Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

216

Trusteeships

On the suggestion of STALIN, this matter was also postponed until the next meeting in order to give the President and Churchill time to consider these Soviet proposals.

Meeting adjourned.

Cohen Notes

Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 4 p.m.

The Report of the Foreign Ministers was received. A change in paragraph 3 ii of Council of Foreign Ministers was adopted. This was to provide for permanent secretariat.

There was considerable discussion as to what the foreign secretaries did favor regarding Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece. Molotov, however, indicated that there should be a relaxation of present restrictions now that the war has ended.

CHURCHILL: On elections – I want to [make] clear that supervision of elections does not mean control.

BYRNES: Observation is a better word.

CHURCHILL: I wanted to make it clear that we did not have the responsibility.

Continued discussion of the foreign secretaries’ report. BYRNES proposed admission of Italy to the United Nations as suggested by President at first meeting, with a declaration against admission of Spain.

EDEN suggested also examination of question of the admission of neutrals. MOLOTOV inquires about Rumania and Bulgaria and sentiment in favor of admitting such countries upon the conclusion of the peace treaty.

CHURCHILL: May I raise a small point of procedure? There is really not time between meetings of foreign secretaries in the morning and the meeting of the Big Three in the afternoon. I suggest that we meet at 5:00.

TRUMAN: I should like us to have the Report of the foreign secretaries by 3:30.

The first matter is Council of Foreign Ministers.

CHURCHILL: I think the meeting place should be in London. London is the capital city most under the fire of the enemy and the longest in the war. It is the largest city in the world. It is more nearly half way between the United States and Russia than any place on the continent. I have twice gone to Washington, twice to Moscow, but London has not been used in the whole of this war. There is great feeling in England on this. I would ask my colleague, Mr. Attlee, to say a word on this.

ATTLEE: I entirely agree with the Prime Minister. The people of London have a right to see these distinguished people and the geographic argument is a strong one.

TRUMAN: I agree. The United States feels it has had its share. London is entitled to its share and the geographical position is right.

STALIN: I agree.

CHURCHILL: May I express our thanks to the President and the Marshal for their acceptance of our invitation.

TRUMAN: What about the time?

CHURCHILL: We will leave that to the foreign secretaries.

STALIN: I agree.

TRUMAN: The next point is our policy toward Italy. The gist of my statement is surrender terms should be terminated and replaced by simple undertakings and peace concluded as rapidly as possible.

STALIN: It would be well for the foreign secretaries to discuss this question. I have no objection in principle but certain drafting amendments, and improvements may be necessary. It would be well to refer this paper to the foreign secretaries and to bring up the question of the other satellites, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary at the same time. We have no right to single out Italy. Italy helped Germany. Bulgaria and Rumania moved their troops against Germany. I am bound to say that their armies fought well. Finland did not give support in the war against Germany, but her position is all right and should be facilitated. The same applies to Hungary. It would be well in facilitating the position of Italy to facilitate the positions of the other satellite countries. If you agree, the foreign secretaries may be asked to examine the question of satellites as a whole.

TRUMAN: I brought up Italy because she surrendered first and surrender terms were the hardest. After Italy has been taken care of, we shall take up the others.

CHURCHILL: Our position regarding Italy is a little different. We were attacked by Italy in 1940 and suffered heavy losses in Egypt and in the Mediterranean. Unaided we had to undertake the Abyssinian campaign. Special Italian air detachments were sent to bombard London. Italy made most dastardly attack on Greece, our Ally; just before the war, she seized Albania. All these things happened when we were alone. We suffered most grievously from Italian action. We can not entirely acquit the Italians of responsibility. Nevertheless, we have tried to keep alive the vitality of Italy. Mr. Roosevelt and I made a joint declaration on it. When there was a question of dividing the Italian ships into three parts, it was agreed that Russia should have her share or the equivalent. We are not hostile to Italians simply because we spoke harshly of Count Sforza who did foolish things.

I am anxious to join with the Marshal in sending a message to the Italian people. Therefore, the British government does not object in principle to making peace in Italy. This work will take several months and one wonders whether the peace conference can be so far away. I also notice that the Italian government has not yet had its elections.

It is the intention of the Italian government that elections should be held before winter. Therefore, while I agree that the foreign secretaries should start on this work, I do not think a final conclusion should be reached until the Italian government rests on a recognized democratic base. In the meanwhile, I do not find myself in full agreement with the President’s position to replace surrender terms with undertakings which the Italian people are no[t] prepared to assume. There would be a gap.

The proposed undertakings do not cover the future of Italian fleet, colonies, reparations, etc. We would lose our rights under the surrender. Finally, the terms of surrender were signed by the Dominions. They would have to be consulted. I do not wish to go further than to assent to the preparation of a peace treaty. I am bound to say that I can not feel that Bulgaria has any particular claim on Great Britain. She struck us a deadly blow and did what she could to hurt us in the Balkans. Bulgaria has hardly suffered at all in this war. She did injury to Greece and Yugoslavia, her neighbors. She was a menace and kept Turkey out of the war.

STALIN: The question of Italy and the satellite countries are questions of great policy. The purpose of such a policy is to separate from Germany the main aggressive forces, these satellite countries. There are two ways. We could use force. Force was successfully applied during the war. But the use of force is not enough to separate satellites from Germany. If we use force alone there is danger that we shall create a medium that will favor the association of these countries with Germany. Therefore, it is expedient to add to force a policy which would wean the satellites from Germany. This is the only means to rally the satellites about us and to separate them from Germany. All consideration of revenge, all complaints for suffering lapse in the face of this high policy. So I favor in principle the paper presented by the President on Italy and would extend it to other satellite countries.

There is another aspect of this question I have in mind. The second part of Mr. Churchill’s speech. Of course Italy committed sins against Britain. She committed sins against Russia also but not as great. Italians fought as far as the Don and the Volga but it would be incorrect to be guided by injuries or feelings of retribution. The feelings of revenge and retribution are poor guides in politics. We should be guided in politics by the calculation of forces. Do we want to have Italy on the side of the United Nations? I think so. The same must be said with regard to the other satellites. Many difficulties were caused by satellites like Rumania, Hungary. Great defeats were caused to us by Finland. It was Finland’s help that enabled Germany to blockade Leningrad. Less injuries were caused to us by Bulgaria but she also helped Germany to fight Russia, but she did not declare war or send her troops to Russia, but she caused harm to our Allies in Greece and Yugoslavia. Bulgaria should be punished and should pay reparations. But it is also contemplated in the Armistice that Bulgaria should fight Germany. Bulgaria’s Army must be demobilized and reduced to peacetime strength. Such are the sins of the satellites against the Allies and the Soviets in particular. After the satellites have been brought to their knees and the Control Commission has taken over, it is high time to pass over to another policy.

And now as to specific proposals. President Truman does not propose immediate peace treaty. All he proposes is that the way should be cleared. For the time being, he proposes an intermediate state of affairs. I think it is difficult to be opposed to such a proposition. As to other satellites, I do not propose this intermediate state, but I do think that we can start having diplomatic relations with them. Democracy is Democracy the world over.

TRUMAN: I have made clear my position on the recognition of the satellites. I have no objection to Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary as well as Italy having their position facilitated by us. While nations must be punished, we want no peace of revenge.

The United States can not, moreover, pour out its resources without prospective return. We want to get satellites on a self-supporting basis. I will not sanction the continued handing out of funds to nations which should be self-supporting. We want to help these nations to become self-supporting. I am hopeful that this matter can be referred to the foreign secretaries.

CHURCHILL: I think we are agreed that preparations of the peace should be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. I merely point out we can not give up the surrender terms while we prepare peace terms. There is no objection to announcing peace treaties with Italy will be prepared – and also with the satellite countries.

I have great sympathy with the view expressed against the peace of vengeance and I have great sympathy with Italy. I mentioned reparations. We will not claim reparations from Italy for ourselves but for Greece.

TRUMAN: Let us refer the easing of the surrender terms to the foreign secretaries.

CHURCHILL: I am for the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy but I think the interim steps should be considered by the foreign secretaries.

STALIN: I should like to have the foreign secretaries discuss the question of other satellite countries.

CHURCHILL: I have no objection.

TRUMAN: Let us proceed. The next point is Vienna and Austria.

CHURCHILL: I regret to have to speak against the Soviet view. The situation in Vienna and Austria is very unsatisfactory. We have been unable to agree on zones which had previously been agreed upon in principle. We have not been able to enter the sector assigned to us. We agreed to reciprocity with respect to inspecting seized ships. Our going into Vienna ought not to be obstructed. The British and Americans retreated in Germany to give Russia her promised zone, but we are unable to enter our sector in Vienna.

STALIN: General agreement was reached as to zones in Austria, but not as to zones in Vienna. But today an agreement was reached. Agreement on air fields took time. The French communicated their agreement to us only yesterday. The French also [always?] delayed. We will now, at once, fix a date for the movement of the troops – today or tomorrow.

MR. CHURCHILL seems indignant but he has no grounds. We were kept out of our zone a whole month and we did not complain. The removal of troops is complicated. There was quicker action in Berlin. Field Marshal Alexander was not skilled in handling these matters. He behaves as if Russian troops were under his control.

CHURCHILL: I am glad to know that the matter is at last settled and we shall be allowed to move into our assigned zone and allocation. I do not think that Field Marshal Alexander is to blame.

STALIN: There are no complaints against Eisenhower. I am not complaining against Alexander. I am only reporting the difficulties.

TRUMAN: If the matter is satisfactorily settled, let us proceed to the western frontier of Poland.

STALIN: If you are not prepared, this may go over until tomorrow.

TRUMAN: The next subject is trusteeship.

STALIN: If you are not prepared, we shall postpone for tomorrow. Adjourned.

217 
761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 20, 1945 — 6:30 p.m.
[Translation]
Very secret
urgent

1427

Re your telegram No. 913.

After considering this matter most carefully, I wish to express my unreserved opinion in the following manner:

  1. Since July 14 an American task force has been operating in the waters off the northern section of Honshu Island; they have come close to the shore in the areas of Kamaishi, Muroran, and Mito and have shelled them in a naval bombardment; we have heard that their carrier-based planes have been menacing traffic between the mainland and Hokkaido and have sunk a great number of ships. Our defensive measures, according to enemy broadcasts, have been next to nothing, even with our Navy and Air Force. This is most regrettable, but it may also be taken as the truth in the matter of how weak our war potential has become. If this trend continues, with every passing day the enemy fleet should be more able to move at will, as though it were unopposed. Actually, the names of the ships comprising the task force and even the name of the task force commander have already been ostentatiously broadcast, hurling an open challenge to the Japanese Navy.

  2. On the other hand, the enemy air forces based in areas such as the Marianas, Okinawa and Iwo, attack various parts of Japan almost continuously. Large metropolitan areas have already been destroyed and the bombings have even reached out to the small and intermediate-sized cities, quite aside from arms-production facilities and oil-storage dumps. The successive destruction and conflagration of our cities continue. Moreover, just as our anti-aircraft defenses have manifestly decreased in their effectiveness in comparison with the days when the B-29s first started their attacks, so have we also had the command of the skies wrested from our grasp. We cannot assess this any other way.

  3. Once the command of the skies has been taken from us by the enemy, our fighting strength will decline at an accelerated rate. This is quite clear if you look at Germany’s example. Furthermore, once you have relinquished the mastery of the skies to the enemy it is well nigh impossible to regain it without outside assistance. For the Empire there is no hope other than that of mass production of aircraft in Manchuria. This development is quite recent and it is not only difficult to be sure just how much to expect from Manchurian production but also Manchuria itself is about to become a victim of mass bombing from nearby Okinawa.

  4. Although I cannot know with certainty whether there is going to be an enemy landing on the mainland, I do not have sufficient faith to declare such a thing impossible, and I believe that we should be prepared for a landing, considering the thorough manner of the landing tactics in the enemy’s Leyte operations, although there may be some differences because of geographic conditions. Furthermore, assuming that a date for the landings has been set, it is equally clear that this would be after our fighting strength has been completely destroyed.

    In order to knock out our fighting strength, the enemy will pay special attention to depriving the people of their means of livelihood, besides directly destroying military installations and industrial plants and bombing the cities. The enemy must know about our food shortage. They must also have a thorough knowledge of how great an influence the present autumn harvest will have on our fighting strength; and so plans on their part to destroy our crops should not be considered impossible with the coming of harvest time. For instance, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the enemy will ascertain the period when the paddies are dry and the rice-plants are ripe throughout the nation and devise methods of burning these up at one stroke. As far as they are concerned, it is a weakness of ours which they should only naturally exploit.

    If we lose our autumn harvest, our situation will be absolutely critical and we will be in no position to continue the war. Our Empire, which has already lost command of the skies, can do nothing to combat the above circumstances; we are at the mercy of the enemy and committed to whatever the enemy should will.

  5. As I have already urged in my telegram No. 1143, continuing the war after our fighting strength has been destroyed should be considered impossible. It goes without saying that the Imperial Army and the populace as a whole will not surrender to the enemy as long as there is no Imperial command to do so; they will literally not throw away their spears until the last man. But even if the officers and men and the entire citizenry, who already have been deprived of their fighting ability by the absolute superiority of the enemy’s bombing and gunfire, were to fight to the death, the state would not be saved. Do you think that the Emperor’s safety can be secured by the sacrifice of seventy million citizens?

    With the above thought in mind, I have come to the conclusion that the individual’s position, the honor of the military, and the pride of the people cannot take the place of the state, and that there is no other way for us than to hurry and make up our minds to advocate peace.

  6. I had been thinking that the peace proposal through the special envoy mentioned in your telegram No. 893, which was to be put forward in Moscow, was most right and proper. The dispatch of the special envoy, however, unfortunately met with disapproval from the Soviet side (my telegram No. 1417), making it necessary to contrive some other way.

    Once peace has been decided upon, although it may be difficult to avoid some harsh conditions which the Japanese citizens must endure as a result, we should be prepared for such an eventuality and have our military representatives and theirs conclude an agreement to terminate hostilities within the shortest possible time; we should put a stop to further sacrifices.

    One of the conditions for peace that will require reservation and emphasis on our part is the matter of protecting our national polity. This will have to be for us an absolute requirement, and the fact that it will require us to make a strong impression on our opponents to this effect has already been stated in my telegram No. 1416. Regarding this matter of protecting the national polity, one way is to consider the matter one of a domestic nature and therefore excluded from the terms of a peace treaty. In this case, however, even though it may be but a formality, it will be necessary to hold something like a constitutional convention to hear the people’s voice for the sake of appearances. And it cannot be expected that there will be no open opposition to the maintenance of the national polity from some extreme leftists at such a convention. Again, convening a constitutional convention may itself run counter to our Constitution; and if we are to cope with emergency circumstances, it will be necessary to find appropriate solutions regarding such criticisms of unconstitutionality.

    On the other hand, we may be able to solve the problem of our fundamental form of government with this formality and it may even be relatively easy to get the enemy’s agreement, but I find this difficult to judge. In fact, if we resolve to have the Imperial Household above us under the general will of the people, our national polity might, indeed, carry a great deal of weight throughout the world.

  7. What I mean to say as a peace proposal is to approve most of the enemy’s conditions with the exception of the protection of the fundamental character of our form of government. As long as the fundamental character of our government is preserved, it would mean that our country’s honor and existence will be guaranteed in the minimum degree, and I trust this will not run counter to the purport of your telegram No. 913-2 (please refer to my telegram No. 1416).

  8. Our country is literally standing at the crossroads of destiny. If we were to continue the war under the present circumstances the citizens would die with the satisfaction of having truly served their country loyally and patriotically, but the country itself would be on the verge of ruin. Although it is possible to remain loyal to the great and just aims of the Greater East Asia War to the very end, it is meaningless to insist on them to the extent of destroying the state. We should protect the survival of our country even by enduring every kind of sacrifice.

    Since the Manchurian incident Japan has pursued a policy of authoritarian rule. In the Greater East Asia War, she finally plunged into a war beyond her means. As a result, we are confronted with the danger of having even our mainland trampled upon. Since there is no longer any real chance of success, I believe that it is the duty of the statesmen to save the nation by coming quickly to a decision to lay down our arms. If we seek peace, of course, we know roughly what the terms will be by observing the example of Germany. It is inevitable that the people will have to endure the heavy pressure of the enemy for a long period of time, but the nation will live on and we may be able to recover our former prosperity again after several decades. The government should certainly select this path. I ceaselessly implore that we put His Majesty’s mind at ease without any delay whatever.

    In the postwar dawn we must strive to carry out thoroughgoing reforms throughout the country, to democratize politics in general, and to do away with the domineering and selfrighteous attitude of the bureaucrats in order to realize a truly harmonious relation between the Emperor and the people. The scorn for diplomacy and the indifference to international relations, even before the Manchurian incident, were the cause which brought about our present misfortune. In view of the fact that we shall encounter problems in finding a way out of our difficulties while being buffeted about by the storm of international relations in the postwar period, we recognize the urgency of adopting the best political system which will attach importance to future foreign relations.

    Since entering into the anti-Comintern pact our foreign policy has been completely bankrupt. The whole thing had its inception in our splitting the world into an Axis force and an anti-Axis force by joining forces with Nazism. For the future, we must clearly recognize our past mistakes and fundamentally reconstruct our foreign policy.

  9. In obedience to the Imperial proclamation of war, it was the bounden duty of all the people to devote every effort to the achievement of the war objectives. Therefore I also endeavored to contribute my humble efforts to this cause. In view of the present situation, however, I consider it necessary to recognize frankly that the prospects in the present war have become desperate. The theory that we should counterattack with all our strength, if the United States and England should land on our mainland, and thus make them tire of the invasion should be carefully evaluated. I might have had some faith in the firm belief of the military and the government that our war potential can still inflict quite a blow on the enemy (your telegram No. 913-2) and I might have placed some hope in this if we had not yet lost control of the skies and of the sea. Today, however, we find ourselves in a situation in which we cannot repel the daily attacks of the enemy naval and air forces and in which our production facilities are continuously being destroyed. Moreover, we must consider that this situation will become rapidly even worse as time passes. The resulting imbalance of the opposing forces cannot be rectified no matter how heroically our soldiers and people fight. It also goes without saying that groups such as organized guerrillas cannot accomplish much in the face of modern weapons. Thus, after an enemy landing on our mainland, there would be a struggle for every inch of land and repeated valiant fighting until we became exhausted and finally laid down our arms. By that time, as can be seen in the case of Germany, the entire country would already have been trampled by the enemy and the national sovereignty would have been transferred to an occupying power.

    I only pray that we may quickly terminate the present situation, in which we can no longer hope to achieve our future objectives and in which we continue to resist simply from past inertia, and that we may save hundreds of thousands of lives which would be uselessly sacrificed and thereby stop short of the destruction of the nation, save our 70,000,000 people from misery, and endeavor to maintain the survival of our race.

    I realize that it is a great crime to dare to make such statements, knowing that they are contrary to the views of the government. The reason for doing so, however, is that I believe that the only policy for national salvation must coincide with these ideas. Therefore, even though I am criticized as being a defeatist and am asked to take the responsibility of submitting to this criticism, I assert that I must willingly accept the responsibility.

    Thus I was able to express my views freely, and I need not repeat them further. I beg that you understand that the motive which prompts me to say these things is my sincere concern for the country. I cannot cease praying that my words, because of too much concern, may not result in unfounded and distorted views.

218

Truman-Churchill conversation

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill

Memorandum by the President

[Babelsberg,] July 20 [1945]

Told Churchill about it. Also asked Churchill not to let any proclamations be issued by control council while we are in session here[.]

According to Leahy: “President inform Churchill. The French Government in an adjustment of the exchange value of the franc is paying $17 per month to American soldiers serving in France at the present time.”

219

Truman-Stalin conversation, about 6:45 p.m.

Cecilienhof Palace, Potsdam

Present
United States Soviet Union
President Truman Generalissimo Stalin

Memorandum by the President

[Undated]

Question asked of Stalin after meeting on 20th. Had already asked him when he called. Agreed to it in a few days.

220

Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Murphy Sir Walter Monckton Mr. Maisky
Mr. Clayton Mr. Turner
Mr. Pauley 
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2045

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

[Undated]

Notes on Soviet Suggestions That the Ruhr Be Internationalized

MAISKY: To ensure control of German War Potential, USSR has considered internationalization of the Ruhr area of four million people under Four Powers, U.S., USSR, U.K. and France which would regulate production of Ruhr area. If sympathetic, Economic Sub Committee should prepare plan for Foreign Secretaries.

MONCKTON: Area? Timing?

MAISKY: Whole industrial area. As soon as possible and “more or less permanently.”

MURPHY: Under Control Council?

MAISKY: Probably a special organization.

CLAYTON: Rhineland and Ruhr?

MAISKY: Probably but no definite area tonight.

CLAYTON: More than four million people.

TURNER: Westphalia and Rhineland – eleven million people.

PAULEY: 25x50 miles – all black coal plus much industry.

MONCKTON: Can only take note. Can’t say a word. Seems political as well as economic.

CLAYTON: Leave Germans there?

MAISKY: Yes.

CLAYTON: Leave them in ownership of properties?

MAISKY: That is another question.

CLAYTON: Which direction will products flow?

MAISKY: That is for Governments to decide.

CLAYTON: Agree Monckton as to political – can’t take into this Committee without instructions.

MAISKY: Please consult individual ministers.

MONCKTON: Is there a Soviet paper? Otherwise Molotov should bring up.

MAISKY: No paper. Please think over. Pauley had mentioned in Moscow.

PAULEY: If you could control coal – you could turn it on and off.

221

The Pittsburgh Press (July 20, 1945)

Truman cites peace and prosperity as America’s only aim

U.S. seeks no new territory, he asserts; President plays piano at state dinner
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

…

222

Editorial: ‘Unequivocally’ for Poland

…

223

Youngstown Vindicator (July 20, 1945)

Eliot: Big Three secrecy following old silly pattern

Dangerous rumors, leaks result; Truman against Russian blackout
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot

…

224

Lawrence: Truman uses new method

Puts Potsdam conference on less personal base than Yalta meeting
By David Lawrence

…

225

U.S. State Department (July 20, 1945)

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Friday, July 20:

Lieutenant Colonel James A. Blair, an old friend of the President on duty in the Berlin area, and Sergeant Truman had breakfast with the President. Shortly after breakfast Sergeant Truman left Babelsberg for Gatow to enplane for Paris and return to the United States.

1200: Generals Eisenhower and Bradley (Omar N. Bradley) called on the President.

1230: General Eisenhower, General Bradley and Colonel Howard A. Rusk were luncheon guests at the Little White House.

1330: The President, accompanied by Secretary Stimson, Assistant Secretary McCloy and Generals Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton, and Clay, left the Little White House by automobile for Berlin. Generals Eisenhower and Bradley rode with the President in an open car.

1400: The President and party arrived at the U.S. Group Control Council Headquarters (Teltower District, Berlin), where the President participated in the official raising of our flag over Berlin…

The President left the scene immediately after the ceremony and returned directly to the Little White House. At 1500 mail was dispatched to Washington.

At 1545 the President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof.

At 1605 the President called the fourth meeting of the Berlin Conference to order. The meeting adjourned at 1840 when the conferees assembled in the Palace dining room for a buffet lunch. Our party left the Palace at 1855 for the Little White House.

Colonel L. Curtis Tiernan, Chaplain Corps, USA, arrived in Babelsberg this afternoon and was a guest of the President for the next several days. Colonel Tiernan was the chaplain of the President’s outfit during World War I, and is now Chief of Army Chaplains in the European Theatre.

2000: Dinner at the Little White House with Assistant Secretary McCloy, Admiral Land and General Clay as guests. Sergeant List, accompanied by Pfc Stuart Canin (concert violinist), played during dinner.

226

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 21, 1945)

Dreimächtekonferenz in vollem Gange

Die alliierte Verwaltung von Deutschland

…

227

L’Aube (July 21, 1945)

Aux « frontières communes » de l’Extrême-Orient –
Les positions respectives de l’URSS et des États-Unis vont être définies à Potsdam

Les deux « Plus Grands » veulent éviter les points de friction

…

228

U.S. State Department (July 21, 1945)

Fourth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Dunn Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Clayton Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gusev
Mr. Harriman Sir William Strang Mr. Maisky
Mr. Murphy Mr. Ward Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Matthews Mr. Novikov
Mr. Cohen Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Russell
Mr. Thompson 
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2145

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Potsdam, July 21, 1945, noon
Top secret

Agenda

1. Date of establishment of Council of Foreign Ministers
It was agreed at yesterday’s meeting of the Big Three that the Foreign Ministers should decide at what date the newly approved Council of Foreign Ministers should be formally set up.

2. German Economic Questions
The subcommittee which has been working for some days on these questions is presenting its first report.

3. The Polish question – Liquidation of the London government and implementation of the Yalta agreement
The subcommittee which has been working on this question is ready to report.

4. Implementation of the Yalta agreement on liberated Europe and satellite states
In accordance with the decision taken at yesterday’s meeting of Foreign Ministers, the U.S. is presenting a new paper on this subject setting forth in specific terms the steps which we believe should be taken in the countries in question in order that the Yalta Declaration may be implemented.

5. Italy and the other satellites
The Big Three at yesterday’s meeting referred to the Foreign Ministers the question of easing in the near future the armistice terms imposed on Italy and the other satellites. The U.S. is presenting new proposals on this subject.

6. Turkey
It is understood that the British Delegation desires to raise orally with the Soviet Delegation the question of Soviet desires concerning the modification of the Montreux Convention and concerning other aspects of Soviet-Turkish relations.

229

Thompson Minutes

Potsdam, July 21, 1945, noon
Top secret

The meeting of Foreign Ministers began at 12 noon on Saturday, July 21, 1945. Secretary Byrnes was in the Chair.

Date of Meeting for the Council of Foreign Ministers

MR. BYRNES said that the first item of business was the fixing of the date of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He proposed not later than September 1.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired what day of the week this would be.

MR. EDEN replied that it was Sunday.

MR. MOLOTOV said he agreed.

It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers would meet at a date not later than September 1.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired in what composition would the Council of Foreign Ministers meet.

MR. BYRNES replied that they had agreed first of all to meet in London and that they would have a formal meeting there to set up the Council.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired if this meant five members. He pointed out that the composition of the Council would determine the type of questions to be discussed.

MR. BYRNES replied that it would be five, because there was the question of organizing the Council and deciding the procedure to be followed.

MR. EDEN pointed out that he did not wish to be grasping. It had been decided that the Secretariat would be in London but the Council might wish to meet elsewhere. He thought this might be said.

MR. MOLOTOV thought they might rotate the meetings.

MR. EDEN proposed that they approve the addition of language to state that the Council should normally meet at London, which would be the seat of its Secretariat, but that it might meet elsewhere by common agreement.

MR. BYRNES said it was decided that they would communicate with France and China before final announcement was made of the creation of the Council. He proposed that they each appoint a representative to draft a telegram. MR. BYRNES named Mr. Matthews, MR. MOLOTOV named Ambassador Gromyko, and Mr. Eden named Mr. Ward, for the purpose of drafting a telegram.

Report of Subcommittee on German Economic Questions

MR. BYRNES pointed out that the Subcommittee on German Economic Questions had presented its report.

MR. MOLOTOV said that the Subcommittee had finished its work late at night and he had had no time to get acquainted with its report. If possible, he would prefer that this question be taken up as item 1 on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting the next day.

This was agreed to.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired if they would have any agenda for the present meeting today.

MR. BYRNES said that they would first consider the questions submitted to them by the Big Three. Then they would take up the reports of the subcommittees which they, the Foreign Ministers, had appointed. Finally, they could consider the agenda for the Big Three meeting.

Polish Question

MR. BYRNES said that papers on this subject had been submitted by the British and Soviet delegations. These had been considered by a subcommittee, and he would now call on the chairman of the subcommittee for his report.

MR. VYSHINSKI said that the subcommittee set up to deal with the Polish question had not reached full agreement on their report. They had had three papers before them: (1) a British paper of July 19, (2) an amended text of the British draft of July 19 which the British had submitted, (3) a Soviet amended draft of the same British text. They were guided in their discussions by the second draft submitted by the British. In drafting the final text on this question there were five matters upon which no agreement was reached. These were:

  1. The first disagreement related to the question of the transfer of the assets of the London Polish Government to the new Provisional Government. The last sentence of paragraph 2 of the British draft was not acceptable to the Soviet delegation, which thought that no discussion of the question of liabilities of the Polish Government should be included in the declaration. The Soviet delegation thought that this was a matter of Polish-American and Polish-British relations. The amount and character of the assets and debts was not known to the Soviet delegation, and they thought that this question should be dealt with separately.

  2. The second difference related to the last sentence of paragraph 4 of the British draft, which related to assurances for the return of Poles to Poland. Mr. Vyshinski pointed out that there were three thoughts embodied in this sentence. The Soviet delegation welcomed the last thought, namely, that the Poles who returned to Poland should have equal rights with other Poles. With respect to the other two thoughts, namely, the question of assurances to Poles and the thought that as many Poles as possible should come home, the Soviet delegation considered that it was not proper to include the mention of these assurances, and they thought that it was already clear that it was desired that as many Poles as possible return to Poland. The Soviet delegation had therefore suggested a shorter sentence, to the effect that the three Governments expect that those Poles that return home will be accorded equal rights with all Polish citizens. The British delegation did not agree with this proposal because of the word “expect.” The British delegation thought that the Polish Government should give assurances.

  3. This disagreement related to the proposal of the Soviet delegation that the declaration include a statement to the effect that the British Government would undertake not to arrest Poles who wanted to return home.

  4. This related to the sentence to the effect that the three powers took note that the Polish Government had undertaken to hold free and unfettered elections, etc. The Soviet delegation agreed to this except for the word “pledge,” which they objected to because the Crimea decision had said “should pledge” and not “pledge.” When the new Polish Government was formed it had given this pledge. A proposal had been made to state “It is the confident hope of the Three Powers that the elections will be conducted in such a way as to make it clear to the world that all democratic and anti-Nazi sections of Polish opinion have been able to express their views freely, and thus to play their full part in the restoration of the country’s political life.” Mr. Vyshinski said that if this meant that all sections of public opinion in Poland, including Nazis, had been able to express their views freely, it was not acceptable. If it meant otherwise, the Soviet delegation proposed to avoid repetition by merely adding to the first part of this paragraph a reference to democratic parties fully participating in the country’s political life.

  5. This difference referred to the freedom of the press to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections. This wording was unlimited and meant that unrestricted freedom of the press was proclaimed. Hostilities had just finished, and the Soviet delegation thought that this would be difficult. They were of the opinion that the press should have greater freedom now because conditions had changed, but this was a Polish internal question and it was impossible to decide it without the Poles.

These five differences the Subcommittee had referred back to the Foreign Ministers. Mr. Vyshinski added that he should mention that there had been other serious differences which had been settled and, with the exception of the five points he had mentioned, the draft had been unanimously agreed upon. MR. BYRNES proposed that they discuss these points in order.

(1) Liabilities and Assets of the Polish Government
MR. BYRNES said that the chairman of the Subcommittee had suggested that the liabilities of the Polish Provisional Government should not be mentioned, because that was a question to be handled between the Polish and American and the Polish and British Governments. He felt, however, that the same thing was true of the question of Polish assets. The United States had recognized the Provisional Polish Government. It had promptly taken steps to protect those assets. He saw no reason to believe that the United States would not transfer them to the government which it has recognized. He was sure that the Polish Provisional Government had no doubt about the United States transferring to it property which belonged to it. The United States was unwilling to make any statement with respect to Polish assets without stating at the same time that we would discuss the question of liabilities through diplomatic channels. Otherwise, a statement with respect to Polish assets might deceive people in Poland and elsewhere, because transfers of this kind must be made subject to any liens under the laws of the United States. Secondly, he did not know what debts might be due to the United States by the Provisional Government of Poland. The Polish Government need have no doubt but that our attitude would be sympathetic, because our attitude toward Poland had always been sympathetic. He disliked to mention in a public statement that we would transfer property to the Polish Government that belonged to them now that we had recognized that Government. That followed as a matter of course. Since, however, his colleagues wanted a statement on this subject, the American representative on the Subcommittee had proposed the following language:

The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property of the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had already stated to the Conference that on the day before the United States had recognized the Polish Provisional Government, the United States Government had learned of a proposal to transfer the Polish Embassy to a third party. The United States Government had intervened and had been prepared to institute proceedings to recover the property had that been necessary. The Polish Government knows this and needs no assurance that it will be treated fairly under the law.

MR. MOLOTOV said he found it difficult to discuss this question without the participation of the Polish Government.

MR. BYRNES said that this was also his position – namely, that the matter could only be discussed with the Poles. He did not know what the debts were, but he would not wish to tell the Poles that we would transfer assets and then find that there were liabilities against these assets. In such a case we would be charged with bad faith. He therefore proposed that they mention neither the transfer of assets nor the payment of liabilities.

MR. EDEN said that they also did not know the extent of the liabilities and debts. They might be sure, however, that the British would not drive a hard bargain. He added, however, that if you deal with the assets you must deal with debts. The British also did not know the amount of the Polish assets. He could assure his Soviet Allies, however, that the British would act in accordance with the obligation they had undertaken by recognizing the Polish Provisional Government. He thought it was best to drop this paragraph altogether.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he did not agree that if they mentioned assets they must mention liabilities. He drew the attention of his colleagues to the manner in which the Polish question was being discussed here and the manner in which it had been discussed at the Crimea. Here the question was a one-sided one. At the Crimea the question was whether or not the British and American Governments would recognize the Polish Provisional Government and not whether the Polish Government would recognize the British and American Governments. He hoped that all these questions of liabilities would be discussed by the parties. There was no need to say anything about it here. He pointed out that the question which had been discussed at the Crimea was only that of the transfer of property which was held by the London Polish Government.

MR. BYRNES said he recalled that Marshal Stalin had raised the question of the transfer of property and that President Roosevelt had said that of course the property of the London Government would be transferred when the new Polish Government was recognized. Mr. Byrnes said he could say the same thing of the Soviet Government. When the Soviet Government recognized the Polish Government, he assumed that it transferred the property of the Polish Government. He assumed also that in making such transfer the Soviets were obliged to take account of Soviet laws and of any liabilities against this property. He would not ask for a declaration that the Soviet Government would comply with its own laws. He knew that it would.

MR. MOLOTOV said that all other questions could be decided by bi-lateral negotiations.

MR. BYRNES said that so far as the United States is concerned they would be decided at the earliest possible date. He did not think that any statement should be made that pressure had to be brought on the United States Government to transfer to the Polish Government property that belonged to that Government.

MR. EDEN pointed out that they had frozen Polish funds.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the matter be referred to the Big Three.

MR. EDEN suggested that Mr. Molotov study the American draft that had been presented during the meeting.

MR. BYRNES said he had offered this substitute draft but he would not be frank if he did not make clear that he would tell the President that, in his opinion, the President should not be a party to a statement in the press that the United States Government would give to Poland property which is rightfully the property of the Polish Government, which it has recognized, without coupling such statement by [with?] a statement that the Polish Government had never questioned that the United States would transfer to the Polish Government the property that belongs to it.

Since Mr. Molotov did not have the Russian text of the new language which had been proposed, the matter was passed over, in order that Mr. Molotov would have time to consider it.

(2) Return of Poles to Poland
MR. BYRNES pointed out that there were two versions of this proposal: one submitted by the Soviet delegation and one submitted by the British delegation.

MR. MOLOTOV said he thought the general idea of both versions was essential and that this general idea should be retained. All the rest was unnecessary and might be offensive to the Poles.

MR. EDEN remarked that he did not see what there was that would be offensive to the Poles. Their object was to get Poles home. He was prepared to agree, however, to some change in the drafting.

MR. MOLOTOV said he did not see why this matter was insisted upon. The Soviet version made clear that the Poles would not be persecuted.

MR. EDEN said that if Mr. Molotov thought the language was offensive, they would accept the Soviet version subject to a minor drafting suggestion.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that there was a change suggested by the Soviet representative, in the last paragraph on page 2 – namely, to substitute for the words “is pledged” the words “in conformity with the Crimea decision has agreed.”

This was agreed to.

(3) Arrest of Poles by British
MR. BYRNES said that the next question was the proposed undertaking that the British Government would take steps on British territory and territory under British control not to arrest Poles who wished to return home.

MR. EDEN said he could not accept in a declaration designed to assure the return of Poles to Poland that they would undertake not to do the opposite. He pointed out that the London Polish Government did not now have any power. Power had been transferred to the new Polish Government.

MR. MOLOTOV said that there would probably be no more such acts and that they could drop the paragraph.

MR. EDEN pointed out that certain governments had been given rights on British territory. The London Polish Government did not now have these rights.

MR. MOLOTOV said that there had been some recent incidents.

MR. EDEN replied that there had been none since recognition of the new Polish Government.

(4) Polish Elections
MR. BYRNES pointed out that the proposed sentence on the free expression of views in the election had not been agreed to.

MR. MOLOTOV said that this sentence would be unpleasant for the Polish Government, that all the thoughts had been expressed in the previous sentence. This sentence would give the impression of mistrust.

MR. EDEN offered to leave out the first part of this sentence if Mr. Molotov would agree to include the last sentence of the draft relating to freedom of the press.

MR. VYSHINSKI drew Mr. Eden’s attention to the fact that in the Subcommittee the British representatives had made just the opposite proposal.

MR. EDEN said that he had not known this.

MR. BYRNES said that at the meeting yesterday Marshal Stalin [Molotov] expressed agreement in principle with the thought that the press should be allowed to report freely on what went on in these countries. Hostilities had ceased and the situation was changed. It would be of great importance in the future relations of the Polish Provisional Government that there be no question in regard to the freedom of the press.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired if there were any complaints that the Allied press could not work in Poland now.

MR. EDEN said it was one thing to let the press in but that it was another as to whether they could say what they wished.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether the correspondents who had visited Poland had complained.

MR. BYRNES said that his information was that for a long while no press representatives had been permitted to visit in Poland.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that there had been no government of national unity at that time.

MR. BYRNES continued that a group of correspondents did visit Poland and that they were not restricted. We did not, however, have any regularly appointed press representatives in Poland.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired if there were any applications pending for American correspondents to go to Poland.

MR. BYRNES said we did not know how these correspondents would be treated if they went to Poland and we only wished to express the hope that they would have freedom.

MR. MOLOTOV said that this would make a bad impression.

MR. BYRNES then proposed that the question be submitted to the Big Three along with the other difficulties that had arisen.

This was agreed to.

Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe

MR. MOLOTOV said that they had not had time to have the document on this question translated into Russian.

At his request it was agreed to pass over this question until he could study the document.

Italian Declaration

MR. MOLOTOV observed that two papers had been submitted on this matter – one on Italy and one on the other satellites. Marshal Stalin had suggested at the meeting yesterday that they simultaneously settle these two questions, and it was Mr. Molotov’s proposal that they consider merging the two drafts.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that at the meeting yesterday it had been recognized that there was a difference between the situation of Italy and that of the other satellites. Italy had signed more severe armistice terms than had the other countries. He preferred two separate declarations rather than one.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that they could be merged in the drafting committee.

MR. BYRNES suggested that the reason for separate texts was that the United States had not recognized the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments. Also, the United States was not at war with Finland. If it was merely a question of drafting, he urged Mr. Molotov to let them take up the matter in two separate papers.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he was proceeding from the suggestion made yesterday by Marshal Stalin. Both of these papers dealt with armistice terms signed by these countries. He was fully aware of and understood the difference between them. The subject of both documents was the same. He could not give a final opinion as he had only had time to read them once. The drafts contained good working material.

MR. BYRNES said that the question was whether there should be one draft or two, and he proposed to refer the matter to the Big Three.

This was agreed to.

Agenda for the Big Three Meeting

MR. MOLOTOV observed that the Soviet delegation stuck to its suggestion for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, and Hungary.

MR. EDEN said that he was circulating a paper on Persia, but he did not ask that it be taken up today.

MR. BYRNES said that he wished to submit a paper which he thought should go to the economic subcommittee. This paper dealt with the necessity of making available increased supplies of oil from Rumania and the use of about 200 tankers to transport this oil.

It was agreed to refer this question to the economic subcommittee.

The agenda of the Big Three meeting was drawn up as follows:

  1. The Polish question – Implementation of the Yalta Agreement and transfer of the Property of the London Polish Government.
  2. Declaration on Italy and Satellite States.
  3. The Western Frontiers of Poland.
  4. Trusteeships.
  5. Turkey.

The meeting adjourned.

230 
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

Proposal by the British Delegation

Berlin, 21st July, 1945
P (TERMINAL) 16
Secret

Persia

  1. His Majesty’s Government and the Soviet Government are maintaining their troops in Persia by virtue of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of the 29th June [January], 1942, under Article 5 of which these forces are to be withdrawn from Persia “not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her Satellites had been suspended.” His Majesty’s Government have suggested to the Soviet Government that the Allied forces should be withdrawn from Persia pari passu and in stages before the final treaty date is reached. The Soviet Government have not, however, replied.

  2. In His Majesty’s Government’s view the time has now come for the complete joint withdrawal of Allied forces from Persia and they propose that this should take place in three stages as follows:

    1. British and Soviet forces would be withdrawn completely from Tehran at once;

    2. After the completion of the first stage, British and Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the whole of Persia except that British troops would remain in Abadan and the southern oilfields area and Soviet troops would remain in a zone in either north-east or northwest Persia;

    3. On the completion of the second stage, British troops would be withdrawn from Abadan and the oilfields area in south Persia and Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the last area in which their troops were stationed in either north-east or north-west Persia.

  3. If this proposal is accepted the demarcation of the withdrawal zones can be worked out afterwards.

231 
023.1/9-1454

Report by the Subcommittee on Poland

[Babelsberg,] 21st July, 1945
P (TERMINAL) 17

NOTE: The Soviet Members of the drafting Committee would omit passages in italics.

The United Kingdom members would omit passages in square brackets.

  1. We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognised by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

  2. The British and United States Governments have already taken measures to prevent the alienation to third parties of property [including merchant vessels] belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They are ready to take immediate measures to arrange for the transfer in accordance with the requirements of the law of such property to the Polish Provisional Government. To this end they are prepared to discuss with properly accredited representatives of the Polish Provisional Government the manner and time of such transfer and the question of the liability of the Polish Provisional Government for the credits advanced to the late Polish Government and other outstanding debts and the relation of such advances to any assets of the Polish State available abroad. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

  3. The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish armed forces and merchant marine. It is their desire that as many of these Poles as possible should return home and they consider that the Polish Provisional Government could itself greatly assist in this regard by giving suitable assurances. [They expect] that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens.

  4. [The British Government will at the same time take measures in order to prevent on British territory and on territories controlled by British authorities arrests of Poles who wish to return to Poland].

  5. The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government is pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. It is the confident hope of the Three Powers that the elections will be conducted in such a way as to make it clear to the world that all [democratic and anti-Nazi] sections of Polish opinion have been able to express their views freely, and thus to play their full part in the restoration of the country’s political life. The Three Powers will further expect that representatives of the Allied Press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.

232 
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2145

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

[Babelsberg, July 21, 1945]
Top secret

Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe

The Three Governments agree upon the following steps of immediate urgency in the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe:

  1. In conformity with the obligations contained in clause (d) of the third paragraph of the Declaration on Liberated Europe the three Governments agree to adopt adequate measures to enable them to become informed of proposed electoral procedures, and to provide for the observation of elections, in Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary for the choice of Governments responsive to the will of the people.

  2. The three Governments agree that in view of the cessation of hostilities in Europe measures should now be adopted to assure prompt and effective procedures to facilitate the entry of representatives of the world press and radio into liberated or former Axis satellite states, and to permit of their freedom of movement, and to afford adequate opportunity for the despatch of their reports without restriction by reason of political censorship, thus providing to world public opinion the basis for an enlightened interest in the welfare and progress of these peoples and a knowledge of the conditions in which they seek to re-establish their ties with other peoples; further, that the three Governments express their desire to see removed, within the countries in question, such restrictions on freedom of the press as may have been imposed to prevent access to news from abroad or the dissemination of news and expression of opinion.

  3. The three Governments agree that the Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, in acknowledgment of the changed conditions since the cessation of hostilities in Europe, will henceforth operate on a tri-partite basis under revised procedures providing for tri-partite participation, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries.

740.00119 Potsdam/7-2145

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

[Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945
Top secret

Policy Toward Italy

The objectives of the Three Governments with regard to Italy are directed toward her early political independence and economic recovery, and the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.

The Three Governments agree to certain steps which would afford some further acknowledgement of Italian contribution toward the defeat of Germany.

  1. The Three Governments will publicly announce their intention to conclude a peace treaty with Italy at an early date coupled with an undertaking to provide Italy with such economic assistance as is practicable and reiterating the desirability of early elections in Italy.

  2. The Allied Commission in Italy will accelerate the steps already taken to transfer increasing responsibilities to the Italian Government.

  3. The Three Governments agree to instruct their respective Ambassadors in Italy, in consultation with the Supreme Allied Commander, together to place before their respective governments before September 1, 1945 a report stipulating those provisions of the terms of surrender to be henceforth considered as inoperative, for approval of the Three Governments.

740.00119 Potsdam/7-2145

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

[Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945
Top secret

Policy Toward Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland

The objectives of the three Governments with regard to Rumania Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, as in the case of Italy, are the early achievement of political independence and economic recovery, and the exercise of the right of the respective peoples ultimately to choose their own form of government.

  1. The preparation of peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland will be undertaken by the Council of Foreign Ministers as soon as possible.

  2. The three Governments will make such public declarations on matters of joint concern with respect to these countries as may be appropriate.

  3. The three Governments recommend to the respective Control Commissions that steps be taken for the progressive transfer of responsibility to the Rumanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian and Finnish Governments, respectively.

  4. The three Governments agree to the revision of the respective terms of armistices with these countries as clauses thereof may become inoperative.

233 
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2145

Rapporteur’s Report

Potsdam, July 21, 1945, noon
Top secret

I. Council of Foreign Ministers
The Foreign Ministers discussed the date of the formal establishment of the Council and agreed that it should be set up not later than September 1. It was also agreed that telegrams of invitation to participate in the work of the Council should be dispatched to the Government of China and the Provisional Government of France before public announcement of the establishment of the Council is made. At the request of the British Delegation, the drafting committee which has been dealing with this question was asked to make a few minor changes in the present text of the proposal.

II. German economic questions
Since the report of the subcommittee on this question had only just been presented and the various delegations have not had an opportunity to give it adequate study, it was agreed to delay the discussion of this subject until tomorrow.

III. Polish question – liquidation of the London government and implementation of the Yalta Declaration
The Chairman of the subcommittee which has been dealing with this subject presented the subcommittee’s report. Since the subcommittee have been unable to reach full agreement, the points of disagreement were discussed at length. The Foreign Ministers were able to reach an understanding on several of these points, but the following were referred to the Heads of Governments for final decision:

a. The paragraph relating to the transfer of assets and the recognition of liabilities by the Provisional Government. (The U.S. substitute draft of this paragraph was presented for consideration.)

b. The paragraph relating to the holding of elections and to freedom of the press.

IV. Implementation of the Yalta agreement on liberated Europe and satellite states
The U.S. circulated a paper on this question at the meeting but it was decided to postpone discussion of the paper in order to allow time for further study.

V. Italy and the other satellite states
The U.S. presented in this connection two papers: one on policy toward Italy and one on policy toward Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. The Foreign Ministers agreed to refer these papers to a drafting subcommittee. A point of difference arose, however, as to whether the drafting subcommittee should be instructed to deal with policy toward all these states in a single paper or to deal separately with Italy on the one hand and with Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland on the other. The Soviet Delegation favored a single paper and the U.S. favored two separate papers. It was agreed that, since the question of policy toward Italy and the other satellites had been referred to the Foreign Ministers by the Heads of Governments, the Heads of Governments should be asked to decide at today’s meeting whether or not the drafting subcommittee should be instructed to prepare a single paper on all of these countries or two papers based on the U.S. drafts.

VI. Agenda of the meeting of Heads of Governments
It was agreed that the Foreign Ministers would recommend to the Heads of Governments that their agenda for this afternoon should include the two questions referred to above, which had previously been referred to the Foreign Ministers by the Heads of Governments and on which the Foreign Ministers now desire further instructions, as well as three questions carried over from the agenda of yesterday’s meeting of the Heads of Governments. The recommended agenda for this afternoon’s meeting would therefore be as follows:

  1. The Polish Question – Liquidation of the London Government and the Implementation of the Yalta Agreement.

  2. Question as to whether in drawing up a policy toward Italy and the other satellites the subcommittee should prepare a separate recommendation on Italy or should prepare a single recommendation on all of the countries in question.

  3. Polish Western frontier. The Soviet Delegation yesterday presented a paper on this subject.

  4. Trusteeship. The Soviet Delegation also presented yesterday a paper on this subject.

  5. Turkey. It is understood that the British Delegation wishes to raise this question orally.

234

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12:15 p.m.

JCS 200th Meeting

Present
Fleet Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Jamison
General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Lincoln
Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Esposito
General of the Army Arnold Captain McDill
General Somervell Captain Stroop
Lieutenant General Hull Captain Oster
Vice Admiral Cooke Colonel Peck
Rear Admiral Flanigan Colonel Dean
Rear Admiral Gardner Colonel Donnelly
Rear Admiral Maples Colonel Stone
Major General Gross Colonel Riggs
Major General Deane Colonel Cary
Major General Norstad Lieutenant Colonel Woodward
Brigadier General Cabell
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore

JCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 21, 1945, 12:15 p.m.
[Extracts]
Top secret

Basic Objectives, Strategy and Policy (CCS 877/4 and JCS 1366/2)

ADMIRAL LEAHY recommended for clarity that the term “this war” be changed wherever appearing in JCS 1366/2 to “the war against Japan.”

GENERAL SOMERVELL read out the wording which he expected Lord Leathers to propose in lieu of the paragraph on cargo shipping appearing on page 21 of the enclosure to JCS 1366/2. He recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff oppose the change since it does not take into account various shipping problems that are the concern of the United States only. He said that Lord Leathers would wish to include this paragraph in the statement of the basic objectives. He considered that the United States Chiefs of Staff might well accept Lord Leathers’ proposal in this regard.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, ADMIRAL GARDNER said that he saw no reason for singling out the question of shipping for inclusion in the statement of the basic objectives since there were other matters such as questions of food and of petroleum products, of the same nature as shipping, that might equally well be included in the statement.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that Lord Leathers would also propose to insert in paragraph III 4c “for use as base or line of communication troops” after “areas” in the third line. He suggested that the United States Chiefs of Staff accept this change provided it was made clear that the change related to British bases in India.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the Enclosure to JCS 1366/2, as amended during the discussion and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 877/5)

Review of Combined Procedures for Munitions Assignments (JCS 1397/2 and 1397/4)

GENERAL ARNOLD proposed a new paragraph 2 to replace that in the enclosure to JCS 1397/4. The change proposed by General Arnold was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that there were so many important matters for the President and the Prime Minister to discuss that he thought that the question raised in this paper might well be handled in a routine manner after the conference is over. He asked if there was any pressing reason why this should be handled at the present time.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the only reason was that there was now an opportunity for the President and Prime Minister to discuss the question.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the draft memorandum to the President and that if Admiral Leahy found an opportunity to take the matter up with the President during the conference that he might do so.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the Enclosure to JCS 1397/4 as amended during the discussion and requested Admiral Leahy to present it to the President at such time as he considered most appropriate.

Internationalization of the Danube River (JCS 1426)

ADMIRAL COOKE pointed out the urgency of acting on this matter at the present time and recommended that the memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff contained in the enclosure be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL HULL said that the Department of State had developed a similar policy in regard to the internationalization of the Danube River and said that a paper approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff would support the Department of State and the Foreign Office in obtaining an agreement.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the Enclosure to JCS 1426 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 896)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

British Troop Ship Employment in U.S. Trans-Atlantic Programs – First Half of 1946 (CCS 679/7)

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the British Chiefs of Staff would request a delay in consideration of this question since sufficient data were not available to them at the present time and since it was affected by the decision which might be reached on CCS 679/6. He thought that the United States Chiefs of Staff should urge the British Chiefs of Staff to complete their studies of personnel shipping and be prepared to discuss the matter with the United States Chiefs of Staff by 15 September 1945.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Confirmed their position as indicated in CCS 679/7 and

b. Agreed to urge that the British Chiefs of Staff complete their survey of passenger ships and be prepared to discuss this subject with the United States Chiefs of Staff by 15 September 1945.

Disposition of Captured German Passenger Ships (CCS 679/6)

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that he understood that the British would offer the Europa for trans-Atlantic service on a 50-50+ basis and that they would agree to the assignment of five of the captured German passenger ships for United States use in the Pacific. He said that the United States wanted all seven of the captured German passenger ships and he thought that the British would agree to the assignment of seven provided the United States Chiefs of Staff made a flat statement that the ships would be used in the Pacific and would not replace there any United States ships for repatriation in the Atlantic.

GENERAL GROSS said that the British might propose that the Europa be used for repatriation of 16,000 Canadians before 31 December 1945.

ADMIRAL FLANIGAN suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should agree that half the capacity of the Europa be used for the repatriation of Canadian troops up to a maximum of 16,000, by 31 December 1945.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Confirmed their position as indicated in CCS 679/6.

b. Agreed to accept a proposal, if made by the British Chiefs of Staff, to employ the equivalent of half the capacity of the Europa for the repatriation of Canadian troops up to a maximum of 16,000 by 31 December 1945.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Collection of Weather Information in Eastern Siberia

ADMIRAL KING proposed a memorandum to the President on the above subject.

ADMIRAL COOKE said that this memorandum related to getting United States personnel into Russia in connection with coming operations and that he considered the matter most vital. He thought that the President should press the question involved with Generalissimo Stalin.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum for the President on this subject proposed by Admiral King.

235

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3:30 p.m.

CCS 198th Meeting

Present
United States United Kingdom
Fleet Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke
General of the Army Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General of the Army Arnold General Ismay
General Somervell Lieutenant-General Macready
Lieutenant General Hull Major-General Hollis
Vice Admiral Cooke
Major General Norstad
Rear Admiral Flanigan
Captain McDill
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Captain Moore Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon

CCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 21, 1945
Top secret

Approval of the Minutes of the 197th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 20 July 1945

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the conclusions of the CCS 197th Meeting subject to the amendment of conclusion b. under item 2 to read as follows:

Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would take steps to obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to the proposed reallocation of areas and command setup in Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia.

b. Approved the detailed report of the meeting, subject to:

  1. The amendment of the 3rd paragraph under item 2 to read as follows:

    General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept the directive on the understanding that the British Chiefs of Staff would be responsible for obtaining the approval of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to the proposed reallocation of areas and command set-up in Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia, since these governments had been party to the original arrangements.

  2. Any later minor amendments.

Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies (CCS 877, 877/1, 877/2, 877/4, and 877/5)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had considered CCS 877/5 and had come to the conclusion that the matter had now reached a stage which was outside the scope of the British Chiefs of Staff. He said that the hands of the British Chiefs of Staff were bound just as were those of the United States Chiefs of Staff. He regretted, therefore, that nothing further could be done in the matter until a decision had been reached on a higher level. He requested that the matter be deferred until such time as a decision on a higher level was forthcoming.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of CCS 877/5.

British Troopship Employment in U.S. Trans-Atlantic Programs, First Half of 1946 (CCS 679/7)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of this matter.

Disposition of Captured German Passenger Ships (CCS 679/6)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of this matter.