Operation Market Garden failed because of three major Allied leaders making bad mistakes and three German leaders reacting fast and furious

It was later flooded in December 1944 when Germans opened up dykes I believe. In September 1944 , 43rd Wessex Division could maneuver over it to bypass German blocking force at Elst and reached Rhine river on 23rd September.

Though I actually agree with you that even if 30th Corps reached Arnhem , in face of German resistance to press and choke down Allied advance in Netherlands (Second Army advance axis was clear to Germans at this stage) 21st Army group could only barely hold a narrow bridgehead across river on Arnhem and noway could expand it. German counter attacks on Allied held Nijmegen island in late September and early October 1944 (which were successfully repulsed but barely) proves that.

There was no magic solution/end to war / victory possible in any place strategically in 1944 autumn and winter , not by Market Garden in Arnhem , nor Aaachen Eiffel sector nor in Loreine. Allied planners (including Montgomery who envisioned advance to Germany would be in phase lines) vision before D-day landings that war would go on till Central and Northern Germany fell in 1945 was proven true , in September 1944 , after fast liberation of France and Belgium , Allies due to premature press releases and propaganda became over optimistic.

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Is this thanks to M-G or in spite of M-G? Surely there was a big demand for an offensive here to reinforce the salient the allies had created with M-G, but the clearing of western Brabant would have been a primary focus for the battle of the Schelde as well. One could also argue that not prioritizing this earlier would allow the Germans to fortify and dig in at the places that would later become crucial in the Battle for the Schelde.

I also agree that the focus on the Groesbeek heights was strategically important not just during M-G, but later as well. However it was mostly tactically important and because the strategy later revolved around this area again, it became strategically important as well. Though these ‘heights’ are barely a hundred meters in elevation and span an area of some 8 by 10 km. They are not some sort of magic pinnacle that the entire front would have revolved around no matter where the fight had taken place.

Agree here and on that point. The choice to go for M-G therefore was already a strategic failure in the first place. The quick rush through France and Belgium had convinced the Allies that the Germans were done for and that they had to rush them down with little regard for themselves overextending their supply lines.

Is this thanks to M-G or in spite of M-G? Surely there was a big demand for an offensive here to reinforce the salient the allies had created with M-G, but the clearing of western Brabant would have been a primary focus for the battle of the Schelde as well.

Attacking western Brabant from both east (airborne corridor that shielded Antwerp from north east) and west , made its liberation Tilburg , Breda , 's-Hertogenbosch , Bergen-op zoom much more quicker though since 15th 25th German Army garrisons were severed from east and could only retreat or supplkied from north over Maas.

More importantly Market Garden was inevitable during wild advance of Allies in September when all over optimistic Allied SHEAF and press reports , releases making it look like the end of war and victory was just around the corner , one more push and another November 1918 victory was just about to happen impression/image. Under those conditions , keeping a highly mobile and well trained (and trained for high risk deep penetration operations like this) 1st Airborne Army idle (when considerable resources were invested on creation. Marshall in Washington was pressuring Eisenhower for a deep behind lines landing operation) was unthinkable. Then Montomery , Eisenhower , SHEAF etyc all would be blamed by their superiors , Combined Chiefs and political leadership for not taking any risks for ending the war more quickly and instead extending whole war.

1st British Airborne Division especially , itchy and all sprung for action since its ranks were pissed for being passed and missing Normandy Landings (6th British Airborne Division was deployed instead ) One British paratrooper in 1st Airborne Brigade complained in August when war seemed about to end soon “We will be used as parade soldiers aftrer the victory !” Poor sods in their desire oer over desire to see action , they were dropped with a poor hasty planning due to narrow time window in seven days (9-16 September 1944 , one week of hasty planning was not nough since the frontline was fluid and conditions changing , retreating Germans regrouping)

Airborne divisions became coins to be spent in Eisenhower’s pocket in September.

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(big inhale of breath for long post :slight_smile:

Oh, don’t worry, Halsey gets his comeuppance in my little day-by-day extravaganza (including “Halsey’s Typhoon”). So does Stilwell. So does Marshall. Indeed, Halsey and Montgomery had one thing in common: without overwhelming force, they didn’t do very well. With overwhelming force, they made mistakes that cost a lot of lives. When somebody else was doing good things, he tried to tear them down.

Let’s not forget Monty’s endless battering away at Caen, papered over later as “pinning the Germans so the Americans had an easy time,” when in reality the US Army were the ones that won the battle while Monty dithered. Let’s not forget Monty’s strategy in the defense of El Alamein - it was his predecessor’s, lock stock and barrel. Let’s not forget his order to have “all plans to retreat destroyed” when he knew there were no such plans. Let’s remember that he defeated a weak German attack on the Alamein line because he knew all about it from Ultra.

Let’s not forget that he waited, and waited, and waited until he had overwhelming force at El Alamein, and still managed to be out-thought by Rommel. Let’s not forget that the only reason he attacked when he did was because he knew the Torch landings were coming soon (two weeks away), and Rommel would have to retreat anyway. If that happened, Montgomery would look a right prat, standing around with massive forces while someone else did the job. Let’s not forget that he spent a very long time in 1944 (the whole campaign in Europe, really), whining about how much better a commander he was than Eisenhower.

Let’s not forget his endless insistence that clearing the Schledt wasn’t important (when it was crucial.). Let’s not forget his massive preparations for crossing the Rhine, when the US Army (Patton, Patch) crossed the Rhine a day earlier – twice, with forces on hand.

Let’s not forget his endless prattling about making a grab for Berlin, when all the ground captured east of the Elbe would have to be given back, and all the casualties suffered taking Berlin would be wasted. Let’s not forget his habit of making sure the bleeding was primarily done with someone else’s army.

Monty has benefitted greatly from good PR. That Patton did too does not change that. That anybody benefited from good PR does not change that.

The key to Montgomery is his sure belief that he was the best General in the War (a belief shared by Stilwell, interestingly enough, half a world away). Everything he did was to try to make sure everybody knew he was. The number of casualties were irrelevant to him, especially when they were somebody else’s soldiers. When he could, he engineered things so that only he could win the war - most notably by hogging supplies for Market-Garden, and didn’t clear the Schledt precisely to make sure nobody else could get enough. (And yes, Eisenhower let him. He also very nearly fired him. Eisenhower did fire Patton. He also made sure that Patton was commanded by Bradley.)

Everybody in command makes mistakes. Monty and his friends have tried to make him be better than anybody else. He wasn’t. He didn’t try to be intelligent, he just battered away. The one time he tried to be more bold, it was a terrible plan, Monty had his head handed to him. Then he set about blaming anybody else.

(I’ve seen the same defense of Haig in WWI, interestingly enough. The reducto is that in late 1918, the British - still under Haig’s command - broke through the German defenses. His rockheadedness for the preceding 3 and a half years are unimportant, in this view. French fighting more cleverly? Americans more exuberantly? Germans more dispiritedly? None of it matters. Haig done it.)

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Good god so many anti Montgomery myths , and revisionism almost one would think the writer would attack on Field Marshall statue in Defence Ministry grounds with a hammer

Now facts

Legend 1 : Montgomnery took over his predecessors plan except HA ! no he did NOT :

It will also be noted that no special importance had been attached to the Alam Halfa Ridge. This is never once mentioned in Dorman-Smith’s Appreciation and the Operations Orders envisage it as only one among the several reserve positions. 21st Indian Infantry Brigade was sent to Alam Halfa on 3 August but this was very much understrength and had made scarcely any progress in the construction of defences by the middle of the month. Still less had any work been done on other strategic localities in the neighbourhood of Alam Halfa. The Bare Ridge between it and the forward positions of the New Zealand Division was completely undefended. It had been planned that the New Zealanders should construct an ‘intermediate position’ on Point 102, the high ground just to the west of Alam Halfa but no such action had been taken by mid-August. This was perhaps not surprising for 2nd New Zealand Division was also very much below strength. Its 4th Brigade had had to be withdrawn from the battle area altogether after its casualties in July, while both the remaining brigades had suffered heavily. The New Zealanders in fact simply did not have enough men to secure both their front line and their left flank which rested on the ridge at Alam Nayil, let alone the Bare Ridge and Alam Halfa Ridge as well. In the circumstances, Alexander’s statement that an enemy advance would be threatened ‘from a strongly prepared position on the Alam el Halfa Ridge’ appears highly optimistic to say the least.

Eighth Army’s armoured formations were also to be ‘fluid and mobile’. The bulk of 23rd Armoured Brigade was kept well back east of the ‘boxes’ around Qasaba. 1st Armoured Division was pulled out of the combat zone entirely to refit after its losses in the July offensives, though its 22nd Armoured Brigade was transferred to provide the main strength of 7th Armoured Division. This was instructed to cover the withdrawal of 5th Indian and 2nd New Zealand Divisions, counter-attacking when necessary – presumably, as so often before, straight at the muzzles of Rommel’s 88s.

Just how ‘fluid and mobile’ the tanks were to be is well indicated by Major General Roberts, who had taken command of 22nd Armoured Brigade at the end of July. ‘On code word “so-and-so”,’ he tells us, ‘we would move to a specific area with a certain task; on another code word we would move somewhere else, etc. etc.’ Since the chances were high that the wrong plan might be followed in the confusion of combat or as a result of communications problems, and since he was also grimly aware that the British armoured units were not ‘sufficiently well trained for a battle of manoeuvre’, Roberts felt strongly that the situation ‘did not inspire the greatest confidence’. Such a lack of confidence was in fact general – and with good reason. Had Rommel known of Auchinleck’s plans he would have been delighted for this type of ‘fluid and mobile’ battle was just the sort at which his troops excelled; it was his own desire that events should ‘move fast’, that ‘on no account’ must the engagement ‘become static’. In Eighth Army therefore, ‘a good many people, including notably Freyberg’, declares Field Marshal Carver, thought the tactics proposed by Auchinleck must fail. ‘It would be difficult,’ complains General Richardson, ‘to conceive a tactical plan more unsuited to the units of the Eighth Army at that time’. The ‘suicidal notions’ embodied in Dorman-Smith’s Appreciation and set out in subsequent commands to formations, ‘might almost’ grumbles Lucas Phillips, ‘have been written for Rommel’s express benefit’.

It would later be claimed in certain quarters that Montgomery had really only taken over the plan prepared by his predecessors, of which Dorman-Smith’s Appreciation was the ‘blueprint’. It is not a view supported by the officers who were in Eighth Army at the time – least of all by Major General Sir Francis de Guingand, who having been Chief of Staff to both Auchinleck and Montgomery, was in a unique position to judge. In Operation Victory, de Guingand implies that Montgomery was unlikely to have seen Dorman-Smith’s Appreciation since he disliked reading documents – de Guingand kept those he did read ‘to the very minimum’ and normally summarized them first. Then in his later book Generals at War, de Guingand specifically confirms that: ‘To the best of my knowledge, he (Montgomery) never examined any plans or appreciations that existed at the time.’ On the contrary, de Guingand relates, Montgomery told him to ‘burn the lot’.

‘My Intelligence staff,’ says Montgomery in his Memoirs, ‘were certain the “break-in” to our positions would be on the southern flank; this would be followed by a left wheel, his armoured forces being directed on the Alam Halfa and Ruweisat ridges. I agreed and my plans were based on this forecast.’

Nonetheless if Montgomery then had no opportunity, no inclination and no need to study Dorman-Smith’s Appreciation, it is still instructive to note how different his own ideas were. This was a matter of some significance for the future, because it is impossible to understand the trust which the men of Eighth Army came to have in Montgomery until it is appreciated – as they did – that victory at the Battle of Alam Halfa arose from just those alterations which Montgomery had made to the previous plans. In the first place, Montgomery concentrated all his attention on the existing front-line positions. He showed no interest in ‘the defences of Alexandria-Cairo-the Delta proper’ which were considered so important by Dorman-Smith in his Appreciation. He cancelled all schemes for withdrawals to the ‘reserve positions’, the Observation Posts, suggested by Dorman-Smith in his Appreciation and set out in detail in subsequent Corps Operation Orders. He rejected the idea that a ‘fluid and mobile’ Eighth Army should ‘be prepared to fight a modern defensive battle in the area El Alamein-Hammam’ as directed by Dorman-Smith in his Appreciation. In short his aim was to do just what Rommel – and Auchinleck – least wanted: ensure that the fighting would ‘become static’. Montgomery’s own Corps Operation Orders therefore, as mentioned earlier, ordered the divisions in XXX Corps – 9th Australian, 1st South African and 5th Indian reading from north to south – and 2nd New Zealand Division which provided the infantry strength of XIII Corps to defend their present positions to the end. Labour units, hitherto employed on tasks in the Delta, were summoned to strengthen and give as much depth as possible to the forward positions of all the infantry divisions, while food, water and ammunition were hurriedly brought up to enable them to conduct a lengthy resistance if needed. Next Montgomery ended the existing obsession with battle groups. These had been mentioned with approval by Dorman-Smith in his Appreciation and their use is taken for granted in the later Corps Operation Orders. Montgomery, however, as de Guingand tells us, ordered that ‘the expression ceased to exist. Divisions would fight as divisions and be allowed to develop their great strength.’ In this objective, he once more enjoyed the support of Alexander who, according to the Official History, made it clear that ‘the basic formation would be the division, which was not to be split up into detachments except temporarily for a definite task’.

This attitude further ensured that the artillery in each infantry division – which normally consisted of three regiments of field guns and one regiment of anti-tank guns – was also no longer scattered among battle groups or ‘boxes’, and in addition Montgomery ordered that every possible gun previously kept back to defend the positions to the rear should be moved up to the front line. He decreed that on future occasions Eighth Army’s artillery would deliver concentrated fire – a task made easier at Alam Halfa by the decision that the fighting should remain static.

The area from the coast to the Ruweisat Ridge was now at last, and for the first time, really held ‘as strongly as possible’, but the situation of 2nd New Zealand Division still appeared perilous. Whereas the divisions in XXX Corps all mustered their full three brigades, Freyberg commanded only two. With these, moreover, he would now be expected to defend not only the existing front line but also his left flank on the Alam Nayil Ridge in case Rommel’s breakthrough to the south should succeed. He naturally expressed concern that he did not have an ‘adequate garrison’ to carry out what he expressly described as this ‘fresh policy’. Still less of course was Freyberg able to guard the ridges extending eastward from Alam Nayil. Fortunately Montgomery had made further decisions which would resolve the New Zealanders’ difficulties. As previously described, 44th (British) Division had been held back to guard the cities of Egypt since Auchinleck considered, probably correctly, that it was insufficiently trained for his ‘fluid and mobile’ battle. Montgomery, having no intention of fighting fighting such a battle, believed, equally correctly, that it would fight well enough from fixed defences. On the evening of 13 August therefore, he demanded that it be sent to the front. Auchinleck, then still officially C-in-C, Middle East, weakly left the decision to Alexander. At 2200, 44th Division was ordered to proceed to the Eighth Army area.

Montgomery also claimed the 50th Division, under Major General Nichols, for his army reserve. This remained at Amiriya for the time being but would duly move up to the battle zone during the coming action – unfortunately it contained only one brigade, the 151st, after the maulings received by 150th Brigade in the Cauldron and 69th Brigade on the Miteirya Ridge. Alexander did retain 51st (Highland) Division under Major General Douglas Wimberley to man defences in the neighbourhood of Cairo. It was not a decision that appealed to Montgomery – he would see that the division was sent forward as soon as the battle was over – but since 51st Division was not then considered fit for action even in a purely defensive role, Alexander really had little choice in the matter.

In any event it was the arrival of 44th Division that was crucial. On 16 August, its 131st and 133rd Brigades relieved 21st Indian Brigade on the Alam Halfa Ridge, while its 132nd Brigade joined the New Zealanders, thereby giving Freyberg sufficient troops with which to guard his front line and also his flank on Alam Nayil. It should be noted, however, that although detached from its parent division, 132nd Brigade did not operate on its own as Auchinleck’s brigade groups or battle groups had previously done. It now formed part of 2nd New Zealand Division, benefiting from all that division’s other elements – field artillery, anti-tank guns, engineers, medical staff, signals staff, and so on. Similarly at Alam Halfa, Major General Hughes had not only his two remaining infantry brigades but all his division’s other resources. He at once set to work to lay minefields, organize gun positions and otherwise stiffen the defences – in short to establish at last, and for the first time, a really ‘strongly prepared position on the Alam Halfa Ridge’. Montgomery was equally determined that his armour should not become ‘fluid and mobile’ for he was well aware of the threat posed by Rommel’s antitank guns – though this is nowhere mentioned in Dorman-Smith’s Appreciation. He had made his views clear as early as 14 August. In a conversation with Major General Renton, commanding 7th Armoured Division, Montgomery was asked ‘who would loose the armour against Rommel?’ He replied, he states in his Memoirs: ‘No-one would loose the armour; it would not be loosed and we would let Rommel bump into it for a change.’ This was ‘a new idea’ to Renton. Most unwisely he ‘argued about it a good deal’ – as a result of which Montgomery transferred 22nd Armoured Brigade to the control of Gatehouse’s 10th Armoured Division. Roberts was then directed to take his brigade to Point 102 where, reinforced by a number of anti-tank guns, it was to await the enemy attack in defensive positions of its own choosing. ‘Gone were all the other plans,’ declares Roberts, ‘and we gladly destroyed the mass of traces with different code names which had been prepared with laborious staff work to indicate the alternative positions. There was one firm plan and one position to occupy and we all felt better.’

Eighth Army’s Greatest Victories - Adrian Stewart (reprinted as Victory in Desert)

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Legend 2

Let’s not forget Monty’s endless battering away at Caen, papered over later as “pinning the Germans so the Americans had an easy time,” when in reality the US Army were the ones that won the battle while Monty dithered.

Not only Montyphobia but Anglophobia also lurks in this myth. During Battle of Caen-Orne flank seven panzer divisions massed on Second Army sector between Vire and Orne bridgehead (list : 1st , 12th , 9th , 10th SS Panzer Divisions , 2nd , 21st Panzer Divisions and Lehr Panzer Division of regular Wehrmacht ) while only two panzer divisions opposed 1st US Army sector in St Lo Countaces. Now Hollywood sure tries to sell the iction that British-Canadians stood by and did nothing legend BUT in reality Caen (D day obsective) fell four weeks late (D+31) but so did St. Lo (D+1 objective) and while British and Canadian lacked room to maneuver and had to attack frontally , 1st US Army (which had fresh manpower) lost 20.000 of so men in June July till capturing St. Lo (because larger manpower pool it had) and then at the cost of bombing friendly units by accidernt achieved Cobra breakthrough in late July against one exremely weakwned (30 panzer strong according to its commander Bayerlein) while rest of the entire Panzer Group West concentrated on Second Army and First Army sector at Vire , Orne canal sector.

It was British and Canadians that did heavy lifting against German panzer divisions (that could be used for counter attacking against US sector) while 1st US Army struggled to advance against Meindl’s 2nd Parachute Corps at St Lo Countaces sector due to ignoring the presence of hedgegrows (while British and Canadfians with dwindling manmpower was struggling against panzer divisions on right flank on Caen Orne sector which according to Eisenhower :

"Concerning the origination of plans and decisions: it is my conviction that no commander could normally take oath that a particular plan or conception originated within his own mind. Preoccupation with the concerns of his command are such that it is impossible for any person later to say whether the first gleam of an idea that may eventually have developed into a great plan came from within his own brain or from some outside suggestion. One of his problems is to keep his mind open, to avoid confusing necessary firmness with stubborn preconception or unreasoning prejudice.

Another point: there is a vast difference between a definite plan of battle or campaign and the hoped-for eventual results of the operation. In committing troops to battle there are certain minimum objectives to be attained, else the operation is a failure. Beyond this lies the area of reasonable expectation, while still further beyond lies the realm of hope—all that might happen if fortune persistently smiles upon us.

A battle plan normally attempts to provide guidance even into this final area, so that no opportunity for extensive exploitation may be lost through ignorance on the part of the troops concerning the intent of the commander. These phases of a plan do not comprise rigid instructions, they are merely guideposts. A sound battle plan provides flexibility in both space and time to meet the constantly changing factors of the battle problem in such a way as to achieve the final goal of the commander. Rigidity inevitably defeats itself, and the analysts who point to a changed detail as evidence of a plan’s weakness are completely unaware of the characteristics of the battlefield.

*The Battle of the Beachhead was a period of incessant and heavy fighting and one which, except for the capture of Cherbourg, showed few geographical gains. Yet it was during this period that the stage was set for the later, spectacular liberation of France and Belgium. The struggle in the beachhead was responsible for many developments, both material and doctrinal, that stood us in good stead throughout the remainder of the war.

Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in tactical charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out by any force immediately available from division down to battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.

On the eastward flank, the city of Caen did not fall to our initial rush as we had hoped and we were consequently unable to gain the ground south and southeast of that city where we had planned to make early exploitation of our tank and combat air strength. But the battling in that area reached a sustained and intensive pitch: Rommel defended tenaciously, and as the fighting progressed it became clear why it was necessary for him to do so.

To support the divisions in the attack area the enemy first drew into the battle zone all the troops he could spare from the Brittany Peninsula. Next he brought up divisions from the south of France and others from the Low Countries. His only remaining major reserves in northwest Europe not committed to the fighting were in and about Calais, in the German Fifteenth Army. To maintain connection with these troops he had to hold Caen. If he lost that city his two principal forces would be divided and could thenceforth operate together only if both executed a long withdrawal. So to Caen he hurried his strongest and best divisions, and made every possible preparation to hold it to the end. Our frustration in the attainment of our immediate tactical goals in the eastern sector involved no change in the broad purposes of the operational plan. It was merely another example of the age-old truth that every battle plan comprises merely an orderly commitment of troops to battle under the commander’s calculations of desirable objectives and necessary resources, but always with the certainty that enemy reaction will require constant tactical adjustment to the requirements of the moment. As quickly as it became certain that the enemy intended at all costs to hang onto Caen as the hinge of his operations it instantly became to our advantage to keep him so preoccupied in that region that all other Allied operations would be facilitated.

Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled. He well understood the personal equation of the British soldier, and the morale of his forces remained high, in spite of frustrations and losses that could easily have shaken troops under a commander in whom they did not place their implicit trust.

From the beginning it was the conception of Field Marshal Montgomery, Bradley, and myself that eventually the great movement out of the beachhead would be by an enormous left wheel, bringing our front onto the line of the Seine, with the whole area lying between that river and the Loire and as far eastward as Paris in our firm possession. This did not imply the adoption of a rigid scheme of grand tactics. It was merely an estimate of what we believed would happen when once we could concentrate the full power of our air-ground-naval team against the enemy we expected to meet in northwest France.

An important point in our calculations was the line from which we originally intended to execute this wheel. This part of our tactical prognostications did not work out and required adjustment. The plan, formally presented by Montgomery on May 15, stated: “Once we can get control of the main enemy lateral Granville–Vire–Argentan–Falaise–Caen, and the area enclosed in it is firmly in our possession, then we will have the lodgment area we want and can begin to expand.”

This line we had hoped to have by June 23, or D plus 17. In his more detailed presentation of April 7, Montgomery stated that the second great phase of the operation, estimated to begin shortly after D plus 20, would require the British Army to pivot on its left at Falaise, to “swing with its right toward Argentan–Alençon.” This meant that Falaise would be in our possession before the great wheel began. The line that we actually held when the breakout began on D plus 50 was approximately that planned for D plus 5.

This was a far different story, but one which had to be accepted. Battle is not a one-sided affair. It is a case of action and reciprocal action repeated over and over again as contestants seek to gain position and other advantage by which they may inflict the greatest possible damage upon their respective opponents.

In this case the importance of the Caen area to the enemy had caused him to use great force in its defense. Its capture became a temporary impossibility or, if not that, at least an operation to be accomplished at such cost as to be almost prohibitive.

Naturally this development caused difficulties. Had we been successful in our first rush in gaining the open ground south of Caen, the advance of the Americans to the Avranches region might have become, instead of the dogged battle that it was, a mere push against German withdrawals. That is, greater initial success on our left should have made easier attainment, on our right, of a satisfactory jump-off line from which to initiate the great wheel.

As the days wore on after the initial landing the particular dissatisfaction of the press was directed toward the lack of progress on our left. Naturally I and all of my senior commanders and staff were greatly concerned about this static situation near Caen. Every possible means of breaking the deadlock was considered and I repeatedly urged Montgomery to speed up and intensify his efforts to the limit. He threw in attack after attack, gallantly conducted and heavily supported by artillery and air, but German resistance was not crushed.

Further, one must realize that when the enemy, by intensive action or concentration of forces, succeeds in balking a portion of our own forces, he usually does so at the expense of his ability to support adequately other portions of the field. In this instance, even though the breakout would now have to be initiated from farther back than originally planned, it was obvious that if the mass of enemy forces could be held in front of Caen there would be fewer on the western flank to oppose the American columns. This was indeed fortunate in view of the difficult type of country through which the Americans would have to advance. These developments were constantly discussed with Bradley and Montgomery; the latter was still in charge of tactical co-ordination of ground forces in the crowded beachhead.

By June 30, Montgomery had obviously become convinced, as Bradley and I already had, that the breakout would have to be launched from the more restricted line. His directive of that date clearly stated that the British Second Army on the left would continue its attacks to attract the greatest possible portion of enemy strength, while the American forces, which had captured Cherbourg four days before, would begin attacking southward with a view to final breakout on the right flank.[3] From that moment onward this specific battle plan did not vary, and although the nature of the terrain and enemy resistance combined with weather to delay the final all-out attack until July 25, the interim was used in battling for position and in building up necessary reserves.

This, of course, placed upon the American forces a more onerous and irksome task than had at first been anticipated. However, Bradley thoroughly understood the situation of the moment and as early as June 20 had expressed to me the conviction that the breakout on the right would have to be initiated from positions near St. Lô, rather than from the more southerly line originally planned. He sensed the task with his usual imperturbability and set about it in workmanlike fashion. He rationed the expenditure of ammunition all along the front, rotated troops in the front lines, and constantly kept his units and logistic elements in such condition as to strike suddenly and with his full power when the opportunity should present itself.

Complicating the problem of the breakout on the American front was the prevalence of formidable hedgerows in the bocage country. (something they should have seen and accounted during planning stage as a geopraphical terrain feature uncamaulaged and dispersed entire Normandy region !) In this region the fields have for centuries past been divided into very small areas, sometimes scarcely more than building-lot size, each surrounded by a dense and heavy hedge which ordinarily grows out of a bank of earth three or four feet in height. Sometimes these hedges and supporting banks are double, forming a ready-made trench between them, and of course affording almost the ultimate in battlefield protection and natural camouflage. In almost every row were hidden machine gunners or small combat teams who were in perfect position to decimate our infantry as they doggedly crawled and crept to the attack along every avenue of approach.

Crusade in Europe - Eisenhower (his Memoirs)

By 30 June, the British Second Army had suffered 24,698 casualties since the invasion began, while the Americans had lost 34,034 men, nearly half as many again. (German losses for the same period were 80,783.) Casualties on D-Day itself had been much lighter than expected, but since then the situation had deteriorated rapidly. British infantry casualties were 80 per cent higher than estimated and there were fewer and fewer replacements to bring units back up to strength. * On top of an instinctive abhorrence of heavy losses from his experience in the First World War, Montgomery felt he had an even stronger reason for caution in his attacks. Yet he did not discuss the manpower crisis with Eisenhower. The British feared losing face as well as power. Churchill was worried that such an admission of British weakness would reduce his influence with Roosevelt when it came to deciding the post-war future of Europe. It would not be long, however, before Montgomery’s 21st Army Group had to disband the 59th Division to reinforce other formations. And in November, to Churchill’s renewed dismay, the 50th Division would also be split up. Montgomery’s reluctance to incur losses in Normandy has long been a target for criticism. But the faults were perhaps more institutional than merely personal. The disappointing performance of his three veteran divisions from North Africa, the 7th Armoured, the 50th Northumbrian and the 51st Highland Division, revealed a war-weariness in large parts of the British Army. An aversion to risk had become widespread and opportunities were seldom exploited. The repeated failures to crack the German front round Caen inevitably blunted an aggressive outlook. Increasingly, the Second Army in Normandy preferred to rely on the excellent support provided by the Royal Artillery and on Allied air power. The idea that high explosive saved British lives became almost addictive.

Whatever the serious flaws and Montgomery’s false claims at the time and later, there can be no doubt that the British and Canadians had kept the panzer divisions tied down at the crucial moment. The Canadians renewed the attack on 25 July to coincide with Operation Cobra, Bradley’s great offensive in the west. This again convinced the Germans that the major Allied attack towards Paris was coming down the Falaise road. A breakthrough here was their greatest fear, because it would cut off the whole of the Seventh Army facing the Americans. Kluge and his commanders did not recognize the true point of danger until it was too late. So the death ride’ of the British armoured divisions was not entirely in vain.

A liaison officer from the Red Army, Colonel Vassilievsky, was brought on a visit to the headquarters of 7th Armoured Division. With true Soviet diplomacy, he expressed the view that the British advance was very slow. Apparently a British officer asked him to show on a map of the eastern front where his own division was fighting. It transpired that there were nine German divisions on that sector, which was over 600 miles long. The British pointed out that they were facing ten divisions, including six panzer divisions, along a front of only sixty-two miles.

D-Day and Battle of Normandy - Anthony Beevor (note that Beevor is an extremely almost unjusitiably crittic of Montgomery when he felt to)

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Legend 3

Let’s not forget that he waited, and waited, and waited until he had overwhelming force at El Alamein, and still managed to be out-thought by Rommel. Let’s not forget that the only reason he attacked when he did was because he knew the Torch landings were coming soon (two weeks away), and Rommel would have to retreat anyway. If that happened, Montgomery would look a right prat, standing around with massive forces while someone else did the job.

Again. Very so much stretching the facts

The reality :slight_smile:

In a prescient note, while the good news about Alam el Halfa was still being digested in London, Brooke wrote on 8 September, ‘My next trouble will now be to stop Winston from fussing Alex and Monty and egging them on to attack before they are ready. It is a regular disease that he suffers from, this frightful impatience to get an attack launched.’ As Brooke knew only too well, the Prime Minister was driven by both political and strategic demons. On 9 August, in a note to the First Sea Lord, pressing him to accelerate the delivery of the Sherman tanks which had been promised by America after the fall of Tobruk and were now on their way to Alexandria, Churchill wrote of ‘the immense importance of beating Rommel as a prelude to Torch’. In part, the ‘immense importance’ he ascribed to this pre-emptive victory sprang from the plausible belief that if the Panzerarmee were to be destroyed at El Alamein, victory in Operation Torch would be far easier to accomplish. But there was another factor. Shorn of any diplomatic niceties, Churchill was desperate to secure the public triumph of a British victory over Germany which would otherwise be submerged by the even greater drama of the first Allied venture of the war, when the spotlight would inevitably be on the Americans.

But this political purpose was reinforced by a pressing strategic anxiety. Warned by the Turkish ambassador that Ankara was losing ‘the will-power to resist’ the diplomatic pressure coming from Berlin following Hitler’s seizure of Sebastopol from the Red Army in July, Churchill sought urgently to stiffen Turkey’s resolve. On 28 August he therefore instructed the Chiefs of Staff to make provision for more ‘war material’ to be despatched from Egypt to Turkey by the end of October. However, he reminded them, the delivery of these tanks and guns by this date hung ‘on the assumption of definite success in the Western Desert by the middle of October’.For all these reasons, Churchill’s impatience knew few bounds. Having instructed Alexander on his appointment to ‘destroy’ the Panzerarmee ‘at the earliest opportunity’, he now cabled his commander-in-chief to find out when the offensive was expected to begin. ‘It would be a help to me to know about when you think it will come off,’ he wrote, admonishing, ‘I had hoped to have heard from you before.’ Ignoring that rebuke, Alexander replied patiently but firmly, to explain that, though Rommel’s army had been ‘seriously weakened’ at Alam el Halfa, Montgomery’s attack was to be somewhat delayed because of it. By this time, the Eighth Army commander had come to the view that Operation Lightfoot, as he had codenamed the opening phase of the final Battle of El Alamein, could not proceed until the second half of October – more than a month later than Auchinleck had planned. This was for several sound reasons: the 300 Sherman tanks, which had only just reached Egypt, were not yet readied for the particular hazards of desert warfare; the 1st and 10th Armoured Divisions required more training; and the final preparations for an offensive by almost 190,000 troops, many of whom had only just arrived in the country, could not possibly be completed before the middle of October at the earliest.

NOTE : Panzer Army had fortified El Alamein defensive line with half a million mines nicknamed Devil’s Gardens and had a very lethal array of anti tank gun screen that lured and ambushed British tanks constantly so it sould be a frontal attack and attrition warfare since there had been no other way in the timetable requested by Combined Chiefs of Staff , London and Churchill.

The commander of an Eighth Army which had already suffered 80,000 casualties since its formation did not intend to risk unnecessary bloodshed on account of incompetent leadership and inadequate training. He could issue all manner of morale-raising instructions – ‘Morale is the big thing in war. We must raise the morale of our soldiers to the highest pitch. They must enter this battle with their tails high in the air and the will to win made’ he liked to say – but without more preparation for the battle ahead, all the morale in the world would be in vain. Montgomery would not allow himself to be harried into a premature offensive.For his part, Churchill’s impatience to pre-empt Torch with a British victory in the desert, was intensified by Malta’s predicament; a lynchpin of Britain’s military operations in the Mediterranean and North Africa, the garrison was once again running low on vital provisions. On 17 September, chafing for action, the Prime Minister cabled Alexander once again. ‘I am anxiously awaiting some account of your intentions. My understanding with you was the fourth week in September. Since then you have stated that the recent battle, which greatly weakened the enemy, has caused delay in regrouping etc…. I must know which week it falls in, otherwise I cannot form the necessary judgements affecting the general war.’Alexander, who was a diplomat as much as a soldier, did not reply at once but instead flew up to Eighth Army headquarters to consult Montgomery.

According to Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, ‘Freddy’ de Guingand, who took notes at their meeting, Montgomery was swiftly to the point. ‘I won’t do it in September,’ he told his commander-in-chief, ‘But if I do it in October it’ll be a victory.’ Alexander asked, ‘Well, what shall I say to him?’ At this, Montgomery took de Guingand’s notepad and wrote the message he wished his commander-in-chief to despatch to London. Out of de Guingand’s earshot, he told Alexander that if Churchill were to insist on a September attack, ‘they would have to get someone else to do it’. Alexander duly informed London that it was ‘essential’ for the attack to be launched at night ‘in the full moon period’; for this reason it would be wrong to start the offensive until ‘minus 13 of Torch’, which was by now scheduled for 4 November.

Churchill bowed to the inevitable. ‘We are in your hands, and of course a victorious battle makes amends for much delay,’ he wrote grudgingly on 23 September, before adding with rather more grace, ‘Whatever happens we shall back you up and see you through.’ By now Montgomery had settled on a date for the attack. It was timed to begin in the late evening of 23 October, when, as so often at crucial moments in this conflict, the desert would be helpfully illuminated by a full moon.

If a small platoon of eminent historians, heavily armed with the wisdom of hindsight, had been in Churchill’s shoes or commanding the Eighth Army on that night, the famous Battle of El Alamein that was about to commence would never have taken place. It was, in their minds, an ‘unnecessary’ as well as an excessively bloody affair which had been made redundant by the fact that, within a fortnight, an Anglo-American army of more than 100,000 men was to land on the North African coast some 1,500 miles away at the other end of the Mediterranean. Torch, they argued, would have forced Rommel to rush back from El Alamein to confront this far greater threat to the Axis position in North Africa. In these circumstances, all that Montgomery would have had to do was to wait for this moment and then give chase, harrying the Panzerarmee all the way back to Tunis and beyond until it found itself squeezed into surrender from the west and the east by the combined power of the two Allied armies. But such speculative analysis not only involves second-guessing the past or indulging the benefit of hindsight, it ignores the military uncertainties and the political imperatives which – at the time – made the Third Battle of El Alamein a strategic inevitability.

In London, it was still feared that the Wehrmacht might yet drive through the Caucasus to threaten the Middle East from the north. The German army still had Stalingrad in a stranglehold and, in his capricious fashion, it remained possible that Hitler would release enough aircraft from the Soviet front and enough U-boats from the Atlantic to blockade the British garrison on Malta. The supplies in Malta would be totally consumed in first week of December and it was vital for British to capture airbases in Libya at Derna sector to provide air cover for next incoming Malta convoy in November (which Montgomery accmplished , apturing Martuba airfields in mid November and providing air cover for Stoneage convoy) Nor, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, was it unreasonable to suppose that the Führer might belatedly heed Rommel’s demand for the men, weapons and provisions which, with Malta neutralised, would allow him once again to threaten the Nile Delta.

Alternatively, if Montgomery had merely stood his ground at El Alamein (as these historians have proposed) and had Rommel indeed withdrawn as soon as the threat from Operation Torch became apparent, it is not at all clear that the Eighth Army would have been able to inflict much damage on the Panzerarmee, with its armour virtually intact: even after its pulverising ordeal at El Alamein, the fragmanted remains of Rommel’s army retained enough discipline and agility to retire in a semi orderly fashion all the way back to Tunisia to confront the Anglo-American invasion. It is not hard to imagine what Eisenhower would have thought – let alone his military and political superiors in Washington – as they contemplated their own casualties in North Africa, knowing that the British under Montgomery had allowed Rommel to steal away from El Alamein before a shot had been fired.

Moreover, given the conviction and guile with which the Axis forces fought to retain their strongholds in North Africa, it is reasonable to conjecture that, had the entire Panzerarmee been allowed to withdraw from Egypt and Libya without a fight at El Alamein, the combined might of the Axis forces which were rapidly assembled to confront the Anglo-American invaders would assuredly have given Eisenhower an even harder fight for very much longer than the six months it eventually took the Allied commander-in-chief to prevail. It is even possible that Rommel would have fought Eisenhower to a standstill. (as it actually happened in Battle of Faid Pass , Kasserine Pass , Sidi Bou Zid in January - February 1943 with a weakened Afrika Korps. Imagine if Panzer Army kept all lost formations , tanks and artillery lost in Second Battle of Alamein and retreated intact to Tunisia instead , thery would probably reconquer Algeria) A military stalemate in North Africa would have revealed Torch as the fiasco which many in Washington had feared it would become, the fragile trust between the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have been severely strained, if not shattered, by Britain’s failure to savage Rommel at El Alamein, and, as a result, the Prime Minister’s standing and influence in the White House, no less than in Britain, would have been gravely eroded.

Destiny in the Desert , Battle of El Alamein - Jonathan Dimbleby

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Your assertion that I am an Anglophobe I find frankly insulting. British forces fought with courage and ingenuity whenever they found an enemy, and I have said so repeatedly - for example in my reddit day-by-days. But declaring that because I find that Montgomery a less than serious artist I thereby hate all Brits is… well, I don’t much care for it.

You need to look at Caen the other way around. The Germans’ strategy was to pin Montgomery outside Caen, and wait for reinforcements to reorganize to deal with the left flank (and then try and push the Normandy bridgehead into the sea.) The ‘pin Monty’ part worked, because Monty was incapable of anything more than ‘charge at Caen and hope’, but Hitler held up a lot of the reinforcements, convinced that Pas de Calais would still be the “real invasion.” Oh, and those pesky Russians were beginning to destroy Army Group Center.

“Sepp Dietrich (commander, 1st SS Panzer Corps) helped pin-down Montgomery’s 21st. Army Group outside Caen for over a month after the D-Day landings” -“Army of the West: The Weekly Reports of German Army Group B from Normandy to the West Wall.”

Monty had three armored divisions, 5 armored brigades, and 3 tank brigades by the time of “Goodwood”, plus 11 infantry (these were all UK units.) The Germans initially put their armored divisions to face this not because they were stupid, or because Monty was smart, but because the Germans could count. Whenever they had the chance, they would put an infantry division into the force facing Monty, and shift panzer units to their left.

Let’s also remember that Monty could call on an almost absurd amount of firepower; his own artillery, battleships and heavy cruisers off-shore, and an absolute cloud of bombers and fighter-bombers, making movement of German troops in daylight impossible, and blowing the bejesus out of anything they did find, suspected might be a place the Germans were, or just took a dislike to. And let’s not forget Enigma, telling Monty everything he needed to know.

Oh, and you should perhaps treat memoirs and glorifying unit biographies with some scepticism.

(By the time of “Operation Cobra”, the Germans had 2 SS Panzer, and 3 Wehrmacht Panzer divisions facing the US forces.)

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Which reinforcements ? 15th German Army was immobile in Pas de Calais due to Operation Fortitute deception BUT it steadily sent infantry divisions from Calais to south beginning with second week of July 1944 though they arrived slowly , piecementally , deployed mostly on Bayeux - Villers Bocage sector before Second Army (so remnants of Panzer Lehr Division could be sent to St Lo in mid Juy) but arrived and deployed on Normandy slowly and one by one and too late due to Allied air superiorty which created havoc on roads in daytime , (15th Army divisions numbers were 15 divisions - in harmony - but in August when “slow , incompatent” Montgomery’s Second Army began to overflank and threw it to first Channel ports then pursuied it all the way to Scheldt in one week (260 miles) it was reduced eight German divisions (90.000 men) all fortified in Scheldt and under strict Hitler orders to hold Antwerp approaches at all costs. (Invasion - General Hans Spiedel) Meindl’s 2nd Parachute Corps holding St Lo did not receive more than one or two weak infantry divisions as reinforcements from Brittany arriving piecementally one by one till mid July and still they held St Lo till 18th July with help of no tanks but lots of hedgegrows and panzerfausts.

Oh, and those pesky Russians were beginning to destroy Army Group Center.

True , Operation Bagration started on 22nd June 1944 , that did not prevent 2nd SS Corps (9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisons) to be transferred from Eastern Front to Normandy , at Caen - Orne sector in July 1944 though which went into a brawl with VIII Corps of Second Army Operation Epsom attack in July 1944 when German front at Countaces - St. Lo Sector had only one panzer divison (2nd SS Panzer Division) and two paratroop divisons (General Meindl’s 2nd Fallscrmjager Corps) devoid of artillery held entire 1st US Army inflicted 30.000 casaulties just for six mile advance to St Lo till 18 July 1944. (when British and Canadians would be glad to find 30.000 replacements which they dis not have but they had a lot of tanks and firepower to use to minimise casaulties in frontal advance so Montgomery wisely used that instead. Omar Bradley’s 1st US Army could waste infantry , Montgomery could not , he could waste tanks though since he had a lot of them and more tank replacements were manufactured and en route to Normandy and he had no shortage of shells or bombs so utilising firepower to advance and reduce a fortified defence line piece by piece is nothing to be shamed for (US Marine Corps did that also in Pacific Campaign to capture underwhelmed numerically infarior Japanese garrisoned atolls to reduce casaulties , why Holland Smith or Chester Nimitz is not villified ?) , it is actually wise to use extesive firepower and material when you have very little infantry replacements and manpower getting less and less and enemy leaving no gaps or open flanks to exploit in an era when smart bombs or missiles to pinpoint enemy positions did not exist.)

“Sepp Dietrich (commander, 1st SS Panzer Corps) helped pin-down Montgomery’s 21st. Army Group outside Caen for over a month after the D-Day landings” -“Army of the West: The Weekly Reports of German Army Group B from Normandy to the West Wall.”

Or in another way ,Sepp Dietrich (who was an ex butcher before becoming Hitler’s bodyguard and had to be guided by his own chief of staff to read maps and according to German paratroop colonel Von Der Heydte “an ignorant brute who had no business to become an officer” ) had massacred and allowed to be destroyed entire 1st SS Panzer Corps (12th SS Hitler Jugend Division went to Normandy with 20.000 men and 400 panzers , returned back from Caen - Vire - Falaise sectors nine weeks later with 500 men and no panzers or artillery left). Though to be objective it was not Dietrich’s fault but Hitler’s own “Hold on at all Costs not a single inch back” order let that destruction of Panzer Group West at Caen - Orne sector in a serious of frontal attacks under range of naval gunfire in June-July and first week of August 1944 (list)

-Operation Perch (10-14 June 1944)
-Operation Epsom (25 June - 1 July 1944)
-Operation Charnwood (6-8 July 1944)
-Hill 191 (7 July - 1st August 1944)
-Operation Godwood ( 18-20 July 1944) , which was oversensetionalised due to over optimistic premature press releases when three panzer divisions on high ground , despite suffering collossal casalties , were able to hold after giving seven miles of ground. Agreed Montgomery msde a big promise out of this for SHEAF and press and results were disappointing but nowhere disaster or strategic failure since it immobiled six panzer divisions on Caen or Orne flank when US Army faced only one panzer (2nd SS ) , one panzer granedier (17th SS Panzergranedier) and three weakened paratroop and infantry divisions in total. All of Panzer Group West in addition along with two or later three infantry divisions concentrated to hold Montgomery’s advances and attacks. Panzer Lehr , almost cut to the bone at Caen sector left with 30 panzers and 55 anti tank guns was transferred to left flank on mid July 1944 but immediately destroyed by strategic bomber attack of USAAF on the beginning of Operation Cobra on 25-26 July (that also killed 700 or so US servicemen due to friendly bombing , again something Montgomery could not afford )

By the time at the end of June , only one panzer division was at St Lo Countaces front (2nd SS Das Reich Division and it was just arriving and arriving piecementally in detail , massacreigng French civilians en route) joining 17th SS Panzer Granedier Division. 1st US
Army had three full corps in front of them. And by the time Cobra breakthrough started on 25th July 1944 there was only two panzer divisions (2nd SS and Panzer Lehr , the latter reduced to a weak regiment strength due to trying to halt British attacks at Bayeux t , Villers Bocage sector till mid July before overwhelmed by US heavy bombers in Cobra) and one panzer granedier division. (17th SS)

On Caen Panzer Army Group still had six panzer divisions and three infantry and Luftwaffe divisions (1st , 9th , 10th , 12th SS Panzer , 2nd and 21st Panzer Divisons supported by 501st and 502nd SS Heavy Tank Battalions) and 116th Panzer Division was en route from Calais to Verriers ridge in July after Operation Atlantic but rerouted to Cotentin peninsula sector along with 2nd Panzer Division in first week of August due to Cobra breakthrough. And Germans (Von Rundstedt himself along with Rommel , Dietrich , Eberbach all wanted to pull back from Caen sector to Seine river out of Allied naval gunfire range that decimated panzers and regroup Panzer Group West divisions for counter attack according to Lidell Hart , except Rommel sand Kluge all gave interviews and later interrogaions to Hart , but constantly prevented by Montgomery’s advances on Caen - Orne - Vire sector and Hitler’s No Retreat Hold at All Costs orders)

Let’s continue

-Operation Atlantic , Verriers Ridge (22 -25 July 1944) (along with Bluecoat convinced Von Kluge that Caen sector was main breakthrough area)
-Operation Bluecoat (30 July - 2 August 1944) , captured Vire
-Operation Totalise (6 - 10 August 1944)
-Operation Tractable (14-20 August 1944) , formation and closure of Falaise pocket

with crumbling and dwindling manpower due to lack of replacements (Britain and Canada not only lacked manpower reserves of US but they also entered war way earlier and manpower crisis , orders from London caused Montgomery to make every operation planning and preperation carefully since these were frontal attacks on enemy’s killzone with reinforced six or seven panzer divisions deployed in depth. Any one studied a little military theory knows that in a frontal attack against a well fortified enemy defence line (no matter how much firepower or logistics you have , those are essentisal anyway to lead momentum of operations when Channel storm in July 1944 severd unloading of logistics tempoarily) you need at least three to one numbers superiorty against enemys prepared kill zone and even that is not enough to guarantee breakthrough (as trench warfare of WWI proved well enough on fortified defence lines deployed in depth are tough nuts to crack)

It does not matter how many armor , tanks Montgomery’s Second Army and First Canadian Army had. Germans had the kill zone and BEST anti tank gunnery with 88 mm 75 mm guns and heavy armor aside , even individual infantry had best hand held anti tank gunnery on rosds ambushing Allied tanks and vehicles , not to mention minefields. Just because these caused a temporary delay in Allied timetable of operations in Normandy in June-July 1944 (which actually played on Montgomery’s hands since due to Hitler’s Hold at All Costs Order he was able to trash Panzer Group West in Normandy in static warfare then able to overflank and encircle them at Falaise - Alencon Gap under naval gunfire range and airpower instead of mobile warfare where Germans were way better than Allies) that was more than compansated with swift fast liberation of France , Belgium in eight days due to rapid advance of 21st Army Group in August-September 1944 , does not mean that in total revisionism Germans won. On the contrary , Hitler , Rommel , Von Rundstedt , Heinz Eberbach , Sepp Dietrich later Kluge all reacted to Montgomery’s advances , gave the initiative to him , diverting precious panzer divisions here and there to hold collapsing dam on Caen front and let them to be crumbled by attrition , leaving St. Lo - Countces - Avrances bare. And having ULTRA intelligence is no way guarantee of victory either. Accurate intelligence does not fight in frontline or take decisions. It does not matter if enemy is not leaving you any gaps to exploit either. It is utilising that intelligence according to your force capabilities (like anticipating German counter attacks at Operation Epsom or Mortain to repulse them) that counted ULTRA most.

Oh, and you should perhaps treat memoirs and glorifying unit biographies with some scepticism.

At least I am showing author and title of resources :slight_smile:

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This is the same kind of view as the idea that operation Mars was just a diversion from what was happening at Stalingrad. Sure, it propably helped, but if this was the endgoal, resources could have probbably been spent more effectively. Had the operation been envisioned differently with western Brabant as its focus, who knows how much earlier those cities would have been liberated. The Germans might have counterattacked yes, but they also counterattacked at Groesbeek which was much closer to their supply lines. The Breskens pocket in Western and Dutch Flanders was also cut of from most supply routes but North and that managed to hold for several months, in part because the Germans were allowed to dig in.

I never argued that M-G was the mistake of a single person, I agree that it was inevitable because of general arrogance in Allied command, not limited to the individual of Montgomery. I definitely think everybody was blindsided to anything other than quick victory. They in fact had begun the rush for Berlin some 6 months too soon. Nevertheless, M-G was a stupid idea that achieved only strategic failure.

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I didn’t say it would work, I said it was their strategy.

… actually, the transfer was done before Bagration, about a week after D-Day.

… and blaming Dietrich for getting his units ground up in combat is no reason to declare him useless. Every unit facing the D-Day landings, and the fight after got ground up.

As for Hart, his ‘interviews’ were presented as rather self-serving, having the Germans describe him as the father of the blitzkrieg, for instance. He also declared as fact that Molotov traveled into occupied Germany to negotate with Ribbentrop to end the war in the east in 1943, which nobody else seems to remember (including the Germans, who you’d think might.) (“Lidell Hart and the weight of history” is an interesting a reexamination of BHLH and his manipulation of his own reputation.)

… and no aircraft. The Germans at the time said that even with the advantages you detail, they were hamstrung by overwhelming Allied air power. When Cobra began, for instance, Panzer Lehr was nearly obliterated by air attack (which accidentally killed 100 or so US troops waiting to attack as well.).

As far as heavy tanks go, there were three ‘abteillung’ with Tigers, plus a few in Panzer Lehr. Probably fewer than 150 at most through the campaign. Panthers - 150 or so on the entire Western Front on D-Day, rising to a maximum of 432 by the end of July. But even these had opponents; M-10 tank destroyers had a 75mm gun of its own, and did good work against Pz-IVs and Pz-Vs they faced. And, you know, aircraft. And artillery.

(For operation Cobra the US had over 2,400 tanks and tank destroyers. For Goodwood, the Brits had over 1,000.)

Oh, poo. :slight_smile:

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Which did not work. Final SHEAF brifing in St Paul’s on 16 May 1944 that displayed 21st Army Group strategy narrated by Montgomery to hold a solid shoulder at Caen (regardless of late capture of the town itsef which was wrecked by bombing anyway) had been much more sound as historical events prove.

And one would also claim that D-Day landings and diversion of Panzer Group West assets and 2nd SS Panzer Corps to Normandy , made the success of Bagration much more sound and sure. OKW was actually expecting a Red Army offensive in Eastern Front in coincidence with D-Day landings in 1944 summer (Gehlen’s intelligence was not sleeping) but badly misjudged the location due to STAVKA maskirovka (deception) and as soon as landings on France started , they assumed that was a bigger threat and sent two SS panzer division that could be utilised in East.

No Allied division in 21st Army Group reduced to %3 strength as 12th SS Hitler Jugend Panzer Division went through in Normandy as far as I know. Or %10 strength like Panzer Lehr and 21st Panzer Divisions experienced. But I agree that Hitler’s stupid “Hold Caen at All Costs till last man and bullet” strrategy which caused delay of towns capture by Allies , also caused crumbling of Panzer Group West rather Dietrich.

…because Montgomery’s strategy was better :slight_smile: Actually in St. Paul’s briefing he deducted that German commanders would make phased withdrawals to better and easier to defend inner lines after D-Day (like during Entante 100 Days Offensive in 1918 when German Army made phased withdrawals) as Allied bridgehead grew and grew since it would make no sense for them to be pinned down under Allied naval gunfire range. And that was indeed what Von Rundstedt , Rommel and Eberbach wanted to do , to retreat towards Seine and gain better maneuver room to regroup panzer divisions for counter attack and get out of naval gunfire range. But they were prevented to do so by Hitlers “Hold at All Costs no retreat” orders therefore that made Montgomery’s job initially tougher in June-July but after that a whole lot more easier since once overstreched German front that was condemned at Normandy collapsed in August , entire 7th German Army and 5th Panzer Army were semi encircled and made rapid advance of Second British Army and First Canadian Army in one week all the way to Antwerp and Brussels and quick liberation of Northern France and entire Belgium possible in August - September 1944.

I agree that his interviews with German generals and own conclusions are self serving but it does not mean we should dismiss all out of hand since by careful checking and verification you can find a lot of truth (as well as exagerrations , misconseptions , falsifications ) in them.

Same Panzer Lehr which was crushed during battles against 50th Northumbrian and 7th British Armored Divisions and 8th Armored Brigade before Bayeux during June - July operations and remained with a handful of panzers and 5.000 men before being transferred to overstretched Cotentin peninsula - St Lo - Countaces sector in mid July. And as you said US strategic bombing during Cobra also caused a lot of friendly fire casaulties in US ranks as well. Air power is not everything and aircraft can not hold the ground though Allied tactical air support via fighter bombers directed by ground observers (Cab Rank system , developed by Montgomery’s Eighth Army and Desert Air Force commander Vice Marshall Harry Broadhurst in North Africa) was much more vital in exploiting the breakthough and pursuit. Use of heavy strategic bombers in Cobra breakthrough was a one time affair (at cost of friensdly fire) , fighter bomber air support and cover by Cab Rank system was constant.

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… uh, what? So transferring the SS was a good idea, but a bad idea? Just checking.

… so he didn’t have to keep attacking Caen over, and over - for three months? If all he was doing was holding a solid shoulder, he’d been doing that for months. Why keep attacking? Could it be simple ego? No?

(I think you mean “deduced”) But he was dead wrong; the Germans knew that any phased withdrawal would unleash exactly what happened. A fluid panzer battle might be what the Generals wanted, but they simply did not appreciate the ubiquity of air power, supply, and forces available to their opponents. A counterpunching defense (like Manstein’s wizardry in Russia in 1943) doesn’t work if you can’t move.

The only place the Germans could go once Normandy unhinged, was all the way out of France. It wasn’t WWI any more. The Allies would be racing a past every defensive line in France, and strategically by landing in southern France. Look at the Saar-Palatinate campaign for what I think would happen.
The Allies were just more mobile in every way.

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This is taking strategic (eitherin theater strategy or Grand Strategy) 2nd SS Corps did not remain in Eastern Front where it could be used to slow down , stall or at least inflict heavier casaulties on Red Army during Operation Bagration. It was not sent to Cotentin peinsula either to halt fall of Cherbourg or to retake Cotentin peinsula back from 1st US Army.

No , it was sent to Caen - Orne sector to counter attack and push Second British Army bridgehead back to sea because both OKW and German Army Group B considered Montgomery’s penetration towards Caen ( major road intersection before Seine river and Greater Paris Area) as greater threat. And it failed because Montgomery launched Operation Epsom in 25 June 1944 that pre empted offensive deployment of 2nd SS Panzer Corps. Operation Epsom gained a bridgehead on Odon river and caused a limited pieacemental (but also using all resources as they arrived) counter attack of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions (that reacted aand gave up initiative) that wAS defeated by Monty’s VII and VIII Corps on Odon bridgehead and Hill 112. Read Patrick Delaforce’s “Taming Hitler’s Panzers”

That German failed attack on Montgomery’s newly gained bridgehead also indirectly cost Von Rundstedt’s job on July 1st.

∗Rundstedt’s dismissal may have come partly as the result of his blunt words to Keitel the
night before. The latter had rung him up to inquire about the situation. An all-out German
attack on the British lines by four S.S. panzer divisions which was expected to drive British back to sea , had just floundered and Rundstedt
was in a gloomy mood. ”What shall we do?” cried Keitel.
”Make peace, you fools,” Rundstedt retorted. ”What else can you do?” It seems that Keitel,
the ”telltale toady,” as most Army field commanders called him, went straight to Hitler with
the remarks. The Fuehrer was at that moment conferring with Kluge, who had been on sick
leave for the last few months as the result of injuries sustained in a motor accident. Kluge was immediately named to replace Rundstedt. In such ways were top commands changed by the Nazi warlord. General Blumentritt told of the telephone conversation to both Chester Wilmot (The Struggle for Europe, p. 347) and Liddell Hart (The German Generals Talk, p. 205)

First of all Caen was captured on July 7th , one month after D-Day (he did not attack the town for three months that gives a wrong impression to belittle his achievements by revisionist mud slinging)

Three months after D-Day on 6th September , 21st Army Group was had liberated most of Northern France and almost entire Belgium and pounding the gates Ghent and Brugge :slight_smile:

As for battles of Caen , Monty was tasked and under strict orders to keep pressure on Caen - Orne sector according to D-Day briefing plans he explined at St Paul’s on May 16

  1. To keep German Panzer Group West busy and pinned down , unable to regroup at Caen - Orne front (suceeded despite depthness and anti tank gun reinforced nature of defences when British and Canadians were devoid of infantry) while 1st US Army complated capture of Cotentin Peninsula and Cherbourg (facing against four weak and low quality non mobile German infantry divisions and still 1st US Army was delayed and off schedule of D-Day timetable when Cherbourg was planned to be captured by D+10 , 16th June , instead it fell on 26th June due to Hitler’s Hold at All Cost No Retreat orders. If 2nd SS Panzer Corps arrived here on this sector Bradley’s job would in western flank at Cotentin and St Lo (which had been a D+1 objective was only captured on 17th July) be much harder and later with US heavier US casaulties on hedgrow terrain or maybe impossible.

  2. To enlarge deployment room in captured Normandy bridgehead so rest of Second Army and First US Army was deployed , due to delay in timetable Allied bridgehead remained long but somewhat shallow till July and there was not enough room for deploying all remaining British , Canadian and US divisions left at UK. This is called Dogfight Phase or Battle of Bridgehead phase of campaign. Plus enough deepness for constructing airfields at bridgehead (maybe 25 km or more at least) was still yet to be achieved till mid July and RAF commanders Arthur Teddler and Arthur Conningham (who both had personal reasons to hold a grudge against Montgomery and Army command in general , inter-service rivalry was everywhere same) were complaining Eisenhower for that and even campaigning for his removal in SHEAF in England from his back while Monty was struggling to enlarge the bridgehead at Normandy against growing opposiiton of ten or so German divsions including six panzer divisons that left no open flanks to outflank or gaps to exploit in their lines with worsening weather (Channel Storm that halted Allied logistics at the end of June) and smaler and smaller British infantry replacements due to manpower crisis (British were at war since 1939 , exhausted their manpower and never had huge pool of replacements like US and Soviet Union had)

  3. Eisenhower also pressuring due to insistence and constant instructions from Combined Chiefs of Staff , War Department , Marshall and Allied press due to premature over expectstion were also insisting and hurrying up for breakthrough and victory , never realising Battle for Build Up and gaining deployment room would be longer and more tiresome than they could ever imagine. On that regard Monty and his PR team maybe rose expectations of press and public a little bit too high that they would break out immediately in June or first half of July (what no one wished but things beginning to look like more and more was an Gallipoli 1915 or Anzio 1944 like stelemate) but Monty’s strategy of diverting panzer divisons to east so US breakout area in west at Cotentin would be open , eventually worked (as Eisenhower admitted as I wrote above) albeit slower and a few weeks longer than planned timetable.

And Hitler’s great strategy of holding Normandy , Caen , Cotentin with all panzer divisions stuck as immobile holding forces to hold a collapsing front (only to be enveloped) , worked brilliantly didn’t it ?

Saar - Palantinate was in 1945 when 7th German Army holding the sector (where it was overstretched on a very extended front from Koblenz to Lorreine and stuck defending West Wall fortifications with Hitler Orders to defend the place that forbade retreat , it made their outflanking a lot more easier) was literally disintegrating after losses suffered in France , Lorreine and Ardennes. In 1944 summer , Panzer Group West had almost 2.400 tanks and mobile guns and they were self confident commsnders leading them that became vetarans in Polish , French and Eastern Front Campaigns while Allies rarely ventured (even with their armor) out of tactical airforce range and when they made pursuit operations of retreating enemy , they were successful when there was no organised resistance in front of them. (like when 7th German Army and 5th Panzser Army was crushed at Falaise in August 1944 thanks to their pinning in Argentan - Alencon sector south of Caen and after that suddenly 21st and 12th Army Groups found themselves on plains of Northern France without anyone to oppose them) Germans were experts in mobile warfare much better in local or greater scale counter attacks to distrupt enemy advance and build up and demoralise enemy ranks and later exploit it to full extent (Battle of Gazala 1942 , Sidi Bou Zid and Kasserine Pass , Kharkov 1943 etc) A staged withdrawal when Allied advance would be cautious with careful rearguard action while panzer divisions regrouped for counter attack would have much better success even if as you said Allied air supremacy and tactical air domination would frustrate them a lot.

BUT whenever they tried to hold a defensive line and reacting enemy moves and abandoning strategic and operational flexibility , no matter how fortified or reinforced that line is , they lost because Western Allied generals like Montgomery , learned their trade of static attrition operations from trench warfare of WWI , always found a way to overwhelm or overflank or breakthrough that defensve line no matter the cost (Alamein line, El Aghelia line , Buerat Line , Mareth Line , Wadi Akarit Line and these are the one Montgomery breached or overflanked in Africa , Enfidaville line in Tunisia) , Etna Line in Sicily (fell combined attack of Eighth Army and 7th US Army) , Gustav Line (toughest nut to crack but breached by reinforced 5th US Army finally in may 1944 after Cassino battles) , Atlantik Wall. These stalled them true , cost them casulties and delayed advance of this forces but Allied generals always overcame enemy static defences.

Germans had these previous examples and human being they were , their conclusion that mobile flexible operations with a mass of panzers when they had a much better balance in unit organisation and training/experience/weapons quality , had a chance of defeating the invasion , holds more merit than “Hold At All Costs” on a defensive line under enemy naval gunfire and firepower thinking. Once they forfeited operational flexibility which they held dear , they lost.

From The Rise and Fall of Third Reich - William Shrier

Hitler’s much-propagandized Atlantic Wall had been breached within a few hours. The once vaunted Luftwaffe had been driven completely from the air and the German Navy from the sea, and the Army taken by surprise. The battle was far from over, but its outcome was not long in doubt. ”From June 9 on,” says Speidel, ”the initiative lay with the Allies.”

(Hans Spiedel , Rommel’s Chief of Stadd , his book “Invasion 1944” is also main resource here)

Rundstedt and Rommel decided that it was time to say so to Hitler, face to face, and to demand that he accept the consequences. They enticed him to a meeting on June 17 at Margival, north of Soissons, in the elaborate bombproof bunker which had been built to serve as the Fuehrer’s headquarters for the invasion of Britain in the summer of 1940, but never used. Now, four summers later, the Nazi warlord appeared there for the first time.

He looked pale and sleepless [Speidel later wrote], playing nervously with his glasses and an array of colored pencils which he held between his fingers. He sat hunched upon a stool, while the field marshals stood. His hypnotic powers seemed to have waned. There was a
curt and frosty greeting from him. Then in a loud voice he spoke bitterly of his displeasure at the success of the Allied landings, for which he tried to hold the field commanders responsible.

But the prospect of another stunning defeat was emboldening the generals, or at least Rommel, whom Rundstedt left to do most of the talking when Hitler’s diatribe against them had come to a momentary pause. ”With merciless frankness,” says Speidel, who was present, ”Rommel pointed out , . . that the struggle was hopeless against the [Allied] superiority in the air, at sea and on the land.” Well, not quite hopeless, if Hitler abandoned his absurd determination to hold every foot of ground and then to drive the Allied forces into the sea. Rommel proposed, with Rundstedt’s assent, that the Germans withdraw out of range of the enemy’s murderous naval guns, take their panzer units out of the line and re-form them for a later thrust which might defeat the Allies in a battle fought ”outside the range of the enemy’s naval artillery.”

But the Supreme warlord would not listen to any proposal for withdrawal.
German soldiers must stand and fight. The subject obviously was unpleasant
to him and he quickly changed to others. In a display which Speidel calls ”a strange mixture of cynicism and false intuition,” Hitler assured the generals that
the new V-l weapon, the buzz bomb, which had been launched for the first time
the day before against London, ”would be decisive against Great Britain . . .
and make the British willing to make peace.” When the two field marshals drew
Hitler’s attention to the utter failure of the Luftwaffe in the West, the Fuehrer
retorted that ”masses of jet fighters” – the Allies had no jets, but the Germans
had just put them into production – would soon drive the British and American
flyers from the skies. Then, he said, Britain would collapse. At this juncture
the approach of Allied planes forced them to adjourn to the Fuehrer’s air-raid
shelter.

*Safe in the underground concrete bunker, they resumed the conversation, and at this point Rommel insisted on steering it into politics. He predicted [says Speidel] that the German front in Normandy would collapse and that a breakthrough into Germany by the Allies could not be checked . . . He doubted whether the Russian front could be held. He pointed to Germany’s complete political isolation . . . He concluded . . . with an urgent request that the war be brought**to an end.

Hitler, who had interrupted Rommel several times, finally cut him short: ”Don’t you worry about the future course of the war, but rather about your own invasion front.”

I should also point out Von Rundstedt , Rommel and their successor Von Kluge , were much more experienced in commanding and directing armies in field than Hitler.

That is all I will say about that. During 1944 summer in mobile flexible operations Allied armies (no matter Patton commanded or not) on operational level , were not at the same league with Germans whose Order Based Operational Method exploited every oppurtunity and regrouping. Only when encountering no organised resistance (other than road blocks and temporary holding rear guard detachments that could be outflanked or bypassed) could Allied armor roam free.

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Why on earth are you assuming that because I say Monty was not a serious artist I think that anybody else was?

Oh, and if all the history books say “The Battle of Caen” ending in August, I tend to believe them.

Anyway, we’re arguing in circles, and I’m not all that interested. That doesn’t mean either of us is correct (but I am :slight_smile:

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Harking back to the original question.
Market-Garden was a strategy driven by egotism; planning driven by best case optimism; and the only reason it wasn’t a total disaster was the German delusion that they needed the Nijmegem bridge and so didn’t destroy it asap.

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Absolutely. Montgomery was obsessed by being “the man who won the war”, and achieving spiritual dominance over the man who he hated as being his inferior in all things: Eisenhower. Montgomery never stopped scheming to replace Ike, and even after he declared himself “your loyal subordinate”, he kept right on scheming.

Monty saw Market-Garden as his chance to put to to rest the criticism that he never attacked successfully without massive superiority. He fancied this a bold plan that would show he was a better general than, well, everybody. Nothing would stand in the way, including clear evidence that his plan was doomed. He kept declaring that success in M-G would mean Berlin would be taken by Christmas

Actually, they did try to blow the bridge; it was thwarted by a Dutch partisan – a Dutch partisan, Jan van Hoof, who cut the wires to the explosives. So when the Germans tried to blow up the bridge on the 20th, nothing happened. It wasn’t delusional, it was optimistic. Remember, 2 SS Panzer divisions were north of the Waal, and might have had an opportunity to cross to the south of the river and drive the whole “Garden” force back in disarray.

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I am aware that they tried to blow the bridge just as it was captured.
However, given the state the SS panzer divisions were in after being mauled in Normandy the idea of driving the whole allied force back wasn’t optimism, it was delusion.
If they had decided to blow the bridge on the 18th or 19th they would have had time to fix the sabotage and turn Monty’s 90% success into a 90% disaster.

If Nijmegen was decisive, if the Germans “should” have blown it, then the 82nd should have captured it first. They had perfect opportunity to, but waited until it was too late.