Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran (1941)

U.S. Department of State (August 28, 1941)

740.0011 European War 1939/14423: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, August 27, 1941 — 7 p.m.
[Received August 28 — 6 a.m.]

111.

The Ali Mansour Cabinet resigned at Prime Minister’s request at 5 p.m., allegedly because of inability to arrive at a satisfactory settlement with the Russians and British.

The Under Secretaries have been instructed by the Shah to carry on until a new Cabinet is formed.

The British Minister informs me that no reply has been received yet to his telegram to London transmitting the Shah’s proposal mentioned in my telegram 105.

Tension is increasing hourly in Tehran. Newspapers and posters tonight are giving the people information as to air raid precautions and how to get in touch with hospitals.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14453: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 27, 1941 — 7 p.m.
[Received August 28 — 9:55 a.m.]

1587.

Moscow, August 26, 1941

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the note of the Soviet Government dated August 25, 1941.

The Government and the people of Iran have always held feelings of the most sincere friendship toward the Government and the peoples of the Soviet Union.

The relations of friendship and good neighborhood between the two countries have always found their expression in the actions and the acts of the two Governments.

Iran has always highly appreciated and appreciates the sincere fraternal and friendly policy of the Soviet Republic, a policy which has found its outward expression in the moral and material support at the most difficult times of its political life. The divers circumstances enumerated in the note which have occurred in the friendly relations between the two countries correspond entirely to the reality both as to the point of view of places and of times.

The development of mutual friendly relations between Iran and the Soviet Union has been founded on the basis of mutual understanding and confidence.

Article VI of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1922 [1921] is a proof of the mutual confidence of the two Governments and of the peoples of Iran and of the Soviet Union, and that article presents in principle a guarantee of the territorial inviolability of Iran.

The circumstances foreseen by Article VI of said treaty are specified by its spirit and by its text. Thus until August 25, 1941, no armed forces of a foreign country have attempted by armed invasion to carry out on the territory of Iran a policy of conquest or to transform the territory of Iran into a base from which to launch a campaign against the Soviet Union. Iran, being a neutral power and a friend of the Soviet Union, has taken all measures to keep without the bounds of Iran the dangers which could have been created, according to the definition of the note which has been handed me, by certain foreign elements now in Iran whose activity has been judged by the Soviet Government as menace to the interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of Great Britain.

The representations of the Soviet Government of June 26, July 19 and August 16 had the purpose of directing the attention of the Iranian Government to the situation created and constituted a preliminary step to the formal warning of August 6, 1941. The Government of Iran, notwithstanding the nonconformity of the forms of these representations with the diplomatic relations customary between sovereign states, urgently took effective and extraordinary measures in view of the friendly relations with the Soviet Union, measures which without doubt would have given results satisfactory to the two countries.

By the careful study of all measures taken by the Government of Iran, I have personally arrived at the conclusion that on September 15, 1941, the last contingency of dangerous persons from the point of view of the Soviet Union would have left the boundaries of Iran.

It is to be regretted that the Soviet Government has not awaited the results of effective and urgent measures by the Iranian Government taken in conformity with its status as a neutral power.

The assurances of respect for the sovereign rights of neutral Iran, its territorial integrity, its inviolability and its independence have been given by the Soviet Union and by Great Britain and the Government of Iran has had entire confidence in these assurances. In view of the preceding as Plenipotentiary Ambassador of Iran, Mr. People’s Commissar, I beg you to be so good as to stop the advance of armed forces on the territory of Iran with a view to an amicable settlement of the question and by respect for the sovereign rights and neutrality of Iran to make possible the reasonable carrying out of the measures taken by the Government to expel from Iran the foreigners designated in the note of August 25 in the shortest time possible.

At the same time having full confidence in the assurances of the Soviet Government that the Soviet troops will be withdrawn from Iran after overcoming the danger I beg you in return for the expelling from the territory of Iran of the foreigners dangerous to the Soviet Union and Great Britain to take measures to the end that the units of the Red Army be recalled to the frontier of the Soviet Union where they may have passed the frontiers of Iran with as little delay as possible and to suspend contact with Iranian troops which defended the inviolability of their territory.

Making a record of my personal disagreement expressed above with respect to the incorrect interpretation of Article VI of the Treaty of Friendship of 1921 and my protest against the temporary entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Iran, I have the honor to assure you, Mr. People’s Commissar, that in the event that the sovereign rights, inviolability, and territorial independence of the territory of Iran are fully respected my Government will take all measures in this case to reinforce the friendly and economic relations between Iran and the Soviet Union.

I avail myself of this occasion, Mr. People’s Commissar, etc.

M. SAED
Iranian Ambassador

STEINHARDT

740.0011 European War 1939/14442: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, August 28, 1941 — 1 p.m.
[Received August 28 — 9:56 a.m.]

3918.

Foreign Office has given me the following account of the course of events at Tehran following the presentation of the British memorandum of August 16.

On August 19, the Iranian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs gave Sir R. Bullard an oral reply to His Majesty’s Government’s memorandum of August 16. He explained that 3 Germans who were understood to have engaged in undesirable activities would leave within a week and at least 100 would leave within a month, after which time the removal of Germans would be accelerated on the basis of schemes being prepared in all Ministries. The Iranian Government were not willing to provide lists of the Germans whose departure was required. The written reply would follow.

This written reply was received by Sir R. Bullard on August 21. It was in very general terms stating that the Iranian Government regretted to observe in the British memorandum of August 16, matters incompatible with their policy of neutrality; nevertheless, the Iranian Government’s policy had from the first been to require superfluous foreigners to leave the country and this policy was now being carried out with greater care and speed. The number of foreigners in Iran had lately been specially reduced and the numbers would soon show a remarkable diminution. The Iranian Government could not put into practice in respect of the nationals of one state steps which would be incompatible with their arrangements and contrary to their treaties and which would lead to the abandonment of their neutral course. The Iranian Government added that they could not accept any proposal whatsoever which was contrary to their policy of neutrality or to their rights of sovereignty.

This unsatisfactory reply was supplemented by an oral message from the Shah conveyed to Sir R. Bullard by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 23. The Shah stated his desire that Sir R. Bullard and his Government should have no cause for anxiety and repeated personally the assurance already given. He had already given orders for the Iranian Government’s programme to be put into execution and he assured Sir R. Bullard that it would be accelerated and that he would soon see a great reduction in the number of Germans, particularly in large centers of the population.

It is clear from these communications that the Iranian authorities have no intention of adequately meeting our requirements. There is, moreover, clear evidence to show that the Shah and his ministers have been influenced in taking their decision by the view that the Russo-German campaign is bound to end in a German victory. Sir R. Bullard has also reported that the Iranian Government’s policy has been drawn up in consultation with the Germans and there is reason to believe that this is the case.

Sir R. Bullard has therefore been instructed to communicate to the Iranian Government on August 25 the communication of which a copy is attached. He has been authorized to make it clear orally that in the view of His Majesty’s Government there is no reason why the measures taken by them should lead to any material alteration in the financial, economic, and other relations normally existing between Iran and the British Empire. There is for instance no reason, if the Iranian Government cooperate in such ways as they can, why the oil royalties should not continue to be paid as hitherto. His Majesty’s Government also have no wish to interrupt supplies to Iran of vital economic needs from British Empire sources.

Following is text of the communication which the British Minister at Tehran was authorized to make to the Iranian Government on August 25:

The attention of the Imperial Iranian Government has frequently been drawn to the need for taking action to secure the removal from Iran of the German community. The presence of German technical experts and advisers throughout Iran, employed in factories and in public works as well as on roads and railways and in many other important posts where their activities might constitute a serious danger, is regarded by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom as a matter of the utmost gravity which closely affects their own interests. His Majesty’s Government have therefore repeatedly urged that a drastic reduction should be made in the number of these Germans. These friendly representations to the Iranian Government culminated in the memorandum communicated to them on the 16th August, in which the Iranian Government were urged once again to take steps to arrange for the German community to leave Iran without any further delay. This communication of the 16th August contained a proposal devised in order to meet Iran’s special needs, by which a few German technicians engaged on important work in connection with Iranian industrialization projects be retained temporarily and it was suggested that a list of those German nationals whom it might be desired to retain for essential work should be communicated to His Majesty’s Minister without delay. His Majesty’s Government also offered in this communication of the 16th August to assist the Iranian Government by endeavoring to find suitably qualified British or neutral experts to replace the German technicians who had left and they added that they would gladly concert with the Iranian Government measures to alleviate any temporary hardships that might be caused by the simultaneous departure of large numbers of trained personnel.

  1. It is regretted that the Iranian Government have not seen fit to return a satisfactory reply to the memorandum of the 16th August. It is evident that the Iranian Government attach greater importance to retaining these German nationals in Iran than they attach to meeting the wishes of His Majesty’s Government in a matter which is becoming one of increasing urgency as a result of developments in the war situation. The Iranian Government must bear the fullest responsibility for the consequences of their decision.

  2. In these circumstances His Majesty’s Government now feel themselves obliged to take appropriate measures to safeguard their own vital interests and to deal with the menace arising from the potential activities of the Germans in Iran. The Iranian Government may be assured that these measures will in no way be directed against the Iranian people. His Majesty’s Government have no designs directed against the independence of Iran or her territorial integrity. Any military measures which British forces may be obliged to take are of a temporary nature only, and will not outlast the present emergency, since they are directed solely against the Axis Powers.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/14463: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State

London, August 28, 1941 — 4 p.m.
[Received August 28 — 1:25 p.m.]

3925.

My 3918, August 28, 1 p.m.

The Foreign Office has emphasized orally the extremely vague and unsatisfactory nature of the Iranian Government’s written reply of August 21 to the British memorandum of August 16. The written reply was even more evasive and unsatisfactory than the oral statements which had been made by Iranian officials in the interval before the receipt of the note. The British, therefore, felt that the situation was too critical and dangerous for them to delay together with the Russians any longer in taking such measures as they considered necessary to forestall German action. The Foreign Office is satisfied from its own sources of information that the number of dangerous Germans in Iran is somewhere between 1,000 and 3,000. It was stated that this estimate comes from British sources and has been entirely uninfluenced by Russian estimates of the numbers which are said to be greater. Mr. Eden had felt that his public statement published on August 26 (my 3916, August 27) had made clear that Great Britain had no designs on Iranian sovereignty or territorial integrity and that this intention has been made emphatically clear both by the British and the Russians in their declarations to the Iranian Government. The Foreign Office also emphasized its conviction that the consistently evasive attitude of the Iranian Government to the British and Russian request for the expulsion of dangerous German nationals had been based on the belief of the Shah and his Government that the Germans would soon be at the frontiers of Iran and that they were determined to be on good terms with Hitler when that day arrived.

The British have no intention of keeping their military forces in Iran longer than necessary to insure themselves against any possibility of Hitler’s gaining a foothold in Iran and access to Iranian oil fields. It was stated they have no reason to believe that Russian intentions are any different and that there are absolutely no private understandings between the British and Russian Governments which would give Russia any sort of free hand in Iran or any tacit acquiescence in Russian troops remaining in Iran any longer than military necessities require.

In a secret telegram received on August 26 from the British Ambassador at Angora, Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen reported a meeting he had with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 25 at which he had handed him a memorandum setting forth the reasons for the British-Russian action in Iran and declaring that the British Government had no designs whatever against Iran’s political independence or territorial integrity. The British Ambassador reported that the Turkish Foreign Secretary was most friendly but had remarked that he thought it right as a friend and ally of Great Britain to explain his reasons for disagreeing with the policy which had been adopted in Iran. As reported by Sir Hughe these reasons were as follows: If the war ended in a draw or if Russia defeated Germany, the Foreign Minister saw no reason why the presence of Germans in Iran should be a danger to the British. If Russia was defeated by Germany a military problem would then arise on which the Minister did not feel competent to express an opinion but he said that even in that event he would have dealt with the matter differently; he did not say how. Sir Hughe explained in detail the dangers which the British wished to avoid, namely German military penetration into Iran with resulting disorder, sabotage and all sorts of fifth column work and in particular the necessity for securing the safety of the Iranian oil fields and refineries. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs did not press his views further and is reported to have been particularly convinced by the necessity for insuring the safety of the Iranian oil fields. Sir Hughe asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he was satisfied with Anglo-Soviet assurances already given and the Minister said that he was.

Is it the Department’s view that the final paragraph of Mr. Eden’s public statement reported in my 3916, August 27, sufficiently covers the future position and Great Britain’s pledge that she has no designs against the independence and territorial integrity of Iran?

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/14466: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State

London, August 28, 1941.
[Received August 28 — 1:30 p.m.]

3946.

Press sheet published by the Soviet Embassy in London gives full English text of note said to have been handed by M. Molotov on August 25 to Iranian Ambassador in Moscow. Final paragraph of note as published reads as follows:

These measures are in no way directed against the people of Iran. The Soviet Government has no intentions whatever against the territorial integrity or national independence of Iran. The military measures taken are solely against the danger created by the hostile activities of Germans in Iran. As soon as this danger, which threatens the interests of Iran and the Soviet Union are averted, the Soviet Government will immediately withdraw its troops.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/14469: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, August 27, 1941 — noon.
[Received August 28 — 2:57 p.m.]

110.

The calm which has prevailed in Tehran is rapidly giving way to nervousness and fear. Contributory causes are the Russian bombing of open towns particularly nearby Qazvin yesterday and growing realization that the Shah may not after all be able to settle matters amicably with his alleged good friends, the British. The drone of Iranian airplanes overhead, the surge of rumors, shortage of food, fear of Tehran being bombed, and the dread of the advancing Russians are also playing their part. The food situation continues unimproved and near riots are developing in food and kerosene cues. The Imperial Bank closed for a short time yesterday due to a run. Gendarmerie police are still in full control and there have yet been no important incidents […] is potentially dangerous and may degenerate into rioting.

Our citizens in Tehran are well and calm and those in outlying section are believed to be safe. Arrangements have been made for our missionaries throughout the country to get in touch with the Legation through the mission headquarters in Tehran in case of danger or harm to them. Mr. Boyce has just informed me that Hamadan and others are in touch with the mission on routine matters and have reported no difficulties.

About 800 Germans have taken refuge in the German Legation and some 350 British Indians and Allied nationals have been taken into the 2 British compounds. Our American staff and citizens in Tehran have not yet considered it necessary to accept my offer to grant them refuge in the Legation compound and I consequently continue to refuse to take in numerous Czechs and other nationals who are applying for admission.

There is little reliable news in Tehran of the actual military situation and Iranian communiqué number 1, issued last night covering the first day gives no news of value. While reinforcements continue to move towards the frontiers and while general mobilization has not been ordered additional soldiers are being drafted.

Military resistance is being offered but I am of the opinion that it is so impotent that it will collapse within a few days unless foreign assistance is received.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14490: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Secretary of State

Ankara, August 28, 1941 — 4 p.m.
[Received 9:15 p.m.]

318.

In course of conversation referred to in my next previous telegram President Inonu expressed to British Ambassador his regret that British had not settled Iranian question by friendly negotiation; and Hugessen maintained that since January his Government had been making every possible effort to settle matter amicably with Iranian Government but had made no progress whatever and had been compelled to conclude that force was only solution. President also expressed regret that even if this action were necessary British had associated Soviets with them rather than undertaking operation alone; and Ambassador pointed out that if for no other reason it would be manifestly impossible for British in view of their manifold commitments elsewhere to involve themselves to possible extent of having to occupy whole of Iran, to which President assented.

  1. During this friendly and intimate conversation Hugessen took occasion to state his understanding of present position of terms of a long-term policy of association with Britain concurrently with a short-term policy of conciliation of Germany and President fully acquiesced in this general statement.

Repeated to Iran.

MacMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/14473: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, August 28, 1941 — 1 p.m.
[Received 11:30 p.m.]

116.

The British Minister and Russian Ambassador were separately summoned at noon today by the new Foreign Minister and told that the Iranian Government has given orders to cease all opposition and is prepared to meet any terms.

The two envoys are telegraphing the foregoing to London and Moscow respectively and are requesting instructions.

The Russian Ambassador has stated that the Russians are making such rapid headway that advanced forces should reach Tehran within the next 24 hours.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14472: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, August 28, 1941 — 10 a.m.
[Received 11:50 p.m.]

113.

The Prime Minister in presenting the new Cabinet to the Parliament this morning made the important announcement that since Iran is a peace-loving nation, orders have been given for Iranian forces to cease all resistance to the British and Russians.

DREYFUS

The Pittsburgh Press (August 28, 1941)

CABINET QUITS; IRANIANS ORDER END OF FIGHTING

British, Russians about to be given key points in settlement

By Edward W. Beattie Jr., United Press staff writer

London, Aug. 28 –
Resistance to the British-Russian occupation of Iran was fading today and it was expected that a new cabinet formed at Tehran would agree quickly to a peaceful settlement ousting German agents and protecting the Near East war supply line with the Soviet Union.

The resignation of the Iranian cabinet of Prime Minister Ali Khan Mansur and formation of a new government was reported to have completed preparations for the settlement, although an official explanation of the situation was withheld and the occupation operations proceeded steadily.

The new Iranian government was given a vote of confidence at the meeting of Parliament at Tehran today, according to the Tehran radio and direct dispatches from Iran. The Parliament also approved an order to cease firing and permit peaceful occupation of strategic ports, rail lines and oil fields.

In Ankara, Turkey, German Ambassador Franz von Papen was quoted as telling the Iranian envoy that the Nazis:

… must remain outside the fighting in Iran and stand aside as they did in Syria.

Dispatches said the British Imperial forces had passed through the important Pataq Pass in the western oil area and occupied Kūh-e Karan, on the highway to Tehran, and taken Shahabad, where Shah Reza Pahlavi had a large private estate.

2,000 Iranians routed

A British general headquarters communiqué reported that about 2,000 Iranian troops were driven off high ground east of Gilan during the advance on Shahabad. The route was said to have been protected also by roadblocks and anti-tank guns.

The Russians, moving swiftly down from the north on the west side of the Caspian Sea, had reached a line extending from Marand through Ardabil to Havir, on the Caspian, about 120 miles south of the Russian border.

It was believed that the settlement, if completed, would give the British and Russians possession temporarily of the ports, railway and highway lines essential to the transportation of war materials from America and elsewhere and control of the oil fields, which are largely British-owned.

In Rome, a Messaggero dispatch from Tehran said that Crown Prince Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, 21, had assumed command of the Iranian Army.

RAF bombs troops

It was said authoritatively that the Russians, advancing steadily, had taken Torkamanchay, 70 miles southeast of Tabriz and 280 miles northwest of Tehran, and Dahargan, 30 miles southwest of Tabriz on the eastern shore of Lake Urmia. The Russians also took Kargan Rud, near Torkamanchay, and Kajan, on the Caspian Sea south of Lisar.

Informants disclosed the Lt. Gen. Edward Pellew Quinan, who has spent most of his life on the Indian frontier, is Commander-in-Chief of British forces in Iran under the supreme command of Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief in India.

Royal Air Force planes had opened the way for the Pataq Pass fighting by bombing the Iranian batteries and troop concentrations there. They has also bombed the Ahvaz Airdrome on the Gulf area, setting fire to a hanger and destroying an Iranian plane.

Other planes dropped leaflets on towns which the Iranians might have been preparing to defend.

Details of the first four days of the campaign give eloquent evidence of the speed and coordination of the attack.

Give details of drives

Khosravi was reported taken by native Indian Gurkhas in rubber shoes who surrounded the village at dawn. They awakened police, who cooperated with them. At Loval, naval personnel and civilians were said to have aided the British in consolidating strategic points.

Heaviest resistance was reported encountered south of Khorramshahr and Abadan. A British colonel leading the attack at Abadan, where the Tigris and Euphrates flow into the Persian Gulf, was said to have been wounded.

One column struck at the Khorramshahr naval barracks, a second force landed by the navy took the Abadan oil refineries intact, and a third force sailed into Bandar Shahpur.

Iranian admiral killed

An auxiliary force, landed between Khorramshahr and Abadan quickly overwhelmed Iran’s little navy, capturing a gunboat and give other small craft. The Iranian flagship, set afire, was beached along the Kārūn River.

Iranian Admiral Bayandor, killed in the action at Khorramshahr, was buried yesterday with full naval honors and British and Iranian officers in attendance.

Love the information! Iran is not a forgotten front, it’s practically nonexistent in any historical recollections of this conflict, besides the already “established” British control and influence. World war indeed!

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U.S. PRESSURE USED IN IRANIAN CAMPAIGN
By Dana Schmidt, United Press staff writer

Ankara, Turkey, Aug. 28 –
United States Ambassador John Van A. MacMurray has advised Foreign Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu that the U.S. supports British policy toward Iran, it was authoritatively reported today, as Turkey sought a quick compromise that would end the Anglo-Russian campaign in Iran.

Well-informed quarters said Mr. MacMurray had advised Saracoğlu of the support of the U.S. for Britain in a talk in which he asked Saracoğlu to outline Turkey’s policy.

News of the resignation of the Iranian cabinet came just after a series of diplomatic talks in which Saracoğlu saw the U.S., British, Russian, Iranian, Afghanistan, German and Italian ambassadors.

Baron Franz von Papen and Ottavio De Peppo, the Germans and Italian ambassadors, were reported to have told Saracoğlu that circumstances forced Germany and Italy to stand aside in the Iranian situation, from the military viewpoint at least, as they had in Syria. They were said to have warned Saracoğlu of the “menace” involved in the prospective presence of Russian troops on another part of Turkey’s frontier.

The Pittsburgh Press (August 29, 1941)

NAZIS GIVE IRAN VIEWS TO TURKS

Von Papen reported asking aid to trap Red navy

By Dana Schmidt, United Press staff writer

Ankara, Turkey, Aug. 29 –
German Ambassador Baron Franz von Papen, delaying his scheduled departure for Berlin, today submitted to President General İsmet İnönü “Germany’s views” on the British-Soviet occupation of Iran, from which Germans nationals fled into Turkey throughout yesterday.

A Sofia dispatch quoted diplomats in the Bulgarian capital as saying that von Papen is seeking an agreement with Turkey whereby Germany hopes to entrap the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and close the Dardanelles to Soviet warships as a route of escape.

President İnönü received von Papen at the presidential palace in the presence of Foreign Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu who had earlier conferred with the British, Russian, Iranian, Afghani and Italian ambassadors.

Saracoğlu was also reported authoritatively to have been visited by U.S. Ambassador John Van A. MacMurray, who advised him that the United States fully supported the British-Soviet occupation of Iran.

Von Papen was understood to have postponed his flying visit to Berlin, scheduled for Wednesday, to consult with President İnönü and Saracoğlu.

Meanwhile, the German legation has reserved 12 rooms at Ankara’s best hotel for a German trade mission which will arrive Sept. 8. German businessmen were already reported to be in Istanbul, negotiating for the purchase of a variety of articles needed by the German armies in the Russian Ukraine.

Most of the Germans in Iran were reported today to have escaped into Turkey. A group of 60 Germans reached Istanbul during the day and another trainload passed through Ankara later.

Turkish official quarters were relieved at the armistice and end of hostilities in neighboring Iran, pointing out that:

…the conflict between two of Turkey’s close friends and allies had been most embarrassing.

BRITISH DRIVE ON UNDER TRUCE WITH IRANIANS

Russians also advancing as Shah gives order to ‘cease fire’

By Ned Russell, United Press staff writer

London, Aug. 29 –
British official sources confirmed today that the Shah of Iran had ordered his forces to cease hostilities but information as to whether British occupation of strategic objectives would continue was refused.

Authoritative quarters said:

That has ceased to be a military question. It is a matter of foreign policy.

Announcement that the Shah had issued a “cease firing” order was issued at British General Headquarters in Simla, India.

Bring flag of truce

It was announced:

Iranian envoys met our forward troops with this information of the cease firing order.

In the northern sector, British and Indian troops, pushing on from Shahabad Thursday, were met by a flag of truce from the Iranian Army, which had retired to Kermanshah.

The Iranian commander offered to withdraw his troops and surrender the town if he was given until Sept. 1. Having information from a prisoner that Germans at Kermanshah had been advising the Iranians on defense plans, our commander rightly refused to accept such a delay and insisted that the Iranians withdraw from defensive positions in successive stages, starting immediately.

Reds continue advance

In the southern sector, Iranian infantry continued to advancer up both banks of the Karun River to Ahvaz, which is now in our hands. Royal Air Force fighters provided air protection for our forward troops in these operations. A new Russian column was reported to have reached Salmas, west of Lake Urmia. Their southward advance is continuing.

Referring to activities at Kermanshah, the communiqué said:

It is significant that, in the previous day’s action, two anti-tank guns were captured intact with ammunition and they proved to have been of the latest Skoda manufacture.

Skoda is the great armament works in Czechoslovakia.

The communiqué said in conclusion:

Local inhabitants have been complaining that Iranian troops have been begging food from them owing to their short rations. Our policy is to assist the Iranian people by providing foodstuffs and to lessen the general shortage existing throughout the country. For a start, arrangements have been made to send about 750 tons of wheat into the area we have occupied in southern Iran.

See stiffer Turk stand

Despite official reluctance to discuss plans for Iran, it was believed that Russian and British Imperial forces, fearful of Nazi sabotage, would continue to march into new areas pending further agreements in Tehran.

The Russians marched into Bandar Shah, at the southeast corner of the Caspian Sea; and nearby Gorgan, on the Gorganrud River; Mianeh, 90 miles southeast of Tabriz; Maragheh, near the east shore of Lake Urmia, and Urmia, near the west shore.

British forces, which had stormed the important Pataq Pass, moved on to occupy Karand and Shahabad in the western area opposite the Baghdad zone.

Britons believe now that Turkey would be encouraged to resist strong new German pressure.

U.S. Department of State (August 30, 1941)

740.0011 European War 1939/14519: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, August 29, 1941 — 7 p.m.
[Received August 30 — 6:45 a.m.]

118.

The local political situation has tonight deteriorated into a state of confusion. This is due to two facts: (1) the Russians have continued to bomb open towns including Kazvin in spite of the Iranians having ceased resistance; and (2) neither the British nor Russian Envoys have received word from their Governments as to their intentions or terms. Nervousness in Government circles has increased enormously.

The Shah and the new Cabinet take a most serious view of the new situation and the Prime Minister has so informed the British Minister. The Shah sent Ebrahim Ghavam, the father of his son-in-law, to the British Minister to express his anxiety at the delay and the continuance of hostilities. Some advisers are counselling the Shah to renew resistance while others are advising him to take flight. Ghavam also sounded out the British Minister on the possibility of the Shah taking asylum in the British Legation because of his fear of the Russians but received little encouragement on this score. The British Minister strongly advised the Government to remain in Tehran to facilitate negotiations.

The Iranian Government after having done all possible to appease the invaders and facilitate a peaceful settlement have been placed in a most difficult position. In this regard please see the penultimate paragraphs of my No. 92 of August 15, 8 a.m., and No. 99 of August 21, 2 [4] p.m. I consider important developments such as a coup or the flight of the Shah to be imminent.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14537: Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq to the Secretary of State

Baghdad, August 29, 1941 — 2 p.m.
[Received August 30 — 3:03 p.m.]

249.

Following views are held in high Iraqi circles having close Turkish contacts and may be of interest as background to recent events: Turkey invoking Saadabad Pact at German instigation prevailed on Iranian Cabinet to temporize in face of British demands on Iran and use position to bargain for commercial advantages as Turkey herself had done. Turkey could thus play for time with the Axis until a final showdown was inevitable. British and Russians in consequence postponed date of planned penetration of Iran originally set for about August 15 pending intensified negotiations with Turkey to bring latter into line. Iranians encouraged by the delay were the more inclined to follow the Turkish lead and now confronted with fait accompli of rapid invasion are furious with the Turks for illtimed intervention. Also held that Axis is furious at Turkey’s failure to influence Iran to temporize or offer more serious resistance and is preparing attack on Turkey as soon as Black Sea coast positions can be consolidated after capture of Odessa.

FARRELL

The Pittsburgh Press (August 30, 1941)

BRITISH, REDS AGREE ON IRAN TERMS

London, Aug. 30 (UP) –
Britain and Russia have agreed on terms for a settlement with Iran and will present them jointly at any hour, it was said authoritatively today.

It was understood that Britain would ask:

  1. Occupation of strategic points in Iran.

  2. Safeguarding of the Iranian oil fields and the supply line for Russian war materials from abroad.

  3. Removal of German agents in Iran, whose ousting had been demanded before the Allied march.

U.S. Department of State (September 1, 1941)

740.0011 European War 1939/14565: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, August 30, 1941 — 1 p.m.
[Received September 1 — 10:35 a.m.]

122.

The British Minister has given me the following outline of the British terms which have just been received from London and which will be presented to the Iranian Government as soon as the Russian Ambassador receives his terms and instructions:

  1. The Russians will withdraw north of the following line: From the Iraq frontier to Ushnūīyeh thence in an easterly direction through Miandoab, Zenjan, and Kazvin; northeast to Khorramabad (on the Caspian); east to Babolsar, south to Samnan, northeast to Shahrud, and north to the Russian border.

  2. British will withdraw west and south of following line: Khanaqin eastward to Kermanshah; in southeasterly direction through Khorramabad (Luristan), Maidan-i-Naftūn, Haftkel, and Gachsaran; southwest to Bandar Deylam (on the Gulf).

  3. Occupation of both these zones will be temporary.

  4. Germans in Iran will be expelled within 1 week although a few technicians will be allowed to remain.

  5. Iranian Government will give full facilities for transit through Iran of war supplies and munitions but not troops.

  6. Iran will maintain a policy of strict neutrality.

  7. British and Russians will maintain friendly relations with Iran.

  8. British will continue to pay their oil royalties.

The terms do not seem to be as severe as had been expected and will no doubt be accepted without rejections by Iranians. It will be noted that the entire oil fields are included in British zone.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14567: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, August 31, 1941 — 9 a.m.
[Received September 1 — 10:40 a.m.]

123.

At my first meeting with the Foreign Minister yesterday he informed me that the Shah was most disappointed that his request through this Legation and his Legation at Washington for American good offices had received no reply.

DREYFUS

740.00115 European War 1939/1367: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, August 31, 1941 — 10 a.m.
[Received September 1 — 10:55 a.m.]

124.

The German Minister approached me yesterday to request my good offices with the British and Russian authorities to insure humane treatment of the 900 Germans who have taken refuge in the German Legation. He seemed honestly to fear for the lives of Germans on the arrival of the Russian troops and stated that he much preferred to have them turned over to the British rather than the Russians. I took the liberty of assuring him that American Government would look with great disfavor on any mistreatment of Germans here and he seemed relieved at my promise to take up the matter informally. British and Russian Envoys with whom I took up the matter informally later in the day assured me that they would do their utmost to see that the Germans are treated humanely and in accordance with international usage. I do not intend to press the matter further since it now appears that Russian troops will not come to Tehran.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14568: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, August 31, 1941.
[Received September 1 — 3:55 p.m.]

126.

Referring to my No. 122, the Russian and British terms were presented to the Iranian Government at 5 p.m. yesterday. The Prime Minister informed Russian and British Envoys a short time ago that the Iranian Government accepts terms in principle. The Prime Minister informed the Majlis this morning that negotiations with the British and Russians have reached an advanced stage. In calling on the deputies and people to be more calm he said that the attitude of panic shown by the Iranians had done great harm.

About 9 a.m. today 8 Russian planes over Tehran dropped a number of bombs. Our Military Attaché examined the craters of 2 which fell about a mile from the airport but did no damage. I have definite knowledge that 2 men killed and 1 injured by a bomb which fell in the south of the city and it is possible there were other casualties. Russian planes are at this moment again overhead. It is difficult to understand why the Russians have bombed Tehran after the Iranians have ceased resistance and after terms have been presented. It is possible that it was a reprisal for the incident mentioned in my No. 21 [121]. If their purpose was to create terror among the Iranians they have succeeded. Some of the leaflets dropped today were addressed to peasant farmers of Iran and stressed how much Russia has done to assist them.

DREYFUS


The Pittsburgh Press (September 1, 1941)

BRITISH, RED TROOPS MEET IN IRAN

Soviet and British Indian soldiers in Iran, 1941 V Norman

London, Sept. 1 (UP) –
British Imperial and Russian troops have effected contact, their first of the war, at the town of Sanandaj in western Iran, a British General Headquarters communiqué issued at Simla, India, announced today.

The Russian and British troops met after a march through the mountains and high tablelands of Kurdistan.

To meet the British, the Russians thrust swiftly 250 miles southward from their frontier and, it was understood, completely cut off Iran from Turkey, thus leaving the country’s only free frontier that bordering on Afghanistan.

The British marched about 100 miles eastward from Iraq for the meeting.

Other British troops of the same column penetrated another 85 miles east-southeastward of Sanandaj to reach the important town of Hamedan, near the reputed tombs of Mordecai and Esther, Biblical figures.

The Simla communiqué said:

The British troops found the situation quite peaceful. Local officials were most helpful and the inhabitants were most friendly. All British residents were safe and sound.

The communiqué confirmed that Tehran, the Iranian capital, was under martial law.

It noted that British forces in the southern area found that “slight damage” had been done to the Bandar Shahpur-Gaggar railroad.

This was presumably the work of saboteurs.


ONLY SCORES OF PRISONERS SHOW THERE WAS IRAN BLITZ
By Henry T. Gorrell, United Press staff writer

Basra, Iraq, Aug. 29 – (delayed)
It is difficult to believe that only four days ago British forces smashed across the Tigris River into Iran.

The Iraqi natives were hazy about how the British blitz started. I gathered that the roads from Baghdad to Basra were jammed with military traffic for several days before Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell ordered the advance. Then early one morning, the British threw pontoon bridges across the Tigris and troops began to march as others were landed on the Abadan waterfront by tugs, sloops and air transports. The shooting was described as very mild by those who heard any of it.

If I hadn’t seen scores of Iranian prisoners being herded into concentration camps by turbaned Indians, I would have sworn I had gone to the wrong place.

British casualties were said to be very few, because the bulk of the Iranian forces retired without resistance. Except for three officials of an Abadan refinery who were shot by Iranian troops when they left their office, all British oil, bank, and consular officials were understood to be safe.

British prisoners have already been released and 700 Iranian troops captured during seven hours of street fighting which preceded the fall of Abadan will be released as soon as the peace terms are announced, it was said.

An Englishman who said he planned to join his family in Tehran, the Iranian capital, “in two or three days,” said the Persians might have been able to offer more resistance if the 10 Curtiss Tomahawk fighter planes received from the United States a few weeks ago had been unpacked.

He said:

I saw them myself in a Persian airdrome. I talked with a Curtiss representative who delivered them to the Shah and was supposed to assembled them. Then, mysteriously, after he had put one Tomahawk in condition to fly, the Curtiss representative took sick and nine of the 10 fights are still in their packing cases.

The British seized the Tomahawks and much additional material, including guns and shells made in the German-controlled Skoda works.


REDS OCCUPY SIX MORE IRANIAN TOWNS

Moscow, Sept. 1 (UP) –
Russian troops occupied six more Iranian towns yesterday, including Qazvin on the Rasht-Tehran highway, only 80 miles from the capital, the official news agency TASS said today.

TASS said the Iranian people were welcoming the Russians cordially.

It quoted Iranian officers as saying that the Iranian ruling classes viewed German intrigues sympathetically but the common people and the army did not want war with the Soviet Union.

TASS said Red tanks, infantry and cavalry were advancing in Iran according to plan and, in addition to Qazvin, the towns of Sari, Sakhi, Sabzevar, Robat-e Khakestari and Shak-e-Dzham had been occupied.

U.S. Department of State (September 2, 1941)

740.00115 European War 1939/1369: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, September 1, 1941 — 2 p.m.
[Received September 2 — 10:05 a.m.]

129.

Referring No. 124, I have consented at request of British Minister and with approval of Foreign Minister to act solely as transmitting agent in negotiations between British and German Ministers for disposition of Germans in Iran. The British Minister has offered following suggestion which he feels if accepted by all parties would offer a solution and prevent Germans falling into Russian hands: The German Legation and community would be free to arrange for sending all Germans to Ahvaz without interference by British, Russians, or Iranians; they would there be taken over by British military authorities for ultimate internment in India; certain Germans would be permitted to remain in Iran; the British would reserve liberty of action in case Germans did not carry out the arrangement faithfully and honestly; German Legation would remain in Tehran.

I have communicated the above to German Minister who will make reply as soon as he has consulted his Government and Iranian Foreign Minister. The British and Russians have no immediate intention of expelling any other Axis nationals.

DREYFUS

740.00115 European War 1939/1370: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, September 1, 1941 — 9 p.m.
[Received September 2 — 11:58 a.m.]

130.

The Turkish Chargé d’Affaires informs me his Government has instructed him to give to Germans refuge in the Turkish city and country embassies in Tehran with a view to facilitating their eventual departure for Germany. This step if carried out may have serious consequences for Iran since it would interfere with the British plan for the disposition of the Germans and might cause a severe revision of British terms. It may also […] occupation of Tehran by the Russians who have already established headquarters at Qazvin and might have the unfortunate consequences of aggravating the Iranian problem at a time when it is well on the way to satisfactory solution.

Repeated to Ankara.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14326: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran

Washington, September 2, 1941 — 6 p.m.

80.

For your information, the following is the text of a message from the President to the Shah dated September 2, 1941 in response to a message which the President received from His Majesty. It should also be considered as a response to the message of the Iranian Government transmitted by your 106, August 25, 6 p.m.

[Here follows text of telegram printed _supra_]

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/14641: Telegram

President Roosevelt to the Shah of Iran

Washington, September 2, 1941.

I have received Your Imperial Majesty’s communication regarding the recent entry of British and Russian forces into Iran. I have been following the course of events in Iran with close attention and have taken careful note of Your Majesty’s remarks.

I am persuaded that this situation is entitled to the serious consideration of all free nations including my own, and Your Majesty may rest assured that we are giving it such consideration and are maintaining our traditional attitude with respect to the basic principles involved.

At the same time I hope Your Majesty will concur with me in believing that we must view the situation in its full perspective of present world events and developments. Viewing the question in its entirety involves not only vital questions to which Your Imperial Majesty refers, but other basic considerations arising from Hitler’s ambition of world conquest. It is certain that movements of conquest by Germany will continue and will extend beyond Europe to Asia, Africa, and even to the Americas, unless they are stopped by military force. It is equally certain that those countries which desire to maintain their independence must engage in a great common effort if they are not to be engulfed one by one as has already happened to a large number of countries in Europe. In recognition of these truths, the Government and people of the United States of America, as is well known, are not only building up the defenses of this country with all possible speed, but they have also entered upon a very extensive program of material assistance to those countries which are actively engaged in resisting German ambition for world domination.

Your Imperial Majesty’s Minister at Washington is fully informed of this Government’s views on the international situation, and of the great effort on which this country is engaged, and I am certain that he has transmitted this information, based on his discussions here, to Your Majesty’s Government.

My Government has noted the statements to the Iranian Government by the British and Soviet Governments that they have no designs on the independence or territorial integrity of Iran. In view of the long-standing friendship between our two countries, my Government has already sought information from the British and Soviet Governments as to their immediate as well as long-range plans and intentions in Iran, and has suggested to them the advisability of a public statement to all free peoples of the world reiterating the assurances already given to Your Majesty’s Government.

I desire to assure Your Imperial Majesty of my good will and to renew to you the assurance of my sincere friendship.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT


The Pittsburgh Press (September 2, 1941)

BRITISH, REDS, IRAN ABOUT TO SIGN PACT

London, Sept. 2 (UP) –
Authoritative informants said today that agreement in principle had been reached between Britain and Russia on one side and Iran on the other regarding the role of the Allied armies in Iran.

They added that they could not confirm reports that an agreement had actually been signed.

Many details must be decided with Iran, the informants said. One was whether the German legation would be permitted to remain open.

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U.S. Department of State (September 3, 1941)

740.00115 European War 1939/1371: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, September 2, 1941 — 1 p.m.
[Received September 3 — 10:15 a.m.]

132.

The Turkish Chargé d’Affaires informs me he received this morning new instructions from his Government authorizing him to grant refuge to Germans only in occupied parts of Iran. This would preclude the granting of asylum to Germans here and avoid the complication mentioned in my number 130.

This relieves a situation which was being viewed most seriously by the Iranian Government and the British Legation replies to Ankara.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14648: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, September 3, 1941 — 9 a.m.
[Received 11 p.m.]

134.

The Iranian Government in its reply to the British and Russian notes accepts the terms offered with only one important exception: They request that the British zone be altered to exclude Dezful and Khorramabad and that Russian zone be amended to exclude Qazvin, Semnan, and Shahrood. In addition, they make following observations: they hope that Iranian independence and right to administer the entire country will continue, that the police will immediately resume their duties, that they will not be expected to pay expenses of occupying forces, that to avoid conflicts the forces will have as little contact as possible with the people, that the Allies will buy the goods formerly bought by Germany, that arms and ammunition which have fallen into Allied hands will be returned, that compensation will be made for lives and property lost after Iranian resistance ceased, that prohibition on entry of Germans will last only for the duration of the war, and that the Allies will withdraw their forces when the situation permits. They agree to the expulsion of the Germans but expect the Allies to arrange for their safe conduct.

The Iranians, I understand, have asked for revision of the Russian zone since they fear the Russians, if so near Tehran, may seek a pretext to occupy the capital. Confidentially the British Minister expresses the same fear.

The British and Russian Envoys are still awaiting instructions concerning expulsion of Germans who continue their refuge in German Legation.

DREYFUS

U.S. Department of State (September 4, 1941)

740.0011 European War 1939/14842

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

Washington, September 4, 1941.

The Soviet Ambassador called at his request. He referred to the suggestion of this Government that Russia and Great Britain proclaim to the general public the temporary nature of their occupation of Iran, et cetera, et cetera, and indicated that he thought they were doing so to a sufficient extent. I replied that, of course, what my Government had in mind was intended for the benefit of public opinion both in Iran and especially in the Moslem world, and that I still thought it would be very helpful for this simple declaration to be made. I then said that the President had made an appropriate statement on this subject in reply to a request for mediation by this country made by Iran. I then repeated to him the substance of my conversation with the Rumanian representative here on yesterday. He seemed very much gratified to learn this. I also emphasized the point that, of course, this Government, in replying to the Iranian Government, had taken care of the entire situation for Great Britain and Russia so far as it was at all consistent. He was very appreciative of this.

CORDELL HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/14463: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

Washington, September 4, 1941 — 2 p.m.

3563.

Reference is made to the telephone conversation on August 27 between the [Acting] Chief of the European Division and the Minister Counselor, and to the last paragraph, Section 2 of the Embassy’s no. 3925, August 28, 4 p.m., regarding Iran.

In a reply dated September 2, 1941, to a message received from the Shah, the President has stated in part as follows:

My Government has noted the statements to the Iranian Government by the British and Soviet Governments that they have no designs on the independence or territorial integrity of Iran. In view of the long-standing friendship between our two countries, my Government has already sought information from the British and Soviet Governments as to their immediate as well as long-range plans and intentions in Iran, and has suggested to them the advisability of a public statement to all free peoples reiterating the assurances already given to Your Majesty’s Government.

You are requested to discuss this matter further with the Foreign Office as early as practicable in the light of the President’s message to the Shah quoted in part above and you should express the hope that sympathetic consideration may be given to our suggestion regarding the advisability of a public statement to all free peoples reiterating the assurances already given to the Government of the Shall by the British and Soviet Governments. Please also state that we desire to be kept informed of developments in the matter.

A communication similar to the foregoing is being sent to the Soviet Government.

HULL


The Pittsburgh Press (September 4, 1941)

IRAN MAY BAN AXIS LEGATIONS

London, Sept. 4 –
Authoritative quarters, pointing out that negotiations are still continuing, said yesterday that Anglo-Soviet peace terms with Iran may include a provision for expulsion or strict limitation of legations representing countries under German control.

British and Russian troops marched into Iran Aug. 25 because of the government’s refusal to expel German “tourists.”

It was said that instructions to Sir Reader Bullard, British Minister to Tehran, “include that in the future not only the German legation in Iran but the legations of other powers now under German control” be placed in such a position that there need be no grounds for apprehension regarding their activities.

CBS in New York said it heard the British radio broadcast a German-language news program yesterday that said:

The government of Iran has accepted the conditions of the Allies.

U.S. Department of State (September 5, 1941)

740.0011 European War 1939/14730: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, September 4, 1941 — 8 a.m.
[Received September 5 — 3 p.m.]

137.

The British Minister informs me he has received his instructions as to expulsion of Germans but since his Russian colleague has not they cannot yet be divulged. He told me in strict confidence however that the matter has taken a more serious turn since British terms were presented August 30 and that it now appears other Axis nationals will be expelled and that the German, Italian, Bulgarian and perhaps other Legations will have to leave Iran. He intimated this change last night to Foreign Minister who was of the opinion that the entire Cabinet might resign rather than submit thereto.

In my opinion this drastic change is the result of the complications brought on by the offer of asylum by the Turks (see my No. 130) and the high-handed attitude the Germans in Tehran have assumed since their first sigh of relief that their necks were temporarily safe from the dreaded Russians.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14729: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State

London, September 5, 1941 — 8 p.m.
[Received September 5 — 5:40 p.m.]

4102.

[Your] 3563 September 4, 2 p.m., has been taken up with Sir Horace Seymour at the Foreign Office and has been brought to Mr. Eden’s personal attention. Seymour has promised a reply as soon as possible. Seymour said that Sir R. Bullard had been instructed to keep Mr. Dreyfus fully informed of all negotiations and moves at Tehran. He said that they are faced with a serious practical difficulty at the moment as those Germans whom they particularly desire to get out of Iran have taken refuge in the German city and country Legations — about 700 altogether. The Shah is endeavoring to force their consent for the return of these Germans to Germany. The British on the other hand are determined to decide themselves which ones may be allowed to return to Germany and Seymour says that there are some of them whom they would not under any circumstances permit to return.

Mr. Eden in a speech at Coventry last Saturday in which he made a general survey of the present war position reinforced the statement he had previously given out regarding British action in Iran. He said:

…meanwhile let me make plain once again our general attitude. We have no territorial claims against Iran. We covet no square inch of Iranian territory. We have no design nor have our Russian allies any design to annex any part of the areas which our forces have now occupied. His Majesty’s Government and the Soviet Government have repeatedly assured the Iranian Government of their determination to respect the political independence and the territorial integrity of Iran. We have repeated that pledge to the Government of our ally Turkey and to the Governments of neighboring states. That pledge stands. We shall as soon as military conditions permit withdraw our forces from Iranian territory.

Full text of this speech has been forwarded by air mail.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/14641: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey

Washington, September 5, 1941 — 8 p.m.

155.

The following is the text of a telegram sent by the President on September 2, 1941, to the Shah of Iran in response to a message received from the latter:

[Here follows text]

You are requested to furnish the Foreign Office informally with a copy of the foregoing message for the confidential information of the Turkish Government.

With reference to the penultimate paragraph of the President’s message to the Shah, you should inform the Foreign Office that our representatives at London and Moscow were instructed on September 4 to express to the British and Soviet Governments respectively the hope of this Government that sympathetic consideration will be given to the suggestion previously made regarding the advisability of a public statement to all free peoples reiterating the assurances already given to the Iranian Government by the British and Soviet Governments.

HULL

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The Pittsburgh Press (September 5, 1941)

NAZIS STYMIED, RED GENERAL IN IRAN SAYS
By Henry T. Gorrell, United Press staff writer_

With the Red Army at Qazvin, Iran, Sept. 3 – (delayed)
Russia has broken the German blitzkrieg and Russia and Britain by their action in Iran have paralyzed aggressive German plans for the Near East, General Max Sinenko, commanding the Red Army in northern Iran, said today.

The Germans relied on lightning war tactics to take important point such as Odessa, Leningrad and Moscow, in six weeks, General Sinenko said.

He continued:

The six weeks have passed. They have not accomplished their objectives.

General Sinenko pounded his fist on the table in his simple headquarters, a room which contained a single bed with a red comforter, and barked emphatically. He spoke through an interpreter.

In discussing the effect of the swift, efficient Russian and British march into Iran, crowned by success when the Iranian government agreed to negotiate a war-long agreement which will leave the Allies in control of strategically important areas, the General’s voice was hard.

But during most of our talk, his voice was soft, in contrast to his rugged peasant face.

I had heard from officers here that when the Russians approached the Turkish frontier in their march down into Iran, they noticed considerable troop activity on the Turkish side. Officers had said also that the Turks were digging trenches and strengthening fortifications.

When I asked General Sinenko about this, he merely smiled, declining to reply directly.

I asked then about reports I had heard of minor unpleasantness in connection with the arrival of the Russians on the Iranian side of the Turkish frontier. A Russian officer at the spot told me that Turks shook their fists at the Russians.

The General said:

The Turkish attitude has been quite correct. There have been no incidents.

I ran a gantlet of steel-helmeted, almost motionless Russian guards to reach the general’s headquarters room, in company with a member of the Russian embassy staff at Tehran.

In illustration of the informality of the Russian army as regards the niceties of military protocol, the attaché book a seat beside the general and kept his brown felt hat on for several minutes after our arrival.

The attaché frequently joined in the exchange.

As we talked, orderlies and uniformed commissars stomped into the room at intervals without ceremony and handed the general messages.

General Sinenko appeared to be about 45. His graying hair is close cropped. He wore a dust-stained dark gray uniform. His rank was indicated only by the four oblong red tabs at erach collar point and one large and two small gold chevrons on each sleeve cuff.


Tehran, Iran, Sept. 5 –
More than 700 Germans caught in Tehran by the Anglo-Russian occupation were bivouacked today at the Nazi legation which they had converted into an armed camp with provisions for a siege if one should prove necessary. One source said the Germans had all needed supplies for a motorcade exit if that proved feasible.

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U.S. Department of State (September 6, 1941)

740.0011 European War 1939/14752: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, September 5, 1941 — 8 p.m.
[Received September 6 — 11:07 a.m.]

138.

The British and Russian notes on the expulsion of Axis nationals were delivered to the Iranian Government at noon today. As indicated in my No. 137 they are more severe than the original demands and will require the expulsion of the German, Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Romanian colonies. The private citizens will be required to proceed to Ahvaz to await transportation to Indoid [India?] for internment. The Legations of these countries will also be required to leave Iran. In addition the Russians are demanding that certain named persons are turned over to them. The British reply to other Iranian suggestions regarding terms is expected from London tomorrow.

The Foreign Minister is appealing to the British to grant safe conduct to Turkey en route to Germany for the women and children and to intern the men of military age near Shiraz under British control. He urges this concession because he feels the Government is so weak that it could not survive the bad effects the Allied action would have on public opinion. The British Minister is however standing firm because he was reprimanded by London for suggesting more liberal terms at the time of the incident referred to in my 130.

The Foreign Minister who has just left the Legation sees no ray of hope for the Government or the people. He feels that the Cabinet will have to resign, that the situation will become chaotic, and he even fears Tehran may be occupied by Allied troops.

The Government is, as Foreign Minister indicates, in a precarious position. The Shah’s prestige sinks ever lower and the tide has so turned against him that his disappearance from the scene is probable.

Conditions in Tehran are quiet with martial law and curfew at 9 p.m. continuing.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14763: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 6, 1941 — 2 p.m.
[Received 5:55 p.m.]

1632.

Inasmuch as Dekanozov was placed in charge of Near Eastern affairs upon his return from Berlin, and as I understand he reports directly to Stalin, I conveyed to him yesterday the substance of the Department’s telegram under reference and expressed the hope that sympathetic consideration would be given the suggestion regarding the advisability of a public statement to all free peoples, reiterating the assurances already given to the Government of the Shah by the Soviet and British Governments. I also expressed a desire that my Government be kept informed of developments in the matter and requested him to inform me of the present position.

Dekanozov, who appeared to be anxious to place the Soviet position before me in the most favorable light, discussed the matter with complete frankness.

He commenced with an outline of the Soviet position which in effect constituted a summary of the note of August 25, from the Soviet Government, to the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, adding that his Government had over a considerable period of time endeavored to persuade the Shah of the dangers inherent in the presence of a large number of German agents in Iran, and had requested him to take the necessary steps to put an end to the work of these agents as much to protect the interests of Iran as those of the Soviet Union. He stated that the Soviet Government had never been able to extract a satisfactory or reassuring response and that the Iranian Government had stubbornly refused to expel the German agents. He said that it was not until then that the Soviet and British Governments had found it necessary to take positive action.

Dekanozov then stated that the present position is “not as dangerous as before,” but that he could not say that all pending questions could be settled without difficulty. He gave “merely as an example” of some of the present difficulties the fact that several Iranian “officer aviators” had refused to obey orders of the Iranian Government not to resist the Soviet and British troops and had bombed Tehran. He expressed the opinion that Iran was “not yet peaceful enough” to permit of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and that a final solution “was not simple.” He added that he thought the area that must be occupied would “not be so big — along the frontier” and that the Soviet Government thought it necessary for the time being to keep its troops in the country but that this would not affect the sovereignty or independence of Iran and that he was convinced a solution could eventually be found. He said it is “now more and more clear” that danger from German agents remains, not necessarily only from agents of German nationality who may now be expelled by the Iranian Government but from agents in the employ of the German Government who may be of other than German nationality.

With respect to the Department’s suggestion regarding a public statement, Dekanozov referred to the closing paragraph of the Soviet Government’s note of August 25 to the Iranian Ambassador and pointed out that the note had received the widest possible publicity. He said in consequence it should not be regarded as would be an unpublished diplomatic document and that through it the Soviet Government had put its assurances regarding the territorial integrity and national independence of Iran before the world. He said that in his opinion a reiteration of the Soviet Government’s position so soon after the publication of the note affirming its intentions might be misunderstood, but that he would take the suggestion under advisement and discuss it with his Government. In this connection he added that the work of the German agents “cannot be undone at once” and that he hoped the American Government would understand that, since it had been found necessary to send Soviet troops into Iran, it would not be possible to withdraw them “at once”. At this point he repeated that he thought it was “too soon” to reaffirm the Soviet Government’s assurances of eventual withdrawal but added “the assurances that were given in the note will be kept scrupulously”. At the close of our talk he again expressed the hope that the American Government understood the position of the Soviet Government, and its ultimate intentions as expressed in the note to the Iranian Ambassador Zahiniu [Sa’ed].

STEINHARDT

U.S. Department of State (September 7, 1941)

740.0011 European War 1939/14764: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 7, 1941 — 5 p.m.
[Received 7:45 p.m.]

1638.

For the President, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary.

The Iranian Ambassador called on me yesterday evening and gave me the following information concerning the status of the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian negotiations.

Recent notes of the Soviet and British Governments to the Iranian Government specify the area of Iranian territory to be occupied by their respective troops and require the expulsion of the Germans as well as an undertaking by the Iranian Government to facilitate railroad transportation through Iran.

The territory which it is proposed shall be occupied by Soviet troops is as follows: an area including all of Iranian Azerbaijan from Ouchaia[?] on the Turkish-Iranian frontier passing through Rezaiyeh, Haidarabad, Miandoab, Zenjan, Qazvin and Amul to a point on the Caspian Sea and including Meshed at which place the Soviets desire to station 12,000 troops and 50 planes.

The area which it is proposed shall be occupied by British troops is to include Khanaqin, Kaszy, Qasr-i-Shirin, and Kermanshah including the Port of Dilan on the Persian Gulf.

The Soviet advance has been stopped at Qazvin and the British advance at Hamadan.

In order to avoid even the appearance of any infringement of Iranian sovereignty, the Soviet and British Governments will not insist on the departure of the German and Italian diplomatic missions.

The Ambassador stated that he does not anticipate any difficulty with respect to the demand for the expulsion of the Germans or the facilitating of railroad traffic as the former would be completed “within a week” and the latter was agreeable to the Iranian Government. In so far as concerns the area which Britain proposes be occupied by its troops, he said it appeared to be reasonable as it was obviously limited to the protection of the oil fields and the facilitating of railroad transportation, in addition to which the Iranian Government does not fear the British occupation. In consequence, he was satisfied that his Government would have no objection to the acceptance of the terms of the British note.

Insofar as concerns the area proposed to be occupied by Soviet troops, however, he said that it is “five times great” as that proposed to be occupied by the British and constitutes an unreasonably large area of occupation. He added that as the Iranian Government fears the Soviet Union and communism and is by no means persuaded that the Soviet Government will ultimately withdraw its forces, he is seriously concerned lest the Shah refuse to accept the Soviet proposal. The Ambassador then said that he is endeavoring to persuade the Soviet Government to reduce the area which it proposes to occupy. Should the negotiations threaten to break down, he said he was considering returning immediately to Tehran, as he believed he could persuade the Shah to accept the Soviet and British proposals subject to modification along the lines described above.

In connection with the possibility that it might be necessary for him to proceed to Tehran to discuss the matter with the Shah he said he was anxious not to be absent from Moscow during the Anglo-American-Soviet conference and that he would appreciate being informed as to whether the conference was imminent. As I understand that our Government is desirous of a speedy and satisfactory settlement of the Iranian matter and as I believe that the presence in Tehran of the Ambassador and his personal presentation to the Shah of his point of view might effectively contribute to that end, I felt justified in saying to him that if, as he had stated, he contemplated an absence from Moscow of only about 2 weeks, I did not think the Anglo-American-Soviet conference would begin within that time.

STEINHARDT

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The Pittsburgh Press (September 7, 1941)

TWO POINTS HOLD UP NEGOTIATIONS IN IRAN

London, Sept. 6 –
Anglo-Soviet negotiations with Iran are being speeded up and it is expected that they will be concluded satisfactorily within a week.

Two principal points remain to be settled. One is Iran’s request for qualifications of the zones which British and Russian troops are to occupy. The other is the fate of the German legation staff and a number of German nationals, totaling 700, who have sought refuge in the legation at Tehran.

One report states that the Germans are armed and have threatened to fight arrest.

Normally, the British would permit the German diplomats to depart, but there is a question as to the number who are actually diplomats. Also the Germans now hold Sir Lancelot Oliphant, British Ambassador in France, and 55 British consuls.

If the British decided not to release the Germans in Iran, it might subsequently be possible to arrange an exchange.

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U.S. Department of State (September 8, 1941)

740.0011 European War 1939/14808: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State

Tehran, September 7, 1941 — 11 a.m.
[Received September 8 — 5:15 p.m.]

140.

With reference to my No. 138, the British Minister has informed me of the following developments:

  1. Because of Russian insistence the Bulgarians will be allowed to remain in Iran;

  2. The Russians have refused the Iranian request for alteration of their occupied zone but the British have approved the stationing of Iranian troops in Dezful and Khorramabad;

  3. The Foreign Minister still urges a plan for the internment of Axis nationals at Shiraz under British-Iranian control and at Meshed under Russian-Iranian control. The British Minister has telegraphed this proposal to London at the risk of further reprimand.

DREYFUS

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