Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

860c.85/7-2045: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State

[Washington,] July 20 [1945]
Secret
73

For attention Clayton.

WSA have brought to our attention problem arising out of Polish seamen’s strike regarding which they are communicating to Admiral Land at Potsdam. Crews of merchant vessels controlled by London Polish authorities and chartered or allocated to British Ministry of War Transport struck last week in protest against recognition of Warsaw-Polish Government. Ships affected include five small American-owned coasting steamers transferred to Polish flag by regular procedure under Lend-Lease and operating in British coasting service. So far as known strike has not extended to the single Liberty ship similarly transferred to Polish operation and now loading on West Coast South America.

WSA state idleness of five Lend-Lease vessels on which crews have struck can not be justified for such a cause and only practical method to deal with the situation is to withdraw the ships under charter option requiring thirty days notice or more promptly on some other basis. However, they wish to avoid any action which might prove prejudicial in present Polish situation or which might prejudice atmosphere or otherwise prove embarrassing in connection with Potsdam conference.

Our view is that political character of strike voids essential purpose of allocation these ships to Polish operation, which was to provide crews for them. This seamen’s strike, however justified from viewpoint of the seamen themselves, constitutes interference with shipping and foreign policy operations of this Government and therefore cannot be tolerated; moreover, strike indicates prospect of continuing trouble with these seamen if existing arrangements continue. Therefore we believe ships should be withdrawn from Polish allocation by promptest legitimate procedure unless such action at this time would in any way embarrass proceedings of Potsdam conference. It is believed British would provide substitute crews if the vessels are allocated to them in view of importance to them of coasting services. If new Polish Government subsequently wishes to take over and operate American-owned ships under similar charter arrangements, this question can be discussed on the basis of then existing circumstances. Of course transfer of these ships to British or other allocation would likely make it more difficult to find other ships for later allocation to new Polish Government.

Possibility has been suggested that withdrawal of these ships from Polish operation might provide new Polish authorities with excuse for withdrawing from UMA and that Polish withdrawal might be followed by others. Since however withdrawal of these ships would reduce tonnage under Polish flag and in no way improve Polish ability to provide shipping space for Polish import requirements, disadvantage to Poland of withdrawal from UMA would not be lessened by transferring these struck ships to other operation. In light of information available to us therefore we do not believe possible repercussions UMA should be considered a significant factor as against greater objection to any course of catering to seamen who have struck for political reasons. We understand strike also affects about twenty Polish-owned ships chartered to British Ministry of War Transport but that presents problem for British to solve independently of action taken toward our ships allocated to Polish operation.

We presume this question will be subject of direct discussion with Admiral Land Potsdam, but would appreciate your instructions or comment.

[GREW]

860c.85/7-2045: Telegram

The Acting War Shipping Administrator to the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator

[Washington,] July 20 [1945]
Secret
74

To Admiral Land for Morse from Conway. SD 4486.

In view of the Polish crew strike, Helmbold and I believe we should immediately withdraw N3’s and re-allocate. State Department also of this opinion but believe with us that no action should be taken pending clearance from you since it may embarrass your current negotiations or UMA questions. Liberty crew so far has not joined strike. At meeting in Shipping Division Office State Department Polish desk advised it would be an advantage to take action now on vessels as this would be a propitious time to take a necessary if unpleasant step. However Saugstad fully advising Clayton on situation. I have signed the following letter and dispatched it to the State Department today:

The State Department has been informed of the arrangements under which the War Shipping Administration has allocated six U.S. owned ships to the Polish Government on a “Bareboat out, time charter back” basis. Since the date on which the ships were delivered there has been a change in the recognized Polish Government.

Although we understand that the Polish Government now recognized is apparently the legal successor to the prior government, it has occurred to us that there may be reasons why it would not be desirable to continue the “Bareboat out, time charter back” arrangements with the new government. A strike on the part of the crews of five of the six ships involved has brought this point to an immediate head which will require action on our part. We are informed by a cable from London today that the crews have struck in protest against the recognition of the Warsaw-Polish Government.

From an operating point of view, we cannot justify the idleness of these ships for such a cause; and the only practical method by which we could deal with the present situation is to withdraw the ships from their present allocation either by taking advantage of our charter option to cancel the present arrangements on thirty days notice or otherwise. Since this might be interpreted as an uncordial act towards a newly formed friendly government we would appreciate your advices before taking any further action.

In the event that the ship delay problem is settled before we have been able to take any action along the above lines, it would appear to us, from an operating point of view, that the present arrangements could be continued and the ships thus kept moving without interruption until such time as a definite policy be established. We believe this possible even though, because of the many uncertainties involved, we have felt it necessary for the present to stop payment of charter hire to protect our interest.

The present arrangement was concluded with the then duly authorized Polish authorities, and we have worked with their duly appointed agency, the Gdynia-America Line, which is ninety-eight percent owned by the Polish Government. Pending official word from Warsaw, we feel there is some basis for continuance of the present arrangements. Because of the many factors involved and because of the maturing obligation to pay charter hire, we would also like your advice on this point.

In view of the operating problem involved, your immediate advice is urgently requested.

We have received following cable from Devlin: “Wsa 3714-W 2084 reference our Wsa 3590-W 2038 on five Polish coasters. Situation unchanged as regards Kowel[,] Kolno and Kielce. Kutno crew remains with exception of master and vessel continues in Liverpool-Belfast trade. Krosno anchored Southend with crew and cargo on board[;] crew will leave when vessel ties up at berth. London berthing situation tight account labour and British hesitate to berth vessel as she will be immobilized immediately she ties up. Prospects of settlement extremely uncertain. Unless otherwise advised by you we will take no action as problem apparently one of high level foreign relations.” To which we have replied as follows: “Your present method for handling situation approved. Settlement of dispute not desirable until we are prepared to act under necessary diplomatic clearances. Necessary that we be kept fully advised of any possibility that situation may be changed. We are handling with State Department here and with Morse in Potsdam.”

Informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 3:45 p.m.

No minutes have been found.

Fourth plenary meeting, 4 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Attlee Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Dunn Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Maisky
Mr. Clayton Sir William Strang Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Davies Mr. Gusev
Mr. Harriman Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Pauley
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Cohen
Mr. Thompson

U.S. Delegation Working Paper

Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 4 p.m.

Agenda for Meeting of Heads of Three Governments

  1. Council of Ministers.
  2. Italy in the United Nations, including reference to Spain.
  3. Vienna – Austria (paper to be presented by Mr. Churchill).
  4. Western frontiers of Poland (paper presented by USSR this morning).
  5. Trusteeship (paper presented by USSR this morning).
  6. Turkey (paper to be presented by Mr. Churchill).

Thompson Minutes

Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

MR. MOLOTOV presented his report as rapporteur of the morning meeting of the Foreign Ministers which was as follows:

1. Economic Policy for Germany
Mr. Molotov said that notice had been taken by the Foreign Ministers of the fact that the subcommittee which was dealing with the question of economic policy for Germany had not yet reported.

2. Polish Question
The Foreign Ministers also noted that the committee on this question had not finished its work and they decided to ask it to finish its report by July 21.

3. Peace Settlement
Since the subcommittee instructed to prepare the draft on this subject had not had time to finish its work the Foreign Ministers had arranged to meet just before the present session and had agreed upon a text which they would submit to the present meeting.

Mr. Molotov read the revised text of paragraph 3 of the document on this question (attachment l).

4. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Areas
Continuing the reading of his report Mr. Molotov said that at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers he had submitted a Soviet draft proposal on this question. As a result the situation in Rumania and Bulgaria was discussed on the one hand and the situation in Greece on the other. The discussion revealed the different views held by the Foreign Ministers. Mr. Byrnes proposed that an agreement be concluded by the Big Three with regard to the supervision of elections in Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, and Hungary; with assurances for the free admission of the press into these countries with opportunity to move freely and to be able freely to send in their reports. Mr. Eden associated himself with the proposal. Mr. Molotov had no reason for an agreement on this subject with reference to Bulgaria and Rumania. So far as Greece was concerned the Soviet delegation had submitted a document on this subject. If the United States and Great Britain wished to submit proposals in writing on this subject they could be considered.

THE PRESIDENT interrupted to state that he had understood that Mr. Molotov had agreed in principle that an agreement be drawn up.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he wanted to discuss the proposals which Mr. Eden and Mr. Byrnes intended to submit. So far no proposals had been submitted.

MR. BYRNES rejoined that he had understood Mr. Molotov to agree on the necessity of drawing up an agreement and that it was merely a question of drafting.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he had literally stated that since Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Eden were anxious to submit their proposals the Soviet delegation was prepared to discuss them.

MR. CHURCHILL intervened to state that in his opinion this should be done but that the word “supervision” should not be used as the British had not contemplated control of the elections.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had no desire to superintend elections in these countries.

MR. BYRNES suggested that “observe” would be a better word.

MR. CHURCHILL explained that the British wished to know what went on; they would not wish to have responsibility for the elections.

There being no further discussion, MR. MOLOTOV proceeded to read the next point in his report which related to Italy.

5. Italy
Mr. Byrnes proposed that there be submitted for decision to the three Heads of Government a proposal that they support the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization and that they not support the entry of Spain while that country was under its present regime. Mr. Eden supported this proposal and said that if any declaration of the three powers was made on this subject the British declaration [delegation] would also support association with the United Nations of neutrals such as Switzerland, Portugal, and Sweden. Mr. Molotov had inquired if this would extend to the states which had become cobelligerents. Mr. Eden had replied that he was ready to discuss this question but that in his opinion the entry of these countries into the United Nations Organization could occur only after peace treaties had been contracted with them. This question had been submitted to the subcommittee consisting of Mr. Matthews, Mr. Cannon, Mr. [Hoyer] Millar, Mr. Dean, Mr. Maisky, and Mr. Gusev.

6. Western Frontier of Poland
Mr. Molotov had submitted the proposals of the Soviet Government for the establishment of the western frontier of Poland with a relative map. It was agreed that this question should be taken up by the Heads of Government at the present meeting on July 20.

7. Trusteeship
Mr. Molotov had submitted the Soviet proposals on this subject and it had been decided to refer it to the Heads of Government at the present meeting.

8. Agenda of Meeting of Heads of Government, July 20
Mr. Molotov said that the Foreign Ministers had then drawn up the agenda for the present meeting of the Heads of Government which was as follows:

  1. Procedure for Peace Settlements.
  2. Policy toward Italy.
  3. Situation in Austria, Particularly in Vienna.
  4. Western Boundary of Poland.
  5. Trusteeship.

MR. CHURCHILL raised a point of procedure and suggested that the meeting of Heads of Government be fixed for five o’clock in the afternoon.

This was agreed to.

THE PRESIDENT said he would also like to suggest that the Foreign Ministers not prolong their meetings and that they submit their reports not later than three o’clock in the afternoon.

Procedure for Peace Settlements

The American document on this subject with paragraph 3 as revised at the morning [afternoon?] meeting of the Foreign Ministers was approved.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that the only remaining questions on this subject were those of the time and place of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

MR. EDEN added that there was the question of the secretariat.

THE PRESIDENT said he was willing to refer these questions to the Foreign Ministers to decide.

MR. CHURCHILL said he was pleased for the question to be discussed but he also held a clear opinion that the Council should have London as a permanent home of the secretariat. Meetings could be held elsewhere if necessary. He pointed out that London was the Allied capital which had been most under fire of the enemy and the longest in the war. It was, he believed, the largest city in the world, although there might be some dispute about this, and it was one of the oldest. Moreover it was more nearly half way between the United States and Russia than any location on the continent.

STALIN interrupted to say that the geographic position was the most important question.

CHURCHILL remarked that he had six times crossed the Atlantic during the war and that he had also visited Moscow on several occasions. With the exception of Mr. Molotov’s visit, Great Britain had not been used as a meeting ground in the whole of this war. There was strong feeling in London on this matter and he would ask Mr. Attlee to add a word in support of his position.

MR. ATTLEE said he entirely agreed with the Prime Minister and added that they had a right to see some of these famous people in England. British people had suffered very much and attached importance to this matter. He also thought that the geographic argument was a very strong one.

THE PRESIDENT said that he also agreed and he felt that the United States had had its share by being host to the recent San Francisco Conference. He also thought that the geographic position was important.

STALIN said that he agreed.

THE PRESIDENT said he did not want what he had said to preclude his inviting the Heads of Government to the United States.

MR. CHURCHILL thanked the President and Marshal Stalin for their courteous acceptance of his suggestion.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought the Foreign Ministers should take steps to insure that France and China take part in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

STALIN said he agreed.

THE PRESIDENT noted that the timing of the meeting of the Council was left for the decision of the Foreign Ministers.

Policy Toward Italy

THE PRESIDENT said he had handed in a paper on this subject on the first day. It is proper to recognize the contribution which Italy has made to defeat Germany. In this document he had suggested that the short terms of surrender and the obsolete clauses of the long terms be terminated and he had proposed that they be replaced by the following undertakings on the part of the Italian Government:

  1. That the Italian government will refrain from any hostile action against any of the United Nations pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace.

  2. That the Italian government will maintain no military, naval or air forces or equipment, except as authorized by the Allies, and will comply with all instructions on the subject of such forces and equipment.

    Under this interim arrangement, control of Italy should be retained only so far as is necessary:
    a. To cover Allied military requirements, so long as Allied forces remain in Italy or operate therefrom.

    b. To safeguard the equitable settlement of territorial disputes.

STALIN said it would be well for the three Foreign Ministers to discuss this question. He had no objections in principle, but it might well be that certain drafting amendments and improvements would be necessary. It would be advisable to refer this paper for final consideration of the Foreign Ministers and to ask them to discuss preliminaries with the question of Italy the other satellite states of Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. They had no grounds to single out the question of Italy in the consideration from the other satellites. There is no doubt that Italy was the first to surrender, but she had helped Germany. It was true that the forces she supplied were small but they had helped. She now proposed to come into the war against Japan which counted in her favor. The day after the surrender these countries had moved their troops into action against Germany. Bulgaria had sent eight divisions against Germany and Rumania had sent ten or twelve. He was bound to say that these divisions had fought well. With reference to Finland, he said that this country had not given much support against Germany, but her behavior had been all right. It would also be well to improve and facilitate her position. The same thing applied to Hungary. It would, therefore, be well in improving the position of Italy if they would also improve the position of the other satellite states and throw them all together. If his colleagues agreed, his proposal was that the three Foreign Ministers be instructed to examine the question of improving the situation of Italy and of the other satellite states.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that his reason for bringing up the question of Italy was that Italy was the first to surrender and that the armistice terms imposed upon Italy had been more harsh than those imposed upon the other satellite states. He agreed with Marshal Stalin that the question of the other satellite states should be taken up. He had taken up Italy first for the reasons given and he agreed with Marshal Stalin’s proposals.

MR. CHURCHILL said that the British position with regard to Italy was not quite the same as that of his two honored colleagues. The British had been attacked by Italy in June 1940. They had suffered very heavily in naval losses in the Mediterranean and heavy losses in Africa at a moment when they were in very grave danger themselves. Their losses in warships in the Mediterranean had been very heavy, as had been their land casualties on the North African shore, when Italy put troops in there. Moreover, without help they had had to undertake the campaign in Abyssinia which had restored the Emperor to his country. Detachments of Italian planes had also been sent to bombard London. It should also not be forgotten that Italy had made a dastardly attack upon Greece; just before the war began Italy had made a lawless attack upon Albania and had seized that country. All this had occurred when the British were alone. He said he mentioned this because he thought it should be remembered and in order that it could not be said that they had not suffered most grievously at the hands of Italy. Moreover, he was bound to state that they could not acquit the Italian people of responsibility any more than they could acquit Germany, because it had come under the control of Hitler. Nevertheless, they had endeavored to keep alive the idea of the renewal of Italy as one of the important powers in Europe and the Mediterranean. When he had gone there a year ago he had made a series of proposals to President Roosevelt, the bulk of which with some improvement made by the President were embodied in a joint declaration. He had said this to show that he was not against Italy nor motivated by a feeling of vengeance. When it was agreed, as was decided at Tehran, to divide the Italian fleet between the three powers, or that if a division were not made the Soviet Union would receive a corresponding number of ships, of the fifteen ships provided the British had contributed fourteen, including the HMS Royal Sovereign and four submarines of a new type. He repeated that he mentioned all this to show the injuries they had received and that they were prepared to proceed in a broad manner with respect to the question of Italy’s future.

He had seen it said that they were hostile to Italy. It had been said when they spoke against Count Sforza that they wished to see Italy plunged into misfortune. He repudiated these press statements. He spoke in the name of his government and with a clean heart. He was anxious to join with the President and the Marshal in the principle of making a gesture to the Italian people who have suffered terribly and have aided in expelling the Germans from their land.

They did not dissent from the proposal to make a peace with Italy. This work will certainly take several months, however, and one wonders whether a general peace conference will be so far away when that work is finished. He also noticed that the Italian Government at the present time had no democratic foundation derived from free and unfettered elections. It simply consists of politicians who call themselves leaders of different political parties. It was the intention of the Italian Government, he understood, to hold elections before the winter. While he agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should start on this work of preparing the peace treaty, he thought it was not advisable that they come to a final conclusion until the Italian Government rests on a democratic foundation. Meanwhile, he was not in full agreement with the memorandum of the United States Delegation on the interim measures providing that the long and short terms of the armistice be withdrawn and replaced by an interim arrangement pending the conclusion of a final peace treaty. No government could be depended upon to carry out its undertakings if it were without a democratic foundation chosen by its people. If their existing rights in Italy were abolished, the long and short armistice terms withdrawn, and there was a considerable interval before the peace settlement, they should have lost their power to enforce their rights except by the use of force. He added that no one wanted to use force. They were entitled to receive from Italy compliance with the various terms which they had the right to ask from her. He pointed out that there would be a gap or a hiatus between the withdrawal of the armistice terms and the time when Italy would have a responsible government which could conclude a peace treaty.

He said, for example, that paragraph one of the American proposal which describes the undertakings which the Italian Government would give does not cover the future of the Italian fleet, the Italian colonies, the question of reparations and other important points. If they lost their existing rights under the surrender in the interval, they would not have the power to secure the peace to which they were entitled.

Finally, he must venture to submit to the President that the terms of surrender have been signed by a great many other people. Australia and New Zealand had lost many dead on African soil. The Greeks had, of course, also lost many men, but other countries had signed the armistice terms as well. He did not wish today to go further than to assent in principle to a peace treaty and he should be glad if it received priority by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

With regard to the other countries he was bound to say that Bulgaria had no claim to regard from Britain. It had struck them a blow and had done them all the harm it possibly could. It was not for him to say what the Bulgarians had done against the Russians. Bulgaria had hardly suffered at all in this war. She lay crouching in the Balkans, fawning on German aid. She had also committed many cruelties in Greece and Yugoslavia. She had prevented Turkey’s entry into the war when this would have been most helpful. There had been no proposal to disarm Bulgaria; on the contrary, he believed Bulgaria had some fifteen divisions. No arrangements had been made for reparations from Bulgaria. Bulgaria had also ill treated British and American prisoners of war. Their sympathies lay much more with concluding a peace with Italy than with Bulgaria.

He thanked his colleagues for listening to him and said he thought it was important that they have all the facts before them. He differed in some points from the President and Marshal Stalin.

STALIN stated it seemed to him that the question with regard to Italy and that with regard to the other satellite states generally were questions of high policy. The purpose of such a policy was to separate these countries from Germany as a great force. There were two methods by which this could be done. One was the use of force. This method had been successfully applied by the Allies in Italy and by the Soviet forces in other satellite states. But the use of force alone was not enough to separate the satellite states from Germany. If they confined themselves to the use of force alone, there was danger that they would create a medium unfavorable [favorable?] to the association of these countries to Germany. Therefore, it was expedient to supplement the method of force by the method of improving the position of these satellites. This seemed to him to be the only means to rally the satellites around them and to detach them once and for all from Germany. Compared with these considerations of high policy the questions of revenge and complaints lapsed. It was in the light of these considerations that he viewed the paper presented by the President and he felt that the President’s paper was in full harmony with this policy of detaching the satellites from Germany by easing their position. Therefore, he had no objection in principle to the proposal, but repeated that there might be some improvements of a drafting nature.

He also wished to refer to another aspect of the matter. Of course, Italy had committed great sins. It had committed sins against the Russians as well, but they had not been great ones. They had fought Italy on the Don and in the Ukraine, for they had penetrated that far into his country. He thought, however, it would be incorrect to be guided by the remembrance of injuries. The feeling of revenge, hatred or the desire for redress was a bad adviser in politics. He said it was not for him to teach, but he thought he should be guided in politics by the weighing of forces. The question was, do they wish to have Italy on the side of the United Nations so as to isolate all possible forces which might arise against them from Germany. This determined everything and the same principle applied to the other satellites.

He pointed out that there had been many difficulties and sacrifices caused to them by the satellite states. Rumania had used twenty-two divisions against them. At the termination of the war Hungary had twenty-six divisions and still greater injuries were caused to them by Finland. Of course, if it had not been for the help of Finland, Germany could not have maintained the blockade at Leningrad. Finland had moved twenty-four divisions against Soviet troops. Smaller injuries had been caused them by Bulgaria. She had helped Germany against Russia, but she did not send her troops against them. On the other hand, she had caused harm to the Allies, Yugoslavia and Greece. Bulgaria should be punished for this and he was not opposed to punishing her. The armistice terms provided for reparations to be paid to these two countries. He said not to worry, for the Russians would compel this payment. It was also contemplated in the armistice terms that Bulgaria was to provide troops to fight Germany. This armistice agreement had also been signed by the United States and the United Kingdom. The armistice terms provided that after the end of hostilities against Germany the Bulgarian army was to be reduced to normal. He said that this was being done and that it would be carried out. Bulgaria had no right to resist the execution of the armistice terms and the Soviets would see to it that they did not resist.

Such were the sins committed by the satellite states against the Allies generally and the Soviet Union particularly. If they started to take revenge against them for their brazen behavior and the losses which they had caused, this was one policy and he was against it. The Control Commission of the Three Powers started functioning to keep these countries under control. It was time for a different policy and for easing the position of these countries – not in such measure as the case of Italy – but still it was necessary. The only means to do this was to dig a channel between the Germans and the satellite states.

The specific proposals submitted by the President did not propose that a peace treaty with Italy be immediately prepared. All he had proposed was that the way be cleared for the conclusion in the near future of a peace treaty with Italy and that an intermediate arrangement be concluded which would cover the situation created by the ending of the armistice terms before the conclusion of a peace treaty. It was difficult to oppose this because it was practical and right. With regard to the satellites, he did not propose that peace treaties be signed with them nor even that some intermediate position be accorded them as the President had proposed for Italy. He thought they could start by resuming diplomatic relations with them. With regard to the statement that there were no freely elected governments in the satellite states, he pointed out that no such government existed in Italy and that in spite of this they had resumed diplomatic relations with Italy. The same thing was true of France and Belgium.

CHURCHILL pointed out that these were Allies.

STALIN replied that he understood this, but that democracy was democracy everywhere, no matter whether it was a question of allies or satellites.

THE PRESIDENT stated that as he understood the position he had made a concrete proposal. The armistice agreement with Italy had been signed by the three governments represented here. The same was true of the other armistice arrangements. He had made a proposition with regard to Italy and Marshal Stalin had made a proposal with regard to the others.

STALIN interrupted to point out that the Dominions had not signed these agreements.

MR. EDEN replied that the three countries had signed in the names of all the other United Nations.

THE PRESIDENT interrupted to state that he would like to keep the argument on the questions which they had been discussing, if his colleagues did not mind. On the agenda of their meeting there had been the suggestion of a statement of policy on Italy. Marshal Stalin has raised the question of Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland. The suggestion of Marshal Stalin is that the matter of these satellite states be referred to the Foreign Ministers. The President thought that agreement could be reached on all of these satellite countries. The United States policy in this matter is that it was trying to bring about a feeling of peace in the world and that this did not have to wait a final peace conference for the world as a whole. They were faced with the situation where the United States must expend enormous sums of money because of countries in Europe. With reference to the question of reparations from Italy, it was necessary to take into consideration that the United States was spending from 750 million to a billion dollars to feed Italy this winter. The United States was rich but it could not forever pour out its resources for the help of others without getting something in return. Unless they were able to get these governments on a self-supporting basis, and there was no prospect of getting them on a self-supporting basis the way things were now going, the United States would not be able to continue indefinitely to maintain them when they should be able to help themselves. They had to try at this meeting to prepare conditions which would bring about a situation in which these countries could help themselves. He hoped that they could send this question to the Foreign Ministers and get agreement on all these countries.

CHURCHILL replied that they certainly thought that they were agreed that the preparation of a peace with Italy should be remitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers. He had only deprecated tearing up the surrender terms for that would remove their right to obtain a proper peace.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he was not proposing to sweep away that right.

CHURCHILL replied that he agreed to the easing of the burden on Italy. He supposed that there was no objection to a declaration of policy on Italy.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought they should include the other satellite states.

CHURCHILL said he agreed with what had been said on the subject of not allowing the future to be governed by a spirit of revenge. It had been a great pleasure for him to hear these words from the leaders of the great communities which his colleagues represented. He had great sympathy for Italy. He had mentioned reparations but the British did not want them for themselves. They were thinking of Greece.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that he had submitted concrete proposals with reference to Italy and that Stalin had submitted proposals with reference to the other satellite states. He suggested that they refer these proposals to the Foreign Ministers.

CHURCHILL replied that he could agree here and now to the preparation of a treaty by the Council of Foreign Ministers. With regard to the armistice terms for Italy he agreed that this could be referred to the Foreign Ministers at the morning meeting.

STALIN said that he suggested that the Foreign Ministers discuss the satellites as well and he urged Churchill to accept this.

CHURCHILL replied that he agreed and that he had not objected to this.

The Situation in Austria, Particularly in Vienna

CHURCHILL said that he regretted in the discussion today he appeared to be arguing against the Soviet view. The situation in Austria was very unsatisfactory. It had been agreed that sectors be assigned to them in Austria. The discussion on this matter had been going on for a very long time. Two months ago they were humbly asking that British officers be allowed to go to Vienna in order to look into the question of accommodations. All this had been agreed to in principle. It was with the greatest difficulty that this had been arranged and he had had to address several communications to Marshal Stalin. There had been no satisfactory results from this inspection. The British had no one in Vienna now and they were not allowed to take up their positions. The entry of British troops into Syria [Styria] had not been allowed, although this had been agreed to. Three or four months ago Austria had been liberated by the Soviets. Field Marshal Alexander had submitted a very unsatisfactory report on the situation. The British did not have a foothold. He thought they should be allowed to go to Austria and take up their zone. At the meeting yesterday Marshal Stalin had raised the question of a visit to the German ships. He proposed that they proceed in a reciprocal manner and pointed out that cities occupied by the Russians should also be opened up. He said that the information reaching them regarding conditions in their zone indicated that they were not satisfactory. In the north in Germany they had retreated to their occupation line and the United States forces had retreated from an enormous territory in occupying their zone, but they had not been allowed to set foot in their zone in Austria.

STALIN said that a general agreement had been reached on the question of zones in Austria. No agreement had been reached on the zones in Vienna. It had taken some time to hold negotiations and agreement had only been reached yesterday.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that he had signed the document on this matter today.

STALIN said that there was also the question of airfields. Agreement had also been reached on this matter, but the French had only communicated their agreement yesterday. For some reason the French were always late. They agreed to fix the date of entry of the Allied troops into Vienna and the date for the Soviet troops to leave. The movement of troops could begin today or tomorrow.

He said that Mr. Churchill appeared to be indignant. He wondered why. The Soviets had not been permitted in the United Kingdom zone in Germany. They did not complain. They knew how hard it was to move troops. They had no intention of violating an obligation. If only Austria and Vienna were in question, this question was settled. A wiser action was taken in the case of Berlin and the question of occupation was settled more quickly. Field Marshal Montgomery [Alexander] had acted less skillfully. This was one of the factors that delayed matters. He behaves as if Russian troops were under his control. The British and American commanders in the German zone had behaved well and everything was all right there. There was no objection to each army occupying its zone whether in Vienna or in Austria. Only yesterday that agreement had been reached.

CHURCHILL observed that he was very glad to know that matters were now settled. With regard to Field Marshal Alexander, he wished to say that he really did not think that he had been able to give sufficient attention to all of these matters.

STALIN said that he had no complaints against Field Marshal Montgomery [Alexander], although he had not checked up on the matter.

CHURCHILL replied that he would be glad to have any complaints, if there were any.

STALIN said he did not wish to institute an investigation.

CHURCHILL said he was bound to say that in the absence of any complaint Field Marshal Alexander retains the complete confidence of His Majesty’s Government.

STALIN replied that he understood this. He had no complaint. He had only stated what he had been informed of by his commanders and that this was one of the factors that caused the delay.

CHURCHILL pointed out that the British were not the only people involved. There were American deputies involved and it was on record that the United States had been far from satisfied.

THE PRESIDENT agreed.

Western Frontiers of Poland

STALIN suggested that if his colleagues were not ready today they might discuss this matter at the next meeting.

This was agreed.

Trusteeships

On the suggestion of STALIN, this matter was also postponed until the next meeting in order to give the President and Churchill time to consider these Soviet proposals.

Meeting adjourned.


Cohen Notes

Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 4 p.m.

The Report of the Foreign Ministers was received. A change in paragraph 3 ii of Council of Foreign Ministers was adopted. This was to provide for permanent secretariat.

There was considerable discussion as to what the foreign secretaries did favor regarding Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece. Molotov, however, indicated that there should be a relaxation of present restrictions now that the war has ended.

CHURCHILL: On elections – I want to [make] clear that supervision of elections does not mean control.

BYRNES: Observation is a better word.

CHURCHILL: I wanted to make it clear that we did not have the responsibility.

Continued discussion of the foreign secretaries’ report. BYRNES proposed admission of Italy to the United Nations as suggested by President at first meeting, with a declaration against admission of Spain.

EDEN suggested also examination of question of the admission of neutrals. MOLOTOV inquires about Rumania and Bulgaria and sentiment in favor of admitting such countries upon the conclusion of the peace treaty.

CHURCHILL: May I raise a small point of procedure? There is really not time between meetings of foreign secretaries in the morning and the meeting of the Big Three in the afternoon. I suggest that we meet at 5:00.

TRUMAN: I should like us to have the Report of the foreign secretaries by 3:30.

The first matter is Council of Foreign Ministers.

CHURCHILL: I think the meeting place should be in London. London is the capital city most under the fire of the enemy and the longest in the war. It is the largest city in the world. It is more nearly half way between the United States and Russia than any place on the continent. I have twice gone to Washington, twice to Moscow, but London has not been used in the whole of this war. There is great feeling in England on this. I would ask my colleague, Mr. Attlee, to say a word on this.

ATTLEE: I entirely agree with the Prime Minister. The people of London have a right to see these distinguished people and the geographic argument is a strong one.

TRUMAN: I agree. The United States feels it has had its share. London is entitled to its share and the geographical position is right.

STALIN: I agree.

CHURCHILL: May I express our thanks to the President and the Marshal for their acceptance of our invitation.

TRUMAN: What about the time?

CHURCHILL: We will leave that to the foreign secretaries.

STALIN: I agree.

TRUMAN: The next point is our policy toward Italy. The gist of my statement is surrender terms should be terminated and replaced by simple undertakings and peace concluded as rapidly as possible.

STALIN: It would be well for the foreign secretaries to discuss this question. I have no objection in principle but certain drafting amendments, and improvements may be necessary. It would be well to refer this paper to the foreign secretaries and to bring up the question of the other satellites, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary at the same time. We have no right to single out Italy. Italy helped Germany. Bulgaria and Rumania moved their troops against Germany. I am bound to say that their armies fought well. Finland did not give support in the war against Germany, but her position is all right and should be facilitated. The same applies to Hungary. It would be well in facilitating the position of Italy to facilitate the positions of the other satellite countries. If you agree, the foreign secretaries may be asked to examine the question of satellites as a whole.

TRUMAN: I brought up Italy because she surrendered first and surrender terms were the hardest. After Italy has been taken care of, we shall take up the others.

CHURCHILL: Our position regarding Italy is a little different. We were attacked by Italy in 1940 and suffered heavy losses in Egypt and in the Mediterranean. Unaided we had to undertake the Abyssinian campaign. Special Italian air detachments were sent to bombard London. Italy made most dastardly attack on Greece, our Ally; just before the war, she seized Albania. All these things happened when we were alone. We suffered most grievously from Italian action. We can not entirely acquit the Italians of responsibility. Nevertheless, we have tried to keep alive the vitality of Italy. Mr. Roosevelt and I made a joint declaration on it. When there was a question of dividing the Italian ships into three parts, it was agreed that Russia should have her share or the equivalent. We are not hostile to Italians simply because we spoke harshly of Count Sforza who did foolish things.

I am anxious to join with the Marshal in sending a message to the Italian people. Therefore, the British government does not object in principle to making peace in Italy. This work will take several months and one wonders whether the peace conference can be so far away. I also notice that the Italian government has not yet had its elections.

It is the intention of the Italian government that elections should be held before winter. Therefore, while I agree that the foreign secretaries should start on this work, I do not think a final conclusion should be reached until the Italian government rests on a recognized democratic base. In the meanwhile, I do not find myself in full agreement with the President’s position to replace surrender terms with undertakings which the Italian people are no[t] prepared to assume. There would be a gap.

The proposed undertakings do not cover the future of Italian fleet, colonies, reparations, etc. We would lose our rights under the surrender. Finally, the terms of surrender were signed by the Dominions. They would have to be consulted. I do not wish to go further than to assent to the preparation of a peace treaty. I am bound to say that I can not feel that Bulgaria has any particular claim on Great Britain. She struck us a deadly blow and did what she could to hurt us in the Balkans. Bulgaria has hardly suffered at all in this war. She did injury to Greece and Yugoslavia, her neighbors. She was a menace and kept Turkey out of the war.

STALIN: The question of Italy and the satellite countries are questions of great policy. The purpose of such a policy is to separate from Germany the main aggressive forces, these satellite countries. There are two ways. We could use force. Force was successfully applied during the war. But the use of force is not enough to separate satellites from Germany. If we use force alone there is danger that we shall create a medium that will favor the association of these countries with Germany. Therefore, it is expedient to add to force a policy which would wean the satellites from Germany. This is the only means to rally the satellites about us and to separate them from Germany. All consideration of revenge, all complaints for suffering lapse in the face of this high policy. So I favor in principle the paper presented by the President on Italy and would extend it to other satellite countries.

There is another aspect of this question I have in mind. The second part of Mr. Churchill’s speech. Of course Italy committed sins against Britain. She committed sins against Russia also but not as great. Italians fought as far as the Don and the Volga but it would be incorrect to be guided by injuries or feelings of retribution. The feelings of revenge and retribution are poor guides in politics. We should be guided in politics by the calculation of forces. Do we want to have Italy on the side of the United Nations? I think so. The same must be said with regard to the other satellites. Many difficulties were caused by satellites like Rumania, Hungary. Great defeats were caused to us by Finland. It was Finland’s help that enabled Germany to blockade Leningrad. Less injuries were caused to us by Bulgaria but she also helped Germany to fight Russia, but she did not declare war or send her troops to Russia, but she caused harm to our Allies in Greece and Yugoslavia. Bulgaria should be punished and should pay reparations. But it is also contemplated in the Armistice that Bulgaria should fight Germany. Bulgaria’s Army must be demobilized and reduced to peacetime strength. Such are the sins of the satellites against the Allies and the Soviets in particular. After the satellites have been brought to their knees and the Control Commission has taken over, it is high time to pass over to another policy.

And now as to specific proposals. President Truman does not propose immediate peace treaty. All he proposes is that the way should be cleared. For the time being, he proposes an intermediate state of affairs. I think it is difficult to be opposed to such a proposition. As to other satellites, I do not propose this intermediate state, but I do think that we can start having diplomatic relations with them. Democracy is Democracy the world over.

TRUMAN: I have made clear my position on the recognition of the satellites. I have no objection to Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary as well as Italy having their position facilitated by us. While nations must be punished, we want no peace of revenge.

The United States can not, moreover, pour out its resources without prospective return. We want to get satellites on a self-supporting basis. I will not sanction the continued handing out of funds to nations which should be self-supporting. We want to help these nations to become self-supporting. I am hopeful that this matter can be referred to the foreign secretaries.

CHURCHILL: I think we are agreed that preparations of the peace should be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. I merely point out we can not give up the surrender terms while we prepare peace terms. There is no objection to announcing peace treaties with Italy will be prepared – and also with the satellite countries.

I have great sympathy with the view expressed against the peace of vengeance and I have great sympathy with Italy. I mentioned reparations. We will not claim reparations from Italy for ourselves but for Greece.

TRUMAN: Let us refer the easing of the surrender terms to the foreign secretaries.

CHURCHILL: I am for the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy but I think the interim steps should be considered by the foreign secretaries.

STALIN: I should like to have the foreign secretaries discuss the question of other satellite countries.

CHURCHILL: I have no objection.

TRUMAN: Let us proceed. The next point is Vienna and Austria.

CHURCHILL: I regret to have to speak against the Soviet view. The situation in Vienna and Austria is very unsatisfactory. We have been unable to agree on zones which had previously been agreed upon in principle. We have not been able to enter the sector assigned to us. We agreed to reciprocity with respect to inspecting seized ships. Our going into Vienna ought not to be obstructed. The British and Americans retreated in Germany to give Russia her promised zone, but we are unable to enter our sector in Vienna.

STALIN: General agreement was reached as to zones in Austria, but not as to zones in Vienna. But today an agreement was reached. Agreement on air fields took time. The French communicated their agreement to us only yesterday. The French also [always?] delayed. We will now, at once, fix a date for the movement of the troops – today or tomorrow.

MR. CHURCHILL seems indignant but he has no grounds. We were kept out of our zone a whole month and we did not complain. The removal of troops is complicated. There was quicker action in Berlin. Field Marshal Alexander was not skilled in handling these matters. He behaves as if Russian troops were under his control.

CHURCHILL: I am glad to know that the matter is at last settled and we shall be allowed to move into our assigned zone and allocation. I do not think that Field Marshal Alexander is to blame.

STALIN: There are no complaints against Eisenhower. I am not complaining against Alexander. I am only reporting the difficulties.

TRUMAN: If the matter is satisfactorily settled, let us proceed to the western frontier of Poland.

STALIN: If you are not prepared, this may go over until tomorrow.

TRUMAN: The next subject is trusteeship.

STALIN: If you are not prepared, we shall postpone for tomorrow. Adjourned.

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 20, 1945 — 6:30 p.m.
[Translation]
Very secret
urgent

1427

Re your telegram No. 913.

After considering this matter most carefully, I wish to express my unreserved opinion in the following manner:

  1. Since July 14 an American task force has been operating in the waters off the northern section of Honshu Island; they have come close to the shore in the areas of Kamaishi, Muroran, and Mito and have shelled them in a naval bombardment; we have heard that their carrier-based planes have been menacing traffic between the mainland and Hokkaido and have sunk a great number of ships. Our defensive measures, according to enemy broadcasts, have been next to nothing, even with our Navy and Air Force. This is most regrettable, but it may also be taken as the truth in the matter of how weak our war potential has become. If this trend continues, with every passing day the enemy fleet should be more able to move at will, as though it were unopposed. Actually, the names of the ships comprising the task force and even the name of the task force commander have already been ostentatiously broadcast, hurling an open challenge to the Japanese Navy.

  2. On the other hand, the enemy air forces based in areas such as the Marianas, Okinawa and Iwo, attack various parts of Japan almost continuously. Large metropolitan areas have already been destroyed and the bombings have even reached out to the small and intermediate-sized cities, quite aside from arms-production facilities and oil-storage dumps. The successive destruction and conflagration of our cities continue. Moreover, just as our anti-aircraft defenses have manifestly decreased in their effectiveness in comparison with the days when the B-29s first started their attacks, so have we also had the command of the skies wrested from our grasp. We cannot assess this any other way.

  3. Once the command of the skies has been taken from us by the enemy, our fighting strength will decline at an accelerated rate. This is quite clear if you look at Germany’s example. Furthermore, once you have relinquished the mastery of the skies to the enemy it is well nigh impossible to regain it without outside assistance. For the Empire there is no hope other than that of mass production of aircraft in Manchuria. This development is quite recent and it is not only difficult to be sure just how much to expect from Manchurian production but also Manchuria itself is about to become a victim of mass bombing from nearby Okinawa.

  4. Although I cannot know with certainty whether there is going to be an enemy landing on the mainland, I do not have sufficient faith to declare such a thing impossible, and I believe that we should be prepared for a landing, considering the thorough manner of the landing tactics in the enemy’s Leyte operations, although there may be some differences because of geographic conditions. Furthermore, assuming that a date for the landings has been set, it is equally clear that this would be after our fighting strength has been completely destroyed.

    In order to knock out our fighting strength, the enemy will pay special attention to depriving the people of their means of livelihood, besides directly destroying military installations and industrial plants and bombing the cities. The enemy must know about our food shortage. They must also have a thorough knowledge of how great an influence the present autumn harvest will have on our fighting strength; and so plans on their part to destroy our crops should not be considered impossible with the coming of harvest time. For instance, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the enemy will ascertain the period when the paddies are dry and the rice-plants are ripe throughout the nation and devise methods of burning these up at one stroke. As far as they are concerned, it is a weakness of ours which they should only naturally exploit.

    If we lose our autumn harvest, our situation will be absolutely critical and we will be in no position to continue the war. Our Empire, which has already lost command of the skies, can do nothing to combat the above circumstances; we are at the mercy of the enemy and committed to whatever the enemy should will.

  5. As I have already urged in my telegram No. 1143, continuing the war after our fighting strength has been destroyed should be considered impossible. It goes without saying that the Imperial Army and the populace as a whole will not surrender to the enemy as long as there is no Imperial command to do so; they will literally not throw away their spears until the last man. But even if the officers and men and the entire citizenry, who already have been deprived of their fighting ability by the absolute superiority of the enemy’s bombing and gunfire, were to fight to the death, the state would not be saved. Do you think that the Emperor’s safety can be secured by the sacrifice of seventy million citizens?

    With the above thought in mind, I have come to the conclusion that the individual’s position, the honor of the military, and the pride of the people cannot take the place of the state, and that there is no other way for us than to hurry and make up our minds to advocate peace.

  6. I had been thinking that the peace proposal through the special envoy mentioned in your telegram No. 893, which was to be put forward in Moscow, was most right and proper. The dispatch of the special envoy, however, unfortunately met with disapproval from the Soviet side (my telegram No. 1417), making it necessary to contrive some other way.

    Once peace has been decided upon, although it may be difficult to avoid some harsh conditions which the Japanese citizens must endure as a result, we should be prepared for such an eventuality and have our military representatives and theirs conclude an agreement to terminate hostilities within the shortest possible time; we should put a stop to further sacrifices.

    One of the conditions for peace that will require reservation and emphasis on our part is the matter of protecting our national polity. This will have to be for us an absolute requirement, and the fact that it will require us to make a strong impression on our opponents to this effect has already been stated in my telegram No. 1416. Regarding this matter of protecting the national polity, one way is to consider the matter one of a domestic nature and therefore excluded from the terms of a peace treaty. In this case, however, even though it may be but a formality, it will be necessary to hold something like a constitutional convention to hear the people’s voice for the sake of appearances. And it cannot be expected that there will be no open opposition to the maintenance of the national polity from some extreme leftists at such a convention. Again, convening a constitutional convention may itself run counter to our Constitution; and if we are to cope with emergency circumstances, it will be necessary to find appropriate solutions regarding such criticisms of unconstitutionality.

    On the other hand, we may be able to solve the problem of our fundamental form of government with this formality and it may even be relatively easy to get the enemy’s agreement, but I find this difficult to judge. In fact, if we resolve to have the Imperial Household above us under the general will of the people, our national polity might, indeed, carry a great deal of weight throughout the world.

  7. What I mean to say as a peace proposal is to approve most of the enemy’s conditions with the exception of the protection of the fundamental character of our form of government. As long as the fundamental character of our government is preserved, it would mean that our country’s honor and existence will be guaranteed in the minimum degree, and I trust this will not run counter to the purport of your telegram No. 913-2 (please refer to my telegram No. 1416).

  8. Our country is literally standing at the crossroads of destiny. If we were to continue the war under the present circumstances the citizens would die with the satisfaction of having truly served their country loyally and patriotically, but the country itself would be on the verge of ruin. Although it is possible to remain loyal to the great and just aims of the Greater East Asia War to the very end, it is meaningless to insist on them to the extent of destroying the state. We should protect the survival of our country even by enduring every kind of sacrifice.

    Since the Manchurian incident Japan has pursued a policy of authoritarian rule. In the Greater East Asia War, she finally plunged into a war beyond her means. As a result, we are confronted with the danger of having even our mainland trampled upon. Since there is no longer any real chance of success, I believe that it is the duty of the statesmen to save the nation by coming quickly to a decision to lay down our arms. If we seek peace, of course, we know roughly what the terms will be by observing the example of Germany. It is inevitable that the people will have to endure the heavy pressure of the enemy for a long period of time, but the nation will live on and we may be able to recover our former prosperity again after several decades. The government should certainly select this path. I ceaselessly implore that we put His Majesty’s mind at ease without any delay whatever.

    In the postwar dawn we must strive to carry out thoroughgoing reforms throughout the country, to democratize politics in general, and to do away with the domineering and selfrighteous attitude of the bureaucrats in order to realize a truly harmonious relation between the Emperor and the people. The scorn for diplomacy and the indifference to international relations, even before the Manchurian incident, were the cause which brought about our present misfortune. In view of the fact that we shall encounter problems in finding a way out of our difficulties while being buffeted about by the storm of international relations in the postwar period, we recognize the urgency of adopting the best political system which will attach importance to future foreign relations.

    Since entering into the anti-Comintern pact our foreign policy has been completely bankrupt. The whole thing had its inception in our splitting the world into an Axis force and an anti-Axis force by joining forces with Nazism. For the future, we must clearly recognize our past mistakes and fundamentally reconstruct our foreign policy.

  9. In obedience to the Imperial proclamation of war, it was the bounden duty of all the people to devote every effort to the achievement of the war objectives. Therefore I also endeavored to contribute my humble efforts to this cause. In view of the present situation, however, I consider it necessary to recognize frankly that the prospects in the present war have become desperate. The theory that we should counterattack with all our strength, if the United States and England should land on our mainland, and thus make them tire of the invasion should be carefully evaluated. I might have had some faith in the firm belief of the military and the government that our war potential can still inflict quite a blow on the enemy (your telegram No. 913-2) and I might have placed some hope in this if we had not yet lost control of the skies and of the sea. Today, however, we find ourselves in a situation in which we cannot repel the daily attacks of the enemy naval and air forces and in which our production facilities are continuously being destroyed. Moreover, we must consider that this situation will become rapidly even worse as time passes. The resulting imbalance of the opposing forces cannot be rectified no matter how heroically our soldiers and people fight. It also goes without saying that groups such as organized guerrillas cannot accomplish much in the face of modern weapons. Thus, after an enemy landing on our mainland, there would be a struggle for every inch of land and repeated valiant fighting until we became exhausted and finally laid down our arms. By that time, as can be seen in the case of Germany, the entire country would already have been trampled by the enemy and the national sovereignty would have been transferred to an occupying power.

    I only pray that we may quickly terminate the present situation, in which we can no longer hope to achieve our future objectives and in which we continue to resist simply from past inertia, and that we may save hundreds of thousands of lives which would be uselessly sacrificed and thereby stop short of the destruction of the nation, save our 70,000,000 people from misery, and endeavor to maintain the survival of our race.

    I realize that it is a great crime to dare to make such statements, knowing that they are contrary to the views of the government. The reason for doing so, however, is that I believe that the only policy for national salvation must coincide with these ideas. Therefore, even though I am criticized as being a defeatist and am asked to take the responsibility of submitting to this criticism, I assert that I must willingly accept the responsibility.

    Thus I was able to express my views freely, and I need not repeat them further. I beg that you understand that the motive which prompts me to say these things is my sincere concern for the country. I cannot cease praying that my words, because of too much concern, may not result in unfounded and distorted views.

Truman-Churchill conversation

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill

Memorandum by the President

[Babelsberg,] July 20 [1945]

Told Churchill about it. Also asked Churchill not to let any proclamations be issued by control council while we are in session here[.]

According to Leahy: “President inform Churchill. The French Government in an adjustment of the exchange value of the franc is paying $17 per month to American soldiers serving in France at the present time.”

Truman-Stalin conversation, about 6:45 p.m.

Cecilienhof Palace, Potsdam

Present
United States Soviet Union
President Truman Generalissimo Stalin

Memorandum by the President

[Undated]

Question asked of Stalin after meeting on 20th. Had already asked him when he called. Agreed to it in a few days.

Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Murphy Sir Walter Monckton Mr. Maisky
Mr. Clayton Mr. Turner
Mr. Pauley
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2045

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

[Undated]

Notes on Soviet Suggestions That the Ruhr Be Internationalized

MAISKY: To ensure control of German War Potential, USSR has considered internationalization of the Ruhr area of four million people under Four Powers, U.S., USSR, U.K. and France which would regulate production of Ruhr area. If sympathetic, Economic Sub Committee should prepare plan for Foreign Secretaries.

MONCKTON: Area? Timing?

MAISKY: Whole industrial area. As soon as possible and “more or less permanently.”

MURPHY: Under Control Council?

MAISKY: Probably a special organization.

CLAYTON: Rhineland and Ruhr?

MAISKY: Probably but no definite area tonight.

CLAYTON: More than four million people.

TURNER: Westphalia and Rhineland – eleven million people.

PAULEY: 25x50 miles – all black coal plus much industry.

MONCKTON: Can only take note. Can’t say a word. Seems political as well as economic.

CLAYTON: Leave Germans there?

MAISKY: Yes.

CLAYTON: Leave them in ownership of properties?

MAISKY: That is another question.

CLAYTON: Which direction will products flow?

MAISKY: That is for Governments to decide.

CLAYTON: Agree Monckton as to political – can’t take into this Committee without instructions.

MAISKY: Please consult individual ministers.

MONCKTON: Is there a Soviet paper? Otherwise Molotov should bring up.

MAISKY: No paper. Please think over. Pauley had mentioned in Moscow.

PAULEY: If you could control coal – you could turn it on and off.

The Pittsburgh Press (July 20, 1945)

Truman cites peace and prosperity as America’s only aim

U.S. seeks no new territory, he asserts; President plays piano at state dinner
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

Editorial: ‘Unequivocally’ for Poland

Youngstown Vindicator (July 20, 1945)

Eliot: Big Three secrecy following old silly pattern

Dangerous rumors, leaks result; Truman against Russian blackout
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot

Lawrence: Truman uses new method

Puts Potsdam conference on less personal base than Yalta meeting
By David Lawrence

U.S. State Department (July 20, 1945)

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Friday, July 20:

Lieutenant Colonel James A. Blair, an old friend of the President on duty in the Berlin area, and Sergeant Truman had breakfast with the President. Shortly after breakfast Sergeant Truman left Babelsberg for Gatow to enplane for Paris and return to the United States.

1200: Generals Eisenhower and Bradley (Omar N. Bradley) called on the President.

1230: General Eisenhower, General Bradley and Colonel Howard A. Rusk were luncheon guests at the Little White House.

1330: The President, accompanied by Secretary Stimson, Assistant Secretary McCloy and Generals Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton, and Clay, left the Little White House by automobile for Berlin. Generals Eisenhower and Bradley rode with the President in an open car.

1400: The President and party arrived at the U.S. Group Control Council Headquarters (Teltower District, Berlin), where the President participated in the official raising of our flag over Berlin…

The President left the scene immediately after the ceremony and returned directly to the Little White House. At 1500 mail was dispatched to Washington.

At 1545 the President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof.

At 1605 the President called the fourth meeting of the Berlin Conference to order. The meeting adjourned at 1840 when the conferees assembled in the Palace dining room for a buffet lunch. Our party left the Palace at 1855 for the Little White House.

Colonel L. Curtis Tiernan, Chaplain Corps, USA, arrived in Babelsberg this afternoon and was a guest of the President for the next several days. Colonel Tiernan was the chaplain of the President’s outfit during World War I, and is now Chief of Army Chaplains in the European Theatre.

2000: Dinner at the Little White House with Assistant Secretary McCloy, Admiral Land and General Clay as guests. Sergeant List, accompanied by Pfc Stuart Canin (concert violinist), played during dinner.

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 21, 1945)

Dreimächtekonferenz in vollem Gange

Die alliierte Verwaltung von Deutschland

L’Aube (July 21, 1945)

Aux « frontières communes » de l’Extrême-Orient –
Les positions respectives de l’URSS et des États-Unis vont être définies à Potsdam

Les deux « Plus Grands » veulent éviter les points de friction

U.S. State Department (July 21, 1945)

Fourth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Dunn Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Clayton Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gusev
Mr. Harriman Sir William Strang Mr. Maisky
Mr. Murphy Mr. Ward Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Matthews Mr. Novikov
Mr. Cohen Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Russell
Mr. Thompson
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2145

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Potsdam, July 21, 1945, noon
Top secret

Agenda

1. Date of establishment of Council of Foreign Ministers
It was agreed at yesterday’s meeting of the Big Three that the Foreign Ministers should decide at what date the newly approved Council of Foreign Ministers should be formally set up.

2. German Economic Questions
The subcommittee which has been working for some days on these questions is presenting its first report.

3. The Polish question – Liquidation of the London government and implementation of the Yalta agreement
The subcommittee which has been working on this question is ready to report.

4. Implementation of the Yalta agreement on liberated Europe and satellite states
In accordance with the decision taken at yesterday’s meeting of Foreign Ministers, the U.S. is presenting a new paper on this subject setting forth in specific terms the steps which we believe should be taken in the countries in question in order that the Yalta Declaration may be implemented.

5. Italy and the other satellites
The Big Three at yesterday’s meeting referred to the Foreign Ministers the question of easing in the near future the armistice terms imposed on Italy and the other satellites. The U.S. is presenting new proposals on this subject.

6. Turkey
It is understood that the British Delegation desires to raise orally with the Soviet Delegation the question of Soviet desires concerning the modification of the Montreux Convention and concerning other aspects of Soviet-Turkish relations.

Thompson Minutes

Potsdam, July 21, 1945, noon
Top secret

The meeting of Foreign Ministers began at 12 noon on Saturday, July 21, 1945. Secretary Byrnes was in the Chair.

Date of Meeting for the Council of Foreign Ministers

MR. BYRNES said that the first item of business was the fixing of the date of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He proposed not later than September 1.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired what day of the week this would be.

MR. EDEN replied that it was Sunday.

MR. MOLOTOV said he agreed.

It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers would meet at a date not later than September 1.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired in what composition would the Council of Foreign Ministers meet.

MR. BYRNES replied that they had agreed first of all to meet in London and that they would have a formal meeting there to set up the Council.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired if this meant five members. He pointed out that the composition of the Council would determine the type of questions to be discussed.

MR. BYRNES replied that it would be five, because there was the question of organizing the Council and deciding the procedure to be followed.

MR. EDEN pointed out that he did not wish to be grasping. It had been decided that the Secretariat would be in London but the Council might wish to meet elsewhere. He thought this might be said.

MR. MOLOTOV thought they might rotate the meetings.

MR. EDEN proposed that they approve the addition of language to state that the Council should normally meet at London, which would be the seat of its Secretariat, but that it might meet elsewhere by common agreement.

MR. BYRNES said it was decided that they would communicate with France and China before final announcement was made of the creation of the Council. He proposed that they each appoint a representative to draft a telegram. MR. BYRNES named Mr. Matthews, MR. MOLOTOV named Ambassador Gromyko, and Mr. Eden named Mr. Ward, for the purpose of drafting a telegram.

Report of Subcommittee on German Economic Questions

MR. BYRNES pointed out that the Subcommittee on German Economic Questions had presented its report.

MR. MOLOTOV said that the Subcommittee had finished its work late at night and he had had no time to get acquainted with its report. If possible, he would prefer that this question be taken up as item 1 on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting the next day.

This was agreed to.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired if they would have any agenda for the present meeting today.

MR. BYRNES said that they would first consider the questions submitted to them by the Big Three. Then they would take up the reports of the subcommittees which they, the Foreign Ministers, had appointed. Finally, they could consider the agenda for the Big Three meeting.

Polish Question

MR. BYRNES said that papers on this subject had been submitted by the British and Soviet delegations. These had been considered by a subcommittee, and he would now call on the chairman of the subcommittee for his report.

MR. VYSHINSKI said that the subcommittee set up to deal with the Polish question had not reached full agreement on their report. They had had three papers before them: (1) a British paper of July 19, (2) an amended text of the British draft of July 19 which the British had submitted, (3) a Soviet amended draft of the same British text. They were guided in their discussions by the second draft submitted by the British. In drafting the final text on this question there were five matters upon which no agreement was reached. These were:

  1. The first disagreement related to the question of the transfer of the assets of the London Polish Government to the new Provisional Government. The last sentence of paragraph 2 of the British draft was not acceptable to the Soviet delegation, which thought that no discussion of the question of liabilities of the Polish Government should be included in the declaration. The Soviet delegation thought that this was a matter of Polish-American and Polish-British relations. The amount and character of the assets and debts was not known to the Soviet delegation, and they thought that this question should be dealt with separately.

  2. The second difference related to the last sentence of paragraph 4 of the British draft, which related to assurances for the return of Poles to Poland. Mr. Vyshinski pointed out that there were three thoughts embodied in this sentence. The Soviet delegation welcomed the last thought, namely, that the Poles who returned to Poland should have equal rights with other Poles. With respect to the other two thoughts, namely, the question of assurances to Poles and the thought that as many Poles as possible should come home, the Soviet delegation considered that it was not proper to include the mention of these assurances, and they thought that it was already clear that it was desired that as many Poles as possible return to Poland. The Soviet delegation had therefore suggested a shorter sentence, to the effect that the three Governments expect that those Poles that return home will be accorded equal rights with all Polish citizens. The British delegation did not agree with this proposal because of the word “expect.” The British delegation thought that the Polish Government should give assurances.

  3. This disagreement related to the proposal of the Soviet delegation that the declaration include a statement to the effect that the British Government would undertake not to arrest Poles who wanted to return home.

  4. This related to the sentence to the effect that the three powers took note that the Polish Government had undertaken to hold free and unfettered elections, etc. The Soviet delegation agreed to this except for the word “pledge,” which they objected to because the Crimea decision had said “should pledge” and not “pledge.” When the new Polish Government was formed it had given this pledge. A proposal had been made to state “It is the confident hope of the Three Powers that the elections will be conducted in such a way as to make it clear to the world that all democratic and anti-Nazi sections of Polish opinion have been able to express their views freely, and thus to play their full part in the restoration of the country’s political life.” Mr. Vyshinski said that if this meant that all sections of public opinion in Poland, including Nazis, had been able to express their views freely, it was not acceptable. If it meant otherwise, the Soviet delegation proposed to avoid repetition by merely adding to the first part of this paragraph a reference to democratic parties fully participating in the country’s political life.

  5. This difference referred to the freedom of the press to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections. This wording was unlimited and meant that unrestricted freedom of the press was proclaimed. Hostilities had just finished, and the Soviet delegation thought that this would be difficult. They were of the opinion that the press should have greater freedom now because conditions had changed, but this was a Polish internal question and it was impossible to decide it without the Poles.

These five differences the Subcommittee had referred back to the Foreign Ministers. Mr. Vyshinski added that he should mention that there had been other serious differences which had been settled and, with the exception of the five points he had mentioned, the draft had been unanimously agreed upon. MR. BYRNES proposed that they discuss these points in order.

(1) Liabilities and Assets of the Polish Government
MR. BYRNES said that the chairman of the Subcommittee had suggested that the liabilities of the Polish Provisional Government should not be mentioned, because that was a question to be handled between the Polish and American and the Polish and British Governments. He felt, however, that the same thing was true of the question of Polish assets. The United States had recognized the Provisional Polish Government. It had promptly taken steps to protect those assets. He saw no reason to believe that the United States would not transfer them to the government which it has recognized. He was sure that the Polish Provisional Government had no doubt about the United States transferring to it property which belonged to it. The United States was unwilling to make any statement with respect to Polish assets without stating at the same time that we would discuss the question of liabilities through diplomatic channels. Otherwise, a statement with respect to Polish assets might deceive people in Poland and elsewhere, because transfers of this kind must be made subject to any liens under the laws of the United States. Secondly, he did not know what debts might be due to the United States by the Provisional Government of Poland. The Polish Government need have no doubt but that our attitude would be sympathetic, because our attitude toward Poland had always been sympathetic. He disliked to mention in a public statement that we would transfer property to the Polish Government that belonged to them now that we had recognized that Government. That followed as a matter of course. Since, however, his colleagues wanted a statement on this subject, the American representative on the Subcommittee had proposed the following language:

The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property of the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had already stated to the Conference that on the day before the United States had recognized the Polish Provisional Government, the United States Government had learned of a proposal to transfer the Polish Embassy to a third party. The United States Government had intervened and had been prepared to institute proceedings to recover the property had that been necessary. The Polish Government knows this and needs no assurance that it will be treated fairly under the law.

MR. MOLOTOV said he found it difficult to discuss this question without the participation of the Polish Government.

MR. BYRNES said that this was also his position – namely, that the matter could only be discussed with the Poles. He did not know what the debts were, but he would not wish to tell the Poles that we would transfer assets and then find that there were liabilities against these assets. In such a case we would be charged with bad faith. He therefore proposed that they mention neither the transfer of assets nor the payment of liabilities.

MR. EDEN said that they also did not know the extent of the liabilities and debts. They might be sure, however, that the British would not drive a hard bargain. He added, however, that if you deal with the assets you must deal with debts. The British also did not know the amount of the Polish assets. He could assure his Soviet Allies, however, that the British would act in accordance with the obligation they had undertaken by recognizing the Polish Provisional Government. He thought it was best to drop this paragraph altogether.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he did not agree that if they mentioned assets they must mention liabilities. He drew the attention of his colleagues to the manner in which the Polish question was being discussed here and the manner in which it had been discussed at the Crimea. Here the question was a one-sided one. At the Crimea the question was whether or not the British and American Governments would recognize the Polish Provisional Government and not whether the Polish Government would recognize the British and American Governments. He hoped that all these questions of liabilities would be discussed by the parties. There was no need to say anything about it here. He pointed out that the question which had been discussed at the Crimea was only that of the transfer of property which was held by the London Polish Government.

MR. BYRNES said he recalled that Marshal Stalin had raised the question of the transfer of property and that President Roosevelt had said that of course the property of the London Government would be transferred when the new Polish Government was recognized. Mr. Byrnes said he could say the same thing of the Soviet Government. When the Soviet Government recognized the Polish Government, he assumed that it transferred the property of the Polish Government. He assumed also that in making such transfer the Soviets were obliged to take account of Soviet laws and of any liabilities against this property. He would not ask for a declaration that the Soviet Government would comply with its own laws. He knew that it would.

MR. MOLOTOV said that all other questions could be decided by bi-lateral negotiations.

MR. BYRNES said that so far as the United States is concerned they would be decided at the earliest possible date. He did not think that any statement should be made that pressure had to be brought on the United States Government to transfer to the Polish Government property that belonged to that Government.

MR. EDEN pointed out that they had frozen Polish funds.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the matter be referred to the Big Three.

MR. EDEN suggested that Mr. Molotov study the American draft that had been presented during the meeting.

MR. BYRNES said he had offered this substitute draft but he would not be frank if he did not make clear that he would tell the President that, in his opinion, the President should not be a party to a statement in the press that the United States Government would give to Poland property which is rightfully the property of the Polish Government, which it has recognized, without coupling such statement by [with?] a statement that the Polish Government had never questioned that the United States would transfer to the Polish Government the property that belongs to it.

Since Mr. Molotov did not have the Russian text of the new language which had been proposed, the matter was passed over, in order that Mr. Molotov would have time to consider it.

(2) Return of Poles to Poland
MR. BYRNES pointed out that there were two versions of this proposal: one submitted by the Soviet delegation and one submitted by the British delegation.

MR. MOLOTOV said he thought the general idea of both versions was essential and that this general idea should be retained. All the rest was unnecessary and might be offensive to the Poles.

MR. EDEN remarked that he did not see what there was that would be offensive to the Poles. Their object was to get Poles home. He was prepared to agree, however, to some change in the drafting.

MR. MOLOTOV said he did not see why this matter was insisted upon. The Soviet version made clear that the Poles would not be persecuted.

MR. EDEN said that if Mr. Molotov thought the language was offensive, they would accept the Soviet version subject to a minor drafting suggestion.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that there was a change suggested by the Soviet representative, in the last paragraph on page 2 – namely, to substitute for the words “is pledged” the words “in conformity with the Crimea decision has agreed.”

This was agreed to.

(3) Arrest of Poles by British
MR. BYRNES said that the next question was the proposed undertaking that the British Government would take steps on British territory and territory under British control not to arrest Poles who wished to return home.

MR. EDEN said he could not accept in a declaration designed to assure the return of Poles to Poland that they would undertake not to do the opposite. He pointed out that the London Polish Government did not now have any power. Power had been transferred to the new Polish Government.

MR. MOLOTOV said that there would probably be no more such acts and that they could drop the paragraph.

MR. EDEN pointed out that certain governments had been given rights on British territory. The London Polish Government did not now have these rights.

MR. MOLOTOV said that there had been some recent incidents.

MR. EDEN replied that there had been none since recognition of the new Polish Government.

(4) Polish Elections
MR. BYRNES pointed out that the proposed sentence on the free expression of views in the election had not been agreed to.

MR. MOLOTOV said that this sentence would be unpleasant for the Polish Government, that all the thoughts had been expressed in the previous sentence. This sentence would give the impression of mistrust.

MR. EDEN offered to leave out the first part of this sentence if Mr. Molotov would agree to include the last sentence of the draft relating to freedom of the press.

MR. VYSHINSKI drew Mr. Eden’s attention to the fact that in the Subcommittee the British representatives had made just the opposite proposal.

MR. EDEN said that he had not known this.

MR. BYRNES said that at the meeting yesterday Marshal Stalin [Molotov] expressed agreement in principle with the thought that the press should be allowed to report freely on what went on in these countries. Hostilities had ceased and the situation was changed. It would be of great importance in the future relations of the Polish Provisional Government that there be no question in regard to the freedom of the press.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired if there were any complaints that the Allied press could not work in Poland now.

MR. EDEN said it was one thing to let the press in but that it was another as to whether they could say what they wished.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether the correspondents who had visited Poland had complained.

MR. BYRNES said that his information was that for a long while no press representatives had been permitted to visit in Poland.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that there had been no government of national unity at that time.

MR. BYRNES continued that a group of correspondents did visit Poland and that they were not restricted. We did not, however, have any regularly appointed press representatives in Poland.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired if there were any applications pending for American correspondents to go to Poland.

MR. BYRNES said we did not know how these correspondents would be treated if they went to Poland and we only wished to express the hope that they would have freedom.

MR. MOLOTOV said that this would make a bad impression.

MR. BYRNES then proposed that the question be submitted to the Big Three along with the other difficulties that had arisen.

This was agreed to.

Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe

MR. MOLOTOV said that they had not had time to have the document on this question translated into Russian.

At his request it was agreed to pass over this question until he could study the document.

Italian Declaration

MR. MOLOTOV observed that two papers had been submitted on this matter – one on Italy and one on the other satellites. Marshal Stalin had suggested at the meeting yesterday that they simultaneously settle these two questions, and it was Mr. Molotov’s proposal that they consider merging the two drafts.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that at the meeting yesterday it had been recognized that there was a difference between the situation of Italy and that of the other satellites. Italy had signed more severe armistice terms than had the other countries. He preferred two separate declarations rather than one.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that they could be merged in the drafting committee.

MR. BYRNES suggested that the reason for separate texts was that the United States had not recognized the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments. Also, the United States was not at war with Finland. If it was merely a question of drafting, he urged Mr. Molotov to let them take up the matter in two separate papers.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he was proceeding from the suggestion made yesterday by Marshal Stalin. Both of these papers dealt with armistice terms signed by these countries. He was fully aware of and understood the difference between them. The subject of both documents was the same. He could not give a final opinion as he had only had time to read them once. The drafts contained good working material.

MR. BYRNES said that the question was whether there should be one draft or two, and he proposed to refer the matter to the Big Three.

This was agreed to.

Agenda for the Big Three Meeting

MR. MOLOTOV observed that the Soviet delegation stuck to its suggestion for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, and Hungary.

MR. EDEN said that he was circulating a paper on Persia, but he did not ask that it be taken up today.

MR. BYRNES said that he wished to submit a paper which he thought should go to the economic subcommittee. This paper dealt with the necessity of making available increased supplies of oil from Rumania and the use of about 200 tankers to transport this oil.

It was agreed to refer this question to the economic subcommittee.

The agenda of the Big Three meeting was drawn up as follows:

  1. The Polish question – Implementation of the Yalta Agreement and transfer of the Property of the London Polish Government.
  2. Declaration on Italy and Satellite States.
  3. The Western Frontiers of Poland.
  4. Trusteeships.
  5. Turkey.

The meeting adjourned.

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

Proposal by the British Delegation

Berlin, 21st July, 1945
P (TERMINAL) 16
Secret

Persia

  1. His Majesty’s Government and the Soviet Government are maintaining their troops in Persia by virtue of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of the 29th June [January], 1942, under Article 5 of which these forces are to be withdrawn from Persia “not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her Satellites had been suspended.” His Majesty’s Government have suggested to the Soviet Government that the Allied forces should be withdrawn from Persia pari passu and in stages before the final treaty date is reached. The Soviet Government have not, however, replied.

  2. In His Majesty’s Government’s view the time has now come for the complete joint withdrawal of Allied forces from Persia and they propose that this should take place in three stages as follows:

    1. British and Soviet forces would be withdrawn completely from Tehran at once;

    2. After the completion of the first stage, British and Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the whole of Persia except that British troops would remain in Abadan and the southern oilfields area and Soviet troops would remain in a zone in either north-east or northwest Persia;

    3. On the completion of the second stage, British troops would be withdrawn from Abadan and the oilfields area in south Persia and Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the last area in which their troops were stationed in either north-east or north-west Persia.

  3. If this proposal is accepted the demarcation of the withdrawal zones can be worked out afterwards.