in connection with the negotiation of a peace treaty with Italy.

  7. Turkey and the Straits. No tripartite agreement was reached on this subject but it was dropped with the understanding that each of the three Powers would consult the Turks, the British and Americans with a view to establishing an international guarantee of free passage of the Straits for all nations at all times; the Russians presumably with a view to obtaining either exclusive Soviet-Turkish control of the Straits or Soviet-fortified bases on the Straits.

  8. Withdrawal of Troops from Iran. It was agreed that troops of the three Powers should be withdrawn from Tehran at once. It was also agreed that further withdrawals would be discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers in September, though it was recognized that troops might according to the treaty remain until six months after the close of the Japanese war. The U.S. stated its intention to withdraw its troops within 60 days.

  9. Tangier. It was agreed that Tangier should remain international and that the three Governments would participate with France in preliminary discussions of this question to be held in Paris in the very near future.

  10. Syria and Lebanon. After hearing the British explanation of their position in regard to this matter, the Soviets withdrew the proposal which they had made.

  11. The Transfer to the Soviet Union of the Koenigsberg Area in East Prussia. There was agreement in principle that this area should be transferred to the Soviet Union, with the understanding that the transfer would have to be finally confirmed by the Peace Conference.

II. Problems pending for consideration before the Heads of Governments or Foreign Ministers

  1. German Economic Questions. The subcommittee has presented a first report on these questions, some portions of which have been approved by the Foreign Ministers. Other parts, however, on which no agreement could be reached have been referred to the Big Three. The subcommittee is in the meantime continuing its work.

  2. German Reparations. The subcommittee is still at work on this question.

  3. Italian and Austrian Reparations. The subcommittee is considering Soviet papers which have been presented on these matters.

  4. Oil for Western Europe. The Economic Subcommittee is still considering a U.S. paper on this subject.

  5. Admission to the United Nations. A paper has been under consideration by the Foreign Ministers and the Big Three expressing the support of the three Governments to the admission to the United Nations Organization of Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, when peace treaties have been concluded with the recognized governments of those countries, and of neutral countries when they can comply with the requirements for admission to the United Nations, but opposition to the admission of Franco Spain as long as the present regime remains in power. Though general agreement on this paper seems to have been reached it has been referred back to the Foreign Ministers for reexamination.

  6. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States. A subcommittee is working on paragraphs 2 and 3 of the U.S. paper on this subject dealing with the freedom of the press and the Control Commissions. There seems no likelihood of reaching agreement on paragraph 1, which deals with observation of elections.

  7. Italy and the other Satellite States. The U.S. has presented two papers, one on policy toward Italy and the other on policy toward Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland. It had originally been intended to refer these papers to a subcommittee, but Marshal Stalin has now taken the position that, unless the U.S. and Britain are prepared to recognize the present governments of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, this question should not be discussed further.

  8. Oil Equipment in Rumania. The British have presented a new paper proposing an examination by representatives of three neutral countries of the ownership of the oil equipment in question.

  9. The Western Boundary of Poland. This question is still being discussed by the Big Three, to whom the Foreign Ministers have reported the views of the Polish Provisional Government.

  10. Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems. A U.S. paper on this subject, urging Soviet participation in the EEC, ECO and EITO [ECITO] is still being considered by a subcommittee.

III. Questions on the original agenda of the three powers which have not yet been discussed by the conference

  1. British Proposals.
    a. War Crimes
    b. Transfer of German populations from Poland and Czechoslovakia

  2. All items on the original U.S. and Soviet agenda have now been raised before the Conference.

350

Dunn-Harriman-Mikołajczyk conversation, 11 a.m.

Present
United States Poland
Mr. Dunn Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk
Mr. Matthews 
860c.01/8-945

Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister

[Babelsberg,] July 24, 1945
[Translation]
Secret

Poland is to be strong, free, independent and sovereign. Poland is to live in alliance with Soviet Russia, with Great Britain and France, and in friendship with the United States and the Slav countries.

This is possible on the following conditions:

  1. The Soviet forces and the NKVD should quit the territories accorded to, and delimited for, the Polish State.

  2. The Polish Army is to become a national army.

  3. The so-called Security should cease to terrorize the community.

  4. The émigrés and Polish troops should return swiftly, and elections should be held, before which the western frontiers should be settled.

  5. There should be freedom of the Press and freedom of concourse and the genuine organization of the five Parties in Poland. The PPR (translators note – the Polish Labor Party or really, the Communist Party) does enjoy these freedoms, the PPS (Polish Socialist Party) only enjoys them in part, whilst the Democratic party is at this moment more or less an extension of the PPR.

    The Peasant’s Party, thanks to which the Provisional Government of National Unity has been formed and the Polish Government recognised, does not have freedom of action, nor does the Labor Party.

  6. Personal freedom and the right of property should be safeguarded within the framework of the law.

  7. The elections should take place at the latest in December or February on the basis of the electoral laws resulting from the 1921 constitution. There must be found a method of ensuring the fairness of the elections. Fair elections are impossible as long as Soviet troops and the NKVD remain in Poland. Elections on the basis of the 1921 constitution are rendered impossible by interpretations relating to the electoral system. These follow the conception of the PKWN (translator’s note: Polish Committee of National Liberation), which was based on the 1921 constitution, and they introduce artificial majorities by the appointment – beside the political parties – of various professional and social organizations which are adjuncts of a party already possessing its own representatives in Parliament (Sejm).

860c.01/8-1445

Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister

[Translation]
[Undated]

(?) As to [To add to (?)] the preceding note from which it follows that at this stage of the dispute one should not limit himself by the relatively small territory which anyway with the support of Russia may by the force of facts appear to be included in Poland.

At this moment the struggle is about the independence and sovereignty of Poland, and the dispute about borders unless it is predetermined is another problem.

To save the independence of Poland the territory should be determined (established?) and the elections should take place as soon as possible.

At the recognition of territory the conditions could be put forward, And so:

  1. Elections – freedom for parties and for press, eventually the international control of elections.

  2. Removal of the Soviet troops and NKVD.

  3. Return and help for return of Polish army from the West in a whole and all émigrés in general.

  4. Help in repatriation of Poles from the East.

  5. Immediate stop of dismembering (taking to pieces) of factories and disjoining the railroad tracks on the territory given to Poland and full control by Poland of political, economic and communications administration.

The Soviet transport through Polish territory on the basis of a plan presented by Polish authorities.

Poland is to take part in the assistance to Europe by its industrial production and later by agricultural products. Therefore Poland must be completely freed and can not be hampered from inside by senseless dismembering of industrial objects, railroad tracks and by depriving it of agricultural machinery and livestock.

860c.01/8-945

Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister

[Babelsberg,] July 24, 1945
[Translation]
Secret

Poland, in order to safeguard her existence, development, and independence, must – after the loss of territories in the East, (to which loss the population cannot psychically reconcile itself) acquire in the west, the frontier of the Neisse, Stettin and the Delta.

This frontier should be determined immediately for the following main reasons:

(a) The population east of the Curzon Line, if it is not to perish for ever, must be boldly encouraged to return and transfer to Western Poland.

(b) The population of the west must be repatriated with utmost speed, and the Western Territories must absorb it; the date of the elections is contingent on their swift return.

(c) If these questions had to be dependent on a tardier fixing of the frontiers, then there would be no possibility either of transfer of population from the east or the west, or of holding elections there. Soviet Armies would stand as hosts in those territories and Poland would lose the chance of directing her own national economy within the area of the entire state. The partial holding of elections, after the losses east of the Curzon Line and without the delimitation of the western frontiers would only cover a small portion of the country’s territory.

(d) This state of affairs would not only overthrow the State system of economy, but it would render impossible any normalisation of conditions in the country, which might prejudice the question of the State’s independence or of its system.

(e) The lack of opportunities for transfer to the west of population from the overcrowded central districts of Poland, leads to the parcellation of peasant farm holdings and estates inside Poland, however healthy the agricultural structure of the country, and it will not be possible to effect a recovery.

(f) If Poland does not take over these territories soon, then there will be no point in a later occupation of these derelict areas.

351

Stimson-Stalin conversation, 12:25 p.m.

Present
United States Soviet Union
Mr. Stimson Generalissimo Stalin
Mr. Page Mr. Pavlov

Memorandum by the Secretary of War

[Babelsberg,] 25 July 1945

Conference With Generalissimo Stalin 25 July 1945[,] 1225 to 1243 at Schloss Cecilienhof, Potsdam, Germany

I stated to Stalin that I was very grateful for the privilege of paying my respects to him; that I was sorry that my duties in the United States called me away from the Conference before its conclusion. I said that there was another reason for my being grateful to the Generalissimo – I had followed during the course of the war the records of the Conferences at Teheran and Yalta, and in that respect I greatly appreciated the help and attitude which the Generalissimo had taken regarding a project I was greatly interested in, namely, the crossing of the Channel as well as the landings in southern France. I distinctly remembered the Generalissimo’s language – it was terse and clear – that he distinguished between a supporting action and an action which was a mere diversion. I considered that the position he had taken contributed to our success – not only to the success in France, but also later, in Germany.

Stalin stated that this was an epochal war unparallelled in history. He greatly appreciated what I had said, and continued saying that he was afraid that he had said less at Teheran and Yalta than he should have said, especially with respect to the Channel operations. This was unparallelled in history. Now we were faced with the Japanese War – also unparallelled in history.

I said that I was particularly interested in the Pacific war. My experiences when I was Governor General in the Philippines made me familiar with the terrain and people in the Pacific.

At this point Stalin again interjected that the Pacific war was unparallelled in history because of its magnitude. I agreed and continued, saying that I hoped that the combination of the forces of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, would bring a speedy victory – not only complete, but short.

Stalin stated that we all would operate on the same field of battle – it was high time for this.

I said that I hoped our common effort would not only bring success, but bring it promptly. Stalin said that Three Power intervention in the Pacific would surely speed up victory. This was a good thing for the entire world as it would reduce losses. I stated this was one thing we were anxious to have for all.

I stated that I was familiar with history and that I had taken great satisfaction in knowing that the two countries – Russia and the United States – had had no issues or differences during the time of the existence of my Government. Stalin said that that was our great fortune. I continued that this was largely because we had no reasons for dispute, and that our natural objectives were the same. The Generalissimo stated that the Russians and the Americans easily understood each other – more so than in the case of the Russians and the British or the Russians and the French. Russians and Americans had something in common. I stated that I hoped that that was so. I continued that I would do everything in my power to follow that line. I stated that I had noticed, as doubtless the Generalissimo had, that our soldiers encountered no difficulty in working together. I therefore thought that it was important that our commanders should make every effort to live together like our soldiers. Stalin appeared to be entirely in agreement with this view.

352

Eighth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 12:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Sir Alexander Cadogan Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Dunn Sir William Strang Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Clayton Major Birse Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Harriman Mr. Gusev
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Golunsky
Mr. Thompson

Thompson Minutes

Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 12:30 p.m.
Top secret

Inland Waterways

MR. BYRNES said that the President had drawn attention at the morning meeting of the Heads of Government to the American paper on Inland Waterways. He suggested that they appoint a committee to consider it.

MOLOTOV said he had not thought the matter had been referred to them, but after the Secretary had assured him that it was, it was agreed to set up a committee consisting of Messrs. Ward, Dean, Riddleberger, Russell, Labrishchev and Gereschenko.

Transfer of Populations

MR. BYRNES pointed out that they had also been asked to deal with the question of the transfer of populations in respect to Czechoslovakia and he inquired what suggestions his colleagues had.

CADOGAN pointed out that it was not only the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia that were involved. It was also the question of the transfer of Germans from western Poland. It was true that they had been told that a large majority had fled from the territory now claimed by Poland, but this did not entirely dispose of the question if these people were to transfer their domicile permanently. There were a number of arrangements to be made. There was a similar question on a smaller scale in connection with Hungary. The Hungarians wished to transfer to Germany a certain number of people. The British have no detailed plan but they thought that in view of the difficulty that would be caused by this movement the matter should be under the Allied Control Council, acting with the cooperation of the governments concerned.

THE SECRETARY agreed that the Control Council was about the only body competent to regulate the matter. If there were a gradual removal it would not aggravate the food problem, but he assumed that the difficulty was that of unilateral action in trying to force the removal at one time of all of these people. Could they not agree to instruct the Control Council to provide for the orderly removal of these people.

MOLOTOV inquired if anybody had complete and detailed information on the question.

THE SECRETARY said it seemed to him that the Control Council was the only body that could regulate it. If they could agree to direct them to prevent the wholesale removal of these people and on the contrary to arrange for their gradual transfer, it would be a great help.

MOLOTOV said that of course the Control Council could deal with it, but he pointed out that these people were coming from other countries. The Control Council could only close the frontier. It could not take any action in Czechoslovakia.

CADOGAN inquired if they could not ask the Control Council to look into the problem as it already existed. If many were already gone they could examine the existing situation and give an estimate of the rate at which others could be received. Could they not at the same time tell the three governments concerned that this was being done so that they might hold up while they were considering the matter. With regard to Hungary he thought the Allied Control Commission could deal with the matter.

THE SECRETARY suggested that they authorize the Control Commission in Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary accordingly.

MOLOTOV pointed out that until now the Control Commission had not been authorized to confer with other governments. He thought that someone should draw up concrete proposals.

THE SECRETARY agreed and said he had been impressed by Mr. Molotov’s statement that the Control Commission could only stop them from coming in and they might avoid a very bad situation by authorizing the Control Commission to consult with the governments in order to avoid such a situation occurring. He agreed that a draft could be drawn up by a sub-committee and with the approval of his colleagues a committee was appointed consisting of Messrs. Cannon, Harrison, Sobolev and Semenov. The Secretary proposed also that they set up committees to deal with the drafting of the protocol and the communiqué.

After some discussion as to whether there should be one committee or two, it was decided that there should be two separate committees which however could consult together. The following persons were appointed to these committees:

  • Communiqué: Mr. Brown

    • Mr. Foote
    • Mr. Sobolev
    • Mr. Galunski

  • Protocol: Mr. Dunn

    • Mr. Matthews
    • Mr. Cohen
    • Mr. Gromyko
    • Mr. Kausurev
    • Mr. Gribanov

CADOGAN named Sir E. Bridges, Mr. Brook, Mr. Hayter and Mr. Dean to cover both committees and said that they would arrange to divide the duties between themselves.

It was agreed to adjourn until Friday morning, at which time the sub-committees which would continue their work would report.

353

Rapporteur’s Report

Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 12:30 p.m.
[Translation]
Top secret

Statement of Peoples’ Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. M. Molotov, Concerning the Meeting of the Three Ministers on July 25, 1945

  1. The Secretary of State of the USA, MR. BYRNES, proposed that the question concerning waterways be discussed at the meeting. Mr. Byrnes stressed the desire that this question be discussed in advance in a commission [subcommittee]. Mr. [Sir Alexander] Cadogan and Mr. Molotov supported this proposal, as a result of which a commission was formed as follows:
    From the USA: Mr. Russell
    Mr. Riddleberger
    From Great Britain: Mr. Ward
    From the USSR: Mr. Gerashchenko
    Mr. Lavrishchev

  2. In addition Mr. Byrnes touched on the question of the transfer of the German population from Czechoslovakia.

    MR. CADOGAN stated that it was not only a question of the transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia, but also from western Poland and Hungary. He assumed that the question of the transfer of these German populations would be under the control of the Allied Control Council acting in collaboration with the Governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

    V. M. MOLOTOV proposed referring this question to the preliminary examination of a commission in order that a draft prepared by it might then be examined at a meeting of the three Ministers.

    MR. BYRNES and MR. CADOGAN agreed with this proposal. The commission was formed as follows:
    From the USA: Mr. Cannon.
    From Great Britain: Mr. Harrison.
    From the USSR: Mr. Sobolev
    Mr. Semenov

  3. MR. CADOGAN introduced a proposal concerning the formation of a commission to draw up a draft communiqué on the work of the conference and a commission to prepare a draft general protocol of the decisions at the Conference.

    MR. BYRNES and V. M. MOLOTOV agreed with this proposal. It was decided to form the following commissions:

    (a) to prepare a draft communiqué on the work of the Conference:
    From the USA: Mr. Walter Brown.
    Mr. Wilder Foote.
    From the USSR: Mr. Loev [Sobolev].
    Mr. Golunski.

    (b) to prepare a draft general protocol of the decisions of the Conference:
    From the USA: Mr. Dunn.
    Mr. Matthews.
    Mr. Cohen.
    From the USSR: Mr. Gromyko.
    Mr. Kozyrev.
    Mr. Gribanov.

    From Great Britain: (on both commissions): Messrs. Bridges, Brook, Hayter and Dean.

With this the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs terminated.

354 
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2545

U.S. Delegation Working Paper

[Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945

Subcommittees With Pending Business

1. Economic Subcommittee
Assignments: German Economic Questions.
German Reparations.
Austrian Reparations.
Italian Reparations.
Oil for Western Europe.
U.S. Representatives: Mr. Clayton.
Mr. Pauley.

2. Subcommittee on Admission to the United Nations
Assignment: Drafting a statement in regard to admission to the United Nations of Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland and neutral countries and the non-admission of Spain.
U.S. Representatives: Mr. Matthews.
Mr. Cannon.

3. Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration
Assignment: Drafting a statement on the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and the Satellite States.
U.S. Representatives: Mr. Russell.
Mr. Cannon.

4. Subcommittee on Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems
Assignment: Discussing the scope and functions of the EEC, ECO and EITO [ECITO].
U.S. Representatives: Mr. Clayton.
Mr. Pauley.

5. Subcommittee on Directives to Military Commanders in Germany
Assignment: To prepare directives for issuance, after consultation with the French, to the Allied military commanders in Germany in regard to the agreements reached at this Conference.
U.S. Representatives: Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Riddleberger.

6. Subcommittee on Navigation of Inland Waterways
Assignment: To recommend action on U.S. paper on free and unrestricted navigation of international inland waterways.
U.S. Representatives: Mr. Russell.
Mr. Riddleberger.

7. Subcommittee on Transfer of German Populations from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary
Assignment: To prepare a concrete proposal on this subject.
U.S. Representative: Mr. Cannon.

8. Subcommittee on the Protocol
Assignment: To prepare the protocol of the Conference.
U.S. Representatives: Mr. Dunn.
Mr. Matthews.
Mr. Cohen.

9. Subcommittee on the Communiqué
Assignment: To prepare the communiqué of the Conference.
U.S. Representatives: Mr. Brown.
Mr. Foote.
355

Clayton-Mikolajczyk conversation

Present
United States Poland
Mr. Clayton Deputy Prime Minister Mikolajczyk
Mr. Dunn Deputy Prime Minister Gomulka
Mr. Harriman Foreign Minister Rzymowski
Mr. Murphy Mr. Modzelewski
Mr. Collado
Mr. Despres 
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2545

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

[Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945
Top secret

MR. CLAYTON opened the conversation by indicating that Ambassador Harriman had reported his discussion with President Bierut of Poland’s immediate and reconstruction needs. Mr. Clayton was hopeful that we could shortly arrange to make 1000 surplus military trucks available, and that Ambassador Lane would communicate full details as soon as they became definite. The Poles expressed their pleasure. AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN indicated that Ambassador Murphy was attempting to arrange for the immediate provision of six sedans for members of the Government.

MR. CLAYTON then asked whether there were any particular questions for discussion, to which the Poles stated that there were no economic specialists in their party, but that they would like information regarding the help the U.S. would furnish in connection with Polish reconstruction.

MR. CLAYTON turned to UNRRA, asking whether the mission had arrived and whether supplies were coming in. The Poles indicated that the mission was to have left Washington on the 18th, that some supplies were coming in through Constanta but that Polish needs were much greater than UNRRA deliveries particularly in the case of fats which UNRRA is not supplying.

MR. CLAYTON asked how long it would be until Poland no longer required UNRRA aid, to which the Poles replied that it might be a very long time. Agricultural capital had been destroyed. Although no complete or reliable statistics were available, it was believed that only 10% of the horses and 15% of the cattle remained. It would take several years to rebuild stocks.

When asked by Mr. Clayton concerning the prospects for the wheat harvest, the Poles stated that it would probably be satisfactory; that they were not worried about grain and bread, but about fats. Mr. Clayton pointed out that there exists a world deficiency in fats of 10%. Later on the Poles indicated that they were slaughtering livestock beyond any proper limits and asked whether they could buy in the U.S. or Canada livestock – pigs and cattle – for breeding purposes. Mr. Clayton replied that they might be able to obtain a small number, but that there was a great deficiency at home.

In response to a question regarding Polish representation at the UNRRA Council meeting in London, MR. DUNN suggested that the Poles communicate the names of their proposed delegation through Ambassador Lane; that there should be no difficulty now that the political situation had been clarified.

The Poles also stated that the first UNRRA ships were due in Danzig on August 23, although they hoped they might arrive sooner. AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said that the port would be all prepared by August 5, and that already Poland was loading coal for Leningrad. At this Mr. Clayton inquired regarding prospects for other coal shipments. The Poles stated that they were concluding arrangements with Sweden and hoped to sell coal to Denmark and Finland. They would have some for France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and had proposed that it be shipped in the returning UNRRA ships.

MR. CLAYTON then asked how much coal might be available for Western Europe before January 1, 1946, to which the Poles replied that they would send the figures from Warsaw. They have talked to Italy, but encounter transport difficulties. The Poles further stated that they needed more food for the miners and better transport in order to increase coal production.

To Ambassador Harriman’s query as to the volume of coal production, the Poles stated that the prewar production of old Poland was 35 million tons, mostly of hard coal, a year; that Germany in 1943 produced 101 million tons in all Upper Silesia by forced production “robbing the mines”; that they were now producing 2 million tons per month, an increase of 100% in the last three months, of which only 10-20% came from German Silesia; that they expected to produce 3 million tons by the end of 1945; and that when the miners returned from Germany they expect to produce 80–100 million tons a year.

The discussion turned to general reconstruction, MR. CLAYTON pointing out that while we were looking into urgent Norwegian and Danish cases we had not made any actual loans as yet. We were trying to put together a picture of overall demands. What were Poland’s total requirements for imports necessitating foreign exchange? The Poles repeated that there were no economic specialists in their group, and stated that no complete estimates were yet available. Total destruction was estimated at some 20 billion gold zlotys or $4 billion. They listed the following priority of reconstruction needs:

  1. Ports and port equipment.
  2. City of Warsaw (they will use local materials)
  3. Transport – railways, cars, locomotives; bridges, highways, trucks, road-building machinery.

They asked where to apply for reconstruction financing – to the U.S. Government or the International Bank. MR. CLAYTON replied that the International Bank would not be functioning for some time, and that they should now apply to the Export-Import Bank.

To Ambassador Harriman’s query regarding the number of trucks in Poland, the Poles replied that it was ridiculously low: a month ago 6000 vehicles of all kinds including motorcycles in all Poland; now perhaps 10,000 all in very bad shape.

MR. CLAYTON inquired whether there was sufficient local production of steel for bridges, buildings, etc. The Poles indicated that there was sufficient for present consumption. A full speed program including the rebuilding of Warsaw would require imports of steel or preferably of blooming mills and rolling mills. These statements, of course, included the German area. The Poles indicated that their need for foreign technical aid would depend largely on the extent to which skilled Poles returned to Poland. When Ambassador Harriman recalled that President Bierut had been anxious to get some technicians, the Poles stated that the President had had in mind specialists.

The Poles indicated that they would need some agricultural machinery – tractors and combines. Their textile industry was in good condition although the Germans had not made any new investments. It was adequate for present needs. They needed to import cotton; had an agreement with the USSR and would seek a trade arrangement with the U.S. later.

MR. CLAYTON asked whether the Germans had removed spindles and looms at Łódź. The Poles answered that they had, but that, although the productive capacity of old Poland had declined as a result, the total capacity of old Poland and the German area had increased.

MR. CLAYTON suggested that the Poles present a memorandum indicating the amounts and types of U.S. materials required by the end of 1946, indicating priority of requirements. The Poles agreed to do so. MR. CLAYTON further suggested that when the new Polish Ambassador goes to Washington, he be accompanied by a good economic man who could talk to the Export-Import Bank. Not an economic mission at the present time; eventually perhaps a purchasing mission.

In reply to Ambassador Harriman’s question as to Polish export prospects, the Poles indicated that they were now slim, should grow, and eventually be substantial. Potential exports include coal, cement, glass, soda, zinc soon, no timber. All from the old area except some coal. Food exports will take some time; pigs – 2 years; mushrooms and eggs – sooner; grain – rye after the next year’s crop.

MR. CLAYTON asked whether the new Government intended to continue in UMA. The Poles replied that they had not considered this matter, but might wish to withdraw some ships for their own use. Mr. Clayton urged that they study the matter and decide promptly.

He concluded by stating that the United States recognizes the reconstruction needs of Poland and wants to be helpful, and by asking that the Poles remember that we have calls for materials and credits from all sides. The Poles expressed their understanding but emphasized that Poland is the most devastated country, it has a most politically sensitive geographical position, and its economic position is important to the whole world.

356

Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister

Babelsberg, July 25, 1945
[Translation]

Economic Conference with the American Delegation (Messrs. Clayton, Collado, Murphy, Despres, and Dunn on the American Side; Mikołajczyk, Rzymowski, and Modzelewski on Our Side) Held on July 25, 1945, at Babelsberg

MR. CLAYTON informs us that, on the basis of a telegram received from Mr. Harriman, he has made arrangements for 1,000 military-motor vehicles to be sent to us, and that by now they are probably on the way.

MR. MURPHY states that in addition we shall get six sedans.

In reply to a question asked by Mr. Clayton, the United States Representative to UNRRA, as to whether the UNRRA delegation had already arrived in Poland and whether we had received any UNRRA deliveries, MR. GOMUŁKA replies and stresses the problem of increased UNRRA deliveries which are necessary for Poland, particularly the problem of fats and oils. We shall need help for some time to come, and Mr. Gomułka points out that livestock has been destroyed, and he gives the approximate figures.

MR. CLAYTON is particularly interested in the question of how long we shall need help from UNRRA and whether we have enough flour to feed the population.

MR. GOMUŁKA states that with regard to grains we shall not feel any shortages unless the crops do not turn out in the future as expected, and he stresses again the problem of fats and oils.

MR. CLAYTON answers that the shortage of fats and oils is felt everywhere in the world, even in the United States, where the supply is about 10% short. Then he asks whether we applied for a loan from the United States for needed reconstruction of the country, as was done by Norway and Denmark. The United States expects a large number of such applications in the very near future. The United States Government wants to orient itself with regard to the total world requirements for loans for reconstruction so that it may grant credits in the proper ratio. Therefore he asks whether the Polish Government has prepared any figures on losses and on credit requirements.

MR. GOMUŁKA answers that we do not yet have any exact figures, but that the damages amount roughly to 20 billion in gold. First comes the problem of the reconstruction of ports. Mr. Gomułka asks about the technicalities involved in getting a loan (applications, banks, etc.).

MR. CLAYTON explains that the loan will be granted by the United States Export-Import Bank. The Bretton Woods International Bank is still being organized and presumably will not begin to function for about a year.

Mr. Mikołajczyk brings up the question of designating a representative of the Polish Government to UNRRA. Heretofore the representative has been Mr. Kwapiński, who acted on behalf of the émigré London Government and who has now been recalled.

MR. DUNN asks that a mission be designated to act on behalf of the Government of National Unity and that the names be given at Potsdam or through the American Ambassador at Warsaw.

MR. MIKOŁAJCZYK then brings up the problem of livestock in Poland, which was decimated by the occupation forces. This problem is connected with the question of fats and oils. If we do not get a sufficient amount of fats and oils from UNRRA, we shall be forced to reduce still further the already depleted livestock, which will have catastrophic consequences for agriculture. It would be desirable to obtain a certain number of cattle for breeding purposes from the United States.

MR. CLAYTON explains that at this time there are not many cattle in the United States either, but that they could sell us a small number of breeding cattle. (In Washington beef can be obtained only once a month.)

MR. GOMUŁKA asks under what conditions and in what amount we could get a reconstruction loan from the Export-Import Bank.

MR. CLAYTON points out that he would have to know what goods we need.

MR. GOMUŁKA mentions material for the reconstruction of ports, and in the first place for the reconstruction of highways and railroads. In answer to a question by Mr. Harriman, as to how many automobiles we have now, MR. GOMUŁKA states that the number is ridiculously small (10,000, including motorcycles, and even this small number of machines is in a deplorable condition and in constant need of repair).

MR. CLAYTON asks whether we have sufficient production of steel to rebuild bridges, docks, etc.

MR. GOMUŁKA states that for our present opportunities our production is sufficient, but that our internal production will not cover the needs when the reconstruction of Poland proceeds farther.

MR. MIKOŁAJCZYK points out the increasing needs in the future in connection with the reconstruction of Warsaw, and Mr. Modzelewski stresses the shortages of metallurgical establishments, rolling mills, etc.

MR. HARRIMAN is interested in our figures for the production of steel, particularly in the western areas which we have claimed.

MR. CLAYTON inquires whether we shall need technical assistance for reconstruction, such as technicians, engineers, etc.

MR. GOMUŁKA thinks that we shall be informed as to the situation in this respect only after the return of our émigrés and our technicians from abroad, where we have a large number of them. He estimates in general, however, that we shall need that kind of assistance.

MR. GOMUŁKA states, in answer to a suggestion by Mr. Harriman, that with regard to agricultural machinery we shall need primarily tractors and combines.

MR. CLAYTON inquires then about the technical condition of our textile production, particularly in Łódź.

MR. GOMUŁKA explains that the textile industry in Poland is not in bad shape and that it works, but that we shall need machinery in the future. In answer to a question by Mr. Harriman about raw material, Mr. Gomułka states that we shall import cotton from the Soviet Union, with which we have suitable agreements, but that obviously possible deliveries of that raw material from the United States can be the subject of a commercial agreement between Poland and the United States. As to the entire textile industry, Mr. Gomułka points out that we have received a large number of German plants, so that our total textile production will exceed the prewar figures.

MR. CLAYTON asks us to prepare a memorandum in which we would specify what kind of goods we need from the United States. The first part of the memorandum should indicate items which are most urgently needed, i.e., needed in the course of the first year (1946), and the second part should indicate goods necessary for later objectives. Mr. Clayton also advises us to assign to our future Embassy at Washington an experienced specialist in economic affairs who would be well acquainted with the economic and present needs of our country. At the beginning it should be only one person attached to the Embassy and only later on, when the relations between the two countries have developed, should it be a special economic mission.

357

Mosely-Strang and Mosely-Gusev conversations

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Mosely Sir William Strang Mr. Gusev

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

[Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945
Top secret
Victory 316

For Ambassador Winant[.] London’s 44360 July 24 received. Strang told Mosely today FonOff has full authority instruct Hood accept Soviet final paragraph covering report on French zone. Meanwhile US, UK and French commanders have agreed on French area in Berlin. Strang obviously does not understand FonOff delay.

Gousev told Mosely today instructions sent Saksin yesterday to accept title of agreement on additional requirements with inclusion of words “to be imposed.”

BYRNES

358 
761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union

[Tokyo,] July 25, 1945 — 7 p.m.
[Translation]
Secret
urgent

944

Re my telegram No. 932

  1. It goes without saying that the outcome of the Big Three Conference will be very closely connected with this subject. However, Churchill and Attlee are expected to return to England temporarily on the 26th and the conference will be recessed for a while. Thus, you should take advantage of this opportunity and, if necessary, go to a place selected as suitable by the other party, meet Molotov, and explain fully the intention of the Imperial Government of Japan. Even though Molotov may find it difficult to arrange a meeting, we believe that the request for a meeting with you would have a good effect in that it would impress them with the sincerity of our desire.

  2. On the occasion of the meeting, as repeatedly mentioned in my previous telegrams, it should be pointed out that the Imperial Government has, first of all, requested the good offices of the Soviet Union and that the sending of the special envoy to the Soviet Union would enable Stalin to acquire the position of advocate of world peace. Also make it clear that we are fully prepared to recognize the wishes of the Soviet Union in the Far East (see my telegram No. 932, last paragraph). Let it be known also that should the Soviet Government react coldly to our request we have no choice but to select other ways and means. Thus, you must work hard to induce the Soviet side to recognize these points and have the Soviet Union take positive action immediately.

  3. Also, at the present time, as you are probably well aware, there are various arguments as to the substance of the demand for the unconditional surrender of Japan in Great Britain and the United States, particularly in the United States. A United States spokesman stated that: “As a rule, for the sake of formality, the Allies will hold fast to unconditional surrender until the end. However, should the Imperial Japanese Government surrender immediately, the Allies are actually prepared to modify the terms.” For instance, on the 19th [21st] Captain Zacharias – although a member of the United States Office of War Information he broadcasts to Japan as spokesman for the United States Government – disclosed the substance of surrender terms, saying that Japan had two choices to make. One was to submit to a dictated peace after the complete destruction of Japan; the other, to accept unconditional surrender and receive benefits under the Atlantic Charter. This is considered simple propaganda strategy. Although it is not definitely stated, this is to a certain degree understood to be a means of encouraging us to surrender. Nevertheless, special attention should be paid to the fact that at this time the United States referred to the Atlantic Charter. As for Japan, it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter. The difficult point is the attitude of the enemy, who continues to insist on the formality of unconditional surrender. Should the United States and Great Britain remain insistent on formality, there is no solution to this situation other than for us to hold out until complete collapse because of this one point alone. On the other hand, since it is possible that the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States may exercise caution and suspect that our dispatch of a special envoy may be a peace plot, we have repeatedly advised that what is described above is not a mere “peace feeler” but is in obedience to the Imperial command. Also, it is necessary to have them understand that we are trying to end hostilities by asking for very reasonable terms in order to secure and maintain our nation’s existence and honor. Should things advance to the stage where we send a special envoy to the Soviet Union, undoubtedly these problems will have to be discussed frankly. Because of the beginning of the Three-Power Conference and also in consideration of the development of the recent delicate situation in the United States, you should keep the above circumstances in mind and lose no opportunity to explain all this carefully to Molotov – if under unavoidable circumstances this is not possible, it will be well to consult Solomon A. Lozovsky, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs – and inform us immediately by telegram regarding their attitude.

359

Conversation concerning the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations

This conversation considered the question of officers of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations and of the Executive Committee of that Commission. It is not clear whether the meeting referred to was a bilateral Anglo-American conversation or whether Soviet representatives participated as well.

360

President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill

Babelsberg, July 25, 1945

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister: In reply to your letter of the 24th, the Secretary of State is preparing a copy of the memorandum directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the issuance of Lend Lease material. It is my intention to abide strictly by the law as passed by the United States Congress on Lend Lease, as I explained to you yesterday, although a liberal construction will be given to the distribution of those items referred to in your memorandum from your Chiefs of Staff.

I am making every effort to get a construction of the new Lend Lease renewal act so as to cause the least difficulty and embarrassment to our Allies. As soon as the memorandum to our Chiefs of Staff is finally prepared, I shall send you a copy.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Very sincerely yours,
[HARRY S. TRUMAN]

President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill

Babelsberg, July 25, 1945
[Extract]

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister: …

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

We sent you last night a copy of our telegram to Chiang Kai-shek. I am hoping that we will receive a concurrence from him, and that we may be in a position to issue the Proclamation at the earliest possible moment. I shall inform you, as soon as I hear from him, and we will issue the Proclamation jointly from here, if that is satisfactory to you.

Very sincerely yours,
[HARRY S. TRUMAN]

361 
740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-2545

The Soviet Delegation to the U.S. Delegation

Babelsberg, July 25, 1945
[Translation — Extract]

Aide-Mémoire

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Information has also been received concerning similar activities of white-immigrants in Germany in the zone of the First French Army. Here this activity is carried on under the active support on the part of the French military authorities from the “Sécurité Militaire.” In the British and American zones of occupation the leadership of the hostile activities vis-à-vis the USSR is carried on by the so-called Committee led by the white-immigrants, General Skoropadski, Kostyushchenko, Mironenko and Shmega. According to information received by the Soviet military authorities this Committee in June 1945 created the so-called “Ukrainian Committees” in a number of German cities, including Weissenburg, Kassel and Nuremberg. Each member of such committee is supplied with certificates prepared in a print shop of the “Central Committee”. On each certificate there is the seal and signature of the “President of the Free Ukraine.” Persons supplied with these certificates are free to move about in the Allied zones of occupation in Germany and carry on without hinder [hindrance?] hostile activities vis-à-vis the USSR in camps for Soviet citizens located in the British, American and French zones.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw to the attention of the Government of the United States of America and of the British Government the above-mentioned facts.

362

Report by the European Advisory Commission to the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic

Secret

  1. Pursuant to the Declaration regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with respect to Germany, signed at Berlin on 5th June, 1945, wherein it is stated, in Article 13(b), that the Allied Representatives will impose on Germany additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements, the European Advisory Commission has, in accordance with its terms of reference, considered certain of the more urgent of these additional requirements. Accordingly, it submits herewith, for consideration and approval by the four Governments, an Agreement regarding certain Additional Requirements to be imposed upon Germany.

  2. It will be recalled that the Commission agreed in March 1944, when discussing the terms of surrender of Germany, that certain broad political and economic requirements should be imposed upon Germany at the time of, or shortly after, the surrender, in addition to the mainly military requirements to be contained in the Instrument or Declaration of Surrender. The most important military requirements were announced in the Declaration of 5th June, 1945. The Commission believes that the enclosed Agreement on Additional Requirements, representing the agreed views of the four Governments, will furnish guidance to the Allied Representatives regarding additional measures to be imposed on Germany. The Commission accordingly recommends that the Agreement on Additional Requirements, as soon as it is approved by the four Governments, be transmitted to the Allied Representatives in Berlin. The Commission recommends that the four Governments authorize the Allied Representatives to decide whether publication of this document shall be in whole or in part.

  3. The Commission has several comments to make with regard to certain specific provisions in the Agreement on Additional Requirements.

    a) The Commission recommends that in exercising control over German research relating to war or the production of war material, as set forth in sub-paragraph 13(b), the Allied Representatives should, when they consider conditions in Germany appropriate, supplement this provision by issuing the following order to the German people:

    All research, experimentation, development or other study relative to war or the production of war material, whether in public or private establishments, factories, technological institutions, laboratories or elsewhere, is hereby abolished and forbidden in future.

    b) The Commission recommends that in giving effect to the provisions of sub-paragraph 15(b) the Allied Representatives should also require the German authorities to hand over, for delivery to the Allied Government concerned, any drawings, plates and other special technical equipment utilized directly for the production of monetary tokens for issue by Germany in territories formerly occupied by her or elsewhere.

    c) In connection with the provisions of sub-paragraph 16(b) the Commission recommends that all property, assets, rights, titles and interests in Germany held for or belonging to any country, other than Germany and the countries referred to in sub-paragraph 16(a), which has at any time since 1st September, 1939, been at war with any of the United Nations, be taken under the provisional control of the Allied Representatives and preserved, pending subsequent transfer to the countries of ownership under arrangements to be worked out with the appropriate Allied Control Commissions or organs in those countries.

    d) In connection with the execution of the provisions of subparagraph 26(a), the Commission recommends to the four Governments approval of the following understanding:

    Vessels of the United Nations surrendered to the Allied Representatives in accordance with sub-paragraph 26 (a) will be returned by the Allied Representatives to the respective Allied States which own or owned, or whose nationals own or owned, such vessels. Nothing in this provision shall alter in any manner any existing agreements and procedures among any of the United Nations with respect to the pooling of the vessels surrendered by Germany under the provisions of sub-paragraph 26 (a).

    e) In connection with the execution of the provisions of paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 19, the Commission invites the attention of the four Governments to the great importance of effecting as full and as prompt restitution as possible of the property which has been looted by the Germans from occupied Allied countries. It points out the urgency of providing the Allied Representatives in Germany with guidance concerning the principles and procedures which should govern the restitution of looted Allied property, in accordance with the Declaration made at London on 5th January, 1943 on Enemy Acts of Dispossession.

  4. During the consultations which the European Advisory Commission has carried on, under instructions of the four Governments, with representatives of the European Allied Governments concerning the Declaration of 5th June, 1945, these Governments have expressed, both in writing and orally, their great interest in the additional requirements which are to be imposed upon Germany. In view of this concern, the Commission recommends that the four Governments instruct it to communicate the Agreement on Additional Requirements, upon its approval by the four Governments, to the interested Allied Governments. In so doing the Commission would point out to the representatives of those Governments that these additional requirements do not purport to be complete and will be supplemented by specific orders and instructions to be issued by the Allied Representatives.

Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission:
JOHN G. WINANT

Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission:
Т. CAКCИН

Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission:
RONALD I. CAMPBELL

Representative of the Provisional Government of the French Republic on the European Advisory Commission:
R. MASSIGLI

Lancaster House, London, SW1
25th July, 1945

[Accompaniment]

Secret

Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on Certain Additional Requirements to Be Imposed on Germany

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic have reached the following agreement regarding instructions to be issued by the Allied Representatives in Germany:

We, the Allied Representatives, Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of occupation of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the French Republic, pursuant to the Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany, signed at Berlin on 5th June, 1945, hereby announce certain additional requirements arising from the complete defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany with which Germany must comply, as follows:

Section I

  1. All German land, naval and air forces, the SS, SA, SD and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers’ Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans’ organizations and all other military and quasi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in accordance with methods and procedures to be laid down by the Allied Representatives.

  2. All forms of military training, military propaganda and military activities of whatever nature, on the part of the German people, are prohibited, as well as the formation of any organization initiated to further any aspect of military training and the formation of war veterans’ organizations or other groups which might develop military characteristics or which are designed to carry on the German military tradition, whether such organizations or groups purport to be political, educational, religious, social, athletic or recreational or of any other nature.

Section II

  1. (a) German authorities and officials in all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they existed on 31st December, 1937, and in any areas within those frontiers indicated at any time by the Allied Representatives, will comply with such instructions as to withdrawing therefrom as they may receive from the Allied Representatives.

    (b) The German authorities will issue the necessary instructions and will make the necessary arrangements for the reception and maintenance in Germany of all German civilian inhabitants of the territories or areas concerned, whose evacuation may be ordered by the Allied Representatives.

    (c) Withdrawals and evacuations under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above will take place at such times and under such conditions as the Allied Representatives may direct.

  2. In the territories and areas referred to in paragraph 3 above, there shall immediately be, on the part of all forces under German command and of German authorities and civilians, a complete cessation of all measures of coercion or forced labour and of all measures involving injury to life or limb. There shall similarly cease all measures of requisitioning, seizure, removal, concealment or destruction of property. In particular, the withdrawals and evacuations mentioned in paragraph 3 above will be carried out without damage to or removal of persons or property not affected by the orders of the Allied Representatives. The Allied Representatives will determine what personal property and effects may be taken by persons evacuated under paragraph 3 above.

Section III

  1. The Allied Representatives will regulate all matters affecting Germany’s relations with other countries. No foreign obligations, undertakings or commitments of any kind will be assumed or entered into by or on behalf of German authorities or nationals without the sanction of the Allied Representatives.

  2. The Allied Representatives will give directions concerning the abrogation, bringing into force, revival or application of any treaty, convention or other international agreement, or any part or provision thereof, to which Germany is or has been a party.

  3. (a) In virtue of the unconditional surrender of Germany, and as of the date of such surrender, the diplomatic, consular, commercial and other relations of the German State with other States have ceased to exist.

    (b) Diplomatic, consular, commercial and other officials and members of service missions in Germany of countries at war with any of the four Powers will be dealt with as the Allied Representatives may prescribe. The Allied Representatives may require the withdrawal from Germany of neutral diplomatic, consular, commercial and other officials and members of neutral service missions.

    (c) All German diplomatic, consular, commercial and other officials and members of German service missions abroad are hereby recalled. The control and disposal of the buildings, property and archives of all German diplomatic and other agencies abroad will be prescribed by the Allied Representatives.

  4. (a) German nationals will, pending further instructions, be prevented from leaving German territory except as authorised or directed by the Allied Representatives.

    (b) German authorities and nationals will comply with any directions issued by the Allied Representatives for the recall of German nationals resident abroad, and for the reception in Germany of any persons whom the Allied Representatives may designate.

  5. The German authorities and people will take all appropriate steps to ensure the safety, maintenance and welfare of persons not of German nationality and of their property and the property of foreign States.

Section IV

  1. The German authorities will place at the disposal of the Allied Representatives the whole of the German inter-communication system (including all military and civilian postal and telecommunication systems and facilities and connected matters), and will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for placing such inter-communication systems under the complete control of the Allied Representatives. The German authorities will comply with any instructions give[n] by the Allied Representatives with a view to the establishment by the Allied Representatives of such censorship and control of postal and telecommunication and of documents and other articles carried by persons or otherwise conveyed and of all other forms of inter-communication as the Allied Representatives may think fit.

  2. The German authorities will comply with all directions which the Allied Representatives may give regarding the use, control and censorship of all media for influencing expression and opinion, including broadcasting, press and publications, advertising, films and public performances, entertainments and exhibitions of all kinds.

Section V

  1. The Allied Representatives will exercise such control as they deem necessary over all or any part or aspect of German finance, agriculture (including forestry), production and mining, public utilities, industry, trade, distribution and economy generally, internal and external, and over all related or ancillary matters, including the direction or prohibition of the manufacture, production, construction, treatment, use and disposal of any buildings, establishments, installations, public or private works, plant, equipment, products, materials, stocks or resources. Detailed statements of the subjects to which the present provision applies, together with the requirements of the Allied Representatives in regard thereto, will from time to time be communicated to the German authorities.

  2. (a) The manufacture, production and construction, and the acquisition from outside Germany, of war material and of such other products used in connection with such manufacture, production or construction, as the Allied Representatives may specify, and the import, export and transit thereof, are prohibited, except as directed by the Allied Representatives.

    (b) The German authorities will immediately place at the disposal of the Allied Representatives all research, experiment, development and design directly or indirectly relating to war or the production of war material, whether in government or private establishments, factories, technological institutions or elsewhere.

  3. (a) The property, assets, rights, titles and interests (whether situated inside or outside Germany) of the German State, its political subdivisions, the German Central Bank, State or semi-State, provincial, municipal or local authorities or Nazi organisations, and those situated outside Germany of any person resident or carrying on business in Germany, will not be disposed of in any way whatever without the sanction of the Allied Representatives. The property, assets, rights, titles and interests (whether situated inside or outside Germany), of such private companies, corporations, trusts, cartels, firms, partnerships and associations as may be designated by the Allied Representatives will not be disposed of in any way whatever without the sanction of the Allied Representatives.

    (b) The German authorities will furnish full information about the property, assets, rights, titles and interests referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above, and will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may give as to their transfer and disposal. Without prejudice to any further demands which may be made in this connection, the German authorities will hold at the disposal of the Allied Representatives for delivery to them at such times and places as they may direct all securities, certificates, deeds or other documents of title held by any of the institutions or bodies mentioned in subparagraph (a) above or by any person subject to German law, and relating to property, assets, rights, titles and interests situated in the territories of the United Nations, including any shares, stocks, debentures or other obligations of any company incorporated in accordance with the laws of any of the United Nations.

    (c) Property, assets, rights, titles and interests situated inside Germany will not be removed outside Germany or be transferred or disposed of to any person resident or carrying on business outside Germany without the sanction of the Allied Representatives.

    (d) Nothing in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above shall, as regards property, assets, rights, titles and interests situated inside Germany, be deemed to prevent sales or transfers to persons resident in Germany for the purpose of maintaining or carrying on the day-to-day national life, economy and administration, subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph 19 (b) and (c) below and to the provisions of the Declaration or of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.