Turkey
CHURCHILL said this was not the first time he had discussed this matter with Marshal Stalin. It became important because of the admitted need to modify the Montreux Convention. He had agreed with the Marshal in these discussions that insofar as the British Government was concerned they favored revision. Revision could only be made by agreement with the signatories with the exception, of course, of Japan. He had also frequently expressed his readiness to welcome an arrangement for the free movement of Russian ships, naval or merchant, through the Black Sea and back. He, therefore, opened the discussion on the basis of a friendly agreement. At the same time he wished to impress on Marshal Stalin the importance of not alarming Turkey. Undoubtedly Turkey was very much alarmed by a strong concentration of Bulgarian and Soviet troops in Bulgaria; by continuous attacks in the Soviet press and radio; and, of course, by the turn which the conversations between the Turkish Ambassador and Mr. Molotov had taken in which modifications of Turkey’s eastern frontier were mentioned, as well as a Soviet base in the Straits. This led Turkey to fear for the integrity of her empire and her power to defend Constantinople. He understood, however, that these were not demands on Turkey by the Soviet Government but that the Turks had asked for an alliance and then Molotov had stated the conditions for such an alliance. He quite saw that if Turkey asked for an offensive and defensive alliance, this would be the occasion when the Soviets would say what improvement they wanted in the Turkish situation. However, the Turks were alarmed by the mention of these conditions. He did not know what had happened beyond these conversations. What he should like to know was the present Russian position on the subject.
MOLOTOV said that he would circulate a letter to the President and Churchill giving the point of view of the Soviet Government on this question. He would like to explain the origin of the matter. The Turkish Government had taken the initiative through the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow and had proposed an alliance. This question had been brought up before their Ambassador in Ankara and again in Moscow at the end of May by the Turkish Ambassador. Early in June he had had two conversations with the Turkish Ambassador. In reply to the Turkish proposals he had stated that the Soviet Government had no objection to a treaty of alliance subject to certain conditions. He pointed out the fact that in doing so they should settle their mutual claims. On the Soviet side there were two. The conclusion of a treaty of alliance meant that they undertook each to defend the frontiers of both states. He had pointed out that there were several sections of their frontiers which they considered unjust. In 1921 a portion of their territory had been torn from Soviet Armenia and Soviet Georgia. He pointed out that he was bound to settle this question before the conclusion of a treaty of alliance.
The second question was that of the Black Sea Straits. The Soviet Union had repeatedly let their allies know that they could not regard the Montreux Convention as a correct arrangement and that they were not satisfied with it. The rights of the Soviet Union under this Convention were equal to those of the Japanese Emperor. It seemed to them that this did not correspond to the present situation. On behalf of the Soviet Government he had presented certain proposals which had been set forth in the Soviet paper which he was now circulating. At the same time, he had pointed out to the Turks that if both of these issues were settled the Russians were ready to conclude an alliance. He had also informed the Turks that the Soviet Union was prepared to settle any questions which the Turks raised on their side. He had added that if the Turkish Government were not prepared to settle these two questions the Soviet Government was prepared to make an agreement on the Straits alone between the Black Sea Powers.
CHURCHILL said that this was an important document which went far beyond the conversations between Eden and himself and Stalin and Molotov.
MOLOTOV said that the treaty of alliance with Turkey had not been under consideration at that time.
CHURCHILL inquired whether the words “proper regular procedure” in paragraph one of the Soviet paper meant that all signatories except Japan would be consulted. He repeated [that] different questions were raised in this paper, when a Russian base in the Straits was asked for; also by the proposal that no one had anything to do with the Bosporus and the Dardanelles except Russia and Turkey. He was certain that Turkey would never agree to this proposal that was being made.
MOLOTOV said that similar treaties had existed in the past between Russia and Turkey.
CHURCHILL asked if he meant the question of a Russian base in the Black Sea Straits.
MOLOTOV replied that he meant treaties which provided for the settlement of the Straits question only by Turkey and Russia. He referred to the treaties of 1805 and 1833.
CHURCHILL said he would have to ask his staff to look up these ancient treaties and added that he had only pointed out the difference between these proposals and those which had earlier been discussed. He said that the British were not prepared to push Turkey to accept these proposals.
STALIN said that they had not discussed the proposals before but had only had conversations.
MOLOTOV said that they had proposed to submit the matter to the June meeting of the Foreign Ministers which had not taken place.
CHURCHILL said that he stood by his conversations with Stalin in which he, Churchill, expressed the willingness to press for the revision of the Montreux Convention side by side with Stalin. That agreement still stood, but he felt quite free with regard to these new proposals.
STALIN said: “Yes,” he was free.
THE PRESIDENT said he was not ready to express an opinion and suggested that they defer consideration of the question.
This was agreed to.
THE PRESIDENT said that they were sending a telegram to the Polish Government and as the matter was sure to leak out he suggested that they prepare a communiqué.
CHURCHILL inquired whether it would mention the purpose of the visit.
STALIN said it would be better not to mention the purpose of the visit, but it made no difference to him whether they issued a communiqué or not. Stalin thought it better not to release the whole text of the invitation.
THE PRESIDENT said he agreed.
MOLOTOV said that the Soviet Delegation would send in its proposal with regard to Koenigsberg in writing.
Treatment of Soviet Prisoners in a British Camp in Italy
MOLOTOV said that the camp referred to was camp no. 5 which was located near Rimini. He said that this camp, which was under British authorities, contained Ukrainians. The first statement they had received from the British stated that there were about 150 prisoners in this camp. When their representatives came to see the camp they found that there were 10,000.
CHURCHILL inquired from whom they had obtained these figures and on what date.
MOLOTOV said he would give particulars.
CHURCHILL said that the British did not make false statements.
MOLOTOV said that he understood that the British had formed a whole division of twelve regiments of these Ukrainians with officers selected from those who had been in the ranks of the German army. When their representatives had visited this camp they had found that 665 persons stated their willingness to return to their native country.
CHURCHILL said they welcomed inspection by the Russians of all of their camps. Perhaps some of these persons were Poles. In any event, he would have an investigation made and obtain a report.
MOLOTOV replied that there were only Ukrainians in the camp. He added that they had received a telegram from General Golikov, who was in charge of the repatriation of Soviet prisoners, only today.
Meeting adjourned.