Background of news –
MacArthur complications
By Jay G. Hayden
Washington –
The letters exchanged by Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Rep. A. L. Miller of Nebraska and which Gen. MacArthur now says “were never intended for publication,” seem certain to have far-reaching repercussions with regard both to presidential politics and the war situation in the Pacific.
By the indirect process of approving statements made by Mr. Miller, Gen. MacArthur reveals himself as bitterly critical of the New Deal policies of President Roosevelt and at least a receptive candidate for the Presidency.
Further he sustains the inference contained in some of his earlier official communiqués, that he is dissatisfied with the tools of war that have been allotted him by Washington.
Not that Gen. MacArthur’s presidential prospect is advanced by this incident. To the contrary, it is the opinion of most of the neutral-minded political analysts that if anything further was needed to remove him as a serious contender, the letters have accomplished it.
A much more intriguing aspect of the letters is their added aggravation of an already-strained relationships between President Roosevelt and Gen. MacArthur.
It was Mr. Roosevelt’s removal of Gen. MacArthur as Chief of Staff in 1935 that caused him to resign his commission and become Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Army.
Scope of command in doubt
When war broke, the President had no other recourse than to accept Gen. MacArthur’s tender of service and make him Commander-in-Chief of Philippine Defense, but even then, there were marked signs of White House perturbation over the situation.
When Gen. MacArthur made his dramatic exit to Australia, there was loud public demand that he be made commander-in-chief of all anti-Japanese forces. The President’s first announcement seemed to give him overall command of land, air and sea forces in the Southwest Pacific, but a little later, dispatches from that front pictured the Navy as refusing to accede to this arrangement.
A subsequent clarification gave Gen. MacArthur control of naval as well as land forces in the Australian area, but when the Battle of the Coral Sea came along, it developed that most of the ships and planes engaged were from the Hawaiian Command of Adm. Chester W. Nimitz.
Just now a situation is developing which may necessitate new chances in command. In the recent attack on Palau and other islands in the Western Carolines, the naval forces of Adms. Nimitz and Halsey for the first time were jointly engaged. Plainly the hour for grand assault by the whole American force in the Western Pacific, operating as one unit, is rapidly approaching, and this would seem to call for the designation of a single directing head – presumably either Gen. MacArthur or Adm. Nimitz.
If he’s demoted – look out!
If Mr. Roosevelt pursues his own inclination, there is very little doubt that Adm. Nimitz would be accorded command of at least all naval forces in this area.
But there is no gainsaying the existence of a political complication, now accentuated by the Miller-MacArthur letters. If Gen. MacArthur’s command is diminished, however slightly, the charge will arise that he has been demoted.
There is a historical parallel in the relationship of President Lincoln with Gen. George B. McClellan.
The latter, who reentered the Army from civil life when the war broke out, was a Democrat with powerful political connections. From the earliest stages of his command of the Army of the Potomac, he made it plain that he considered himself too important for the President to dare to fire. And when Mr. Lincoln’s great patience was finally exhausted and he did oust Gen. McClellan, the Democrats made him their presidential candidate in 1864.