The President’s Chief of Staff to the President
Cairo, 25 November 1943
Memorandum for: The President
The Effect of North Burma Operations on Cargo Delivery to China
The following data pertains to the current discussion between Lord Mountbatten and the Generalissimo, concerning the conflicting requirements between tonnage over the Hump and projected operations in North Burma.
General Stilwell maintains that the minimum tonnages which must be delivered over the Hump to maintain the Yunnan Force, the 14th Air Force, and the Chinese-American Composite Wing, is as follows:
| Total | For 14th Air Force & China-US Comp Wg | For Yunnan Force | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| November | 9,700 | 6,500 | 3,200 | |
| December | 9,700 | 6,500 | 3,200 | |
| January | 8,050 | 7,900 | 4,700 | 3,200 |
| February | 8,050 | 7,900 | 4,700 | 3,200 |
| March | 9,000 | 9,200 | 6,000 | 3,200 |
| April | 9,500 | 9,200 | 6,000 | 3,200 |
| May | 9,700 | 9,200 | 6,000 | 3,200 |
| June | 10,000 |
Lord Mountbatten considers that these above tonnages should be accepted only as target amounts rather than guaranteed minimums. He must employ portions of the Air Transport planes to support the Operation TARZAN.
The Generalissimo demands that 10,000 tons be delivered over the Hump each month, regardless of the logistics requirements of the Burma Campaign.
An optimistic estimate of the Air Transport Command’s ability to transport supplies over the Hump during the period of the North Burma operations, and with no diversion for these operations, is as follows:
| November | 9,000 |
| December | 9,000 |
| January | 9,444 |
| February | 11,000 |
| March | 12,000 |
| April | 12,000 |
| May | 12,000 |
Furthermore, Lord Mountbatten has indicated a positive requirement for an additional 25 operating C-46 aircraft to make possible the Burma operations’ logistic requirements.
There is a project in the China-Burma-India Theater to build a 4-inch pipe line from Assam to Kunming. The project has 16 C-47s and 40 C-46s allocated to it. In view of changes in the original plans for the pipe line, it may later be found possible to divert the 16 C-47s to Lord Mountbatten.
It is suggested that in your discussions with the Prime Minister and the Generalissimo on this subject, you establish the following:
a. First priority in the use of U.S. Army transports on the India-China Wing to be assigned to the delivery of the minimum tonnages recommended by General Stilwell for the 14th Air Force, the Yunnan Forces and the composite Chinese-American Wing (Air).
b. All Air Transport Command capacities or facilities in the China-Burma-India Theater, beyond those required to meet the guaranteed minimum tonnages, are to be available to Lord Mountbatten for the support of the Burma Campaign.
c. No additional transports can be promised for over the Hump activities or the Burma Campaign, beyond the 16 additional referred to in paragraph 6 above.
W. D. LEAHY
Admiral, USN